IMPERIAL LINES, INDIGENOUS LANDS: TRANSFORMING TERRITORIALITIES OF THE RÍO DE LA PLATA, 1680-1805

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ABSTRACT

JEFFREY ALAN ERBIG JR.: Imperial Lines, Indigenous Lands: Transforming Territorialities of the Río de la Plata, 1680-1805
(Under the direction of Kathryn Burns)

In the 1750s, and again in the 1780s, Portugal and Spain commissioned mapping expeditions to draw a border between Brazil and Spanish South America. The two Iberian courts hoped to resolve long-standing disputes over territorial possession through the latest cartographic technologies, yet their proposed division ran through lands controlled by autonomous indigenous communities. This dissertation explores the relationship between the subsequent mapping expeditions and interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata region—Uruguay, northeastern Argentina, and the far south of Brazil.

Recent work on the history of cartography shows that maps were powerful tools of imperial governance, while scholarship on interethnic borderlands in the Americas suggests that imperial borderlines had little to no impact on native peoples until the nineteenth century. I contribute to this discussion by arguing that mapped lines were significant in certain eighteenth-century borderlands, but mainly because native peoples appropriated them for their own purposes. I draw upon manuscript materials from twenty-six archives in seven countries, and use Geographic Information Systems (GIS), to demonstrate the centrality of independent indigenous communities to the entire bordermaking process.

At the time of the mapping expeditions, native peoples known as Charrúas and Minuanes were the principal arbiters of the Río de la Plata’s rural interior, restricting Iberian and Jesuit-Guaraní settlers to its perimeter. Given their limited territorial reach, Portuguese and Spanish diplomats turned to mapmaking as a means to claim native lands without having to claim native peoples as vassals. The mapping expeditions
transformed imperial interethnic policies and engendered responses from Charrúas and Minuanes, who exploited Iberian bordermaking to expand kinship ties, establish commercial networks, and gain refuge in times of duress. These shifting territorial dynamics enabled some communities and caciques to expand their networks of power, while exposing others to capture and dislocation. Those who had prospered through the development of an operative borderline nonetheless found themselves debilitated when it began to dissolve in the early nineteenth century.
To Sari and my family.

And to the memories of Paul Lafaire and Robert Philip Erbig II.
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<td>Archivo General de Indias</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Seen from an Amerindian perspective the world, more often than not, looks like coexisting territories within the same space. Such a perspective is quite different from the Spanish (and European) one, in which either there is not such a thing as coexisting territorialities [or], if there is, Amerindian cosmology and cosmography were reduced to the Christian ones. – Walter Mignolo

This colonial perspective still dominates our way of imagining the space we inhabit….The dehistoricization of the territory and its dehumanization leave an imprint in our cognitive format, in our culture, and in our episteme. – Gustavo Verdesio

On January 13, 1750, Portuguese and Spanish diplomats reached an ambitious agreement in Madrid. More than a century removed from the disunion of their two crowns, they sought to create a definitive division of their South American territories. Their aim was to resolve the conflicting claims to territorial possession that had resulted from years of overlapping settlement and a litany of interimperial accords. The Treaty of Madrid diverged from earlier agreements, as its architects sought to establish an exclusionary borderline that would not only eliminate ambiguous and contingent claims to territorial possession but establish exclusive rights for each crown over contiguous spaces on its side of the line. Furthermore, interlocutors on both sides aspired to avoid further conflicts by utilizing the latest mapping technologies to measure and represent the borderline with exactitude. For this reason, they commissioned joint mapping expeditions to traverse the continent from the Caribbean coast in the north, through the

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3 I differentiate the concepts of possession (claims over land) and sovereignty (claims over subjects) in order to demonstrate the interplay between them. Prior to the invention of an interimperial divide, a sovereign’s claim to territorial possession derived from ownership of lands belonging to their subjects; afterward, claims to sovereignty over imperial subjects derived from their occupation of lands possessed by a given crown.
Amazon and the Pantanal, to the Atlantic coast in the southeast. These expeditions included parallel Portuguese and Spanish teams of trained cosmographers, astronomers, engineers, and geographers, supported by hundreds of laborers, who modified and added precision to the general line agreed upon by the courts. Their principal task was to draft and cosign maps at various scales that would serve as legal documents for both the royal courts and local officials as they scrambled to populate, administer, and exploit the resources of the continental interior.

The Treaty of Madrid and its execution, while ostensibly bilateral endeavors, were nonetheless contingent upon the activities of independent indigenous communities throughout the continent. The perpetuity of conflicting imperial claims was due in part to inability of either Iberian crown to establish footholds in lands distant from the continental coast or the fragile corridors that ran through parts of the interior. The territories over which they sought legal possession were contested spaces – what most scholars call “borderlands” – where native peoples limited the actions of imperial agents. Moreover, as territorial possession often derived from claiming native peoples as vassals, indigenous autonomy frequently belied imperial claims. The treaty was therefore an attempt to establish a priori territorial possession through geographic representation, thereby circumventing the dynamism and contingency of local

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relations. As demarcation teams crisscrossed the continent, however, they confronted the complexities of local rivalries, power relations, knowledge, and territorial claims. They sought to demonstrate imperial possession through their maps and diaries, yet depended upon indigenous agents for geographic information, safe passage, guidance, and sustenance. Native responses varied, as some individuals and communities shared information, traded cattle and captives, guided the expeditions, and corrected imprecision in their guidemaps, while others charged tribute or openly attacked the interlopers. The southernmost demarcation teams even incited a three-year uprising by Guaraní mission dwellers and neighboring native communities.

The Madrid demarcations concluded in 1759, but their results were short-lived as the Treaty of El Pardo annulled them two years later. They nonetheless served as a precedent and model for a later peace accord, signed in San Ildefonso in 1777. Here again, the Iberian crowns commissioned joint mapping expeditions to determine and map a detailed borderline. These demarcators recounted experiences similar to those of their antecessors, and when taken together, these mapping endeavors constituted a significant turning point in imperial logics and strategies in claiming possession of ultramarine territories. For the first time, jointly mapped borderlines served as the preeminent determinants of territorial possession, superseding or limiting the applicability of other avenues towards making claims, such as occupation, trade, or vassalage. Furthermore, these expeditions coincided with broader shifts in imperial governance, often referred to as the Bourbon (Spain) and Pombaline (Portugal) reforms, as administrators on both sides of the

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divide sought to incorporate indigenous peoples as imperial subjects, exploit new resources, and create efficient structures of tax and trade within their dominions.  

What is less clear is whether mapmaking and subsequent attempts to impose mapped lines upon physical lands had any tangible impact upon interethnic relations in the areas where the border ran. Did the declaration and performance of these imaginary spatial frames engender any meaningful changes? If so, what difference did the demarcations make for independent native peoples? How could a border come into being in lands controlled by people who did not share that spatial vision? The answers to such questions are important not only to the ways in which we conceptualize mapmaking, but to the very nature of interethnic relations in borderland spaces. I argue that the mapping of borderlines had the potential to dramatically restructure interethnic relations by incentivizing and making possible new territorial formations, and that these changes required the participation of autonomous native peoples. While indigenous communities surely did not imagine borderlines from the panoramic perspective of royal mapmakers, they nonetheless recognized the changing territorial practices – settlement patterns, trade routes, assertions of lordship – of their imperial counterparts, and sought to utilize them to their advantage. As a result, indigenous and imperial territorialities came to coexist in ways that simultaneously resembled a borderline and, at least temporarily, reinforced the authority of native communities.

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9 The use of “territoriality” here follows David Delaney, who defines it as “an aspect of how humans as embodied beings organize themselves with respect to the social and material world” in order to identify the historical production of territories as “human social creations” that “reflect and incorporate features of the social order that creates them.” Territoriality is thus the interplay
This assessment of the interplay between mapped lines and interethnic relations builds upon two pillars of interdisciplinary research: the history of cartography and borderlands studies. In recent decades, historical sensibilities regarding cartographic practices have changed significantly. Scholars are increasingly aware that imperial maps “exercise[d], and [were] instruments of, power.”¹⁰ As mapmaking was a means to “discursively appropriate space,” the selective and subjective representation of human, political, and physical geography both “reflected and reinforced the material transformations of New World landscapes.”¹¹

With this conceptual outlook, historians have adopted two principal strategies to situate mapmaking within broader political, social, and epistemological trends in colonial Latin America. The first has been to focus on maps as representational forms, which served as evidence of broader territorial processes or conscious efforts to highlight or conceal certain geographical information. Numerous works have thus analyzed the content and form of maps in order to identify changing methods of measurement and representation, political motives, or prescriptive territorial claims.¹² This approach has also enabled scholars to identify between territorial imaginations and territorial practices. David Delaney, *Territory: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 10–12.


indigenous territorial perspectives by reading imperial maps for native signs, names, and locations or by expanding traditional definitions of “maps” to include spatial representations drawn by native peoples themselves. The second strategy has been to consider the process of mapmaking, from the collection of information to a map’s final form. Scholars have pointed to the relationships between mapmakers, informants, administrators, and engravers in order to assess their experiences and the cartographic materials that they eventually produced. Here too, several works point to the active participation of native individuals in the production of imperial or hybridized “geographical imaginations.”

These studies of cartography in colonial Latin America have collectively demonstrated the subjectivities of maps and have offered new and useful techniques for utilizing visual sources to understand territorial practices. The underlying premise of the power of maps nonetheless requires further interrogation. Despite the common historiographical assumption that mapmaking was a means to effect territorial change, few works demonstrate the mechanisms whereby this occurred materially. As a result, narratives of imperial mapmaking tend to assume the realization, however limited, of such territorial forms,


while those of native mapmaking demonstrate the “colonization of literacy,” or the gradual waning of indigenous territorial representations and practices.\textsuperscript{15} Accepting maps as opaque indicators of territorial practices and particular mapping conventions as patently European necessarily leads to such conclusions, as maps attributed to native peoples were generally restricted to Mesoamerica and the Andes during the sixteenth century. Additionally, as most revisionist histories of cartography derive from theories of hegemonic power relations, they tend to position indigenous peoples as subalterns or imperial subjects whose territorial forms were challenged by European mapmaking.\textsuperscript{16} Such power dynamics were not omnipresent, and the limited and negotiated nature of imperial authority in the early Americas renders claims to the impact of mapmaking more tenuous than commonly imagined.

Skepticism toward the material impact of mapping is perhaps no more evident than in studies of interethnic borderlands between imperial agents and independent native peoples. Whereas historians of cartography have argued for the inherent power of maps as tools of empire, borderlands studies have tended to question the impact of mapped borders in such spaces. Reacting against traditional narratives that imagined imperial limits (borderlines) and intercultural frontiers (borderlands) as synonymous, scholars have since dismissed mapped lines as strictly discursive “expressions of [imperial] desire,” distinguishable

\textsuperscript{15} Mignolo, \textit{The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization}, 309.

from the on-the-ground “realities” of borderland regions. Studies of mapped borderlines are almost entirely restricted to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as scholars have tacitly accepted a temporal distinction between “borderlands” (imperial) and “bordered lands” (national), thus synchronizing the creation of American borders with similar mapping projects in South and Southeast Asia. In eschewing borderlines as meaningful concepts, most contemporary scholarship stresses the permeability of borderland spaces, employing such terms as “zones/spaces of interaction,” “contact zones,” “permeable frontiers.” Others have preferred frames such as “middle ground,” “contested ground/spaces,” or “native ground” to highlight disputed or indigenous sovereignty, while still others have emphasized the expansion of native power or the construction of ethnic identities by employing terms such as “Comanchería” or “Araucanía” to define their regions of study.


These concepts have been necessary correctives to the rigid binaries of earlier studies, as they emphasize collaboration, exchange, kinship, and contested authority. They highlight the limits of imperial power and the frequent indistinguishability of lines between imperial and indigenous agents. At the same time, they underestimate the significance of territorial organization to analysis of interethnic relations. While some scholars have identified dialectics between inhabitants of interethnic borderlands and the natural environment, developing such concepts as “social ecology” or “ecological zones,” the potential impact of mapped lines has been altogether absent from recent borderlands studies. This reluctance to grant any historical efficacy to “artificial” lines is likely grounded in the belief that to acknowledge borderlines as significant would be to imply the consolidation of imperial sovereignty and native dispossession, or conversely, to dismiss native sovereignty and autonomy. If borderlines as territorial objectives derived from European epistemologies and ideals of governance, then they must not have been meaningful in areas that European empires did not effectively control. This tendency is nonetheless problematic, given the centrality of bordermaking — drawing lines on a map and then attempting to replicate them on the ground — to eighteenth-century Iberian territorial strategies in American borderlands. It also conceals the participation of native peoples in the production of these ostensibly European territorial


22 For a historiographical overview on studies of boundary disputes in Latin America, see: Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession*, 2–6.

arrangements. Lastly, it eschews a valuable lens of comparison between different regions, as mapped lines did not exist in all interethnic borderlands and often accounted for local peculiarities.

The present study proposes a third way of imagining mapped borderlines in the contested spaces of American borderlands before the nineteenth century. Rather than perceiving borders as powerful imperial arrangements imposed upon native lands or as powerless representations restricted to the worlds of lettered elites, I suggest that in some instances mapping borderlines did alter regional territorialities, but that such transformations necessarily depended upon the participation of independent indigenous communities. This occurred in two ways – by altering patterns of imperial action and by producing new possibilities for native peoples near the imaginary line. In the case of the Madrid and San Ildefonso lines, the demarcations dramatically altered the ways in which local imperial agents imagined regional space. They offered a new legal apparatus that incentivized and made possible the issuance of land titles in previously disputed lands, and led administrators to engage independent native peoples as if they were imperial subjects. At the same time, the continued dominance of native peoples over borderland spaces required that imperial agents solicit their support in order to make the borderline operative or, alternatively, to access the other side. Heightened imperial need in borderland spaces – to stop contraband, to apprehend unauthorized travelers, or to foil enemy incursions, for example – altered the opportunities available to native leaders and their communities, and for many it initially served as a means to expand their kinship, tributary, or commercial networks. While they undoubtedly did not share the bird’s-eye perspective of most imperial maps, they were conscious of and able to exploit the new patterns of movement of imperial agents and resources in the region. Given the heterogeneity and locality of indigenous communities, responses ranged from outright rejection of the presence of imperial agents to strategic collaboration in the development of new borderline territorialities. In nearly all cases, however, native responses served to reinforce borderlines as meaningful, if contested and incomplete, territorial arrangements.
To imagine borderland spaces in this way requires alternatives to the categories of resistance or accommodation that tend to frame debates on native agency and imperial hegemonic power. Native peoples did not simply adapt to Iberian efforts; they altered the very structures of imperial governance, making bordermaking necessary and then transforming the meaning and form of mapped lines. Mapping was a response to the short territorial reach of imperial power and it alone did not produce borderlines. Rather, the drawing of lines was a declaration to which a variety of actors responded, and the collective responses of such people transformed imaginary lines into meaningful patterns of territorial movement and engagement. The maps generated by the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcations encoded the world and altered the ways in which imperial agents imagined and engaged it, engendering certain bordermaking practices – the founding of forts, strategic settlements, new contours of pact-making, and new commercial demands, to name a few. Native peoples in borderland spaces did not respond to visual documents, but rather to these new patterns of spatial engagement, mediating such efforts through incorporation, rejection, and transformation all at the same time. They recognized the new territorial tendencies and needs of their multiple imperial counterparts and, when possible, leveraged them to their advantage.

The eventual realization of borders as operative, if limited, territorial arrangements did not imply the vanquishing of native sovereignty, as multiple means of imagining territory, possession, and authority coexisted. The flood of migrants to populate or enforce the newly declared limits of imperial dominions simultaneously signified the realization of a new territorial arrangement (for imperial agents) and the


incorporation of new kin, tributaries, or allies (for native peoples). Seemingly contradictory territorialities were able to operate at the same time, as the divergent territorial imaginations both shaped patterns of actions and the interpretations of their meaning. In fact, it was not the production of borderlines, but instead their dissolution that undermined native authority in some instances. As many local communities hitched their livelihood to their ability to mediate borderline territorialities, the rupture of such arrangements produced hostile, unpredictable, and ultimately uninhabitable worlds.

In addition to shaping patterns of eighteenth-century movement and interaction, the Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping expeditions created discursive precedents that continue to shape the geographical imaginations of regional historiographies. Through compiling and ordering earlier accounts, and by producing voluminous natural histories and ethnographies, they generated a vast source base that continues to frame historical accounts. In reading against the ethnographic grains of such sources, scholars often overlook the origins of the geographic perspectives that they promulgate. The principal result has been to conceal the historical processes whereby such a spatial order developed, as both the acceptance of borders as irresistible imperial impositions and the rejection of borders as meaningless discourse present space as a neutral stage of historical action. By assessing the dynamic production of space, and the interplay between territorial imaginations and territorial action, the significance of mapmaking in interethnic borderlands comes into sharper relief.26

A Regional Approach

In order to assess the relationship between imperial mapmaking and interethnic relations, I focus on the southernmost portion of the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcation efforts, an area that corresponds with present-day Uruguay, northeastern Argentina, and the far south of Brazil. During the sixteenth and much of the seventeenth centuries, the region was a backwater for Iberian endeavors, but in 1680, when a Portuguese expedition from Rio de Janeiro founded a small settlement – Colônia do Sacramento – along the mouth of the Río de la Plata estuary, it was thrust into the center of global juridical disputes.27 Over the course of the next seventy years, the two Iberian courts signed four separate treaties to arbitrate access to the area, while racing to establish settlements to fortify their claims. This corner of South America dominated deliberations in both Madrid and San Ildefonso, as half of the treaties’ articles regarding possession of specific lands referred to it: six of thirteen for the former and six of eleven for the latter.28 It was here, too, that the demarcation line varied most widely from treaty to treaty, a product of continued native control. Furthermore, the region is an instructive case in which historiographical imaginations of eighteenth-century territorialities continue to impede studies of indigenous pasts. Most scholarship casts the area primarily as an interimperial borderland where Spain and Portugal jockeyed for possession and the principal indigenous actors were missionized Guaraní-speakers, yet a closer analysis of territorial dynamics reveals that it was primarily an interethnic space where independent native peoples played central roles.29

27 Before 1680, the principal Spanish settlements – Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Corrientes – were extensions of riverine and overland trade routes that stretched from Peru and Paraguay and were restricted to the western portion of the region. Missionary endeavors in the 1620s and 1630s resulted in a short-lived Jesuit and Franciscan presence in the north and southeast as well.

28 Other articles defined borderland practices, rather than specifying the borderline’s location.

29 References to “Spain” or “Spanish” actors and “Portugal” or “Portuguese” actors are both for convention and an effort to focus on the complexities of native peoples. As has been shown elsewhere, both of these “polycentric monarchies” were a tapestry of localities and local loyalties frequently trumped national allegiance. Pedro Cardim et al., eds., *Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).
Despite the scores of geographical texts produced on the region during the eighteenth century, its jurisdic- 
tional ambiguity left it with no singular name or frame. Portuguese-language texts employed such terms as the Capitania de El Rey or the Continente do Rio Grande, while Spanish-language sources tended to identify the region as the “Other Coast” (“Otra Banda”) of the Río de la Plata, the Río Paraguay, or, later, the Río Uruguay, opposite their own settlements. Other common frames, such as the “Banda Oriental,” more closely represent retrospective nationalist territorial imaginations than discernible territorialities of the eighteenth century and before.30 The instability and subjective framings of these terms make them untenable for a discussion of regional dynamics that does not privilege imperial territorial perspectives. I therefore choose instead to frame the region according to the territorial reach of its independent indigenous communities. Still, to define the region according to the principal ethnic identifiers associated with it—Charrúa and Minuán—would be to accept such ethnonyms as meaningful for the people to whom they referred and to depict them as centralized polities. “Charruaría” or “Minuanía” are thus equally problematic names. I instead use the general term “Río de la Plata,” borrowing the name of the region’s principal watershed. This term possesses its own ambiguities—it has been used in other places to refer to the territorial limits of the homonymous Spanish viceroyalty or the non-Chilean Southern Cone—but nonetheless allows for an analysis of competing territorialities without privileging one or another.31


31 While the present study employs the “Río de la Plata” as a regional frame in order to assess changing territorial perspectives and practices, it is important to avoid fetishizing this space or scale. Any regional definition presents the risk of occluding flows and distant connections, as well as imagining hierarchical spatial scales in which power flows from small (global, continental) to large scale (regional, local), and large scales are seen as more real, tangible, or material. For a deeper discussion on the issue, see: Sallie A. Marston, John P. Jones III and Keith Woodward, “Human Geography Without Scale,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30, no. 4 (2005); Arturo Escobar, “The ‘Ontological Turn’ in Social Theory: A Commentary on ‘Human Geography Without Scale,’” by Sallie Marston, John Paul Jones II and Keith Woodward,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 32, no. 1 (2007).
Interimperial disputes over territorial possession in the Río de la Plata were mapped onto a complex interethnic landscape. While Portuguese, Spanish, and Jesuit-Guaraní authorities made juridical claims to regional lands, independent indigenous communities dominated the countryside through most of the eighteenth century. Organized into local and itinerant encampments (tolderías) of approximately fifty to one hundred inhabitants, autonomous native peoples limited imperial and missionary actions. Imperial and ecclesiastical writers employed a number of ethnonyms to name their indigenous counterparts – along with “Charrúas” and “Minuanes,” they mentioned “Bohanes,” “Guenoas,” “Machados,” “Martidanes,” “Yaros,” and others – although the use of such terms was uneven, varied according to locality, and changed over time. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that such terms or arrangements were meaningful to the peoples to whom they referred, and no evidence appears to exist of anyone ever self-identifying in this way. Given the ambiguity of ethnic categories, as well as the heterogeneity, local patterns of authority, and conflict between communities, I utilize the term toldería as the principal means of identification, and where possible the names of individual caciques, treating ethnonyms as imperial modifiers rather than native identifiers. I most often discuss “Minuán tolderías” or “tolderías identified as Minuán,” rather than “Minuanes,” as a way to highlight the locality of territorial circumstances, authority, and processes of decision-making without dismissing the potential, if opaque, meaning of ethnonyms. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the broad territorial networks of kinship, tribute, and allegiance that certain caciques were able to establish, and the overall authority that tolderías exercised over the region, amidst their differences and distinctions.

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Geographical Imaginations and Ethnohistory in the Río de la Plata

A brief survey of the historiography of the region is instructive, as territorial assumptions have dramatically shaped narratives of indigenous pasts. Historians generally mark 1831 as an end date for tolderías in the Río de la Plata. In this year, republican forces of the newly independent republic of Uruguay orchestrated an ambush of a number of Charrúa communities near the Río Salsipuedes, in the north of the country. For most historians, the “Salsipuedes Massacre” (“Matanza de Salsipuedes”) was both a final episode in a decades-long genocidal campaign that began during the second half of the eighteenth century and the moment in which tolderías ceased to be active historical agents. Thereafter, scholars relegated independent indigenous communities to subordinate roles in an unfolding narrative of creole territorial advancement.

Both historical and fictional accounts focused primarily on the realization and consolidation of national territories, discursively erasing non-sedentary peoples. Travelers to the region reiterated this general trope of indigenous disappearance either by recounting the elimination of mobile native peoples or by explaining that they simply had left the region, generally in a westward migration across the Río Paraná to the Chaco. During these years, the most extensive descriptions of tolderías were published transcriptions

33 Key historical texts of this moment included: Sota, Juan Manuel de la, Historia del Territorio Oriental del Uruguay Tomo I (Montevideo: Ministerio de la Instrucción Pública y Previsión Social, 1965); Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, 2a ed Tomo II (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Bonaerense, 1856); Francisco Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay Tomo Segundo (Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 1895); “Degollacion de Charruas,” Revista de la Biblioteca Pública de Buenos Aires Tomo II (1880). This historiographical tendency is perhaps most clearly seen in Luis Alberto de Herrera’s La tierra charrúa, which despite its name only mentions charrúas as one of the many potential roots of the Uruguayan national type, or the “gacho oriental.” Luis Alberto de Herrera, La tierra charrúa (Montevideo: Arca Editorial, 1968), 32–35. Literary works demonstrated similar tropes in their national self-reflections, treating native peoples alternatively as conquered barbarians or vanquished victims. Key authors included Juan Zorrilla de San Martín, Margaríños Cervantes, and Eduardo Acevedo Díaz. Annie Houot, Guaraníes y charrúa en la literatura uruguaya del siglo XIX: realidad y ficción (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2007), Parte II.

of Jesuit and imperial ethnographies, which were written during the colonial period, or the published work of naturalist travelers who reiterated the same ideas.\textsuperscript{35}

The turn of the twentieth century saw the first shift in historical and anthropological studies of the region, as tolderías began to receive increased attention.\textsuperscript{36} Building upon established narratives regarding the realization of contemporary spatial limits, historians imagined Charrúas, Minuanes, and others as prehistoric forebears or antiquated enemies, vanquished through military, territorial, or spiritual conquest.\textsuperscript{37} For them, native history was one of disappearance, either through forceful extermination or

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\textsuperscript{35} Notable ethnographies published or utilized in the nineteenth century included the works of Lorenzo Hervás, Gonzalo de Doblas, Félix de Azara, José Saldanha, and Pierre François-Xavier Charlevoix. Although Hervás’s text was published in 1787, it was an important reference for ethnographic studies. Azara’s travel narrative, which contains his most extensive ethnographic discussion, was first published in France in 1809, but was not translated to Spanish until 1846. José Saldanha, who wrote the most extensive ethnographic account of Portuguese travelers, was not published until 1929, yet was representative of the same trend. Similarly, Pierre François-Xavier Charlevoix’s work was first translated to Spanish in 1910. Lorenzo Hervás, \textit{Saggio pratico delle lingue: con prologoemi, e una raccolta di orazioni dominicali in piu di trecento lingue e dialetti…} (Cesen: Gregorio Biasini, 1787), 85, 228; Gonzalo de Doblas, “Memoria histórica, geográfica, política y económica sobre la Provincia de Misiones de Índios Guaraníes,” in \textit{Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, Tomo Tercero}, ed. Pedro de Angelis (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836); Félix de Azara, \textit{Viajes por la América Meridional}, 2 vols. (Montevideo: Biblioteca del Comercio del Plata, 1846); José de Saldanha, “Diario resumido,” in \textit{Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro}, 135–301 Volume LI (Rio de Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1929); Pierre François-Xavier Charlevoix, \textit{Historia del Paraguay} (Madrid: V. Suárez, 1910). Notable naturalist travelers during the nineteenth century included the Frenchmen Alcide d’Orbigny and Auguste de Saint-Hilaire. The former drew extensively upon the work of Azara in his account of Charrúas and Minuanes and the latter only offered a few commentaries on customs and appearance. Each of these authors concerned themselves primarily with situating native peoples within the global taxonomies. Alcide Dessalines d’Orbigny, \textit{El Hombre Americano}, \textit{Colección Euríndia} (Buenos Aires: Editorial Futuro, 1944); Traducción de Alfredo Cepeda, 32, 38, 80-1, 276-80; Auguste de Saint-Hilaire, \textit{Voyage a Rio-Grande do sul (Brésil)} (Orléans: H. Herluison, Libraire-Éditeur, 1887), 248-9, 277-8. François de Curel, the Frenchman who transported several Charrúa captives to Paris in 1831, also published an ethnographic study of Charrúas in 1833. This text was published in French, however, and was not translated to Spanish until 1996. François de Curel, \textit{Reseña sobre la tribu de los indios charrúas} (Montevideo: Vínten Editor, 1996); Edición facsimilar Paris 1833, con un prólogo de Daniel Vidart; Antonio Díaz, \textit{Apuntes varios sobre los indios charrúas} (Montevideo: Estado Mayor del Ejército, Departamento de Estudios Históricos, División "Histórica" 1977); Versión modernizada de José Joaquín Figueira. For more on imperial ethnographies, see: Guillermo Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII,” \textit{Horizontes Antropológicos} 9, no. 19 (julho de 2003): 109–17; Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”; Erbig Jr., \textit{Forging Frontiers}, 42–53.

\textsuperscript{36} Gustavo Verdesio has argued that the consolidation of national control over regional territory enabled the inclusion of native peoples in academic texts. Expanding upon Ángel Rama’s idea that “once the social/cultural group that bothered the lettered city [disappears], it can be more or less harmlessly incorporated into the national cultural tradition,” he adds that Uruguayan intellectuals of the nineteenth century generally preferred to ignore native peoples entirely. Gustavo Verdesio, “An Amnesic Nation: The Erasure of Indigenous Pasts by Ukrainian Expert Knowledges,” in \textit{Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-century Latin America}, ed. Sara Castro-Klarén and John C. Chasteen (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003), 196–224, 203–5.

\textsuperscript{37} Vicente G. Quesada, \textit{Los indios en las Provincias del Río de la Plata: Estudio Histórico} (Buenos Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1903), 41–45; Pacífico Otero, \textit{La orden franciscana en el Uruguay: Crónica histórica del Convento de San Bernardino de Montevideo} (Buenos Aires: Cabaut y Cía, 1908), 2-6, 10-13, 47-8; Manuel Cervera, \textit{Historia de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Fe, 1573-1583} Tomo Primero (Santa Fe: La Unión de Ramón Ibáñey, 1908), 193, 230-43, 253-4, 493-4, 499-500; Enrique Peña,
through a teleological transition from Indians to gauchos to acculturated republican subjects, a trope that continues to influence many macro-level and long-durée studies of tolderías in the region. Given tolderías’ positioning as peripheral or subordinate in historical accounts of creole expansion, the most detailed studies regarding them came from anthropologists. Beginning with José H. Figueira’s work presented at the 1892


Exposición Histórico-Americana in Madrid, anthropologists sought to catalogue tolderías according to linguistic groups, macro-ethnicities, geographical locations, or archaeological patterns.¹⁹ Posing questions of national or subnational interest – who were our prehistoric forebears? when did they arrive? how did their cultures shape contemporary identities? who can claim them as patrimony? – their conclusions tended to reinforce national or subnational ideals. For example, as Guenoas were most commonly associated with the territory of Rio Grande do Sul and Charrúas purportedly inhabited Uruguay and the Argentine Mesopotamia, Brazilian scholars tended to define all tolderías as part of the “Guenoa macro-ethnicity,” while Argentine

and Uruguayan researchers deemed them part of the “Charrúa macro-ethnicity.”\footnote{The term “Mesopotamia” refers to the Argentine provinces of Corrientes and Entre Ríos. The idea of a “macro-ética guenoa” has exclusively appeared in Brazilian texts: Roberto Southey, História do Brasil Tomo Quinto (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria de B. L. Garnier, 1862), 531; Aurélio Porto, Dicionário Enciclopédico do Rio Grande do Sul Fascículo I, 1o Volume (Porto Alegre: Editorial Minuano Limitada, 1936), 23–25; Porto, “O minuano na toponímia rio-grandense”: 108; Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 66–67; Martha D. Hameister, “Para dar calor à nova povoação: Estudo sobre estratégias sociais e familiares a partir dos registros batismais da Vila do Rio Grande (1738-1763),” (Tese de Doutorado, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2006), 73–74. The idea of a “macro-ética charrúa” has appeared in texts such as: Lafone Quevado, “Los indios chanases y su lengua. Con apuntes sobre los querandíes, yaros, boanes, güenoas o minuanes”; Cervera, Historia de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Fe, 1573-1583, Tomo Primero and Serrano, “Filiação Linguística Serrana.” Still others have incorporated both groups into a “macro-ética guaraní,” a more amorphous distinction, due to the geographical reach of settlements and their relationship with Jesuit missionaries and creole settlers alike. See, for example: Francisco Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay Tomo Primero (Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 1895); Araújo, Etnologia salvaje.

\footnote{Ítala Irene Basile Becker, Os índios charrua e minuano na antiga banda oriental do Uruguai (São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil: Editora Unisinos, 2002); Claudio Corrêa Pereira, Minuanos/Guenoas: Os Cerritos de bacia da lagoa Mirim e as origens de uma nação pampiana (Porto Alegre: Fundação Cultural Gaúcha, 2008); Susana Rodríguez and Rodolfo González, En busca de los orígenes perdidos: Los guaraníes en la construcción del ser uruguayo (Montevideo: Planeta, 2010).} This general framework of anthropological studies has also remained intact in recent years, as scholars continue to focus on the overriding theme of national identity.\footnote{Ítala Irene Basile Becker, Os índios charrua e minuano na antiga banda oriental do Uruguai (São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil: Editora Unisinos, 2002); Claudio Corrêa Pereira, Minuanos/Guenoas: Os Cerritos de bacia da lagoa Mirim e as origens de uma nação pampiana (Porto Alegre: Fundação Cultural Gaúcha, 2008); Susana Rodríguez and Rodolfo González, En busca de los orígenes perdidos: Los guaraníes en la construcción del ser uruguayo (Montevideo: Planeta, 2010).}

Despite having been produced over the course of nearly two centuries, these studies shared common geographical assumptions. First, they presumed that tolderías were neither active agents in the construction of territorial relations nor possessors of their own sense of territorial order. Thus most works either ignored portions of land until they became controlled by settlers or exaggerated the extent of imperial territorial control. This shaped interpretations of interethnic exchanges, as scholars cast competition for resources or indigenous claims of authority as native invasions or resistance to territorial order. Second, their geographical frames of analysis were inextricably linked to twentieth-century territorial units, as they imagined colonial jurisdictions as proto-national spaces. Scholars “[enumerated] the indigenous nations that inhabited Rio Grande,” searched for the “origin of the Indians that populated Uruguay,” narrated the “displacement of hunter Indians, who populated lands that would come to be Uruguayan,” or mapped ethnic locations within the frames of contemporary administrative units (Map I.1). As native peoples (“our Indians”) moved on and off national territories (“our lands”), they moved in and out
of nationally inspired histories. Third, scholars used territorial positioning to define reified ethnic communities and narrate their territorial evacuation. They ascribed ethnonyms according to indigenous “habitat,” using rivers and other geographic features to distinguish distinct ethnic communities. They then

Map I.1 – Ethnic Geographies and National and State Borders

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42 Clockwise, from left to right: José H. Figueira, “Los primitivos habitantes del Uruguay” in El Uruguay en la Exposición Histórico-Americana de Madrid, 138; Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 62; Rodolfo M. Sosa, La nación charrúa (Montevideo: Editorial "Letras" 1957), 51.

assembled references to a given ethnonym in published source materials – from early explorers and chroniclers, from Jesuits, and from the demarcation expeditions – and in manuscripts from their most proximate archives, in order to devise theories of ethnic migrations.

These general trends become starkly apparent when we consider the various arguments about habitat and migration collectively. Between 1850 and 2009, at least thirty-two different texts explicitly theorized the locations and movements of Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, Yaros, and Guenoas. They either situated one of the named groups in a fixed location throughout the colonial period or traced their supposed migrations from the late sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century. While these theories made logical sense in the context of individual texts, mapping them together reveals both inconsistency and contradiction. The defined “habitats” of given ethnic communities appear in disparate locales throughout the region, rather than in the restricted sites posited by one author or another (Map I.2). Even in cases where multiple authors concurred on a group’s location, such as Charrúas along the northern shore of the Río de la Plata or Bohanes between Entre Ríos and Uruguay, their agreement often derived from the borrowing of arguments or the shared usage of the same archival collections. Similar incongruences emerge when we map together the various theories of ethnic migration. While individual authors’ discussions of regional migrations neatly display the abandonment or swapping of lands upon the arrival of a new ethnic community, or the extermination of one group by another, when taken collectively, they reveal impossible geographies (Maps I.3 & I.4). Not only did scholars never reach a consensus, but many authors arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions, with some suggesting migrations from Rio Grande do Sul or Entre Ríos to Uruguay and others positing the reverse. These discrepancies derived from scholars’ exclusive use of their nearest archival collections, as well as their imposition of contemporary territorial imaginations upon native pasts – nearly all of these theorized migrations traversed present-day boundaries.
Map 1.2 – Theories of Indigenous “Habitat”. This map represents the collective ethnic geographies of authors that catalogued tolderías according to a fixed locale, or “habitat”. Native peoples are plotted according to their ascribed ethnonym and the geographic area where authors situated them. Label weights correspond with the number of authors that made a particular claim: 10 pt. for 1 author, increasing incrementally at 3 pts. per additional author, and capped at 25 pts. for six or more citations.44

Map I.3 – Theories of Migration (Minuanes). This map represents the collective ethnic geographies of authors who articulated Minuán migrations. Arrows represent the before and after of theorized migrations, which authors described as unidirectional over the course of the colonial period, particularly the eighteenth century. Arrows are weighted at 1 pt. per author, and range from 1 to 7.45

Rather than being concerned with understanding native peoples, then, scholars were primarily interested in demonstrating when they entered or exited the historical stage of a particular nation, province, or state. In the case of Minuanes, for example, a number of authors argued that they migrated

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from Entre Ríos to Montevideo sometime during the 1720s. The significance of this migration had little to do with pursuing Minuán cultural logic, but instead enabled authors to suggest that Spanish settlers of Montevideo had arrived first, and thus narrate a 1731 conflict between Minuanes and Montevideanos as a story of indigenous aggression. Similarly, in the case of the Charrúas, most scholars depicted a migration from the south of Uruguay to the north. This theory derived from the fact that sixteenth-century explorers encountered peoples that they identified as Charrúas around the deltas of the Río Uruguay and Río Paraná. By projecting these early and localized interactions upon the entirety of national space, scholars were then able to narrate the evacuation of lands with the advancement of an imagined Spanish frontier. In reality, there is no evidence to suggest that Charrúas ever occupied lands near Montevideo or the eastern part of the country. Such tendencies can be seen in each territorial unit of the map, as migrations accommodated narratives of creole territorial advancement and the achievement of contemporary units amidst belligerent indigenous enemies. As few scholars engaged beyond national or linguistic boundaries, these parallel and contradictory theories proliferated.

Despite the persistence of theses broader historical and anthropological tropes, the past two decades have also produced numerous revisions of indigenous pasts in the Río de la Plata. Building upon renewed efforts to identify and divulge primary source materials on tolderías, and employing ethnohistorical approaches, scholars in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil have deconstructed conceptual divides between settlers and neighboring tolderías. By zooming in on specific localities — Santa Fe, Santo

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47 The idea that Minuanes arrived late to Montevideo was first mentioned in the writings of Félix de Azara, who has been a principal interlocutor for anthropologists and historians of the region. Félix de Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara Tomo Primero (Madrid: Imprenta de Sanchiz, 1847), 145; Azara, Viajes por la América del Sur, 174.

48 The past decade has seen numerous efforts to identify and transcribe sources: Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final, 133–60; Bracco, Charrúas, guuenos y guaraníes Diego Bracco and José M. López Mazz, Charrúas, pampas y serranos, chanches y guaraníes: La insurrección del año 1686 (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2006); José M. López Mazz and Diego Bracco, Minuanos: Apuntes y notas para la historia y la arqueología del territorio guueno-minuán (Indígenas de Uruguay, Argentina y Brasil) (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2010); Sergio Hernán Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico: Francisco García de Piedrabuena contra los ‘charrúas y otros infieles’, 1715,” Corpus. Archivos virtuales de la alteridad americana 2, no. 2 (2do semestre 2012).
Domingo Soriano, Colónia do Sacramento, Montevideo, Rio Grande, Yapeyú, La Cruz, San Borja, and San Miguel, to name a few – they have emphasized economic, cultural, social, and biological exchange and downplayed ephemeral moments of interethnic conflict. These localized studies, whether focused on Jesuit-Guarani, Portuguese, or Spanish settlements, have demonstrated the development of kinship ties and interethnic pacts in all corners of the region.⁴⁹ Other scholars have attempted to situate tolderías within broader regional forces, pointing to their roles in the development of informal economies, as they transported and sold livestock, guided outsiders through the countryside, and simultaneously engaged known contrabandists and local ranchers.⁵⁰ These broader studies have also identified ways in which

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tolderías negotiated between empires, using the specter of one to gain the upper hand in pacts with the other. Still others have analyzed the emergence of ethnographic writings about mobile native peoples, identifying connections between knowledge production and changing imperial policies vis-à-vis tolderías.

When taken collectively, localized studies and thematically driven histories constitute a significant reassessment of interethnic relations in the region, including an underlying critique of the spatial frames of older analyses. By adopting hyper-localized approaches or by focusing on patterns of interaction, revisionist accounts repudiate nationally inspired narratives of imperial territorial realization. Still, most of these studies have abandoned spatial analysis in their focus on dynamic interethnic relations, as they have adopted ambiguous concepts (zones, spaces, grounds) of borderlands studies or avoided discussions of territoriality altogether. Furthermore, revisionist retellings have not always translated into comprehensive regional assessments, as many scholars continue to rely exclusively on localized series of either Spanish- or Portuguese-language sources. As a result, despite greater emphasis on interaction and exchange, such models continue to position mobile native peoples as the Other to colonial actors. Without a broader conceptual reframing of territorial relations, which reads beyond the myopic gaze of local manuscript


53 The principal exception to this tendency has been works on the southernmost Jesuit-Guarani missions, yet even these accounts reproduce binary models of analysis, in which “mission space” serves as a historical stage that tolderías enter into as interlopers in their engagement with sedentary settlers. Wilde, “Los guaraníes después de la expulsión de los jesuitas”: 74, 97-102; Lía Quarleri, rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata: Guaraníes, jesuitas e imperios coloniales (Buenos Aires: Fondo de la Cultura Económica, 2009), 70-1, 87, 90. 97-98, 100, 104, 106-7; Norberto Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas: Una frontera exclusivista-inclusivista,” Revista de Historia Regional 14, no. 1 (Verão 2009); Julia Sarreal, “Globalization and the Guarani: From Missions to Modernization in the Eighteenth Century,” (Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009), 79, 323-4.
collections to center tolderías’ regional strategies and movements, these important revisions will remain limited in scope.

By synthesizing and integrating these local studies of the Río de la Plata region, it is possible to develop a new regional analysis that acknowledges the broader territorial dynamics that shaped interethnic relations. If local settlements dotted the perimeter of the region, and if each of these sites shared an inward local frontier with neighboring tolderías, it follows that the region’s vast interior was dominated by Charrúas, Minuanes, and other independent native peoples. Some recent work has begun this effort, arguing that the Río de la Plata as a region developed through interethnic exchange, that non-missionized native peoples controlled the vast majority of regional space, and that the invisibility of native territorialities derives from their unintelligibility to imperial and national authors.54 Building upon this groundwork, one can begin to reassess interethnic relations in the region, and measure the impact of bordermaking initiatives.

Sources and Methods

In order to develop a new geographical perspective, which centers tolderías and the rural spaces where the invisible borderlines ran, it is necessary to consider a wide variety of sources. This includes local town council (cabildo) reports, military journals from campaigns and daily logbooks from forts, baptismal and marriage records and administrative accounts from missions and towns, correspondence, diplomatic treatises, newspapers, maps, natural histories, and diaries from the demarcation expeditions, among others. While juridical jockeying for territorial possession, the eventual demarcation of a borderline, and subsequent efforts to populate it generated a long paper trail, source materials on tolderías are fragmented, geographically dispersed, episodic, and generally unpublished. As tolderías’ inhabitants left no written

records of their own, and as imperial and ecclesiastical settlements were largely restricted to the perimeter, the myopic territorial perspectives of lettered individuals mediated available information on native peoples in the region. Extant records thus reflect the frustrations and anxieties of imperial writers when faced with the presence or specter of neighboring tolderías, even as they project contiguous control over the territories that separated isolated settlements. As tolderías entered onto the stage of historical sources only through their interactions with the lettered city, the majority of their actions escape written accounts.⁵⁵

Records on tolderías have also had unique historical trajectories, which in turn mediate their accessibility. Given the numerous and ever-changing jurisdictional apparatuses that sought to administer the region, as well as the connectedness of local events to global projects, manuscript records regarding tolderías are spread across no less than twenty repositories in five countries.⁵⁶ As a result, any single repository or series of local archival institutions contains a severely limited portion of available documentation. Furthermore, as no site of imperial recordkeeping was able to engage the region as a whole, materials available in any one institution or locale reflect the territorial myopia of its administrative forebear. “Higher order” administrative centers, such as Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro, contain a broader range of sources; however, they are limited to lands claimed and engaged by Spanish or Portuguese authorities, respectively.

In an effort to read across the archival limits that continue to shape regional histories and to center borderland spaces, I consulted over 700 manuscripts regarding the Río de la Plata’s tolderías (Map I.5). Rather than filtering materials according to source type, I examined any source that mentioned tolderías or individuals identified by one of the operative regional ethnonyms. Then, as new a way of “drawing things together” and reading against imperial and national territorialities, I used Geographical Information Systems


⁵⁶ The referred-to manuscripts were found in archival repositories in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Portugal and Spain. Manuscript sources pertaining to juridical debates and demarcation expeditions, were consulted in Paraguay and the United States as well.
(GIS) to represent tolderías’ locations and movements over time. This recasting of territorial conditions served as a foundation to reinterpret the meanings of interethnic encounters and exchanges, as their narration in sources was mediated by changing notions of property, possession, and vassalage. It also enabled me to identify linkages between distant locales, as individual caciques and their tolderías moved between isolated settlements whose record-keepers were frequently unaware of their engagement with others. This attention to both archives of geographical knowledge and geographies of archival knowledge allows us to look at the region from the inside out and to assess the significance of spaces and peoples that have long been rendered invisible in source materials. The centering of what might be considered “native

Map I.5 – Geographies of Manuscript Sources. This map represents the geographic locations of the nearly 700 manuscripts that mention tolderías in the Río de la Plata. Individual locations have been weighted proportionately according to numbers of manuscripts in a given city, ranging from 1 to 175. About 17% of these sources have been transcribed and published. While more sources will likely appear in the future, this represents every document consulted in this study or cited in other investigations.

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grounds,” and their transformations over time, permits the development of new geographical imaginations that more adequately account for the centrality of tolderías to the production of regional space.

This dissertation traces territorial practices in the Río de la Plata region over the course of a long eighteenth century, marking the midcentury mapping expeditions as a key turning point. The first two chapters, which span from the 1680 founding of Colônia do Sacramento to the eve of the Madrid mapping expeditions, address the territorial practices of regional inhabitants prior to the invention of an interimperial divide. Chapter One examines the early modern and indigenous territorialities that defined the region in order to demonstrate that tolderías were the principal arbiters of access to and travel across it. Strings of Spanish, Portuguese, and missionary settlements, rather than constituting conterminous frontiers or provincial units, were relatively isolated points along fragile corridors or waterways, restricted to the perimeter of the region by neighboring tolderías. In order to access key regional resources, livestock in particular, imperial agents relied upon payments to or evasion of tolderías. For their part, tolderías competed with one another, and used imperial settlements as sources of trade goods or as sites of temporary refuge in moments of duress. Despite mutual interests and the absence of any singular authority, territorial order governed power relations between settlers and tolderías, and tilted in tolderías’ favor.

Chapter Two builds upon this dynamic to examine the juridical battles that arose between Spain (and by extension the Jesuit-Guarani missions) and Portugal as each sought to claim legal possession of regional lands. It inserts local interethnic relations, governed by territorial conditions, into these broader juridical debates to demonstrate the discursive gymnastics that each side employed as it claimed tolderías as vassals yet shirked responsibility for their actions. Given the tenuous and unenforceable nature of such claims, as well as growing confidence in the precision of geographical explorations and measurements, the two sides eventually agreed to combine mapmaking with treaty-making as a means to rectify their disputes and circumvent native actors in the determination of possession. The demarcations did not represent the realization of imperial territorial control, but rather prescriptive claims over space. Despite a wave of
extermination campaigns by local Spanish authorities at midcentury, the impact of such efforts was relatively limited, and at the time of the expeditions tolderías continued to control most of the region.

The next two chapters, which begin with the Madrid demarcations in 1752 and continue to the definitive end of efforts to map a borderline in 1806, explore the impact of bordermaking initiatives upon interethnic relations. Chapter Three follows the mapping expeditions commissioned under the Treaty of Madrid in the 1750s and under the Treaty of San Ildefonso in the 1780s and 1790s. It compares the detailed diaries of demarcation officers to the maps they produced in order to highlight contradictions between the two. Whereas treaty maps demonstrated stable landscapes and served as templates for future settlement initiatives, the events of the demarcations reveal the continued dominance of tolderías over regional lands. As mapping teams traversed the region to claim territorial possession for their imperial patrons, they found themselves paying tribute to Charrúa and Minuán caciques in exchange for safe passage. The chapter also provides a new reading of the oft-cited “Guaraní War,” in which Guaraní mission-dwellers allied with neighboring tolderías to challenge the Madrid line and stymied demarcation efforts for five years. While traditional and revisionist retellings of these accounts alternatively center Jesuits and Guaraníes as the war’s principal agents, I argue that tolderías arbitrated its outcome; it was only when tolderías withdrew their support for the rebels’ cause that the Luso-Hispanic armies and their allies were able to quell the uprising.

Chapter Four addresses the ways in which the imaginary lines proposed by mapping teams transformed into territorial practices centered on the borderline. As the principal officers of the demarcation efforts transitioned into high-ranking posts in newly defined territorial units, they aimed to bring the lines they had drawn into being. Their efforts included strategic settlement campaigns to populate the border with settlers from the Azores and Canary Islands or emigrants from the missions. Post-demarcation territorial initiatives promulgated new ideals of territorial order, which included sedentary subjects, private property rights, and well-regulated commercial practices. For Spain, these objectives translated into violent extermination campaigns against tolderías, whom officials perceived as unruly
subjects and whom they accused of aiding contrabandists. For Portugal, it engendered increased efforts at pact-making with caciques in an effort to safely access Spanish dominions without disrupting interimperial peace. Tolderías experienced these changing tendencies in different ways according to their territorial positioning. With the shift of Colônia do Sacramento to Spanish control, a statute of both treaties, neighboring tolderías found themselves bereft of once lucrative economic opportunities and the benefits of competing imperial foes. Conversely, those closest to the imaginary borderline were able to take advantage of imperial bordermaking initiatives. They utilized increased imperial desires to realize an operative borderline, the new economic opportunities that it produced, and the influx of migrants to expand kinship ties, develop commercial networks, extract payments, and gain refuge in times of duress.

Chapter Five examines the eventual disappearance of tolderías, and by extension Charrúas and Minuanes, from the documentary record by 1831. It argues that rather than marking the end of a slow decline for tolderías, this discursive shift was due to three factors. First, over the course of the eighteenth century, ecclesiastical and imperial agents captured several thousand individuals in an effort to effect territorial removal. As many of these individuals were exiled to other parts of the region, either distributed to elite families or forcibly marched to missions, their separation from tolderías engendered ethnic indistinguishability in written records. Those who were once “Charrúa” or “Minuán” became simply “Indians” in record books, thus concealing their continued presence. Second, as many individuals moved back and forth between settlements and tolderías, developing commercial and kinship ties, they blurred the lines between the two. As ethnonyms referred to people clearly affiliated with tolderías, these individuals found themselves disassociated from such terms. Third, the eventual end to tolderías as possible living arrangements was a product of the dissolution of an operative borderline beginning in 1806. As tolderías living in such areas had initially extracted numerous benefits from their territorial positioning, the unpredictability of imperial agents and the crisscrossing of rival factions during struggles for independence made the countryside an increasingly uninhabitable space.
CHAPTER 1: AN ARCHIPELAGO OF PLAZAS AND TOLDERÍAS

The Spanish Conquest [left] in its wake a scattering of cities, isolated and practically out of communication from one another, while the territory between the new urban centers continued to be inhabited almost solely by the dismayed indigenous populations. – Ángel Rama¹

Try to speak with Don Joaquín, chief of the Minuanes, to whom I have given gifts and whose conversion I have solicited. It was recently written to me that he has demonstrated kindness and friendship toward our people. Give him whatever gifts you have in order to ensure his friendship. – Manuel de Velazco y Tejada, Governor of Buenos Aires, 1710²

Fragile Peace

In early July 1731, two men set out from the San Borja mission. The first was the mission’s priest, Jesuit Miguel Ximénez, and the second was a Guenoa Indian named Francisco de Borja, whom Ximénez had taken as a guide. The two men and their party traveled for nearly a month, and floods and freezing rains waylaid them along their journey. They eventually arrived, drenched and exhausted, at several Guenoa encampments (tolderías) near the headwaters of the Río Piraí, where Borja’s kin and several prominent chiefs (caciques) resided. Borja and Ximénez bore a heavy diplomatic burden: they sought to broker peace between the Spanish settlement (plaza) of Montevideo and neighboring Minuán tolderías.³ If they failed, the

¹ Rama, The Lettered City, 10.
² “Procurara hablar con D.n Joaquin cazique de los minuanes à quien he agasajado y solicitado su convencion, y ultimamente me escriven se a mostrado con fineza y amistad de parte de nuestra jente, al qual regalara con lo que lleva procurando conserbar su amistad” AGI - Contaduría, 1931, f. 24v.
³ The term “plaza” refers to localized settlements, including cities, towns, fortresses, and missions. While contemporary usage of the term refers to an urban square, eighteenth-century authors also used it to designate settlements as a whole, particularly those that were fortified. Raphael Bluteau, Vocabulário Português e Latino, 8 vols. 6 (Coimbra: Colégio das Artes da Companhia de Jesus, 1728), 665–66; Dicionário de autoridades Tomo V (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1737); Fuente electrónica elaborada por el Instituto de Investigación Rafael Lapesa y editado en Madrid por la Real Academia Española. For examples of this use of the term this way, see: AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 243, Carpeta 3, No 14; AGI - Buenos Aires, 46, f. 629-631v; AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Letters dated 1758-06-27, 1759-10-06, 1758-10-03, 1759-10-20, 1759-10-24, 1760-01-23); BNP - F. 1445; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.22, f. 404v-405v; Silvestre Ferreira da Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de
fighting that had broken out in the south would engulf the entire region, including their mission and the Guenoa tolderías (Map 1.1).

Map 1.1 – Plazas and Tolderías of the Río de la Plata, 1675-1750

The conflict had begun a year earlier when one of Montevideo’s inhabitants had killed a Minuán and then run away to the Portuguese plaza of Colônia do Sacramento. When a commission of Minuanes went to collect the body of their fallen kinsman, Montevideo’s town council (cabildo) offered condolences and gifts,

but no justice. In response, the tolderías attacked the city’s ranches, killing as many as twenty farmhands and blockading Montevideo’s residents from their primary food supply. The plaza responded in kind, seeking to break the blockade with the force of its militia. This strategy proved futile, however, as half of the conscripted fighters deserted to Colônia and the Minuanes took possession of their approximately 500 horses.\(^4\) By April 1731, the arrival of the rainy season and the rising of the region’s rivers suspended the fighting temporarily; Minuanes maintained possession of the countryside, while Montevideo’s residents found themselves trapped within the city’s walls and its cabildo contemplated rationing food for the winter.

Each side also sought to garner allies, as the principal cacique (Quireymbá), named Yapelman, called upon support from Guenoa tolderías in the north and Montevideo’s cabildo contacted the Governor of Buenos Aires, who in turn solicited aid from the Jesuit-Guaraní missions.\(^5\)

Jesuit authorities were wary of involving themselves in a conflict with the tolderías and sent Ximénez’s and Borja’s envoy as a last-ditch effort to avert war. This endeavor certainly brought its own risks, however, as a trip by Ximénez to the tolderías the previous year had precipitated infighting and combat among the caciques. His return carried the potential of reigniting animosities that were still fresh in the minds of many. Likewise, Borja’s decision to follow Ximénez to the mission that year had generated animosity amongst his immediate family, and his presence served as another variable that could undermine peace. Indeed, there was at least one attempt on the lives of the two men during their stay, an event that both barely survived.\(^6\) Nonetheless, deliberations between Ximénez, Borja, and the caciques proved

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\(^6\) The two men were cudgeled by a person sent by Borja’s family, who relented when Borja and Ximénez gave him “a gift of the items that Minuanes most value [un buen regalo de las cosas que ellos mas estiman].” Cortesão, *Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri*, 162, 166-8, 247-8. Part of the missions’ apprehension toward war likely derived from their efforts to establish cattle reserves.
successful in the end. The caciques shared the priest’s reticence toward a war that would bring missionary forces to their tolderías, since they were aware that it would be mutually devastating. Furthermore, Ximénez bestowed gifts upon them and caught their attention by traveling to their tolderías amidst perilous rainfall and floods.\(^7\) Once the waters subsided, they sought out other caciques from the south, including Yapelman, to whom they owed their allegiance. Upon arriving, Yapelman received more gifts from Ximénez and accepted his pleas for peace, citing the priest’s gestures of humility and submission as motivating factors. He refused the Ximénez’s invitation to sign peace accords in the missions, but promised to advise other tolderías throughout the region to respect the pact they had made.\(^8\)

The conflict between the Minuán tolderías and the plaza of Montevideo demonstrates broader patterns of interethnic relations and territorial dynamics in the Río de la Plata. Principally, during the greater part of the eighteenth century, Minuanes, Guenoas, and other mobile native peoples were the primary arbiters of access to the region’s vast countryside. As local plazas, including Montevideo, Colônia, and San Borja, dotted the region’s perimeter, they depended upon peaceful relations with tolderías in order to access natural resources and sustain their local populations. For this reason, both Ximénez and the Cabildo of Montevideo first approached neighboring caciques with gifts before considering armed combat. The missions’ military forces certainly wielded the collective strength to engage Minuán and Guenoa tolderías, but experience had taught them that the results would be mutually disastrous. For their part, the ragtag militia assembled in Montevideo was entirely ill equipped and hardly a threat. Their desertion to Colônia represented an acknowledgment of the impossibility of their efforts.

\(^7\) Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 164–65.

The dominance of tolderías over the countryside is also evident in Ximénez’s and the Montevideo cabildo’s lack of familiarity with the geography of the interior. Ximénez relied upon Francisco de Borja, a Guenoa, to serve as guide (baqueano), while Montevideo’s militia lost track of the tolderías once they withdrew from the walls of their city. In contrast, the Minuanes and Guenoas involved in this conflict knew where to locate Montevideo and the San Borja mission. Still, in spite of their relative dominance over rural space, tolderías were unable to monopolize access and were keenly aware of their own limitations. It was also in their best interest to pursue peace with their sedentary counterparts, in order to avoid the costs of war, to protect trade partnerships, and to maintain potential allies in a multipolar world. For this reason, the caciques who met with Ximénez and Borja sought to convince Yapelman to end the blockade.

This brief account also demonstrates the importance of intermediaries between plazas and tolderías. Francisco de Borja was one of numerous individuals who transited the distant locales of the region and blurred perceived ethnic or imperial allegiances. His decision to abandon his toldería was one that many others in his position also made, much in the same way that many individuals under the aegis of missions or towns eventually ended up in tolderías. These go-betweens traversed ethnic and territorial divisions out of necessity, particularly in times of famine or war, or through captivity. By straddling two worlds, they simultaneously became conduits of exchange and sources of tension. In Borja’s case, his family struggle nearly undermined the peace that their toldería and several plazas desperately hoped to achieve.

Most importantly, the 1731 conflict highlights incongruence between eighteenth-century territoriality and the anachronistic geographical imaginations of nationalist historiographies. This event is a centerpiece of Uruguayan national history, which scholars have used to demonstrate the military might of mission forces or the cunning diplomacy of Spanish officers. In these retellings, Minuanes have served as

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9 Nearly all Spanish, Portuguese, and missionary incursions into the region’s countryside depended upon baqueanos.
villainous aggressors whose defeat was inevitable. Such narratives coincide with the broader assumptions of regional historiographies—principally the idea that tolderías were peripheral actors or anachronistic impediments to the progress of Iberian and missionary advancement—but raise key questions. If Minuanes were marginal actors, why were colonial officials so preoccupied with maintaining peace? If they wandered aimlessly, how did Borja know where to find them? If clear divisions existed between mobile and sedentary peoples, how did Borja and others move between the two worlds? How can we understand regional power dynamics without presupposing European dominance or romanticizing native peoples as ever-resistant actors? If local loyalties and material concerns frequently superseded imperial or indigenous bonds, what forces guided individual actions and historical events? How can we articulate such a multipolar world?

The eighteenth-century Río de la Plata was an archipelago of plazas and tolderías. In geographic terms, plazas were stationary points on the ground, such as towns, forts, or missions, strung along narrow corridors, while tolderías were mobile encampments of independent native peoples. Both plazas and tolderías constituted localized centers of economic, social, and cultural activity. Each exhibited limited territorial reach, yet tolderías tended to control much larger stretches of land. As the former aimed to establish a stronghold over a single locale, the latter moved strategically to maximize their control of resources and arbitrate access to the countryside. Despite imperial propensities to project unified and consolidated territories in drawings and writings, contiguous territorial control did not exist. Such spatial visions instead reflected the myopia and ambition of plazas, while concealing indigenous actions and territorial imaginations. Placing the territorialities of plazas and tolderías on even ground provides a new and more effective means to understand the dynamics and processes that defined the region at the time.

Dotting the Landscape

The Río de la Plata was a region defined principally by flatlands, fluctuating waterways, and open pastures. Stretching from its homonymous estuary in the south to the Ibicuí and Jacuí river systems in the north, the region was bounded on the west by the Río Paraná and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean (Map 1.1). By the early decades of the eighteenth century, its inhabitants had developed a multipolar world organized around plazas and tolderías. Overlapping Spanish, Portuguese, and Jesuit-Guaraní settlements dotted the region’s perimeter, while Charrúas, Minuanes, and other mobile peoples moved their tolderías throughout its interior, arbitrating plazas’ access to resources. In this multipolar world, four dynamics defined territorial relations – locality, informality, mobility, and interdependence.

Locality

Unlike modern territorial states, early modern government relied upon contingent, reciprocal relationships to define sovereignty. Viceroyalties were not groups of consolidated provinces, but series of unaligned localities connected by their shared allegiances to a common ruler.11 The principal territorial designations of this region – Spanish governorships (gobernaciones) and Portuguese captaincies (capitanías) – did not imply complete possession or control, but instead constituted collections of discrete plazas tethered to a shared governor and in frequent competition with one another.12 Given their location on the fringes of


12 Beginning in 1617, the Spanish grouped their plazas in the region into the Gobernación del Río de la Plata, administered from Buenos Aires, and the Gobernación del Paraguay, administered from Asunción. Both pertained to the Virreinato del Perú. The Portuguese plaza of Colônia do Sacramento, which was founded in 1680, pertained to the Capitania do Rio de Janeiro, while the plaza of Rio Grande, which was founded in 1737, pertained first to the Capitania de São Paulo, and later to the Capitania de São
competing empires, each plaza was of strategic importance for its respective governor, and therefore wielded significant amounts of leverage in negotiations with him. They also served as important centers for the social, economic, and political lives of colonial settlers, with cabildos as their principal governing bodies. Simply put, plazas functioned as a series of relatively autonomous points on the map, each with its own interests and needs.

The localized interests exhibited by each plaza were largely due to its short territorial reach. While competing cabildos jockeyed for rights over broad swaths of land, in practice they were largely confined to their immediate countryside. Ranches did not extend far beyond a plaza’s population center, and most livestock roamed far beyond the reach of any single plaza. For this reason, colonial writers often differentiated their adjacent countryside, where livestock could be corralled and maintained, from lands beyond their control (tierra adentro), where wild cows, sheep, and horses proliferated.\(^\text{13}\) To sustain a plaza, it was necessary to send expeditionary parties to garner cattle, which clustered in distant ranges (vaquerías), and either slaughter them or herd them back to local ranches. At the turn of the eighteenth century, the two most important vaquerías were the Vaquería de los Piñares and the Vaquería del Mar; the former was located far to the north, near the headwaters of the Río Uruguay, and the latter was southwest of the Lagoa Mirim, near the Río Cebollatí (Map 1.1). Smaller cattle ranges also existed, but the combination of human extraction and natural predators, such as tigers and wild dogs, caused them to move over time.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{13}\) See, for example: AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1746-02-13; Vivoras, 1746-09-16; Campo de Bloqueo, 1752-10-19, 1757-08-06); AGNA - IX. 24-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-04-26). While wild cattle was the region’s most lucrative resource, there was also a significant amount of small-scale farming, particularly around Montevideo and Colónia do Sacramento. Jorge Gelman, Campesinos y estancieros (Buenos Aires: Editorial Los Libros del Riel, 1998).

\(^{14}\) In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Jesuit-Guaraní missions sought to transport cattle from these vaquerías to lands closer to their plazas. Manuel Duarte, “A conquista da terra e a iniciação pastorícia no planalto e nos fundos de Baqueria de los Piñares,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXIV, 4o Trimestre, No 96 (1944): 193; Norberto Levinton, El espacio jesuitico-guaraní: La formación de una región cultural, Biblioteca de Estudios Paraguayos - Volumen 80 (Asunción: Centro de Estudios Antropológicos de la Universidad Católica (CEADUC), 2009), 141.
Plazas’ efforts to procure and maintain livestock faced not only the challenge of distance but the dominating presence that numerous tolderías exerted over the countryside. Mobile peoples stood between plazas and the resources that they needed, monitoring and controlling the region’s vast plains. Assuming that herders from the plazas were able to locate and reach wild cattle and avoid detection, they then faced the onerous task of transporting herds back to their plazas. Furthermore, given that wire fencing did not yet exist, ranchers struggled to maintain their four-legged resources in the immediate environs of their plazas. In moments of peace, cows or horses were liable to wander away, and in moments of conflict, tolderías were able to extract them with ease. In order to gain access to cattle, therefore, plazas had to either maintain positive relations with tolderías or find a way to overpower them. Peace was generally preferable to conflict, as no individual plaza had the capacity to engage a collectivity of tolderías with force. Even the missions most often sought to avoid belligerent encounters, given that their populous militias found themselves exposed and outmatched when venturing into the countryside.

Despite the historiographical proclivity to frame regional dynamics around expansive, if porous, imperial frontiers, the opposite conditions existed. The plazas that dotted the region’s perimeter did not constitute points along broader frontiers, but isolated populations situated along riverine corridors and surrounded by tolderías. Contemporary scholarship has begun to demonstrate this dynamic on a local scale, describing Santa Fe as isolated or Yapeyú having tolderías on all sides. The same was true for other plazas, such as the La Cruz mission, which was walled on all sides due to Charrúa attacks. As for tolderías, the

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15 In an effort to claim herds of livestock, ranchers frequently branded them. These claims over property, while recognizable by tolderías, most likely did not constitute legitimate possession from their vantage point.

territorial limits they faced derived not from imperial control, but from relations with other tolderías. It was not Santa Fe and Corrientes that formed a western limit for Charrúas, Yaros, and Bohanes, but instead the presence of Pampas, Querandíes, Abipones, Mocovíes, Tobas, Chiriguano, Guaycurú, and other native peoples across the Río Paraná. In the same way, to the north of the Ibicuí and Jacuí rivers, one would have found Guaraní and Tupi-speaking peoples.

These territorially based power relations belie traditional notions of imperial authority in the region. For example, colonial chroniclers and postcolonial writers have alike pointed to a 1702 massacre of Charrúas, Yaros, and Bohanes along the Río Yi as evidence of Spanish military superiority; however, the validity of this claim is dubious at best. While it is true that missionary forces killed large numbers of individuals, and took as many as 500 captives, they did not act alone. In this case and in others, Guenoa tolderías were key participants in the defeat of enemy tolderías, making the victory less a story of imperial dominance than one of strategic alliances. In addition, the so-called “Battle of the Yi” was not an encounter that pitted missionary forces and Guenoas against Charrúas and their allies, but rather an incident between several plazas and tolderías. Neither Guenoas nor Charrúas were a singular or homogeneous group. In the same way that a Spanish military defeat of Colônia was not a defeat of São Paulo, a victory over several tolderías did not imply the defeat of an entire perceived ethnicity. Indeed, during the same years as this incident, Guenoa tolderías attacked the Yapeyú mission and just two years later, Guenoas, Yaros, and Bohanes.

An alternate way of understanding this dynamics would be to suggest that the very ethnic categories that we continue to use to define native peoples are in reality products of Spanish travelers who positioned themselves between them. Travelers moving up and down the Río Paraná potentially used the river to divide and conceptualize the numerous tolderías that frequented it, naming those on the western side (Banda Occidental) of the river Abipones and Mocovíes and those on the eastern shore (Banda Oriental) Charrúas. While more evidence is necessary to make this claim, clear geographical and ethnic divisions between native peoples did not exist in a way that was discernible to imperial eyes. Lidia R. Nacuzzi, *Identidades impuestas: Tehuelches, aucas y pampas en el norte de la Patagonia*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2005); Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*.

A detailed discussion of the Battle of the Yi can be found in: Bracco, *Charrúas, guenos y guaraníes*, Capítulo 4.

RAH - Mata Linares, t. 101, f. 239-40; Cortesão, *Tratado de Madri*, 143. Guenos also formed a key component of Francisco García de Piedrabuena’s 1715-1716 expedition against Charrúa tolderías in Entre Ríos. In this instance, Piedrabuena paid Güenos in yerba mate, tobacco, and cloths in exchange for their aid. Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico”: 3-5.
Bohanes defeated mission forces that were attempting to blockade Colônia and others that were spying along the region’s southeastern coast.\textsuperscript{20} Finally, the massacre along the Río Yi was more the exception than the rule, as most other military expeditions (\textit{salidas}) commissioned by plazas resulted in abbreviated skirmishes or no conflict at all.\textsuperscript{21}

The years following the Battle of the Yi provide a more accurate picture of relations between plazas and tolderías, as they show the impact of territorial dynamics in the midst of a military stalemate. During these years, different mission plazas worked together in an attempt to extract cattle from the Vaquería del Mar and to establish ranches south of the Río Ibicuí, closer to home, thereby circumventing jurisdictional disputes with rival plazas and eliminating the need for long journeys. While few records exist to detail excursions from mission plazas to the Vaquería del Mar, the Jesuit Silvestre González’s 1705 diary demonstrates the trepidation that travelers had along the way following the Battle of the Yi. During their two-month journey, González and others from the San Borja mission remained constantly vigilant to detect Yaros “and other nations that have joined together to seek vengeance.”\textsuperscript{22} González’s account also points to his reliance upon Guenoa guides for their knowledge of the interior, as the mission troops sought to avoid contact with Yaros and other Guenoa tolderías. This dependency reveals González’s and his team’s lack of knowledge of the happenings of the countryside, as well as the diversity of Guenoas at the time, each with distinct relations with nearby mission plazas. By 1743, Guenoas represented approximately one-third of the

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\textsuperscript{22} “(…) los infieles yaros y otras naciones que se han juntado con ellos para vengar las muertes que en los suyos hicieron los nuestros ahora cuatro años (…)” In his 16 page diary, González took frequent account of the presence or absence of signs of Yaros, Minuanes, and others in order to avoid contact. Silvestre González, \textit{Diario de viaje a las Vaquerías del Mar (1705)}, Primera Edición (Montevideo: Artes Gráficas Covadonga, 1966), 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 25.
\end{flushright}
San Borja mission; however, conflicts between the mission and other Guenoa tolderías never ceased.\textsuperscript{23} As missionaries sought to cross Guenoa-controlled lands to access the vaquerías, or to extract cattle from their tolderías, conflicts abounded. Journeys to the Vaquería del Mar in 1704 and 1706 proved disastrous, and attacks against tolderías in 1700, 1701, 1704, 1707, and 1708 led to retribution by Guenoas.\textsuperscript{24}

The conflict of 1708 perhaps best expresses the control that tolderías maintained over the countryside and the relative stalemate vis-à-vis mission plazas in terms of military dominance. That year, Guenoas and Bohanes blockaded the various mission plazas from access to the vaquerías. In response, armed agents from the missions killed 41 members of a Guenoa toldería, and took numerous captives with them to the missions. Meanwhile, Guenoas and Bohanes killed 38 people in Yapeyú and Santa Cruz, and took with them 26 captives. Neither side was able to gain the upper hand, and safe passage to the vaquerías remained elusive for the various mission plazas.\textsuperscript{25} Considering these events in terms of plazas and tolderías reveals this balance of power, the relative containment of missionary plazas by native peoples, and the challenges facing Guenoa caciques.\textsuperscript{26} While missionaries complained that a blockade of the vaquerías would result in the starvation of their plazas, Guenoas had their own claims on regional resources. Maps drawn from the perspective of the missions demonstrate that Jesuit-Guaraní territorial claims reached as far south as the Río Pereira, ‘Y hoy están en paz’, 22; AGI - Charcas, 384, “Petición del Procurador de la Compañía de Jesús, padre Juan José Rico” (s/f), visto en consejo en (1743-10-17).


\textsuperscript{24} Cortésao, Tratado de Madri, 321–22.

\textsuperscript{25} Incidentally, one of the principal Minuán caciques involved in these events was Yaguareté, who was amongst the caciques that received Miguel Ximénez in 1731. “Memoria para las generaciones venideras, de los indios misioneros del pueblo de Yapeyú” in Misiones del Paraguay, 549. Yaguareté also received gifts from Spanish official Joseph García Inclán in 1714, in an attempt to garner aid for the then Spanish-controlled Colônia do Sacramento. AGI - Charcas, 264, f. 11-13.
Negro and the Río Yi (Map 1.2); however, tolderías controlled most of those lands throughout the eighteenth century.

Tolderías' territorial dominance became especially clear when the Spanish and the Portuguese attempted to connect their disparate plazas. Since the sixteenth century, Santa Fe had served as a key point on the Spanish royal roads (caminos reales) that connected the viceregal capital in Lima to Buenos Aires and the missions, while Corrientes was an intermediate point between Santa Fe and the Paraguayan capital of Asunción. Movement between these disparate locales required that travelers cross lands controlled by tolderías, and thus in moments of conflict they found themselves exposed to attacks, as occurred numerous times between 1707 and 1714.27 Most colonial accounts pointed to aggression on the part of Charrúas, Yaros, and Bohanes; however, proceedings from a viceregal investigation revealed a different story. In them, residents of Corrientes and Asunción argued that attacks along the rivers and in the countryside were a direct response to earlier raids on tolderías, in which missionaries had taken numerous captives.28 River travel had always been a negotiated enterprise, as tolderías positioned themselves alternatively as traders and blockaders. In 1691, for example, Jesuit father Antonio Sepp recounted a trip along the Río Uruguay in


28 AGI - Buenos Aires, 235, “Responses to question #116 of inquiry.” The testimonies taken as part of the investigation into the Comunero Rebellion should be taken with caution, as most declarants had explicit enmity against the Jesuits. Nonetheless, these cases point both to the fragility of plazas and travelers and the rationales behind intercepting riverine travelers.
Tolderías appear in this map as “infieles,” a common identifier to classify them collectively. According to this rendering, they were entirely outside of the realm of mission ranches (estancias).²⁹ which he bought horses from several Yaro tolderías, and later found his ships under siege by the tolderías of the cacique Moreira.³⁰ Plazas depended upon peaceful relations with tolderías in order for their inhabitants to transit native lands without incident.

²⁹ Guillermo Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuitica del Rio de la Plata, 2 vols. 2 (Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1936), Mapa XXIII.

³⁰ Anton Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, Biblioteca Histórica Brasileira (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora; Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1972); tradução de A. Reymundo Schneider, 50-1, 107-8. As Sepp does not clearly identify who the first group of Yaros were, it is unclear what their relationship was to Moreira.
The Portuguese tended to be more successful in this regard. Much like Santa Fe and Corrientes, the plazas of Rio Grande and San Miguel existed as a means to access cattle ranges and to form a bridge between Colónia do Sacramento and Laguna, further north along the Atlantic Coast. By 1703, Portuguese explorers had opened the “Coastal Route” (Caminho da Costa), a pathway that began in Colónia and continued along the coast to Maldonado, Rio Grande, and eventually Laguna, and within three decades, livestock traders (tropeiros) added a line of access from Rio Grande all the way to the markets of Sorocaba, near São Paulo. The perpetual presence of military forces, combined with the Spanish foundation of Montevideo in 1725, made the first leg of this journey complicated for Portuguese tropeiros. For this reason, authorities from Laguna made numerous efforts to develop positive relations with the Minuán tolderías that dominated territories between Rio Grande and Colónia. Rather than trying to engage the tolderías with military force, Portuguese administrators chose instead to provide frequent payments, generally in the form of tobacco, yerba mate, and aguardiente. In exchange for these continued payments, Minuán tolderías provided guides for the travelers and defense against Spanish and missionary hostilities. The survival of this expansive network of trails, which simultaneously sustained Colónia and fed the Sorocaba markets, depended upon

31 João Borges Fortes, “Velhos Caminhos do Rio Grande do Sul,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul, 4o trimestre (1938): 210–5; Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 35; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (período hispánico), vol. 1, 34. The rise in the demand of cattle and the growth of the Sorocaba market were directly linked to the mining boom in Minas Gerais, and thus the transport of cattle from the Rio de la Plata was a fundamental cog in a broader imperial machinery. The Caminho da Costa was the only route between Colónia and Rio Grande, and was a forty day journey.

Minuán collaboration. Even the Conselho Ultramarino in Lisbon recognized this need as an imperial imperative, and each time Minuanes demanded greater payments, the Portuguese acquiesced. 33

In this context of isolated plazas separated by mobile tolderías, local interests frequently superseded imperial or ethnic allegiances. While scholars have generally framed interethnic relations in the region in terms of Spanish, Portuguese, or missionary settlers versus Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, Yaros, or Guenoas, a more localized perspective better captures the multipolar world that these people inhabited. The relationship between the plaza of Santa Fe and the Yasú tolderías provides a clear example. Juan, Miguel, and Pedro Yasú were well-known Charrúa caciques who positioned their tolderías across the Río Paraná from Santa Fe during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Santa Fe was a consistent trading partner for the Yasús, who were in turn a key ally and source of labor for the plaza. In exchange for weapons, horses, and foodstuffs, the caciques supplied captives to the plaza. Not only did the list of captives include other Charrúas, but Santa Fe defied imperial prohibitions on human trafficking (rescate). 34

While trade items changed over the years, the close relationship between settlers in Santa Fe and the Yasús persisted. In 1713, for example, when a Charrúa attacked and injured a boy from Santa Fe, Juan Yasú wrote to the cabildo and promised that if the boy died, he would take the life of the delinquent. 35 Two years later, the Cabildo of Santa Fe attempted to thwart an expedition ordered from Buenos Aires against the Yasús and other Charrúa tolderías and offered refuge to the Yasús and their kin. Local ties were so


34 Nidia R. Areces, ed., Reflexiones sobre el V Centenario (Rosario: UNR Editoria, 1992), 159-67; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”; AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg. 11, exp. 1.

35 AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1713-12-30.
strong that when the expedition came upon several of the tolderías, they were discovered on ranches operated by individuals from Santa Fe.\textsuperscript{36} The plaza’s precarious position between Charrúas to the east and Abipones and Mocovíes to the west is one way to account for this persistent allegiance. Indeed, Santa Fe frequently found itself reduced to the limits of its plaza and depended upon peace with Charrúas to garner aid in conflicts against western foes.\textsuperscript{37} Nonetheless, the mutual participation in amicable relations demonstrates a deeper bond between the city and the Yasús. It was for this reason that Santa Fe’s defense of the Yasú tolderías in 1715 did not extend to other Charrúas in the region.

This tendency toward local allegiance also manifested itself in other plazas in the region. In the 1728 to 1729 investigations of a rebellion in Paraguay, for instance, residents of Corrientes showed themselves to be strong allies of local Charrúa tolderías. They accused Jesuits and Guaraníes of abducting Charrúa women and children, noting that at the moment of the raid, Charrúa men were working in some of the city’s ranches. They also complained that the missions’ aggression came at a moment in which Corrientes was at peace with local Charrúas, relying on them for livestock, river crossings, and cattle-based products.\textsuperscript{38} Corrientes was eventually able to restore relations with the tolderías, and thereafter their relationship contrasted sharply to that between tolderías and the missions: “If anyone has a horse with a branding of the [Jesuits, the Charrúas] don’t let him slaughter cattle.”\textsuperscript{39}

In spite of their shared antagonism with Charrúas and other tolderías in the early decades of the eighteenth century, mission plazas did not operate as an organic whole. They too represented an

\textsuperscript{36} AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1715-12-07, 1715-12-08, & 1715-12-10; MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C17, P1, No. 40; Sallaberry, \textit{Los charrúas y Santa Fe}, 190. For more on the Piedrabuena expedición, see: Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico”; Latini and Lucaioli, “Las tramas de la interacción colonial en el Chaco y la "otra banda.” Santa Fe also opposed a 1735 expedition against Charrúas. Sallaberry, \textit{Los charrúas y Santa Fe}, 232.

\textsuperscript{37} RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, f. 402v; AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1710-10-11; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”.

\textsuperscript{38} AGI - Buenos Aires, 235, “Responses to questions #115 and #116 of inquiry.”

\textsuperscript{39} “Si uno tiene un caballo con una marca de los padres, no lo dejan coger ganado.” \textit{ibid.}, f. 89.
archipelago of plazas, and their internal rivalries often played out in the competition for resources. During Silvestre González’s trip to the Vaquería del Mar, for example, he and the other travelers from San Borja received more aid from Guenoa allies than from other missionaries. In the pages of his diary, he cited conflicts between his mission and representatives from San Miguel, Apóstoles, and other missions over ownership of the yerba mate and tobacco that they had brought and the cattle that they had corralled. At one point, individuals from la Concepción tried to trick González into returning to San Borja so that he would not partake in the division of cattle that they had gathered.\textsuperscript{40}

Portuguese plazas did not tend to exhibit the same tensions with each other as their Spanish and mission counterparts. This may have been due to their smaller number, the perpetual threat of incursions from Buenos Aires and the missions, or their reliance on trade relationships with Minuanes and other tolderías. As advance posts in the extreme south of Brazil, these plazas relied heavily on imperial support from distant administrative and economic poles, such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, or Salvador da Bahia, and therefore their conflicts were vertical in nature. English travelers who arrived in Rio Grande in 1742 observed one instance of this dynamic. Soon before the Englishmen’s arrival, the soldiers of the plaza had dismissed many of the ranking officers and appointed locals in their place. They then detained the Brigadier Governor from Laguna and would not let him leave until he promised to dispatch the clothes, provisions, and money that had been promised to them and resolved their grievances.\textsuperscript{41} Local interests, while not generating conflict with other Portuguese plazas, could supersede imperial fealty nonetheless.

\textsuperscript{40} González, Diario de viaje a las Vaquerías del Mar (1705), 20, 23-5. Recent scholarship has begun to recognize the lack of uniformity and frequent tensions amongst mission plazas, particularly in their competition for resources. See, for example. Wucherer, “Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay”: 6.

\textsuperscript{41} Jacob A. Cummings, South America (Boston: Cummings, Hillard & Company, 1820), 173–76.
Informality

The territorial organization of plazas and tolderías engendered particular types of spatial practices among regional inhabitants. Given the short territorial reach of individual plazas and the vast plains that separated them, neither Iberian empire exercised control over the region’s interior. This provided the opportunity for individuals desiring to break free from administrative control to create new lives for themselves, eschewing imperial responsibilities and alliances. Military deserters, criminals, traders, and others frequently found life in the countryside more welcoming than in a particular plaza. Few documents exist about these people, but this is more a result of the limited purview of colonial writers than the emptiness of rural spaces. Nonetheless, close look at records pertaining to the countryside offers glimpses of this world, where informal relations did not lend themselves to official regulation or recording. In these spaces, settlers who had abandoned Portuguese, Spanish, and mission plazas lived together unencumbered by the restrictions of imperial allegiances. They developed informal economies based on trade and short-term or seasonal labor stints, at times working on the ranches of a given plaza or participating in cattle runs. Most importantly, they maintained close relationships with local tolderías, whether as inhabitants, neighbors, or tributaries, and occasionally functioned as arbitrators between them and individual plazas.

Both Portuguese and Spanish authorities disapproved of this sort of lifestyle and made efforts to bring such people under official control. When Portuguese officials sent an expedition to scout potential sites for a settlement in Rio Grande in 1728, they stumbled upon one such group. In a letter to the Portuguese king, the Governor of Rio de Janeiro recounted that as his commissioned explorers entered into the river they found:

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42 High-level authorities tended to refer to these individuals in general terms, indicating the limited knowledge that they had over rural inhabitants. See, for example: Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Serie II Tomo IV (Buenos Aires, 1927); publicados bajo la dirección del Archivo de la Nación, 273.
thirty Portuguese and sixty Castilians, and [Manuel de Antonio, the leader of the expedition] said that these were supposedly criminals from Buenos Aires, and bandits, which will be motive for Castile to allege that those lands belong to it on account of being inhabited by its vassals.43

This encounter and the governor’s preoccupation highlight several important aspects of these informal living arrangements. First, while Portuguese officials hoped to found a new plaza along the Rio Grande, the supposedly vacant lands that they planned to use were already occupied. Second, the expeditionary team found individuals identified both as Spanish and as Portuguese, most likely according to their spoken language. This indicates that imperial rivalries carried little weight for individuals beyond the purview of either crown. Third, both the governor and his informant assumed that the Spaniards were criminals from Buenos Aires, though neither explained how he arrived at this conclusion. This is certainly conceivable, but it also demonstrates their association of informality with extralegal behavior, a trope that would become more common as the century wore on. Lastly, the governor feared that Spain would use the presence of its vassals as a means to claim regional lands. This concern points to the limited range of Portuguese and Spanish imperial projects, as well as their dependence upon informal relationships to engage the countryside. Indeed, after receiving news of these settlers, the governor sought to establish an even larger colony comprised of individuals who frequented the area.44

These off-the-grid communities frequently depended upon tolderías or included individuals from them. In 1718, for example, the Governor of Buenos Aires complained of two populations established far away from Colônia, each comprised of Portuguese vassals and independent native peoples. Frustrated by


44 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.26, f. 71.
their consumption of cattle, the governor denounced the frequency of such communities: “[T]hese sorts of men, both from Portuguese and Spanish settlements often join together, and seized by the liberty that they desire, [they] attempt to accompany the barbarians [tolderías].” Similarly, in 1734, a Portuguese writer noted that a number of Spanish settlers had “formed ties with the Indians that inhabit [lands near Maldonado and north of Montevideo] that they enter to hunt with the Indians and establish themselves in the countryside that [their tolderías] currently possess.” The text then pointed out the vast number of mestizo children that these relationships had come to produce. Given their position beyond the scope of local points of authority, other groups like these likely existed. From the few recorded cases, however, it is clear that trade and at times kinship with tolderías was a core attribute of their survival.

In spite of their official complaints about informal communities, administrators from regional plazas often depended upon them to circumvent regulations and develop trade relations that transcended imperial divisions. Indeed, one of the key reasons the Governor of Rio de Janeiro wanted to establish a plaza in Rio Grande was to conduct “fraudulent” commerce with the missions. A 1723 arrangement between Portuguese officials from Laguna and Spanish settlers near Rio Grande provides an even more illustrative example. These settlers had originally come from Santa Fe and Colónia and hoped to broker trade with Laguna. They explained that merchants from Santa Fe were discontented with Spanish forces that had blockaded Colónia because they were impinging upon their city’s cattle supply. Establishing a trade

45 “(…) suelen juntarse diferentes hombres así de ellos como de los de este Pays, que llevados de la libertad, que apetezen, solicitan acompañarse con los barbaros.” AGI - Charcas, 263, (Buenos Aires, 1718-07-04). These communities presumably included women, despite their lack of mention in existing records. For similar cases, see: AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1723-03-14); Cayetano Cattáneo, “Relación del viaje realizado de Buenos Aires a la Misiones Orientales,” in La cruz y el lazo, ed. Esteban F. Campal, 175–94 (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1994), 184–85.

46 “se ligarão com os Indios q’habitavão, q’ entraráo a cazar com as Indias, e estabelecer-se no Pais, q’ actualm.te posiuem” BNP - F.R. 909, f. 64.

47 Fraudulent (a fraude) trade refers here to contraband, or the trading across imperial lines. BNP - F.R. 909, f. 68v; Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, Documentos relativos ao ‘banderismo’ paulista e questões connexas, no periodo de 1721 a 1740, 121–22.
relationship between these merchants and Laguna would be of mutual interest, they argued. The ranking official from Laguna agreed, and he sent them back to Santa Fe to establish terms.48

A closer analysis reveals how such an arrangement was achieved. While the principal actors in this account are Spaniards who had established themselves as traders in the countryside, these individuals were only able to position themselves as such because of their relations with mobile peoples. Before traveling to Santa Fe, this same group of traders acted as intermediaries between Laguna and Minuanees near Rio Grande. In fact, it was these individuals who delivered the first payments from the Portuguese to local caciques as they attempted to curry favor. These were also the same people who came back to Laguna expressing the caciques’ demands for greater payments, indicating that they had a preexisting relationship with the Minuán tolderías that were near Rio Grande.49 Otherwise, it would not have made sense for them to be the arbitrators of peace. In light of the dominance that Minuán tolderías exercised over the expansive plains that separated Laguna and Rio Grande from Santa Fe and Colônia, it was most likely the relationship that the traders held with local caciques that made their enterprise possible.

**Mobility**

Estimates regarding tolderías’ total populations varied widely, as most lived beyond the myopic vantage points of imperial eyes and as observers applied their calculations to one of several imagined ethnic

48 In addition to proposing future trade, the Spaniards also requested license to sell the 800 livestock that they had with them. Fortes, *Rio Grande de São Pedro*, XXXVII, 16–17; Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, ed., *Correspondência e Papeis Avalos de Rodrigo Cesar de Menezes (1721-1728)*, Publicação oficial de documentos interessantes para a história e costumes de São Paulo 32 (São Paulo: Typographia Andrade & Mello, 1901), 299. For more on transimperial trade in the Río de la Plata during the first half of the eighteenth century, see: Fabrício Pereira Prado, “In the Shadows of Empire: Trans-Imperial Networks and Colonial Identity in Bourbon Río de la Plata (c. 1750 - c. 1813),” (Dissertation, Emory University, 2009), 44–47.

categories, rather than to tolderías collectively. Nonetheless, when considering together the population estimates from numerous locales, tolderías accounted for somewhere between five and ten thousand people at any given time. Individual tolderías generally included about fifty to one hundred people, although they frequently joined with others to form encampments of several hundred occupants. The few imperial observers who entered tolderías noted that they included tent-like structures (toldos), cemeteries, herding grounds, and gathering places; they also viewed a wide range of economic activities, including cultivating honey, hunting, fishing, herding feral livestock, and domesticating horses. A scarcity of sources prohibits a detailed discussion of social organization, but it appears that each toldería had at least one cacique as well as spiritual leaders. The periodic union of distinct tolderías also indicated broad networks of kinship ties or political allegiance. Indeed, despite the hyper-locality of tolderías, certain caciques were able to garner support, broker agreements, and offer protection for multiple tolderías, each of which had their own cacique.

This diversity and locality belies the broad ethnic categories ascribed to tolderías by imperial authors. No evidence exists to suggest that such “imposed identities” – Bohanes, Charrúas, Guenoas, Minuanes, Yaros, and others – were meaningful to the native peoples to whom they referred; rather, they reflected imperial observers’ attempts to catalogue inhabitants on a regional scale and define political relationships that would apply to broad populations. These large and homogeneous ethnic categories enabled imperial writers to assume uniformity of action by members of the same group. Yet the intermittent and contradictory uses of such terms in imperial writings occluded the local, material factors

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50 For example: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 60v; AGI - Chile, 153, (Montevideo, 1724-08-29); AGI - Buenos Aires, 304, (Buenos Aires, 1749-09-05); AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31); Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 64; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”: 123.

51 José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 233, 236; Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 166; Pereira, Minuanos/Guenoas, 183.

52 Nacuzzi, Identidades impuestas.
that shaped native interests, power dynamics, social organization, and actions. Indigenous communities that shared an ethnonym in imperial records frequently fought against one another, pacts made with individual caciques rarely included all peoples identified by the same ethnonym, and multiple ethnonyms were often ascribed to single communities.\(^5\) To understand tolderías’ dominance over the countryside amidst relatively small populations and localized social organization requires looking past supposed ethnic uniformity and focusing on material concerns and logics of mobility.

The mobile lifestyles of tolderías were strategic choices. While colonial authors associated mobility with vagrancy and laziness, this way of living maximized territorial control and access to resources and trade.\(^5\) Distant locales provided the opportunity to gather different resources at different times of the year. For this reason, tolderías frequently moved according to the season, returning to the same stopping points (paraderos) along the way in patterns of “seasonal nomadism.”\(^5\) One observer noted that Minuán tolderías “ordinarily go to the hills of Maldonado during the summer, and in winter retire to the part of the Río Negro that drains in the Uruguay, where they make drinks from honey,” while another explained that the highlands near Maldonado were “common habitation for the Minuanes during certain seasons because of the

\(^{53}\) Erbig Jr. and Latini, “Across Archival Limits”.

\(^{54}\) Colonial officials frequently used the term “vagar” to define tolderías’ movements. This term was significant for its double meaning. On one hand, vagar as derived from the Latin vagari means to wander, generally implying without a particular destination. On the other hand, vagar as derived from the Latin vacare means to be idle or at leisure, much like the contemporary English “vagrant”. The union of these meanings in the term vagar demonstrated the association that colonial authors made between wandering and being idle, as opposed to sedentary and productive. In the case of the Río de la Plata, authors associated the perceived vagrancy of mobile peoples with the proliferation of cattle, which provided an easily accessible food source.

\(^{55}\) Wucherer, “Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay”: 5. Lidia Nacuzzi has conceptualized Tehuelche movements in a similar way, focusing on fixed stopping points that Tehuelches frequented in Patagonia: Lidia R. Nacuzzi, “La cuestión del nomadismo entre los tehuelches,” Memoria Americana - Cuadernos de Etnohistoria, no. 1 (1991). In other instances, tolderías’ movements responded to human threats or served as a quarantine against smallpox epidemics. For example: Cayetano Cattáneo, “Relación del viaje realizado de Buenos Aires a la Misiones Orientales” in La cruz y el lazo, 187; Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la demarcación de limites en la América Meridional,” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros días, ed. Carlos Calvo Tomo Octavo (París: A. Durand, 1866), 211–13.
many deer that they can hunt there.” As the hills of Maldonado were near the Vaquería del Mar and honey reserves existed near the Río Negro, these tolderías were able to maximize both resources. Occupying both locales at the same time would not have been a realistic possibility, as seasonal variance in precipitation often restricted movement. Flat as they may have been, the pampas of the Río de la Plata were dissected by a vast network of rivers and creeks that would rise and fall according to rainfall. Moments of heavy rainfall, most frequent in the autumn and winter months of April through September, caused sudden rises in the water table and transformed shallow streams into fast-moving currents that could not be traversed on foot. It was for this reason that Francisco Borja and Miguel Ximénez struggled to arrive at the Minuán tolderías in the winter of 1731, and why the caciques were forced to wait before they could contact Yapelman. Knowledge of river crossings and changing currents was therefore essential for regional inhabitants, as it allowed them to herd livestock to particular locales and then maintain them there until waters subsided.

Awareness of the vacillations of river depth also provided mobile peoples with a strategic advantage over their sedentary counterparts. By positioning their tolderías relatively close to a particular plaza, they could time their raids on ranches to coincide with heavy rainfalls. This practice was particularly common around the area of Santo Domingo Soriano, which was located near the delta of the Río Negro and prone to inundations. On numerous occasions, outsiders entered into Soriano’s ranches, extracted livestock, and then quickly absconded to their tolderías. Over and over, the town reacted by putting together an armed force to recover the losses and enact punitive measures, only to find itself restricted by the rising water

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56 “(…) los Binuanes, los cuales asisten de ordinario por el verano en las cercanías de las Sierras de Maldonado, y por el invierno se retiran a la parte del río Negro, que desagua en el Uruguay, donde hacen bebidas de miel de abejas.” AGI – Charcas, 237, “Copia de memorial conteniendo propuesta de José García Inclán, sobre poblar en Montevideo” (1720-11-08). Cited through Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 165–66. Also transcribed in: Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los chartrías en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 241, and Ponce de León, Luis R., “Minuanes o Guenoas”: 28, “es havitacion comun de los minuanes a temporadas por la mucha casa de venados que ay en el” AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1750-01-27).

57 Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 164–66.
The frequency of such events and the fact that outsiders were able to transport livestock across the same lands points to the calculated timing of such actions. Otherwise, the actions would have resulted either in the death of those responsible or armed incursions into the tolderías. A similar situation arose during the 1731 conflict in Montevideo, as the plaza’s inhabitants found themselves blockaded simultaneously by Minuanes and the rising tides of local waterways.\textsuperscript{59}

River systems also channeled the movement of travelers, so by establishing their tolderías next to a particular ford (paso) or at the headwaters of a river, mobile peoples could best monitor the countryside.\textsuperscript{60} Despite the region’s flat landscape, travelers rarely had the opportunity to cross the plains in a straight line. Even in moments of little rainfall, trepidatious currents forced people to follow coastlines until they found areas shallow enough to cross. Sifting through documents written from the region’s interior, therefore, one encounters the frequent mention of river crossings as key elements of the rural landscape. Travelers generally named these sites, implying their centrality to trade routes and their relative fixity. Often, they noted the presence of tolderías at the base of a given ford, and even named some fords to reflect this. One example is the “Paso del Cacique Quei,” which was occupied by Minuanes.\textsuperscript{61} Rivers provided sustenance and safety, as their lush surroundings offered wood, shelter, animals, and places to hide. At the same time, they allowed small numbers of people to control vast expanses of land.

It is likely for this reason that so many mobile peoples established their tolderías near the falls of the Río Uruguay, near the modern-day town of Salto. Although twentieth-century damming has created a vast reservoir in the area, during the eighteenth century the river was fordable by foot. Numerous travelers

\textsuperscript{58} AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Vivoras, 1746-09-16 & 1746-09-23).

\textsuperscript{59} AGNU - Ex Museo y Archivo Histórico Nacional, Caja 1, n. 19, f. 3; AGI - Charcas, 214, (Buenos Aires, 1731-04-30).

\textsuperscript{60} The same dynamic applied for highland passes, such as those that cut across the Cuchilla Grande in the east of the region.

\textsuperscript{61} Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro Volume LII (Rio de Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1930), 418.
passed through this site on their way to Buenos Aires or the Jesuit-Guarani missions and frequently encountered either Charrúa or Yaro tolderías encamped at the crossing.\textsuperscript{62} This also explains the location of Guenoa tolderías along the Río Piraí during the 1731 conflict with Montevideo, as this river was near the headwaters of the Río Uruguay, the Río Grande, and the Río Jacuí watersheds, making it a key conduit for rural travelers. Minuán tolderías’ patterns of seasonal migration to the hills of Maldonado, which divided rivers running to the Río Negro from those that emptied into the Lagoa Mirim and the Atlantic, followed this pattern as well. This hilly area, known as the Cuchilla General, became a sort of regional highway between Colônia and Rio Grande.

The strategic location of tolderías also explains the permanent settlements that eventually came to occupy the same spaces. For example, long before the Spanish founded plazas in Montevideo and Maldonado, Minuanes used those areas as stopping points. While the selection of these sites by Minuanes could be attributed to either the large cattle reserves that existed there or to their connection to the Atlantic economy, it is clear that they were of strategic interest. By occupying them, tolderías could position themselves as intermediaries between foreign traders and other tolderías further inland.\textsuperscript{63} Over the course of the eighteenth century, Spanish, Portuguese, and missionary forces also strived to station troops along river crossings or headwaters that were previously occupied by mobile peoples. One key example was Batovi, which like the Río Piraí was a site that easily connected to a variety of watersheds. This paradero had been important to Minuanes long before it became a point of contestation for Spanish and Portuguese militaries; when Spanish settlers attempted to occupy the area, they encountered armed resistance and


\textsuperscript{63} Montevideo and Maldonado are two of the principal natural harbors along what is now the Uruguayan coast. From the late seventeenth-century, Minuanes traded with European ships at these sites. AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12); AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 44, 49-50.
discovered numerous cemeteries at the site. In the same way, the Spanish sought to establish a settlement in Minas, near Maldonado, “to prevent enemy Indians from invading Montevideo’s farms and ranches, [and so that the Portuguese and other nations cannot] enter by land and invade Montevideo.” By closing this highland pass, the city would dramatically reduce its exposure to land-based attacks.

By positioning themselves in strategic locales, certain caciques could extend their influence throughout the region. After procuring peace with Miguel Ximénez in 1731, for example, the cacique Yapelman left the tolderías near the Río Piraí to “give the news to his vassals that were near the [Río Cebollatí, southwest of the Lagoa Mirim], and also to two other caciques that lived in the ranches of San Miguel [the mission].” Assuming that these were the furthest tolderías under his control, Yapelman’s reach extended from the Atlantic coast southeast of the Lagoa Mirim all the way to the mission ranches. Others demonstrated a similar range of influence. One of the first caciques that met with Miguel Ximénez that year, Yaguaretè, moved his tolderías in various locations between the Río Piraí and Colónia do Sacramento. Likewise, a cacique named Tacú, who was a key player in the peace negotiations between Minuanes and Montevideo, appeared at the plaza of Rio Grande several times in the following years, making pacts and developing kinship ties to Portuguese leaders. Charrúa caciques demonstrated similar patterns, bringing together numerous tolderías under their aegis. The Charrúa cacique Carabí and the Yasús provide


65 “para impedir a los Yndios enemigos al que hagan sus inbasiones en las chacras y estancias de Montevideo, [y para que los Portugueses y otras naciones no puedan] internarse por tierra a imbadir a Montevideo.” AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo XV, 95.

66 “dando aviso â sus vasallos que estaban azia el Cebellati, y tambien â otros dos Caziques que vivian en la Estancia de S.n Miguel” Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 169.


68 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrias en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 53; IEB - AL-072-042; Hameister, “No principio era o caos”: 114; Kühn, Breve historia do Rio Grande do Sul, 21.
two clear examples, the former operating between Yapeyú and lands to the southwest and the latter between Santa Fe and Corrientes.69

The broad territorial reach of particular caciques implies a certain level of hierarchy among tolderías. Knowledge of regional geography would not have been enough to exercise such broad control, since such knowledge was not exclusive to any particular cacique or toldería, and while the use of force was certainly an option in expanding one’s control, no single toldería had a monopoly on violence or a clear advantage in this regard. Therefore, for a given cacique or toldería to develop an expansive range of influence, they had to meet the localized demands of other tolderías. This was most often achieved by providing protection or resources and trade items. In the 1731 case, for example, the four caciques that meet with Ximénez – Yaguaretè, Pastau, Guayancay, and the son of Coroya – had no direct involvement in the conflict.70 Nonetheless, the principal cacique, Yapelman, had the authority to call upon them and others throughout the region to join in the defense of tolderías near Montevideo. In spite of this clear hierarchy in the priest’s account, sources from Montevideo never once mention Yapelman’s name. Instead, they identify Tacú as their primary foe, a cacique who never appears in Ximénez’s account. Furthermore, after meeting in Montevideo to hear the plaza’s petition for peace, Tacú then returned to the tolderías to consult with other caciques.71 Thus, while Tacú and several unnamed caciques were those whose tolderías were directly in conflict with Montevideo, Yapelman was able to garner support for them through his authority over

69 Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico”: 4; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 321–22; Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 234. Charrúa caciques seemed to have shorter ranges of geographical influence than their Minuán counterparts; however, the dynamic of principal caciques that exercised authority over numerous tolderías appears to be consistent for both. The shorter territorial reach may be attributed to a greater population density in the Mesopotamian region (currently the Argentine provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes), but more research would be necessary to show that to be the case.

70 Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 165–66.

tolderías throughout the region. In the same way, if there had been conflict between the northern tolderías and mission plazas, Yapelman would have had to provide support for their cause as well.

Principal caciques and their tolderías were also able to expand their influence through the provision of trade goods to both plazas and other tolderías. Throughout the region, as tolderías guided plaza residents to cattle ranges and then aided in the slaughter of cows and other animals, they received payment for their services. Likewise, when they sold horses, bulls, and leather within the plazas’ walls, they were paid in kind. Instances of such relationships exist in records from nearly every plaza in the region, including Rio Grande, Colônia, Yapeyú, La Cruz, Santo Domingo Soriano, and Santa Fe, and at times authorities even institutionalized annual payments. Moreover, when French and British traders approached the coast, Minuanes in particular were almost always present to exchange cattle and leather for other goods. When taken collectively, these transactions demonstrate a frequent, if not steady, supply of external goods acquired by individual tolderías.

Payments to tolderías varied and almost never appeared itemized in account books, making it impossible to trace any specific flow of goods. Nonetheless, it is clear that they included yerba mate, tobacco, fabrics, hats, staffs, swords, knives, firearms, and sugar. Without knowing the quantity of goods procured by tolderías, it is difficult to surmise their intention in any specific transaction. Indeed, many payments by plazas appear to have been symbolic, especially when given in exchange for safe passage or protection. These payments were generally in smaller amounts and directed at caciques themselves. For the caciques, they likely signified recognition by the plaza of their authority over regional lands. Thus, when

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72 See, for example: AGI - Charcas, 382, (Madrid, 1716-10-17); AGI - Charcas, 226, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-10); AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1732-01-22; AHU - Rio Grande (019), Caixa 1, Doc 18; Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, Documentos relativos ao ’bandeirismo’ paulista e questões connexas, no periodo de 1721 a 1740, 92; Lozano, Historia de las Revoluciones de la Provincia del Paraguay (1721-1735), Tomo 1, 273; Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, 50–51; Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo IV, 313; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 126–27; Emilio A. Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 2a ed (Buenos Aires: Librería Editorial Platero, 1979), 74–75; Fernandes Pinheiro, Anais da Província de São Pedro (História da Colonização Alemã no Rio Grande do Sul), 196–200.
representatives from Laguna offered payment to Minuán caciques in exchange for the ability to settle near Rio Grande, the caciques had the freedom to reject their offer. They had no physical need for the items that Portuguese settlers possessed, but wanted a level of payment that acknowledged their authority. Still, certain non-symbolic trade goods flowed from plazas on the perimeter towards the interior. For example, in their attack on Yapeyú’s ranches in 1701, Guenoas used firearms that they had acquired from the Portuguese in Colônia. Three years later, in an attack on Santo Domingo Soriano, they used guns acquired not only from Colônia, but also from the missions.

The flow of external trade goods to the region’s interior shaped relations between tolderías. As competing groups jockeyed for regional control and allegiances, the capacity to proffer demanded goods was a strategic advantage. This was evident in a conversation recorded in 1693 by Spanish captain Gabriel de Toledo. While making a journey from Corrientes to Colônia, Toledo came upon a Charrúa toldería, where he was received by Francisco, a Spanish-speaking cacique with whom he had friendly relations. Toledo asked Francisco for news on an ongoing conflict between his tolderías and their Guenoa enemies.

In response, Francisco gave the following account:

[Our tolderías] are always in a bad state and now very concerned that [the Guenoa Indians] will defeat and destroy us, now that they have become friends with the Portuguese settled in the Islands of San Gabriel [Colônia do Sacramento], because with their support will no doubt destroy [us].

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73 For details on pacts between the Portuguese and Minuanes near Rio Grande, see: AHU - São Paulo (023), Caixa 1, Doc 67; AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 39, Doc 9058; Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, Correspondencia e Papéis Avalos de Rodrigo Cesar de Menezes (1721-1728), 290; Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 15–18; “Memoria dos serviços prestados pelo Mestre de Campo André Ribeiro Coutinho no Governo doRio Grande de S. Pedro, dirigida a Gomes Freire de Andrade, em 1740”: 237–46; Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo IV, 313.

74 Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, 229–30; AGI - Charcas, 263, (Madrid, 1716-05-12).

75 In Toledo’s report, the Charrúas enemies appeared as “Indios Yanuras.” This was likely a reference to peoples more frequently identified as “Guenoas,” given the phonetic proximity of the two words, the geographical location of the people in question, and the fact that the ethnonym “Yanura” does not appear in any other source.
Given that the Charrúas and Guenoas were in a state of war and therefore not communicating with each other, Toledo pressed further as to how Francisco could possibly know this, to which the cacique replied:

We have news from other Indians on the frontier [between Charrúas and Guenoas], who are afraid of both [of us]. Having seen them with several knives, beads, and other trade items, I asked them where they had acquired the said goods. They then said to me that they had been provided by the Guenoa Indians, and that they had many of them, along with rolled tobacco and several types of cloth. 76

Francisco went on to explain that Guenoas acquired these items from the Portuguese in exchange for horses and meat, and lamented that this privileged trade position enabled them to inflict damage on Charrúa tolderías.

In the competition between Charrúa and Guenoa caciques for the allegiance of tolderías wedged between them, territorial dynamics were paramount. Despite the internal conflicts and diversity previously discussed, tolderías identified as “Charrúa” appeared more frequently along the west of the Río Uruguay, while those identified as “Guenoa” and “Minuán” tended to be to the east. 77 As each sought to expand their range of influence and control, Charrúa caciques and those further east jockeyed to garner the support of tolderías situated between them. From Francisco’s account, it appears that the two principal means of building such connections were military might and the provision of desired goods. For tolderías wedged between Charrúa, Guenoa, and Minuán geographic strongholds, this meant constantly negotiating their position. Unable to compete directly with either group, they instead played one against the other.

76 “(...) siempre andaban de malos y oí mui rezelosos de que los bençiesen y destruisen por la ócaçion, de Averse Amistado con Los portugueses que estan poblados en las islas de San Gabriel que con su fomento, no duda los destruirán. y Preguntando por Este testigo, como savia Lo que le avia referido quando los dhos Yndios Yanuras, como sus enemigos no hablaban con ellos: dijo que La notizia la tenían de ôtros yndios sus fronterisos, que estan en el com medio de unos y otros a los quales por haverles visto algunos cuchillos quenta, y ôtros rescates, Les pregunto el dho yndio que de donde Avian alcansado los dhos Generos: y que entonçes Le dixeran como los Avian rescatado de los yndios Yanuas, que tenían muchos dellos: y Juntam.te tavaco torçido y algunos Generos de lienzo: quienes Le Avian referido que todo aquello les daban los portugueses que Estan Poblados en las islas de San Gabriel a truque de Cavallos y carnes con que los asistian y que Ellos Les daban los dhos Generos y los regalaban y acarisaban mucho: y que de esta noticia se hallaban bastantam.te Rezelosos de que faborezidos de los Portugueses Les harían daños mui considerables (...)” AGI - Charcas, 262, f. 16-16v.

77 Bracco, *Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes*, 58, 156-68.
Guenoa tolderías had gained the upper hand over Charrúas in the provision of trade goods, and the
lynchpin of their success was their trade relationship with the Portuguese in Colônia. Positioned more
toward the coast, Guenoas were more able to integrate themselves into the Atlantic economy and thus
provided goods that Charrúa tolderías could not. In the same investigation that produced Gabriel de
Toledo’s account, for example, others testified that Guenoa tolderías were trading cows and horses in
Colônia for tobacco, knives, sugar, and cloth.78 While Charrúa tolderías had access to tobacco and knives
through their relationships with Santa Fe, Corrientes, or mission plazas, they likely could not provide the
same range of goods as their rivals. Recognizing the utilitarian and symbolic value of such items, Francisco
and other Charrúa caciques found themselves outmatched in the competition over intermediate tolderías.

Given the advantage that Guenoas held because of their relationship with Colônia, it is unsurprising
that over the next few decades other tolderías sought to establish direct partnerships with the plaza. By
1703, Colônia’s governor, Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral, reported positive relations (boa correspondência)
with Yaros, Guaraníes, Serranos, Chanás, Bohanes, and Charrúas, in addition to those already established
with Guenoas.79 By circumventing Guenoa intermediaries, other tolderías could access valuable trade goods
and strengthen their position. They sought similar partnerships throughout the region. Charrúa tolderías
already possessed long-standing commercial relations with Santa Fe and Corrientes, but those wedged
between Charrúas and Guenoas did not have the same territorial advantage. They instead pursued trade
with missionary embarkations traveling up and down the Río Uruguay, acquiring such items as tobacco,
breads, yerba mate, knives, pins, and metal fishhooks in exchange for horses.80 These commercial ties

78 AGI - Charcas, 262, f. 1v-3v, 7v-8.
79 Sebastião da Veiga Cabral, Descrição Corográfica e Coleção Histórica do Continente da Nova Colônia da Cidade do Sacramento
(Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1965); Apartada de la Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay - Tomo XXIX,
19; AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Doc 26; Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo
Primero, 414.
80 Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, 50–53.
allowed individual tolderías to maintain their livelihoods without submitting to the hierarchical relations that others sought to establish.

*Interdependence*

The perpetual competition amongst tolderías and plazas generated a multipolar world in which no single group was able to assert unilateral dominance. For this reason, individual plazas and tolderías continually sought to establish bonds with others that shared similar interests. As noted, these pacts often superseded imperial or ethnic ties and came about primarily through local interests. They also tended to be short-lived, as the plurality of local aims and constant changes in territorial conditions simultaneously produced new opportunities and points of conflict. While scholars have traditionally sought to explain these trends in terms of allegiances between ethnicities and empires, they are better understood as the negotiation of shared or competing interests between individual plazas and tolderías.\(^81\) Whether for access to resources and trade goods or for defense, plazas and tolderías developed fragile relations of mutual dependency in the face of a plurality of competitors.

Relations between Colônia do Sacramento and local tolderías demonstrate the ways in which interests could align. From the moment of its founding in 1680, Colônia served as the furthest Portuguese settlement in the extreme south of Brazil. Across the river from Buenos Aires and separated from the rest of Brazil by Jesuit missions, Colônia’s inhabitants relied heavily upon local tolderías for their survival. From the beginning, they offered payments to tolderías in an effort to preemptively win their support before

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\(^{81}\) The exact delimitation of purported alliances has varied by author; however, scholars have often argued for a bilateral division between the Portugueses/Minuanes and the Spanish/Guaraníes. Charrúas have fallen on either side of the imperial divide. This structuring of interethnic relations presupposed hierarchies between imperial patrons and indigenous clients, as well as the uniformity of imperial or ethnic categories. As a result, in their repeating of the perspectives of colonial authors, scholars manifested their same frustrations with native peoples, deeming them unfaithful partners or untrustworthy allies. Recent scholarship has challenged this tendency by focusing on the temporality of pacts or the ways in which native peoples negotiated between empires. See: Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas”; Frühau García, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados".
Spain had the chance to do the same. These pacts consistently proved beneficial to Colônia, whether to gain advance warning of Spanish and Jesuit-Guaraní military movements or for access to the countryside and its resources.

As the years passed and the Spanish attempted to blockade this plaza, its relationship with tolderías became essential for the sustenance of its residents. Indeed, in a letter written in 1715, the City of Buenos Aires lamented the impossibility of permanently unseating the Portuguese from Colônia, given their relationship with Charrúa, Minuán, and other tolderías. If these ties were not somehow broken, they feared that Colônia would be able to gain access to the river’s entire northern bank and all its major ports.

Consequently, one of Buenos Aires’s principal strategies for breaking the Portuguese hold on Colônia was to garner the favor of Minuán tolderías. Indeed, from the first years of the plaza’s foundation, Spanish troops reached out to “disobedient Indians” in order to convince them not to trade with Colônia or guide its inhabitants to local cattle ranges. By 1705, Spain was able to take control of the plaza, but the Treaty of Utrecht returned it to Portuguese in 1715. It is not surprising, then, that over the next decade, Buenos Aires sent no less than six commissions to curry the favor of Minuán caciques. In each of these instances, representatives of the Spanish governor offered payments of yerba mate, tobacco, and other products in the hope that the Minuanes would cease to provide a lifeline to Colônia. This strategy was not

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83 AGI - Charcas, 263, (Buenos Aires, 1715-12-16). Tapes also broke the blockade on occasion. AGI - Buenos Aires, 533, (Buenos Aires, 1736-03-20).

84 “yndios que no estan a la ôbediençia.” AGI - Charcas, 278, (Madrid, 1683-12-17). Unobedient here can be interpreted here as applying to native peoples who have not been baptized or who do not accept royal authority. In either case, the author is explicitly referring to the region’s mobile tolderías.

85 AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1722-05-31) & f. 11-13; AGI - Contaduría, 1932, (1717-12-04) cited in López Mazz and Bracco, *Minuanos*, 101; AGI - Charcas, 237, (San Lorenzo, 1720-11-08); AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12); AGI - Contaduría, 1937, (Buenos Aires, 1722-01-13); *Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires*, Tomo IV, 313; *Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires*, Serie II Tomo V (Buenos Aires, 1928); publicados bajo la dirección del Archivo de la Nación, 222–23.
always successful, given that the Portuguese opened their coffers as well, but in the race to secure Minuán favor, Spanish authorities occasionally gained the upper hand. In 1737, for example, a Portuguese military officer wrote from Maldonado:

> All of the countryside is full of Indians called Tapes, and Minuanes. They communicate with the Portuguese and with the Spanish, whichever provides a better coexistence….At present, they are found to be friends of the Spanish because the countryside is full of them impeding the Portuguese from taking cattle to Colônia.\textsuperscript{86}

Native support was indispensable for Iberian colonial projects, given the ephemeral nature of interethnic agreements. With Colônia, and later Montevideo, hanging in the balance, both empires recognized that without Minuaneis on their side they would never be able to establish a foothold on the northern shore of the Río de la Plata. This conflict frequently gave Minuaneis the upper hand in pact-making, and savvy caciques continually played one side off the other in order to extract greater payments.\textsuperscript{87}

While the Portuguese and the Spanish jockeyed for control of Colônia, Charrúa, Minuán, Guenoa, Bohan, and Yaro tolderías sought to use the plaza as a means to gain an upper hand on their competitors and as a counterbalance to the plazas of their various locales. Following the Battle of the Yi, for example, numerous tolderías sought refuge in Colônia while they recovered and regrouped. Although the plaza’s residents were wary of taking on refugees, its leadership was cognizant that developing ties with tolderías was in their best interest.\textsuperscript{88} Tolderías sought similar refuge in plazas throughout the region, generally remaining in the proximities of a particular locale for a number of months. While official records do not

\textsuperscript{86} “Toda aquela Campanha esta cheya de sentios hinos [indios?/gentio] a q’ chamão tapes, e outros minuanes hinos. E outros se comonicionão com os Portuguezes, e com os Castilhanos, e o mais he com quem lhes fas mayor comveniencia (…) estes ao presente se achão com amizade com os espanhuez, por andar aquella campanha cheya delles de empidir os Portuguezes, p.a lhe não passarem gados a Colonia.” BNP · F. 1445, f. 56. Other examples of tolderías participating in attacks on Colônia include: AHU · Serviço de Partes (030), Caixa 4, Doc 611; “Documentos sobre a Colônia do Sacramento: Cópia feita em 1938 por Artur da Motta Alves e propriedade da Biblioteca Riograndense, da Cidade do Rio Grande,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXV, 3o trimestre, No 99 (1945): 41–2.

\textsuperscript{87} AGI · Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1722-05-31); Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 621–7.

\textsuperscript{88} IHGB · Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.23, f. 79v-80; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 130.
always provide a clear picture of the motivations that tolderías had for their brief stays, it is most likely that these respites related to wars with other mobile peoples or a seasonal lack of resources. Plazas were generally able to provide security over their locale, and at times had cattle reserves that they could offer.

This occurred in 1748 and 1749, as numerous tolderías simultaneously sought refuge in plazas throughout the region. During those years, a conflict between Charrúa and Minuán tolderías seems to have spilled over to the entirety of the region’s countryside. Charrúas presented themselves in Yapeyú and the Spanish blockades of Colônia, while Minuanes sought refuge in Rio Grande. Each group cited the aggression of the other as their primary motive for seeking shelter and requested clothing and sustenance for the upcoming season. Each of the plazas acquiesced.89

This strategy of using plazas as temporary refuge also explains why mobile peoples established settlements, known as reductions (reducciones), with missionaries from time to time. Such arrangements provided mission plazas the opportunity to pursue spiritual goals and strategic alliances, and at the same time offered tolderías respite from their external conflicts (Map 1.1). During the latter part of the seventeenth century into the eighteenth, a number of reductions appeared, only to dissolve within several months or years. They included San Andrés (Guenoas/Yaros, 1657), Jesús María (Guenoas, 1682), San Joaquín (Charrúas/Yaros, 1690-1693), and San Joseph (Charrúas, 1743), among others. Each of these reductions operated as a distinct settlement; however, they were all near either San Borja or Yapeyú.90 Few

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89 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo de Bloqueo, 1748-03-26, 1748-05-21; Buenos Aires, 1748-04-16); “Registro de atos oficiais no presídio do Rio Grande (1737-1753),” Anais do Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul Volume 1 (1977): 258; Leite, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, vol. 6, 528–30; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os indios escolhem os seus aliados”: 619. In the case of Charrúas, they also faced in 1749 the first of several campaigns coordinated by the Governor of Buenos Aires. It is likely for this reason that a number of Charrúa tolderías chose to forge peaceful ties with Minuanes rather than to seek refuge in Spanish or missionary plazas. AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16); AGNA - IX. 23-3-4, cited in: Diego Bracco, “Los errores Charrúa y Guenoa-Minuán,” Jarbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas 41 (2004): 132–3.

90 AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, Documento 4390/1, #11; Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara, Tomo Primero, 165; Southeyl, Historia do Brazil, Tomo Quinto, 531; Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo Primero, 174; Furlong Cardiff, Cartografía jesuíta del Rio de la Plata, vol. 2, Lámina XXXII; Porto, Historia das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 67; Aníbal Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado: Contribución a la historia rural uruguaya, Biblioteca Uruguaya 5 (Montevideo: Ediciones del Nuevo Mundo, 1967), 58;
records exist of these sites, but since provisions would have been necessary to sustain them, being close to established missions made logical sense. Furthermore, if these arrangements came about in moments of duress for the tolderías, they would likely have needed to tap into existing missions’ reserves.

In some instances, the urgency of a given toldería’s need caused it to latch onto an already existing mission rather than founding one separately. This occurred in the Franciscan settlement of Santo Domingo Soriano, which Bohanes used during the summer of 1702 to 1703 as a refuge. Arriving in November 1702, the Bohanes sought military protection from Minuán tolderías, which the mission’s administrators willingly provided in the hope that their guests would eventually form a reduction of their own. By April 1703, however, local officials learned that the Bohanes had not only reconciled with their Minuán counterparts, but that they had made plans to leave the mission and take a number of its women with them. In response, the mission’s authorities proposed founding a new settlement nearby for the Bohanes, in order to separate them from Soriano’s inhabitants. Eventually, the Bohan tolderías left, leaving Soriano’s bewildered administrators to complain that they had done so “for their own motives, without cause, reason, or pretext.”91

Other reductions appear to have existed as well, though the scarcity of source materials makes it difficult to provide a precise estimate of how many. In a map drawn in 1749 by Jesuit Joseph Quiroga, for example, the priest marked a missionary settlement that had been established with Minuán tolderías near the headwaters of the Río Negro (Map 1.3). Due to the newness of the establishment, however, Quiroga noted that it and others could not be located with exactitude. Two years earlier, the Jesuit José Cardiel had lamented the failure of a Guenoa reduction along the Río Uruguay, suggesting that despite their best efforts,

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91 “(...) hallaron que se habían ido de su motivo, sin más causa, razón ni pretexto” AGNA - IX. 41-1-3, exp. 4, (Buenos Aires, 1703-10-08), transcribed in: Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 249–50.
the priests had been unable to overcome the Guenoa’s barbarism. In the end, they had left the settlement and returned to their kin in the countryside.\textsuperscript{92} Considering these brief references alongside the tangible benefits that temporary settlements provided for mobile peoples, it is likely that more appeared than have been accounted for. The brevity of their existence produced a scant paper trail, yet was indicative of the strategies employed by their mobile inhabitants.\textsuperscript{91}

Map 1.3 – Joseph Quiroga, “Mapa de las Misiones de la Compañía de Jesús,” 1749. Quiroga’s map shows a “Red.n de Minuanes” near the headwaters of the Río Negro, between Guenoas and Minuanes, and beyond the immediate territorial reach of any mission plaza. The reduction does not appear in maps produced in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{92} AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, Documento 4390/2, #5.

\textsuperscript{93} It is also possible that some of the sites of these reductions were already paraderos of mobile peoples. This would explain both the openness of a given toldería to staying in a fixed location for a period of time and the eventual abandonment of the locale in a relatively short period of time.

\textsuperscript{94} Fúrlong Cárdiff, \textit{Cartografía jesuítica del Río de la Plata}, vol. 2, Mapa XVI.
Conclusion

In April 1731, with winter fast approaching, the Governor of Buenos Aires, Bruno de Zavala, drafted a letter to the Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias) in Spain. In it he contrasted Montevideo’s situation with that of Colônia do Sacramento. The residents of Montevideo, who had provoked the blockade of their plaza by local tolderías, were facing a decision about whether to begin rationing food. They were unable to access their ranches, and as a consequence, could not sustain themselves. Furthermore, this blockade prevented Buenos Aires from meeting its business agreements. The Real Asiento of Great Britain had requested 50,000 leather hides for purchase, and without access to the countryside surrounding Montevideo, the Spanish were unable to meet the demand. Meanwhile, the residents of Colônia not only had access to the riches of the countryside, but were able to travel freely between their plaza and other parts of Brazil to the north. Time was short and the stakes were high.

The failures of Montevideo’s militia earlier that year had caused Zavala to reach out to any allies he could. He had first turned to Jesuit authorities of the mission plazas, which resulted in the Miguel Ximénez’s journey in August of that year. Not content to rely on this singular strategy, however, Zavala also turned to a less expected ally. While the Jesuit was pleading his case to Guenoa caciques in the north, Zavala made an arrangement with Charrúa tolderías in case peace negotiations broke down. If the situation was not settled by spring, 300 Charrúas would join together with soldiers from Buenos Aires to force the Minuán tolderías near Montevideo to end their blockade. He announced this contingency plan during a

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95 Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Serie II Tomo VI (Buenos Aires, 1928); publicados bajo la dirección del Archivo de la Nación, 286–87; Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 79.

96 AGNU - Ex Museo y Archivo Histórico Nacional, Caja 1, n. 19, f. 3-4.
the September session of Buenos Aires’s cabildo, noting that he had been giving them payments already for at least a month.  

In the end, peace prevailed over further warfare. Following their meeting with Ximénez, a delegation of nine Minuán caciques returned to their tolderías near Montevideo to end the conflict. In response, Buenos Aires prepared its own peace delegation, which arrived in February 1732. The first round of negotiations in Montevideo failed, and Minuán caciques rejected the entry of a Spanish delegation into their tolderías. Nonetheless, by the end of March, an agreement had been reached. The Spanish offered 600 pesos’ worth of gifts to the caciques, including yerba mate, tobacco, knives, and metal bits for their horses. The Minuanes agreed to allow Montevideo’s inhabitants to return to their ranches, but they refused to return the 500 horses that they had confiscated the year before. In short, Montevideo proffered material payments and accepted its own losses in exchange for access to the countryside.

The 1731 conflict between Minuán tolderías and the Spanish plaza of Montevideo was not the triumph of Spanish diplomacy or military might, but rather a typical episode that reinforced broader territorial dynamics. Given Montevideo’s short territorial reach and dependence upon Minuanes for safe access to the countryside, it is unsurprising that the Spanish peace commission was willing to accept an agreement that materially favored the tolderías. Payment to tolderías was a common practice that was almost never reciprocated, indicating a hierarchy of territorial control. Likewise, the governor’s reaching

97 Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo VI, 399. The deal with Charrúa tolderías was brokered by Domingo Monzón, who in return received a land title (merced). AGNU - Escritano de Gobierno y Hacienda (EGH), 1823, exp. 46, f. 16v-18v; Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado, vol. 5, 20. Buenos Aires had implemented similar strategies in the past, when dealing with tolderías closer to its own city walls. In 1725, amidst another request of the Real Asiento of Great Britain for leather, Buenos Aires reached to 100 “indios amigos” in order to procure safe access to the countryside. Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo V, 516.

98 Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo VI, 433-5, 459-61, 465-70, 645-8; Azarola Gil, Los Orígenes de Montevideo, 1607-1759, 129–32; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 55–58; Fucé, “Ceremonia persuasiva”: 166–9. The pacts included promises to reopen commerce between Minuanes and Montevideo, including provisions to allow Minuanes to enter into the plaza to sell goods. Verbal agreements were also made regarding the enactment of justice for the wrongdoings of individuals on both sides; however, there is little evidence to show that such an arrangement was ever enforced.
out not only to mission plazas but to Charrúa tolderías demonstrates the persistent jockeying for strategic alliances that transcended ethnic or imperial limits. If paying Minuanes proved unsuccessful, paying competing tolderías for aid was a logical alternative. For their part, Minuán caciques sought a solution that would acknowledge their control over the countryside without forcing them to engage in further combat. The plaza of Montevideo posed little threat, but combined forces from Buenos Aires, mission plazas, and Charrúa tolderías would have been a formidable foe. Receipt of payments combined with the symbolic humility of Ximénez in traveling to their tolderías was enough for them to achieve both of their aims.

Although cognizant of the control that tolderías exerted over the Río de la Plata’s countryside, Portuguese and Spanish administrators were unsatisfied with their own positions. While positive relations with native peoples allowed them access to the resources that they needed, neither side could gain the upper hand on its imperial foe. In addition, the overlapping settlements of Colônia and Montevideo prevented either empire from acquiring legal possession of the region. This structural issue grew increasingly apparent as decades passed, and both sides deemed it unsustainable. As a result, both the Spanish and Portuguese developed competing discourses of regional possession that belied the territorial practices in which they engaged on a daily basis. This dissonance between territorial discourse and territorial practice would be the motor behind the radical changes that occurred during the eighteenth century’s middle decades.
CHAPTER 2: FROM PLAZAS TO PROVINCES

Empires did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of holes, stitched together out of places, a tangle of strings....Although empires did lay claim to vast stretches of territory, the nature of such claims was tempered by control that was exercised mainly over narrow bands, or corridors, and over enclaves and irregular zones around them....Together these patterns and practices produced political geographies that were uneven, disaggregated, and oddly shaped – and not at all consistent with the image produced by monochrome shading of imperial maps. – Lauren Benton

It is possible, that those of us who are soldiers of Christ…go out in conquest not of a plaza, but rather of entire provinces. – José Cardiel

“Disobedient Vassals”

On September 24, 1703, the Portuguese Governor of Colônia do Sacramento, Sebastián Xavier da Veiga Cabral, penned a letter to his Spanish counterpart in Buenos Aires to demand justice and reparations. One month earlier, Colônica’s chaplain, Padre Manuel González, had been killed while on the ranch of one of the plaza’s inhabitants. The assailants had entered the ranch to rob sheep, horses, and a slave, and in the process, they ran the priest through with lances and killed or gravely wounded nine others. The ensuing Portuguese investigation concluded that the aggressors were one of two groups – a troop from Santa Fe who had recently delivered horses to the nearby guardpost of San Juan or Charrúas and Bohanes who had been in Santo Domingo Soriano (Map 2.1). In response to these accusations, the Governor of Buenos Aires, Alonso Juan de Valdez y Inclán, opened his own investigation, taking declarations from no less than 23 individuals. Like Cabral, he aimed to identify the culpable parties; however, he also sought to liberate

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1 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 2.

2 “[Pues es possible, q los q’ somos soldados de xpto, los que andamos en conquista no de una Plaza, sino de Prov.as enteras...]” AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, Documento 4390/1.

3 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, exp. 4, f. 4-13, 16-17.
Buenos Aires from responsibility.¹ The case hinged on three questions: who killed the priest? were they Spanish vassals? did the murder occur on Spanish or Portuguese lands?

Map 2.1 – Important Sites in the Case of Manuel González

It quickly became apparent to both Spanish and Portuguese investigators that the troop from Santa Fe had not been involved. Numerous witnesses verified that these soldiers had been in San Juan at the time of the murder, that no one had separated from the troop, and that they had not returned to Santa Fe with

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¹ ibid., exp. 4, f. 7-15v.
any slaves.⁵ Thereafter, Spanish investigators turned their attention to the Charrúas and Bohanes, and sought to determine their whereabouts at the time of the murder. They immediately ruled out the Charrúas as suspects, as the convoy from Santa Fe had passed their tolderías on their initial journey to Santo Domingo Soriano, but Bohanes were a more difficult case. Earlier in 1703, ten Bohan tolderías had sought refuge in Soriano because they were embroiled in a conflict with Minuanes, and the plaza’s authorities had convinced them to set up camp across the Río Uruguay.⁶ The travelers from Santa Fe had seen them soon before they arrived at Soriano at the end of June, but the tolderías had left the area before González’s murder. It was not until early October that Soriano’s magistrate (corregidor) had received news of the Bohanes’ whereabouts, 35 leagues west in the Bajada de Santa Fe. That left open a window of about three months where they were beyond the plaza’s purview, including the date of González’s death. Although the Bajada de Santa Fe was in the opposite direction of Colônia and the Bohanes were traveling on foot, this evidence was not conclusive enough to eliminate them as suspects.⁷

Investigators therefore turned to whether or not the Bohanes were vassals of the Spanish Crown. Cabral suggested that they were, since they had established themselves in Soriano and several had been baptized. Each of the witnesses questioned by Spanish authorities testified that they were not. They pointed to the fact that the tolderías had only been seeking refuge in Soriano and not looking to settle on a reduction (reducción).⁸ Several testimonies acknowledged that the Bohanes had expressed interest in becoming Christians and giving their obedience to the king, which meant establishing themselves permanently at the

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⁵ ibid., exp. 4, f. 18-46v, 64-5.

⁶ See: Chapter 1.

⁷ ibid., exp. 4, f. 18-46v, 71-83.

⁸ A “reducción” was a settlement of newly incorporated native peoples. The use of this term was significant because it treated sedentism as a necessary condition for order, reason, and Christianity. The act of forming a reducción, to “reducirse,” literally meant “to be ordered” or “to be brought to reason,” while ecclesiastical officials frequently sought to convince tolderías to “reduce themselves to the holy faith” (reducirse a la santa fe). ibid., exp. 4, f. 39-42; Joanne Rappaport and Tom Cummins, _Beyond the Lettered City: Indigenous Literacies in the Andes_ (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 221.
new site and accepting a church, priest, and corregidor. Yet by the time that officials had gone to discuss permanent settlement with them, they were already gone. Without settlement, they could not consider the tolderías obedient subjects. The deponents identified other tolderías as possible suspects, including Minuanes, Yaros, and other “nations,” but unanimously declared that they too were subject to neither the Spanish Crown, nor the Catholic faith, nor laws of reason. In fact they argued, these tolderías were enemies of both Iberian crowns and that when patrolling the countryside, Spanish soldiers always had to be on alert for attacks from them. Devoid of a fixed population, they recognized no law.⁹

Following his investigation, Inclán drafted an internal report that claimed that no subject of the Spanish Crown was among the guilty.¹⁰ In a letter to his Portuguese counterpart, however, he argued:

The Bohan Indians that were in the reduction of Santo Domingo Soriano (and not Charrúas as Your Lordship has called them), although they are vassals of the King [of Spain] my lord since they inhabit his lands, are not obedient because they go about the countryside untamed [levantados] and idle. They took refuge there by chance, fleeing from the Minuanes, and sought shelter for Christian and political reasons…saying that they wanted to be Christians and restore their obedience to the King…[but] they left of their own will in the middle of July and…they passed near Santa Fe more than a month ago…I take from this that they did not execute the execrable sacrilege to which your Lordship refers and even if they have committed it, being Vassals of the King that go about untamed, and not having a fixed location, our government is not obliged to remunerate the damages that Your Lordship anticipates.

(emphasis added)¹¹

This final report diverged from the testimonies collected, as it identified Bohanes as vassals to the Spanish King, since they inhabited his lands. This is unsurprising, given that Spain and Portugal were embroiled in a decades-long dispute over legal possession of the Río de la Plata that had begun with the founding of

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⁹ AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, f. 18-46v.

¹⁰ ibid., f. 46v-47.

¹¹ “Los Yndios bohanes que estubieron en la reducion de Santo Domingo Soriano (y no charruas como a VS le an dho) aunque son vassallos del Rey mr sr respeto de havitar sus tierras, no estan a la obediencia por que andan por essas campañas lebanttados y vagos acojieronse alli por cassualidad huyendo de los minohanes, ampararonse por razon cristiana y política…diciendo querian ser cristianos, y restituirse a la obediencia del Rey…se fueron de boluntad propia por mediado de Julio…sacando de esto que ellos no executaron el exacrable sacrilejo que VS refiere y que aun que lo ayan cometido siendo Vassallos de su Magestad que andan lebanttados, y no tienen asistencia firme no esta este gobierno obligado a sattisfacer los daños que VS previene.” ibid., f. 49-49v.
Colônia. To suggest that Bohanes were not vassals would be to acknowledge a lack of territorial possession, but to claim their vassalage would require Inclán to accept responsibility for their crimes. He therefore added the caveat that the Bohanes were “disobedient vassals” because they wandered about the countryside, a designation he extended to all tolderías in the region. He stated that these “barbarian bandits” were “subjects that have not been able to be subjected to obedience and are enemies of all Christians,” thereby denying any accountability for their actions.  

Inclán even used González’s death as a foundation for his own complaints against Cabral. He accused the governor of selectively defining tolderías’ vassalage according to his immediate needs. In seeking reparations for the killing of the priest, Colônia’s authorities sought to identify them as Spanish vassals. Conversely, in moments when it was useful to identify tolderías as vassals to the Portuguese Crown, they were quick to claim them as subjects. Inclán did not directly state under what circumstances the Portuguese would want to define mobile native peoples as vassals, but he was most likely referring to the issue of land claims. If Portugal claimed sovereignty over them, then it could also claim possession of the lands that they inhabited. González’s death illuminated this contradiction because it occurred on a ranch located beyond the range of Colônia’s artillery, and thus beyond the plaza’s jurisdictional limits.  

If Cabral wanted to claim these lands for Portugal, he would have to accept responsibility for the activities of native peoples who controlled them and find his own solution for protecting his people. To emphasize this point and demonstrate Spanish territorial authority, Inclán offered to secure the countryside and sent a troop of thirty soldiers to survey the coastline between San Juan and Maldonado. In the end, however, the troop maintained its distance at each sign of tolderías and apprehended no one.

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12 “…salteadores Yndios Varbaros que aun que por estar en tierras de su magestad son subditos destte gobierno no se an podido sujectar a la obidencia y son enemigos de todos los christianos.” ibid., f. 50-50v.

13 ibid., f. 51-53v.

14 ibid., f. 54-9, 86-7. In addition to commissioning troops to patrol the countryside, Inclán continued his investigation into the whereabouts of the Bohan tolderías. He sent an official to Santa Fe to collect depositions of the members of the troop that had
The death of Padre Manuel González and the investigation that ensued demonstrate the key contradiction of regional dynamics in the Río de la Plata region during the early eighteenth century. As discussed in the previous chapter, both Portuguese and Spanish authorities were restricted to the localities of their plazas, while mobile native peoples moved their tolderías throughout the countryside to maximize their own territorial control. Nonetheless, the two Iberian crowns debated dominion over regional lands on a bilateral basis, since land possession by independent native peoples was incomprehensible to them. As a result, imperial diplomacy generated a dissonance between the materiality of local territorial relations and broader claims of territorial possession. Local events like the death of Padre González revealed this discord because they forced imperial authorities to adopt elaborate explanations of their relationship with mobile native peoples. The desire for dominion forced the two crowns to claim tolderías as imperial subjects; however, their incapacity to control such peoples made this a risky proposition, as governments were ultimately responsible for the actions of their vassals.

In order to understand the nuances of Spain’s and Portugal’s perpetual conflict over possession of the Río de la Plata, it is therefore necessary to examine the role of mobile native peoples in it. As plazas of both empires projected visions of possession over lands that they did not effectively control, they relied upon relationships with tolderías for secure access to the countryside and upon the perceived vassalage of tolderías to make juridical claims. Lordship over people implied dominion over their lands. Lack of territorial control continually proved problematic for imperial designs, as no plaza could claim exclusivity in their relations with mobile peoples and as tolderías sought exchange not only with Iberians, but also with other foreigners who touched upon the region’s shores. Given these circumstances, Spain and Portugal delivered the horses to Soriano. According to these individuals, they had met with the Bohanes along the Río de Nogoyán on their return to Santa Fe in the beginning of August. The Bohanes had few horses at the time of their encounter and later took shelter with Spaniards near the Santa Fe. The last reports were that they had been seen in the company of Yaros near the Paso del Alcaraz on the road north to Corrientes. This evidence was certainly useful for absolving the Bohanes of responsibility for the murders; however, given Inclán’s position about their status as disobedient vassals, it was of little import for the question of reparations. The second round of depositions was principally a symbolic gesture of Spanish dominion over the region. Ibid., f. 67-83.
simultaneously sought to claim territorial possession through juridical measures and to transform mobile peoples into Christian subjects by making them sedentary. As the decades wore on, however, this discursive competition for dominion and vassalage would be addressed through mapping. Jurists began to consider territorial possession a matter to be determined through cartography and observation, rather than relationships with local peoples. These tensions and transitions built up to mid-century, ushering in new patterns of interethnic engagement.

**Articulating Possession**

Beginning in 1680, with the Portuguese founding of Colônia do Sacramento, the two Iberian crowns began to jockey not only for access to the Río de la Plata region, but also for possession of it. They deployed armies of soldiers and jurists, equipped with cannons and pens, in an attempt to solidify their claims and eventually gain exclusivity. Along the way, these individuals produced myriad diplomatic treatises and war reports that made the case for their respective crowns’ legitimate possession of the region. Despite these ambitious territorial imaginations, both sides depended upon positive relations with tolderías in order to maintain their coastal footholds and to access the countryside they claimed on paper. This incongruity between juridical aims and material relations engendered a perpetual struggle to claim possession through discursive acrobatics and strategic settlement. As they competed to garner tolderías’ support, Spain and Portugal sought juridical avenues both to dislodge one another and to keep foreigners from the northern shores of the Río de la Plata. Iberian diplomats justified their territorial claims through a range of logics, including papal donations and natural limits, but over time tended toward projecting

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15 Possession here refers to legal rights over land, including the right to trade, extract resources, settle, or proselytize. Up through the first half of the eighteenth century, however, it did not necessarily imply sovereignty over subjects within a particular territorial unit. While a particular crown might claim the right to police a given geographical area, that right did not imply exclusivity of access or signify that foreigners or native peoples living within such space were vassals/subjects of that crown. Sahlins, *Boundaries*, 81, 84, 89, 93-4.
possession from coastal settlements to the vast countryside. By claiming key entry points to the continental interior, such as harbors or rivers, and then claiming independent tolderías as imperial subjects, the dueling monarchies could claim possession of lands effectively controlled by native peoples.\(^\text{16}\)

Colônia’s founding was a watershed moment that linked the Río de la Plata to global debates over legitimate territorial possession. It ushered in dueling logics of possession between Spain and Portugal and a constant feedback loop between juridical debates and physical settlements. In particular, it represented the first direct challenge in the region to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which had guided Iberian claims to territorial possession in the Americas for nearly two centuries, in favor of possession through settlement. For the next seventy years, both Iberian crowns founded strategic settlements in the region in order to establish territorial claims. They chose the sites of such settlements not only for their sustainability and material benefits, but also as a means to fortify their particular juridical arguments. New international standards for possession and new geographical knowledge would guide the locations of new plazas, which in turn would shape the historical narratives jurists and negotiators would use to fortify their framing of legitimate territorial possession.\(^\text{17}\)

Situating Colônia’s founding in a longer history of settlement and juridical jockeying helps bring this dynamic into focus. From the time of European arrival to the Americas, Spain and Portugal sought to establish rules as to which crown could claim which lands. The earliest iterations of this effort were

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\(^{16}\) As Lauren Benton has demonstrated, early-modern travelers in the Americas used river estuaries as the principal markers for claiming possession. By controlling these access points to continental interiors, Iberians could most effectively prevent competitors from gaining local footholds. This partly explains the detailed information on coastal rivers in sixteenth and seventeenth-century maps of the Americas, and motivations that both crowns had to keep their geographic information secret. Controlling river estuaries did not always imply control or even access to interior lands, as Iberians depended upon the knowledge and good will of local guides in order to move beyond the coast. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 41–59.

\(^{17}\) By establishing a foothold across the Río de la Plata estuary from Buenos Aires, the Portuguese sought to access clandestine trade routes that brought silver from Potosí to the Atlantic, to reestablish older trading links to the Río de la Plata region, and to consolidate broader efforts at territorial occupation. By using Colônia as a means to claim territorial possession, Portugal sought to acquire joint navigation rights of the Río de la Plata and access to the terrestrial resources between the plaza and the rest of Brazil. Moniz Bandeira, *O expansionismo brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Philobiblon, 1985), 55; Prado, *A Colônia do Sacramento*, 23–35, 44.
numerous papal bulls and the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which established an imaginary line dividing the Atlantic to separate one imperial realm from the other.¹⁸ From the beginning, however, the ever-accelerating exploration undertaken by both sides served to muddle the situation. On one hand, the constant flow of soldiers, settlers, and priests, each of whom served as the physical embodiment of Iberian sovereignty, resulted in complex human geographies that could not be easily untangled.¹⁹ On the other, increased geographical knowledge revealed the shortsightedness of European treaties, as treaties projected dominion upon a world imagined through maps. As navigators charted coastlines and cosmographers measured the globe with ever-increasing precision, they exposed the imprecision of previous agreements.

Although this phenomenon did not come to a head in the Río de la Plata until the late seventeenth century, its articulation in the region was influenced by earlier conflicts further north and across the Atlantic. In particular, during the 1630s, Jesuits from Córdoba and Asunción competed with bandeirantes from São Paulo for the souls and labor of people living in regions known as Guayrá and Tape (Map 2.2). Early bandeirante victories led to the Jesuit evacuation of both regions, while the eventual arming of the missions’ inhabitants prohibited further advances. By 1641, a de-facto division had been produced along the Río Uruguay, with missions to the west and bandeirantes to the east.²⁰ This division would be a significant baseline for each side as they articulated future claims of possession in the region.

¹⁸ The 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza extended the Tordesillas line around the globe by defining an antimeridian in the Pacific Ocean. For a detailed discussion on the treaty and the antimeridian, see: Barrero García, Ana María, “Problemas en torno a la aplicación de la línea de demarcación: La cuestión de las Molucas,” Anuario Mexicano de Historia del Derecho, no. 5 (1993).

¹⁹ In the early-modern world, people, rather than mapped lines, defined imperial sovereignty. Subjecthood was defined by an individual’s relationship with a sovereign, rather than by living within a certain geographical unit, and that subjecthood was portable. In this way, as Iberian vassals traveled to the Americas, they developed corridors and enclaves of jurisdictional authority for their crown, rather than the large bounded units depicted in contemporary atlases. The legal result of the movement of imperial subjects was overlapping jurisdictions and isolated centers of jurisdictional reach. Therefore, early-modern territorial possession and jurisdictional reach encompassed plazas, rather than province. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 2-23, 30-33, 37-8; Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 33–68. This was the case not only for ultramarine possessions, but also within Europe itself, where the union of clear borders and territorial sovereignty did not occur until the eighteenth century. See: Sahlin, Boundaries; Standen and Power, Frontiers in Question; Jordan Branch, “Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change,” International Organization 65 (Winter 2011): 9–19.

²⁰ Historians often point to the Battle of Mbororé, which occurred on March 11, 1641, as a turning point in relations between missions and bandeirantes. It was at this moment that the Spanish crown began to arm mission dwellers, who would later turn
Map 2.2 – Missions of Guayrá and Tape until 1641. This map shows approximate locations of the missions (crosses) and towns (points) pertaining to Guayrá (red) and Tape (purple). All of these settlements were to the north or east of the Río Uruguay and all had been abandoned by 1641. The Río Ibicuí in the south designates the northern reaches of the Río de la Plata region.²¹

In the wake of this conflict, European affairs produced direct challenges to the Treaty of Tordesillas and new means of claiming possession. Whereas the unification of Iberian sovereignty from 1580 to 1640 had blurred the lines between Spain and Portugal, its schism required a new articulation of territorial difference. Spain continued to rely upon the Tordesillas line to justify its claims, while Portugal developed two counterarguments. First, as the treaty had specified that an imaginary line be drawn 370 leagues into the most potent military force in the region. See: Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, Capítulo IV; Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata, 81–91.

²¹ Mission locations are adapted from: Maeder and Gutiérrez, Atlas territorial y urbano de las misiones jesuíticas de guaraníes. Argentina, Paraguay e Brasil.
westward from the Cape Verde Islands, Portugal questioned which island of the archipelago should be taken as a starting point and what sort of leagues (nautical, terrestrial) should be used as a measure.\(^22\) Second, mapmakers and jurists suggested that Brazil represented a continental entity different from the rest of South America. This geographical concept, known as the “Brazil Island” (*Ilha Brasil*), claimed that a vast waterway that began in the Amazon River, continued through the Pantanal, and ended with the Río de la Plata constituted as a natural limit between the two realms (Maps 2.3 & 2.4).\(^23\) These arguments dovetailed with the end of the Thirty Years’ War, as the Treaty of Westphalia challenged on an international level the legitimacy of the papal bulls upon which the Treaty of Tordesillas was based. As the north of Europe rejected the authority of the Pope, the Catholic arguments of proselytization employed by Spain to justify its dominions also came under attack.\(^24\)

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Map 2.3 – Teixeira, Luis, Mapa das Capitanias hereditárias: Carta general do Brasil, c. 1574. This map demonstrates the concept of an Ilha Brasil. Teixeira, a Portuguese Jesuit, aligned the Tordesillas line with the Amazon River and the Rio de la Plata.25

Map 2.4 – Blaeu, Willem, *Americae nova tabula*, 1665. This map also demonstrates the concept of an Ilha Brasil. Blaeu, a Dutch cartographer, discarded the Tordesillas line, but connected the Río de la Plata with the Amazon River to divide Brazil from the rest of South America.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{26} Willem J. Blaeu, *Americae nova tabula* (Amsterdam, 1665); Wikimedia Commons, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/01/Americae_nova_Tabula_-_Map_of_North_and_South_America_%28Willem_Blaeu%2C_1665%29.jpg (accessed February 23, 2015).
Given persistent challenges to the Treaty of Tordesillas, the notion of territorial possession through papal donation carried less and less weight over time. Instead, the Iberian crowns and their competitors began to rely upon the occupation or utilization of particular lands in order to have their claims recognized internationally. The founding of Colônia thus represented a Portuguese effort to solidify its claim to lands north and east of the Río de la Plata estuary. While diplomats relied upon the natural limits of an Ilha Brasil and the ambiguity of the Tordesillas line to justify their efforts, once the plaza was established, they began to espouse the idea of possession through settlement (uti possidetis) as well. Missionaries and Spanish administrators responded with a flurry of strategic settlements of their own. Jesuits ventured back across the Río Uruguay and founded seven new plazas, while Spain and Portugal brought settlers from the Canary Islands and the Azores respectively to establish settlements along the coast (Map 2.5). The presence of Charrúas, Minuanes, and other mobile peoples restricted all parties to the region’s perimeter, yet it did not prevent them from debating who had the legal right to access its interior. Each settlement thus served the dual purpose of being an access point to the region and evidence of territorial possession, however limited the effective reach of an individual plaza actually was.

Plazas alone were not enough to claim possession. They instead served as bits of evidence that jurists could draw upon to develop arguments of natural or historical rights. Advocates for Spanish or Portuguese possession of the Río de la Plata also hearkened back to early expeditions to the region that carried the banner of their crown. They pointed to vestiges of short-lived settlements and the erection of

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27 Uti possidetis, which in Latin means “as you possess,” is a concept of international law that suggests that settlement rights take priority over earlier accords when determining territorial possession.

Between the founding of Colônia do Sacramento and the Treaty of Madrid, Portuguese (P), Spanish (S), and Jesuit (J) authorities sought to establish plazas east of the Río Uruguay. Plazas without dates were founded before 1680.

crosses or stone markers by travelers as proof of territorial possession. In addition, they scoured earlier treaties and maps for words or images that would justify their current territorial claims. Their arguments

For example: BA - 54-xiii-16, n. 137; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 144; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 281; Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colônia do Sacramento, 1–5.

See: AHU - Nova Colônia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 3, Doc 325; IEB - Projeto Brasil Ciência, 14 C 4; L 19 700; BA - 51-v-37, f. 43v-44v; BA - 54-xiii-16, f. 1-11v. Acts or “ceremonies” of possession varied widely and were constantly disputed. Examples include settlement, trade, public declarations, gestures of proselytization, physical marks upon the landscape, and mapping. Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) While certain crowns used some practices more than others, acts of possession varied more according to contemporary juridical conditions and local contexts than particular national traditions. Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 25–33. It
differed in evidence and conclusions yet shared the common trope of stringing together instances of travel or settlement to argue that the other side had impinged upon their lands. Spanish advocates pointed to the foundation of Colônia as an egregious infraction by the Portuguese, while writers sympathetic to Portuguese interests made the same point with regard to mission settlements. These contradictory claims highlight the ambiguity of what constituted an act of possession or evidence of first arrival.

To understand the parallel juridical narratives promulgated by Lisbon and Madrid, one must consider not only what constituted an act of possession, but also how far territorial possession actually reached. The early eighteenth century was a transitional moment in this regard, as Enlightened ideas of bound provinces began to supplant early modern notions of isolated plazas. In accordance with early modern European territorialities, the possession of a plaza did not necessarily imply the possession of the adjacent countryside or all of the lands bounded by a geographical feature or a line on a map. Since sovereignty flowed through interpersonal relationships rather than rigid territorial jurisdictions, the idea of bounded territories divided by borderlines was not an operative concept. As a result, subjects of a particular crown could establish settlements that overlapped with those of another crown, as commonly occurred in lands that were distant from a metropolitan center. In fact, it was not until the final years of the seventeenth century that any European peace accords commissioned cartographers to map a large-scale interimperial border. This normative mode of perceiving space would shift, however, during the first half of the eighteenth century, as imperial border demarcations became an ever more common practice.

was the responsibility of travelers sponsored by one crown or another to make their claims as visible as possible and it was the task of jurists to articulate why particular historical acts constituted legitimate claims. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 54–5, nt. 40. For more on the use of historical narratives to justify possession in the Rio de la Plata, see: Verdesio, *Forgotten Conquests*, 75.

31 For example: ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 728, v. 1, f. 10v-11. Portuguese royal authorities made similar complaints regarding the Guardia de San Juan, the plaza of Montevideo, and Spanish attempts to populate Maldonado. AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Docs 27 & 78; BA - 49-x-7, f. 138-139v; BA - 51-v-37, f. 138; BLIC - MS 509; BLIC - MS 509, f. 138; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.3, f. 86-93; Sylva, *Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colônia do Sacramento*, 1–5.

32 In 1699, the Ottoman State and the Holy League agreed to a joint demarcation effort of a political boundary, which took place between 1700 and 1703. Over the course of the eighteenth century, other crowns followed suit. Abou-el-Haj, “The Formal
The case of Colônia do Sacramento was emblematic of this broader epistemological transition. Prior to the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, diplomats and administrators did not imagine the Río de la Plata as a territorial state in the modern sense. Spanish plazas throughout the region did not share allegiance with one another, territorial disputes between them were commonplace, and instances even exist of the erection of stone markers to indicate the jurisdictional limits of one versus another. Likewise, from the founding of Colônia, it was unclear whether this plaza represented the terrestrial extension of Brazil or an isolated enclave. The 1681 Provisional Treaty of Lisboa, which was the first to deal with the situation of Colônia, sought to resolve the ambiguity of regional possession by offering Portugal and Spain shared access to the regional countryside. It utilized a “tiro de um canhão” (cannon shot) as a standard measure to limit the reach of Colônia’s territorial exclusivity. Rather than an exact limit, this measure was a general estimate – used in the same way as a foot, a league, or a musket shot – given that the distance of cannon fire would depend upon the size of the ball and the angle of the cannon. In the case of Colônia, this measure would be an issue that would arise regularly during jurisdictional disputes, as occurred after the death of Manuel González. More importantly, the concept of a “tiro de um canhão” signified that Colônia was an enclave

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33 In 1721, representatives from Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, various mission plazas agreed to construct boundary stones near the Río Uruguay and near Colônia to indicate the territorial rights of their respective plazas. AGI – Charcas, 221, “Reunión de los apoderados de los pueblos de Misiones, de la ciudad de Santa Fe, y de la de Buenos Aires” (Buenos Aires, 1721-01-28).

34 Examples of the uncertainty of this distance include: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, 43v-47v. The concept of a “tiro de um canhão” was applied as a measure at other moments in the region as well, such as during deliberations for the demarcation of limits near Castilhos on December 3, 1752. IHGRGS - Arquivo Visconde de São Leopoldo, f. 1-10.

35 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.23, f. 86; IHGRGS - Arquivo Visconde de São Leopoldo, f. 10v-12; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 107, f. 29; BA - 54-xiii-16, n. 155, f. 1-15.
and that its presence along the Río de la Plata’s Northern Shore (Banda Norte) did not imply exclusive access to the countryside. The Treaty of Lisbon’s seventh article stated:

The citizens of Buenos Aires will enjoy the use and exploitation of the same site, its cattle, wood, game, fishing, and charcoal, as it did before a population was established there, without any difference, being present in the same site whenever they want with the Portuguese in peace and friendship, without any impediment.

Both Spanish and Portuguese subjects would share the right to access the countryside surrounding Colônia and its resources. Diplomats and administrators would continually refer to this idea over the course of the following decades, marking a clear distinction between the jurisdiction of the plaza and the right to access resources in the rural countryside (Map 2.6).

During the early decades of the eighteenth century, coexistence in the Río de la Plata became increasingly problematic for Spanish and Portuguese administrators. The lack of unilateral territorial possession or control by one side or the other permitted third parties to attempt to establish themselves along the coast, particularly after the 1715 Treaty of Utrecht solidified the standard of uti possidetis. Spain

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36 The “Banda Norte” refers to the northern coast of the Río de la Plata estuary. Its geographical extent was ambiguous as its implied western boundary ranged from the Río Paraná to the Río Uruguay and its northern boundary was never defined.

37 “Os visinhos de Buenos Ayres gozaráõ do uso, e aproveitamento do mesmo sitio [os campos perto da Colônia do Sacramento], seus gados, madeira, caça, e lavradores de carvão, como antes, como antes, que nelle se fizesse a povoação, sem diferença alguma, assistindo no mesmo sitio todo o tempo, que quizerem com os Portuguezes em boa paz e amizade, sem impedimento algum.” Transcribed in: Jaime Cortesão, ed., Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750), Parte III: Antecedentes do Tratado, Tomo I (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Instituto Rio Branco, 1951), 45–51 See also: BNP - COD. 13212 //11.


39 This treaty was perhaps the strongest rebuke of the concept of the papal donation and the clearest step in favor of uti possidetis as the standard for territorial possession. It undermined Spain and Portugal’s ability to project possession from isolated plazas upon entire regions and required instead the establishment of permanent settlements in places such as Montevideo, Maldonado, and Castillos Grande. While French ships in particular had occasioned these harbors to trade with tollederas now for decades, the uptick in trading activity that occurred between 1715 and 1720 was likely due to these new jurisdictional conditions.
Map 2.6 – Sá Almeida e Menezes, Rodrigo Annes de, “[Território da Colónia do Sacramento],” 1726. This map was part of a compendium compiled by the Portuguese Secretary of State. It demonstrates the Tordesillas line’s ambiguity and the lands referred to in the 1681 Treaty of Lisbon.40

and Portugal were not the only European empires that maintained relations with native peoples in the region. Spurred on by the drive for known resources (cattle) and suspected resources (mines), French and English ships also dropped anchor in the Río de la Plata’s coastal harbors.41 French traders established direct


41 While cattle was certainly the dominant resource that attracted traders to the region, numerous eighteenth-century sources allude to the existence of mines. Many believed that Jesuit missionaries had discovered secret mines in the area that they hoped to
relationships with Minuanes and Guenoas in the coastline’s three other natural harbors – Montevideo, Maldonado, and Castillos Grande. The first reference to such relations occurred in 1683; however, they likely began much earlier. Over the course of the next sixty years, at least thirteen reported incidents emerged of French traders slaughtering cattle or trading for leather with Minuanes, Guenoas, and others (Table 2.1). Given the short range of Iberian territorial reach in the area, many more likely occurred.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PLACES</th>
<th>SHIP NAME/CAPTAIN</th>
<th>PARTNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1683-11-08</td>
<td>Maldonado</td>
<td>El Señalado Armas de Francia / Captain Mr. La Visconte</td>
<td>Guenoas; &quot;otros aliados&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1705-00-00</td>
<td>Banda Norte</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
<td>Guaraníes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706-00-00</td>
<td>Maldonado</td>
<td>Nantes / Mr. D'Escaseau</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706-00-00</td>
<td>Islas de Flores (Maldonado)</td>
<td>Falmouth of St. Malo</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708-00-00</td>
<td>Maldonado</td>
<td>Atlas</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717-05-27</td>
<td>Montevideo; Maldonado; Rio Grande; Santa Catarina</td>
<td>Petit Danican</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717-06-23</td>
<td>Maldonado; Isla de Flores</td>
<td>2 ships</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720-05-25</td>
<td>Maldonado; Castillos Grande</td>
<td>4 ships / Étienne Moreau</td>
<td>Guenoas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720-09-25</td>
<td>Maldonado</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-08-26</td>
<td>Castillos Grande; Maldonado; Montevideo</td>
<td>2 ships</td>
<td>&quot;gentio livre&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-08-31</td>
<td>Montevideo; Maldonado</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
<td>Charruas, Bohanes, Yaros, otros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-09-12</td>
<td>Montevideo; Maldonado</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1722-01-01</td>
<td>Banda Norte</td>
<td>[ - ]</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 – Reported Trade between Tolderías & French Ships

shield from foreigners. The prospect of discovering mines heightened exchange between Minuán and Guenoo tolderías and foreign ships. See: AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Doc 20; BA - 51-v-37, f. 25v, 137; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 280; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 180v-181, 182, 185v.

42 AGI - Escribanía, 884, “Comisión a Antonio de Vera y Mujica para proceder contra José de Herrera y Sotomayor," partially transcribed in López Mazz and Bracco, Minuanos, 38–39; González, Diario de viaje a las Vaquerías del Mar (1705), 11; William Betagh, A Voyage Round the World: Being an Account of a Remarkable Enterprise, begun in the Year 1719, chiefly to cruise on the Spaniards in the great South Ocean. (London: Printed for T. Combes at the Bible and Dove in Pater-noster Row, J. Lacy at the Ship near Temple Bar, and J. Clarke at the Bible under the Royal Exchange, 1728), 329-30, 336-8, 533; Mémoire pour servir d’addition & d’éclairciffiment à la Relation abrégée, &c. qu’on vient de donner au Public, fur l’abominable conduite des Jésuites, dans les payt & domaines d’outre-mer dépendans des Royaumes d’Espagne & de Portugal, 24; AGI - Escribanía, 877A, f. 10v-59; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, f. 168-9, 355-6; Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 70; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 43-52, 59v-62, 298-90; Bautz, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo Primero, 455–62; Pedro Lozano, Historia de la conquista del Paraguay, Río de la Plata y Tucuman, Biblioteca del Río de la Plata Tomo 3 (Buenos Aires: Casa Editora "Imprenta Popular" 1874), 472–76; Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, Libro
In response to the French presence, officials from Colônia and Buenos Aires repeatedly sought to broker deals with tolderías, requesting that they desist from trade with foreign ships and prevent foreigners’ access to the countryside. Occasionally these pacts proved successful, as individual caciques agreed not only to avoid new trading partnerships, but also to patrol the coast and report the presence of foreign ships. Most often, however, the plurality of tolderías and their unique interests made such agreements elusive. If French traders could provide more attractive payments than their Portuguese or Spanish competitors, there was no good reason for a toldería to avoid trading with them. A direct link to the Atlantic economy afforded caciques access to better returns on their leather and the opportunity to obtain lucrative objects of material and symbolic value.

English ships also explored the coastline, using the ambiguity of possession as an avenue to access. While both Portugal and Spain considered unsanctioned foreign ships to be pirates, ship captains could claim that they believed they were on the lands of the other crown and therefore beyond the offended party’s jurisdiction. More importantly, these interlopers increased the Iberian crowns’ desire for exclusivity over the countryside of the Banda Norte. Without legal exclusivity, neither side could issue secure land titles and thus advance regulated settlements far beyond the reach of their plazas. Nor could they restrict access to outsiders through juridical means. Officials began to see the issue of territorial possession as less a question of legal access to resources and more a question of legal ownership of resources as property. Access permitted sharing, but ownership implied exclusivity.

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41 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 180-181v; AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31); AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12); Ponce de León, Luis R., “Minuanes o Guenoas”: 29.


43 One such case occurred in 1741, when John Bulkeley, John Cummins, and other English sailors encountered Spanish fishermen near Montevideo. John Bulkeley and John Cummins, A Voyage to the South Seas, in the Years 1740-1 (London: Printed for Jacob Robinson, 1743), 166.
Spanish authorities made the first efforts to gain exclusivity over the Banda Norte, employing both military and juridical tactics. They undertook numerous invasions to dislodge Portuguese settlers from Colônia, and between 1705 and 1715, they were even able to occupy it themselves. More often, they sought to blockade the plaza and contain Portuguese settlers within its stipulated limits. To this end, they established the guardpost of San Juan and coordinated between plazas to extract livestock from Colônia’s vicinity. While generally a wartime measure, the blockade became institutionalized following the return of the plaza to the Portuguese in 1737.\textsuperscript{45} The success of this effort required collaboration between various Spanish and missionary plazas, but it was also contingent upon the continued favor of local tolderías. For that reason, Spanish officials pursued deals with local caciques to lend support to their efforts or to withhold support from the Portuguese in Colônia. Such favor proved elusive, as it required continual payments to caciques or kinship ties. By offering payments and attempting to foster close ties to Minuán and Guenoa tolderías themselves, Portuguese administrators in Colônia maintained a lifeline that the blockade could not prevent. Only in the few moments when local tolderías decided to favor particular Spanish plazas did the Portuguese find themselves without recourse.\textsuperscript{46}

If military might could not dislodge the Portuguese from Colônia, juridical measures could at least serve to fix the limits of the plaza and contain settlers within it. Here, mapping was the key. Thus by the 1730s, the King of Spain had ordered the mapping of a clear limit between the plaza and what lay beyond. All Portuguese possessions outside of the plaza’s jurisdiction would be burnt, its vassals would be sent back

\textsuperscript{45} Prado, \textit{A Colônia do Sacramento}, 94. It was not until the 1730s that Portuguese negotiators would seek territorial exclusivity for themselves. Cortesão, \textit{Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750)}, Parte III, 481.

\textsuperscript{46} From the first years of the founding of Colônia, authorities in Buenos Aires sought to separate local tolderías from the Portuguese in Colônia, with little success. AGI - Charcas, 278, “Parecer y voto dado al gobernador de Buenos Aires” (1683-02-03); Cortesão, \textit{Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750)}, Parte III, 352. Some Spanish traders also sold horses and other goods to residents of the Portuguese plaza in spite of the blockade: Cabral, \textit{Descrição Corográfica e Coleção Histórica do Continente da Nova Colônia da Cidade do Sacramento}, 11. These efforts proved successful on several occasions: AHUL - Nova Colônia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 3, Doc 325; BNP - F. 1445, f. 56.
to the plaza, and sentinels would patrol the countryside to keep the population contained. This became a centerpiece of the policy of the Governor of Buenos Aires, Miguel Salcedo, vis-à-vis Colônia, and it also signified a clear rejection of the shared use of rural space in favor of Spanish exclusivity. A deviation from the policies of previous governors, this shift incited a sharp rebuttal from Portuguese authorities in Colônia and culminated in war between 1735 and 1737.

Possessing Maps

The eighteenth-century drive for territorial exclusivity in the Río de la Plata region and other ultramarine territories brought mapmaking to the forefront of territorial disputes. While professional engravers had always held a role in interimperial debates over jurisdiction, through the end of the seventeenth century their principle aim was to compile travel accounts or navigation charts and project them onto the globe as a geographic whole. Wary of the circulation of detailed information regarding their foreign lands, Iberian diplomats often chose to withhold accounts of their continental interior from international debates. As uti possidetis supplanted the Treaty of Tordesillas as the principal foundation for claiming territorial possession, however, mapping took on new juridical value as a means to demonstrate

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47 MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C18, P1, No. 2, f. 4, 6v–7; Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colonia do Sacramento, 72–75.


49 Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, 135. For a detailed explanation of the factors shaping Iberian decisions to conceal or divulge geographical information, see: Portuondo, Secret Science It is also certain that by the eighteenth century, imperial knowledge of the South American continent was deeply lacking. The famous Relaciones Geográficas employed by Spain, for example, focused principally on New Spain. Those that did pertain to South America were almost entirely from the Andes, with no responses at all from Chile, Paraguay, the Guianas, the Río de la Plata, or Brazil (which was under the Spanish crown at the time via the Iberian Union). Clinton R. Edwards, “Geographical Coverage of the Sixteenth-Century Relaciones de Indias from South America,” Geoscience and Man XXI (1980); Mundy, The Mapping of New Spain, Chapter 3. The Jesuit maps of South America, which were developed principally in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were not always accessible for royal courts.
one’s own claims. Furthermore, advances in mapping technologies, such as gridded maps with accurate longitudinal measurements, provided imperial authorities the opportunity to visualize continental interiors as never before. Rather than theorizing where dividing lines should run, mapmakers could directly observe, measure, and represent territorial features as a means to fortify their claims.

The competing logics of territorial possession employed by Spain and Portugal generated lineages of competing cartographies. Although their maps were engraved and printed in numerous European cities, from Paris to London to Amsterdam, mapmakers in the half-century after the founding of Colônia adopted one of two representative styles. Printers like Nicolas Sanson located the interimperial divide as far north as São Paulo, hearkening back to divisions that existed between the Jesuit missions and Portuguese bandeirantes (Map 2.7). By contrast, maps such as Guillaume de L’Isle’s *Carte du Paraguay, du Chili, du Detroit de Magellan, &c*, depicted Brazilian territorial possession extending contiguously to Colônia (Map 2.8); L’Isle’s map was even published at times in hybrid form, as printers used the original plates while redrawing the border (Map 2.9). Early eighteenth-century maps, whether favoring Portuguese or Spanish logics of possession, were nonetheless incongruent with regional territorial conditions, as contemporary mapping conventions could not account for overlapping settlements or shared territorial access. As engravers published maps based upon written travel accounts, they generally assumed the completeness of territorial possession and drew imaginary lines to encompass the aggregated plazas founded by one crown or the other.
Map 2.7 – Sanson, Nicolas. *Amerique Meridionale*, 1709

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Map 2.8 – L'Isle, Guillaume de. *Carte du Paraguay*, 1703

51 Guillaume de L'Isle, *Carte du Paraguay, du Chili, du Detroit de Magellan &c.*: dressée sur les descriptions des P.P. Alfonse d'Ovalle, et Nicolas Techo, et sur les relations et mémoires de Brouwer, Narbouroug, Mr. de Beauchesne &c (Paris: chez l'auteur le sieur Delisle sur le Quay de l'Horloge, 1703); NL - Baskes oversize G1015 .L57 1700, [plate 89].
Map 2.9 – L'Isle, Guillaume de. *Carte du Paraguay, 1710*.

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Amidst this cartographic ambiguity, Spain and Portugal began in the 1730s to hire scientists to demarcate their remote borderlands. The Castilian crown concentrated its efforts in the Amazon region, supporting a French geodesic mission that was led by Charles Marie de la Condamine. Although the French scientists’ principal aim was to measure the circumference of the globe along the Equator, La Condamine’s trip along the Amazon River lent cartographic weight to Spain’s land claims in the area. For their part, Portuguese authorities financed the “New Atlas of Portuguese America” (Nova Atlas da América Portuguesa) project. Like the Spanish, they hoped to fortify their territorial claims in the Americas by sending surveyors to measure lands in their favor; however, they relied upon Jesuit mathematicians rather than French scientists. The Novo Atlas project, which began in 1729, commissioned Domenico Capassi to map the north of Brazil and Diogo Soares to map the south.

These projects were significant for a number of reasons. First, they demonstrated that not all mapmaking was the same. Whereas cosmographers and engravers had produced maps of overseas territories for centuries, their works no longer carried the same weight as maps that resulted from on-the-ground measurements and observations. Indeed, the French and Jesuit expeditions aimed to use the precision of their geographic renderings to cast doubt upon previous perceptions of disputed territories. Second, these expeditions reveal the extremely limited geographical knowledge that each side had of the Río de la Plata.

53 Part of La Condamine’s justification for his journey up the Amazon was the inaccuracy of the Jesuit Samuel Fritz’s 1691 map of the region, which was the most well-known at the time. Safier, Measuring the New World, 76–81; Magalhães, “Mundos em miniatura”; 84 The diplomatic usage of the expedition’s maps and measurements came principally from Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Spanish officials who had participated in it as intermediaries between the Crown and the French scientists. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Disertación histórica y geográfica sobre el meridiano de demarcación (Madrid: Instituto Histórico de Marina, 1972); Reprint of 1749 edition, 69–88.

54 Though contracted in 1722, Capacci and Soares did not leave for Brazil until 1729. Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, 175–76 André Ferrand de Almeida, A formação do espaço brasileiro e o projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa (1713-1748) (Lisboa: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2001), 100–112; Magalhães, “Mundos em miniatura”; 80–2 The reliance on foreign mapmakers by the Iberian crowns was due to a general inferiority of Spanish and Portuguese cosmography through the first half of the eighteenth century. Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”: 12.

55 The Soares expedition produced the first measurements of longitude in the Río de la Plata region, in 1730, followed by the Spanish Jesuit Miguel Quiroga, in 1748 Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, 198–200.
countryside and of the South American interior in general. Soares’s maps focused entirely on the Río de la Plata’s coastline, highlighting access points to the interior rather than the nuances of the rural landscape itself, while Spanish authorities relied on Jesuit missionaries, whose geographic knowledge was principally of lands to the north. For this reason, as late as the 1750s, the Spanish commander of the blockade of Colônia solicited the help of the Jesuit Joseph Quiroga to help him map the area, complaining that there was no reliable map available of lands of the Banda Norte.

The short territorial range of these mapping endeavors was due to the limited geographical knowledge of the informants they depended upon. Spanish administrators relied upon Jesuits in the north of the region, whose geographic pursuits focused on waterways that would take them from Buenos Aires to Paraguay rather than through the Río de la Plata countryside. For his part, Soares utilized the knowledge of individuals with experience traveling in the region (práticos de país) as a source base for his maps, contracting them to answer questionnaires (notícias práticas) about local lands:

I now have a large compilation of reports, itineraries and maps from the best pioneers from São Paulo and Cuyabá, Rio Grande, and [the Río de la] Plata, and I continue to look for others with the aim of beginning a map, because foreign ones are full of errors, not only with respect to the countryside, but also in the elevation and longitudes of this entire coast.

He acquired detailed descriptions of lands north of the Río de la Plata – the Jesuit missions, cattle markets in Santa Catarina and São Paulo, and cattle ranges near what is now Porto Alegre – but details on lands

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56 A detailed list of maps produced by the mathematical expedition can be found in Almeida, *A formação do espaço brasileiro e o projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa* (1713-1748).

57 AGN-A – IX. 4-3-2, “Carta de Francisco de Graell a Joseph Quiroga” (San Borja, 1759-01-28).

58 David Buissere, “Spanish Colonial Cartography, 1450-1700” in *The History of Cartography*, 1148, 1168By this time, the most detailed maps of the continental interior of South America had been produced by Jesuits. Nonetheless, their geographic renderings focused principally on the areas of their missions. See: Fúrlong Cárdiff, *Cartografia jesuítica del Río de la Plata*, vol. 2.

between Rio Grande and Colônia do Sacramento ran thin. He lamented, “as my entire yearning was to see this countryside, I decided to also draw, with necessary caution, a small map of it, but it was not possible to complete it with the exactitude that I desire.” Whereas coastal calculations were reliable, the mathematician relied upon guesswork to draw the countryside in the final versions of his maps (Map 2.10).

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60 The purpose of this endeavor, then, was to compile Portuguese knowledge of the region, which would serve as a correction to the unreliable maps produced to this point by other imperial travelers. In particular, Soares communicated with Cristóvão Pereira, a military officer whose close relations with Minuanes enabled him to chart a pathway between Colônia and Rio Grande. “O Rio Grande do Sul na cartografia antiga,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXVI, No 103, 3o Trimestre (1946): 297 The various notícias práticas have since been copied numerous times. They can be consulted at IHGB – Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 142-198, esp. f. 180-2. Those relating to the Río de la Plata have also been transcribed in “Notícias práticas do novo caminho que se descobriu das Campanhas do Rio Grande, e nova Colonia do Sacramento para a Villa de Coritiba no anno de 1727 por ordem do Governador e General de S. Paulo, Antonio da Silva Caldeira Pimental,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro tomo LXIX, parte 1 (1908): 236–59; “Notícias praticas de Costa e povoações do Mar do Sul e resposta que deu o sargento-mór de praça de Santos Manoel Gonçalves de Aguiar as perguntas que lhe fez o Governador e Capitão General da cidade do Rio de Janeiro e Capitania do Sul Antonio de Brito e Menezes sobre costa e povoações do mesmo nome,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro tomo LXIX, parte 1 (1908): 290–309 Other reports from Pereira to Soares include: AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 2, Doc 237. The little information on the Río de la Plata that did appear in these sources focused principally on trade with native peoples and on rumors about mines or cattle further inland. In addition, these reports may have included manuscript maps. Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, 202–3 While Soares did not mention specific maps as sources, it is likely that he consulted the 1719 works of Bertolomeu Pays de Abreu. These maps, too, demonstrate the limited scope of Portuguese territorial knowledge beyond the coast at the time. See, for example: Abreu, Bertolomeu Pays de, Demonstração da costa desde Buenos ayres athê a Villa de Santos, 1719 (BNB – Manuscritos 049, 05,003).

61 “como a minha ancia toda era o ver estas campanhas, animei-me a tirar tambem com a cautela que me pareceu precisa, hum pequeno mappa dela, que me não foi possivel concluir com a exacção que desejo.” AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 33, Doc 7623, transcribed in: Almeida, A formação do espaço brasileiro e o projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa (1713-1748), 120.
Map 2.10 – “[Carte manuscrite de l’embouchure de Rio da Prata],” 1740. This map is likely the one to which Soares referred above, given the latitude and longitude measures that frame it. It includes details near the coastline, including principal trade routes, but only general information further inland.62

Paying Tribute While Soliciting Vassalage

The broad juridical debates about imperial possession and dominion, while discussed in royal courts and other European forums, ultimately depended upon global conditions, particularly in the Americas. The claims exerted by Spain under the authority of papal bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas were predicated upon the advancement of Christianity, much like Portuguese claims along the West African coast. Likewise,

the concept of uti possidetis was grounded in the idea that newly claimed lands must be vacant. In each of these debates, the status of indigenous inhabitants of the Americas, specifically those who had not accepted Christianity, was a determining factor. Did the papal donation give Spain dominion over the lands of peoples who refused conversion to Christianity, and what authority did the Pope have to grant this concession? Could native peoples even possess land and exercise dominion over it?

While sixteenth-century debates aimed to define the terms of just warfare as a means to appropriate people and territory, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century challenges to the legitimacy of the papal donation opened up the question of how to determine if native peoples had dominion. The de facto exclusivity that the Castilian Crown enjoyed early on in most of the Americas led Spanish theologians to outline the terms of just appropriation of land and labor. For example, Francisco de Vitoria argued that native peoples in the Americas conceivably held dominion over their territories and rejected the notion that their resistance to Spanish declarations of possession (El Requerimiento) constituted just cause to seize their lands and claim dominion over them. Instead, he articulated specific statutes that would legitimate such seizure, particularly if it meant defense of the innocent against tyranny. Similarly, Bartolomé de las Casas, in his famed debate with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1552, outlined six just causes for waging war against nonsubjugated Indians and seizing their labor and property. By the seventeenth century, however, as

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63 Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 233–92 Vitoria’s writings were part of a broader attempt to regulate the standards of territorial possession enacted in the Americas. The Laws of Burgos and the Requirement were issued by the crown in 1512 and 1513 respectively in an attempt to establish standards of just war. They did not, however, belie the logic of the papal donation as a means to claim territorial possession. See: Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), 1–36. Vitoria, on the other hand, contended that even if the pope had dominion over peoples throughout the world, he was not authorized to claim their property, including lands. Vitoria, *Political Writings*, 258. Internal debates in Spain over just cause for the claiming possession over the lands of “infieles” became increasingly limited. See: Mariluz Urquijo, “La valoración de la bulas alejandrinas en el siglo XVIII”: 170–1; Caamaño-Dones, “La concesión a Castilla de la soberanía sobre las Indias y el deber de evangelizar”, 15–16; Jonathan D. Amith, *The Möbius Strip: A Spatial History of Colonial Society in Guerrero, Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 77–85.

Catholic proselytization began to wane as sufficient cause for Iberian exclusivity, theorists debated standards for imperial possession and considered the ways in which native peoples could demonstrate possession themselves. Some, like Hugo Grotius and Wolfgang Adam Lauterbach, considered agriculture to be the foundation of all territorial claims – to claim land was to exploit it – while Cornelius de Pauw and others contended that hunting or fishing equally constituted territorial exploitation and dominion.65

The lynchpin to these debates was whether or not the indigenous Americans in question had adopted a sedentary lifestyle of cultivation. For Catholic theologians and jurists, Christianity and sedentism were synonymous terms, or more precisely, mobility signified infidelity. For this reason, one of the principal terms for identifying mobile peoples was “infidel Indians” (indios infieles). The process of conversion, in addition to baptism, involved forming a reduction or settling within an extant community, where one could both practice catechism and cultivate the earth. To convert indios infieles, therefore, was to “reduce them to the faith” (“reducirlos a la fe”), a concept that highlighted the indistinguishability of sedentism and Christianity.66 Furthermore, sedentism clarified for jurists the submission of native peoples to papal authority, which flowed through the crown, priests, and imperial officials. Such individuals could more readily be identified as vassals, and their lands and properties as pertaining to their imperial patron.67

For those who questioned the validity of the papal donation and sought to standardize acts of possession, the question of sedentism was also a key issue. If the Pope did not have the right to claim

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66 Other means of expressing this idea included “reduzir a nossa obedencia” or “reduzir à doutrina e aldêa,” the former emphasizing vassalage and the latter emphasizing sedentism. IHGB – Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 44, 49v, 60, 61. Muriel, Elementos de derecho natural y de gentes, 313–15. For more on the relationship between conversion and territorial possession, see: Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 70–95.

67 Imperial subjects did not necessarily share this juridical perspective. While individuals or communities may have accepted the authority of a royal court, this did not necessarily imply the cession of land rights.
dominion over lands belonging to “infieles,” then the resistance to or acceptance of Catholicism would shape whether or not they were vassals of an Iberian crown. In instances in which the independence of a particular community of native peoples was apparent, however, how could someone else claim their lands? Did the statutes of natural law protect their dominions? Over time, jurists demonstrated increased reticence toward acknowledging the rights of people who were not firmly established in a single location.68

Nonetheless, many others saw herding or commerce as legitimate indicators of possession. In agreement with de Pauw, the Jesuit Domingo Muriel wrote:

Not all of the human flock has the idea or much less the intention to become a legitimate possessor [of land] by means of their occupations of the regions in which they roam, and with exclusion of all others. But once vacant land has been occupied, property and dominion are acquired not only through new or intense cultivation, but also by means of herding cattle and by commerce.69

Here and in other occasions, Muriel contended that while mobile peoples did not necessarily seek territorial exclusivity themselves, their occupation of a given place coupled with the herding of cattle or trade served as a legitimate determinant of their property and dominion. Imperial occupation, therefore, did not necessarily supersede that of mobile peoples in terms of natural rights, even when the establishment of colonies went unopposed.70

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68 José María Mariluz Urquijo, El régimen de la tierra en el derecho indiano (Buenos Aires: Perrot, 1968), 28–29. Although the question of mobility vs. cultivation was always present in juridical debates, it became increasingly important in the eighteenth century. The idea of “terra nullius” emerged when earlier arguments, which justified territorial usurpation based upon incivility or the rejection of Christianity, waned. As settlement became a principal standard for determining possession, increasing numbers of jurists came to agree that uncultivated land was subject to no sovereign. Moretti, International Law and Nomadic People, Chapter 1.

69 “No todo rebaño humano tiene la idea y menos la intención de hacerse posesor legítimo por medio de sus ocupaciones de las regiones en que yerra y con exclusión de los demás. Pero una vez que la tierra vacante ha sitio ocupada, la propiedad y el dominio se adquieren no solamente por medio de la cultura empezada ó intensa, sino también por medio del pastoreo de los ganados y del comercio.” Muriel, Elementos de derecho natural y de gentes, 99 Other jurists who shared Muriel’s opinión included Samuel Fufendorf, Christian Wolff, and William Blackstone. Moretti, International Law and Nomadic People, 24-30, 39.

70 Muriel, Elementos de derecho natural y de gentes, 128, 131, 315, 348-9 While Muriel suggested that such claims to dominion were weaker than those exercised by sedentary peoples, and did not necessarily imply exclusivity, he nonetheless acknowledged their right to conserve their territories. Levinton, El espacio jesuitico-guaraní, - Volumen 80, 138, nt. 417.
These juridical debates, although they never directly mentioned Minuanes, Charrúas, or other mobile peoples in the Río de la Plata, did have a direct impact on the thinking of Iberian administrators. Along with fomenting a race to establish strategic settlements, the juridical context of the early eighteenth century conditioned the meanings ascribed to interethnic relations. Knowing that tolderías effectively controlled the majority of regional space, administrators and diplomats alike sought to demonstrate that their imperial patron could still claim possession of it, either by delegitimizing the rights of native peoples or claiming them as subjects. Evidence of direct discussions of this issue is difficult to come by, and for that reason imperial attitudes are best understood through an assessment of the strategic actions of regional administrators. Nonetheless, one instance in which a high-ranking official opined on the juridical status of mobile peoples occurred in 1721, when the governor of Buenos Aires complained about trade between Yaros, Bohanes, Charrúas and foreign ships.

It would be good if Your Lordship would order the Governor of this Plaza to oblige said Indians, by force or willingly, to abandon that countryside, over which they have no right, because they are like gypsies, vagabond wanderers, that have no fixed lands, house, or home, and only inhabit the countryside because of the cows [that are there].

His complaint demonstrates the key contradictions that plagued Iberian claims to the Río de la Plata’s northern shore. Since he was unable to claim the tolderías in question as vassals to the Spanish crown, Buenos Aires’s governor sought to delegitimize their rights to the region’s countryside. The logic that he employed asserted that given their mobility, Yaros, Bohanes, and Charrúas were not legitimate possessors. Instead, they were mere “inhabitants” of the land, a refrain that city officials repeated many times over.

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71 “sería bien que V.Sh. mandase al Governador de esta Plasa, que obligasse á dichos indios, por fuerza, ó de grado, á desamparar aquellas campañas, a que no tienen derecho alguno, porque son como los gitanos, gente Bagamunda, que no tienen tierras fijas, casa, ni ógar, y solo las habitan, por el cebo de las Bacas...” AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31). Although García Ros identified Yaros, Charrúas, and Bohanes as the arbiters of trade and access to the countryside, it is more likely in this case that he was referring to Guenoa or Minuán tolderías that had been trading there for some time. See, for example: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 280-90; AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12).

72 AGI - Charcas, 263, (Buenos Aires, 1699-12-19 & 1715-12-16).
There were two problems with this logic. First, it implied that if the tolderías had no territorial claim, Spain was the region’s legitimate possessor. This notion was most certainly rooted in the 1681 and 1715 treaties, which had limited Portugal’s jurisdictional exclusivity to a cannon shot from the plaza of Colônia do Sacramento. By denouncing the rights of the tolderías because of their lack of settlements, however, the governor of Buenos Aires affirmed the notion that settlements should serve as a standard for determining territorial possession. In 1721, Spain had not yet founded the plazas of Maldonado and Montevideo, and thus had no foundation for its own claim. It is likely for this reason that the early signs of a French trading post in this area caused consternation across the river. Second, in seeking royal support for the expulsion of the tolderías from the area, the governor assumed that Spain had the right and capacity to police it. In doing so, he rejected the reports of individuals who had been in the field, which suggested that that the tolderías collectively had as many as 3,000 archers – a force too strong to topple. He dismissed such claims as exaggeration and argued that coercion was both advisable and feasible.73

While Iberian administrators dismissed tolderías as inhabitants of regional lands rather than possessors, they nonetheless relied upon them for access to the countryside. For imperial authorities, therefore, pact-making served the dual purpose of currying favor with particular caciques and creating the legal framework to identify them as vassals. The 1731 treaty between the plaza of Montevideo and Minuán tolderías provides a good example. The peace accord between included payments from the former to the latter in exchange for access to the ranches that lay outside its walls. At the same time, however, the written agreement contained clauses that declared the tolderías to be subjects of the Spanish Crown. This nuanced language was likely of little importance to the caciques present at the parley and certainly had no direct impact on their relationship with the plaza; however, it was of the utmost importance to Spanish

73 As discussed in the previous chapter through the near abandonment of Montevideo in 1731, however, such an attitude was inaccurate and potentially disastrous.
authorities who were eager to claim possession over regional lands. By claiming the tolderías as vassals of the Spanish crown, they could delegitimize Portuguese territorial claims that were similarly framed.

Up through the first half of the eighteenth century, then, Spanish and Portuguese officials sought to incorporate regional tolderías into their imperial projects. Peace accords, such as that of 1731, provided legal language for imagining native peoples as imperial subjects; however, Iberian administrators more frequently sought to entice their mobile counterparts into settling on a reduction. Most of these efforts proved unsuccessful, as caciques likely interpreted the frequent payments given to them as an affirmation of their own authority rather than an incentive to subjugate themselves. Moreover, in those instances where tolderías settled in a fixed locale and developed a relationship with a priest, they did so for trade or for temporary shelter, and their seasonal movements made such arrangements ephemeral. This, combined with the heterogeneity of tolderías in the region, made the idea of reducing all of them an elusive task.

The possibility of establishing reductions was integral to the interimperial struggle over Colônia. In 1715, after ten years of Spanish occupation, the Treaty of Utrecht transferred the plaza back to the Portuguese. Frustrated over the loss, the Governor of Buenos Aires considered retaking the plaza.

[By controlling Colônia] we will have the advantage of dominating all of that countryside, and the reduction of the infidel Indians that inhabit it. If we do not, those provinces and the 30 Missions of the Company of Jesus will remain exposed to being easily lost to whichever nation settles and fortifies itself [there].

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74 Fucé, “Ceremonia persuasiva”. A transcription of the peace accords is available in: Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 57–58.

75 Intercultural exchanges such as these frequently produced misunderstandings in which both sides interpret an action through their own cultural norms. See: White, The Middle Ground, x; James Lockhart, Of Things of the Indies: Essays Old and New in Early Latin American History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 99. Records of payments from Iberian officials to caciques do not indicate indigenous perceptions; however, given the material dependency of Iberian settlements plazas upon tolderías at the time, it is more likely that caciques interpreted these offerings as tribute than affirmations of imperial authority.

76 “y que de esta forma se conseguira la conveniencia de señorear todas aquellas campañas, y reduccion de los yndios infeles que avitan en ellas; Y de lo contrario quedaran aquellas Provincias y mas de 30 pueblos de las Misiones, de la Compañía, expuestas a perderse con gran facilidad poblándose y fortificándose otra cualquiera nación.” AGI - Charcas, 263, (1ª carta, Buenos Aires, 1716-05-13).
By controlling Colônia, Spain would be the lone imperial power with a foothold in the region. All that remained for it to consolidate its control would be to convince regional tolderías to settle on reductions.

The particular advantage of dominating all of that countryside [is] having the possibility of reducing to our Holy Faith the infidel Indians that inhabit it, who if they joined together with the Christians and Spanish would be enough to oppose whatever insult our enemies might attempt.  

Now, with Colônia back in Portuguese hands, caciques could once again negotiate between the two crowns and reducing them would be more difficult. The region was again exposed to foreign powers, as the Portuguese presence left juridical debates in the air and mobile tolderías with multiple trading partners.

Portuguese officials attempted the same strategy upon their return to Colônia. For them, local tolderías represented not only a lifeline to their plaza, but also the best chance at preventing future Spanish or French settlements in Montevideo and Maldonado. Thus, in 1718, Colônia’s governor wrote to the Ultramarine Council (*Conselho Ultramarino*) in Lisbon:

>[W]hat would help more than anything is if we were to have on our side the Indians of that district [Montevideo] because these are the ones that facilitate the Castilians in their undertakings there and the ones that obtain [cattle] for them. For this reason it is necessary to take great care and industry in acquiring them, in exchange for several items that are given to them, which they hold in great esteem yet for us are a small price, and attempt to reduce them to a village under the governance of the Jesuits, or another reformed religion.  

Days later, the governor made a pact with several Minuán caciques – Chacadar, Francisco, and Loya. In exchange for the caciques’ promise to guard the coastline against foreign ships, the Portuguese would pay 200,000 reais in goods and help them locate a relative who had been sent to Rio de Janeiro. According to the Governor’s official report, the agreement also included a Minuán promise to live under the protection  

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77 “…la particular combenensia de señorerear todas aquellas campañas teniendo posibilidad de reduír a n.rra Santa Fé a los yndios yñifeles que las abitan, los quales se reuniesen con los cristianos y españoles bastarian á oponerse a qualquer ynsulto que los enemigos pudiesen yntentar…” ibid., (2ª carta, Buenos Aires, 1716-05-13).  

78 “…contribuirá mais que tudo se tivermos da nossa parte os índios daquelle distrito, porque estes sam os que facilitam aos Castelhanos, as suas empresas n’aquella parte e os que lhes conseguem, para o que será preciso pór grande cuidado e industria em adquirir-los, a trôco de algumas cousas que se lhe dêem, que sendo para elles de grande estimação, para nós são de pouco preço, e procurar reduzí-los á doutrina e aldê debaixo do Governo dos padres da companhia, ou deoutra religião reformada.” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 49-49v.
of the Portuguese king and to be baptized.\(^7\) This accord, much like the later one between Montevideo and Minuán caciques, represented the dissonance between imperial ambitions and material territorial conditions. While the Portuguese governor sought to produce evidence of Minuán vassalage, Chadacar, Francisco, and Loya would have had little reason to interpret the arrangement in such terms. The act of baptism, if it indeed ever occurred, would have been a ceremonious signification of such ties rather than an act of submission. Likewise, the offering of payment would probably have been understood to be either a reciprocal act of giving or the recognition of Minuán authority in the region.\(^8\) The plaza offered 200,000 reais again in 1727 in the hope that this time Minuán caciques would agree to settle; however, the results of this venture were the same as the first.\(^8\)

More often than not, missionaries rather than secular officials undertook the labor of advancing reductions. From as far back as the 1620s, Jesuits, Mercedarians, Franciscans, and other orders sought to establish reductions with Bohanes, Charrúas, Guenoas, Minuanes, and Yaros, much as they had with Guaraní-speaking peoples. A survey of ecclesiastical records reveals at least seventeen attempts between 1623 and 1736, in addition to the numerous Charrúas and Guenoas who alighted in Yapeyú and San Borja, respectively (Table 2.2). Much like Iberian officials in Colónia, Montevideo, or Rio Grande, church leaders hoped to use the reductions simultaneously as a means to subjugate and proselytize tolderías, to gain access to the rural countryside, and to stake a claim over regional space against competing plazas.

\(^7\) IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 59-62; AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 17, Doc 3580; AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Doc 52. For more on Minuán motives in this particular case, see: Frühauf García, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 618–9.

\(^8\) In the end, the Portuguese governor did provide payments, yet it appears that the baptisms never did occur. IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 237-8. For more on the issue of baptism and Minuán caciques, see: Hameister, “No princípio era o caos”: 114-115, 125.

\(^8\) AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 2, Doc 180.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ETHNONYM</th>
<th>ORDER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1623</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>[Never founded]</td>
<td>Charrúas; Yaros</td>
<td>Jesuit</td>
<td>Mouth of Río Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1624</td>
<td>[1631]</td>
<td>San Francisco de Olivesa</td>
<td>Charrúas</td>
<td>Franciscan</td>
<td>Mouth of Río Negro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1624</td>
<td>[1631]</td>
<td>San Juan de Céspedes [San Antonio de los Chanáes]</td>
<td>Chanás</td>
<td>Franciscan</td>
<td>Mouth of Río Negro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>[1658]</td>
<td>San Andrés*</td>
<td>Yaros</td>
<td>Jesuitas</td>
<td>Arroyo Ibarapita-guazú</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>Santo Domingo Soriano</td>
<td>Chanás; Charrúas</td>
<td>Franciscan</td>
<td>Mouth of Río Negro, west of Río Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>Doctrina de Francisco de Rivas Gavilán**</td>
<td>Guaranies</td>
<td>Mercedarian</td>
<td>Itacurubi, near San Javier, Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>[n/a]**</td>
<td>Charrúas</td>
<td>Mercedarian</td>
<td>Sauce de Luna, cerca del arroyo Pay Ticú</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1678</td>
<td>[Never founded]</td>
<td>Guenoas</td>
<td>Jesuits</td>
<td>Near La Cruz &amp; Yapeyú</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1682</td>
<td>1682</td>
<td>Jesús/Santa María de Guenoas</td>
<td>Guenoas</td>
<td>Jesuit</td>
<td>Mouth of Río Ibicuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>[Never Founded]</td>
<td>Guenoas</td>
<td>Jesuit</td>
<td>Between Santo Tomé, Yapeyú, &amp; La Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1683]</td>
<td>[1683]</td>
<td>San Andrés*</td>
<td>Guenoas</td>
<td>Jesuit</td>
<td>Santa Tecla/Aceguá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1693</td>
<td>1693</td>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td>Charrúas; Yaros</td>
<td>Jesuit</td>
<td>Areñes o Ytus del Río Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>[Never founded]</td>
<td>Bohanes</td>
<td>Franciscan</td>
<td>Old site of Soriano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1724</td>
<td>1724</td>
<td>[Never founded]</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
<td>Franciscan</td>
<td>Montevideo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726</td>
<td>1726</td>
<td>[Never founded]</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
<td>[n/a]</td>
<td>Colónia do Sacramento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>Estancias del Bojurú</td>
<td>Minuanes</td>
<td>[n/a]</td>
<td>Rio Grande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Cayastá</td>
<td>Charrúas</td>
<td>Franciscan</td>
<td>North of Santa Fe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2 – Reductions and Attempted Reductions in the Río de la Plata, 1623-1750

82 It is unclear whether San Andrés de Yaros and San Andrés de Guenoas represented the same reduction, two separate attempts at a reduction at the same site, or confusion amongst Jesuit sources. In Fúrlong, map XXXII, the reduction is labeled “San Antonio de Guenoas y Yarros.” **It is possible that the two 1664 Mercedarian reductions were instead one. Nicolás del Techo, Historia de la Provincia del Paraguay Tomo 3 (Madrid: A. de Uribe y Compañía, 1897), 135–137, 240; Sergio Hernán Latini, “Reducción de charrúas en la Banda del Norte” a principios del siglo XVII: ¿Logro de poder colonial o estrategia indígena de adaptación?,” Memoria Americana 21, no. 2 (julio-diciembre 2013); Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 65; Bracco, “Los errores Charrúa y Guenoa-Minuán”: 124–5; Levinton, “Guaranies y Charrúas”: 62–3; Fúrlong Cárdfiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Río de la Plata, vol. 2, Mapas XX & XXXII; Francisco Jarque, Insignes missioneros de la Compañía de Jesus en la provincia de
By the 1730s, nearly all of the plazas that dotted the perimeter of the Río de la Plata were undertaking efforts to entice its numerous tolderías to settle on reductions. In 1736, as Colônia was under siege, Portuguese officials hoped to strengthen their position in the plaza of Rio Grande. Although they had been in contact with Minuán caciques for years, offering payments in exchange for the ability to transit between Rio Grande and Colônia, they made a new push toward establishing a formal reduction alongside the plaza. This settlement never materialized, however, as many of Rio Grande's Portuguese inhabitants were fearful of the nearby tolderías, as they had come to take horses from them not long before. More

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83 Santa Fe and Corrientes were the principal exceptions to this rule, a point likely explained by their distance from disputed territories. By the Treaty of Utrecht in 1715, Portugal no longer claimed dominion over territories west of the Rio Uruguay.

importantly, the Minuán caciques were simultaneously negotiating with Spanish authorities and therefore had little incentive to stay.85

Spanish authorities in Montevideo had been supporting similar efforts at reductions since the first Iberian attempts to establish a plaza there. In 1724, Franciscan friar Pedro Jerónimo de la Cruz proposed the idea of a reduction for what he calculated to be the 2,000 Minuanes who lived nearby, yet local caciques rejected the offer. De la Cruz cited his advanced age as the reason for the caciques’ reticence; however, there was little promise of material benefit for them.86 By 1743, imperial authorities renewed their efforts to establish a Minuán reduction in the proximities of the plaza. Their plan, put forth by Jesuits in Buenos Aires, was to send Christian Guenoas from the San Borja mission to persuade the tolderías that were nearest to Montevideo. It also included a specific effort to define the legal status of the Minuanes in the event that they accepted the proposal.

It should be judged convenient that from the City of Montevideo, where [they would be] reduced to a more political lifestyle, [the Minuanes] will have fewer obstacles to receiving the gospel, which without a doubt will be achieved if the said Indians are assured under your Royal Word that they will neither serve nor be entrusted to the Spanish (an idea that they extremely abhor) but rather attached to the Royal Crown, in order to protect them in a proper and gentle vassalage.87

In this way, Jesuit leaders aimed to incorporate local tolderías as vassals to the Spanish crown without subjecting them to local authorities. They sought to gradually win their allegiance through material support.

In response to this plan, the Crown authorized the installation of a Jesuit residency in Montevideo the

85 Field reports by Portuguese soldiers revealed that Minuán tolderías were simultaneously patrolling the countryside with Spanish soldiers and entering and leaving Montevideo. Minuanes near Rio Grande also maintained close ties to Guaraníes from the easternmost missions. BNP - F. 1445, f. 56; “Coleção de documentos sobre o Brigadeiro José da Silva Paes”: 16–7 Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 126–27; Hameister, Para dar calor à nova povoação, 19.

86 AGI - Chile, 153, (Montevideo, 1724-08-29 & 1724-09-15).

87 “Jugsasen comben.te de la Ciu.d de Montevideo, donde reducidos á vida mas politica, tendran menos embarazo p.a recivir el evangelio, lo que no duda se conceguirá si se les asegura á Rhos Yndios debajo de V. R.l Palabra, de la no serviran, ni seran encomendados ál español (lo que sumam.te aborrecen) sino solo agregados á V. R.l Corona, p.a protekerlos en un devido y suave vassallaje.” AGI - Charcas, 384, “Petición del Procurador de la Compañía de Jesús, padre Juan José Rico” (s/f, pero visto en consejo 1743-10-17); Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, Capítulo 5, nt. 8, 12; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, Capítulo 6.
following year. As was the case with Rio Grande, however, there was little incentive for the tolderías to settle on a reduction and develop a dependent relationship with the local plaza. By the century’s midpoint, the success of gradual incorporation through payment seemed improbable.

Jesuit authorities also developed new strategies to try to attract Charrúa and Guenoa tolderías to the northern and western portions of the region. In 1747, José Cardiel drafted a report outlining the difficulties that he and others had faced in the reduction of tolderías and strategies to overcome them. Basing much of his assessment on time that he had spent visiting Charrúa tolderías near Yapeyú in 1743, Cardiel argued:

We have found two kinds of Indians in this province: those on foot [who are farmers] and who live in houses and towns with obedience to their caciques, and those on horseback, with neither houses nor towns nor crops nor obedience to their caciques. [They live as] lazy vagabonds their entire lives without a fixed locale, always living on what they hunt or steal….Converting the first has not come at a great cost because they have a certain sort of rationality and order, nor has the formation of their towns been expensive since they are accustomed to the work that their houses and farms demand. From the beginning, they devoted themselves to the [work] that a town demands. Such have been the Guaranies and the Chiquitos. The second [kind], because of their lack of rationality and order, their innate inertia, and the horror that they have of all kinds of work, even if it is for their own good, have made the Apostolic men whine and sweat for more than a century without having any effect.

Convinced that if only they could see the benefits of a sedentary lifestyle firsthand, Charrúas, Guenoses, and others would choose to stay permanently on reductions themselves, Cardiel proposed the founding of settler colonies in the midst of lands controlled by certain tolderías. Each colony would be comprised of upwards of 200 individuals from the Guaraní missions and would be provisioned with food, clothing, and

88 AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 183, docs. 1182 & 1188.
89 “Dos especies de indios son los q’ encontramos en esta Prov.a: unos de a pie, y Labradorres, ó chacareros, como aqui se dice, q’ viven en casas y Pueblos con obediencia á sus Caciques. Y otros de acabalbo, sin casas, ni Pueblo, ni sementeras, ni obediencia á sus caciques, vagos, y vagabundos toda su vida sin sitio fijo; y viviendo siempre dela caza, y del hurto….Los 1.os por tener algun genero de racionalidad y policia, no ha costado mho el convertirlos; ni han sido mhos los gastos en la formacion de sus Pueblos; pues como acostumbrados al trabaxo, q’ piden sus casas y chacras, desde el principio se dieron á las fabriscas, y trabaxos q’ pide un Pueblo. Tales han sido los Guaranis, y los Chiquitos = = = = Los 2.os por su falta de racionalidad y policia, por su inata inercia, y por el orrible orror, q’ tienen á todo trabaxo, aunq’ sea p.a su bien son los q’ han hecho sudar y gemir a los varones Apostolicos por mas de un siglo sin conseguir efecto.” AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, 4390/1; Levinton, El espacio jesuitico-guaroni, - Volumen 80, 111–12; Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas”: 64.
goods taken from the other missions. He hoped that by forming a province of new plazas in the region’s interior, rather than restricting them to the perimeter, tolderías would have more incentives to remain in the same location permanently. 90 Much like the cases of Colônia, Rio Grande, and Montevideo, this plan never came to fruition.

1749 to 1752: Interimperial Peace and Interethnic Violence

In 1749, a sharp change occurred in interimperial and interethnic relations in the region. Iberian diplomats for the first time articulated new standards for determining territorial possession – treaty maps – as they negotiated what would become the Treaty of Madrid. As the competing arguments over the papal donation versus uti possidetis had failed to resolve the perpetual territorial disputes, and nationally sponsored mapping expeditions were insufficient to garner international recognition, negotiators now put their faith in the union of diplomacy and mapmaking (Table 2.3). While these deliberations were taking place far away in royal courts, the Río de la Plata became once again embroiled in interethnic violence. Spanish and Portuguese officials reported armed combat between tolderías, and soon after, in both Montevideo and the western portion of the region, Spanish soldiers engaged in fighting as well. As a result, the next three years saw both a dramatic reconfiguration of relations between regional tolderías and an increased number of caciques negotiating the possibility of reductions.

90 AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, 4390/1 & 4390/2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TREATY</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE FOR RÍO DE LA PLATA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1494</td>
<td>Tordesillas</td>
<td>Set theoretical division between Spanish &amp; Portuguese dominions at 370 leagues west of Cape Verde Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1529</td>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>Produced an antimeridian of the Tordesillas line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Spanish &amp; Portuguese vassals could cross imperial frontiers (Article 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>(1) Colônia do Sacramento recognized as Portuguese possession (Articles 2 &amp; 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Common use of countryside (Article 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Spain renounces rights over lands arbitrated in 1681 treaty (Article 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>(1) Lands/plaza of Colônia do Sacramento returned to Portuguese (Articles 5-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Uti posseditis replaces papal donation as standard measure of possession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>(1) Colônia do Sacramento affirmed as Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Principal of uti posseditis guides treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>(1) Mapping replaces uti posseditis as standard measure of possession (Article 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Permuta]</td>
<td>(2) Portugal and Spain exchange Colônia do Sacramento for the Siete Pueblos Orientales in affirmation of territorial exclusivity (Articles 13 &amp; 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Demarcation expeditions sent to region to define border (Article 22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3 – Treaties Guiding Territorial Possession in the Río de la Plata up to 1750

The combined distrust for earlier accords and unilateral mapping endeavors led Portuguese and Spanish diplomats to seek a new means to determine legitimate territorial possession. Despite their disagreement about how to divide possession, they were unanimous in their diagnosis of the problem.

Representatives of the royal court in Lisbon contended:

[Following the Treaty of Tordesillas, the Spanish] never catalogued their conquests nor demarcated their limits, nor detailed this imaginary line, the division with Portugal from North to South. For this reason, the two crowns possess an undivided America, with neither being able to say with certainty what is theirs, beyond that which they have settled. And in this way, Castile can say with much certainty that Cuyabá, Mato Grosso, and Pará are theirs, and Portugal that Buenos Aires, Tucumán and Paraguay pertain to it; the demarcation will be the proof and certainty of each of these claims.91

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91 “[Depois do Tratado de Tordesilhas, os espanhóis] nunca tomarão as suas conquistas, nem demarcavão os seus limites, nem carreão a tal linha imaginaria, divisão com Portugal do Norte a Sul, de que sucede estarem as duas coroas possuindo a America como por indivízo, sem nenhum poder dizer de certo o que he seu, senão o que tem povoado, e neste sentido pode dizer Castela com tanta certeza, que o Cuyabá, Mato Grosso, e Para superior são seus. Como Portugal, que Buenos Ayres, Tucuman e o Paraguay lhe pertence, pois a falta de demarcação será a prova e a certeza tanto a huns como a outros.” IHGB - Arquivo, lata 168, doc 4, f. 65. Numerous Portuguese diplomats also expressed this distrust toward Spanish-sponsored mapping expeditions. See, for example: IHGB - Arquivo, lata 50, doc 7; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 30v.
The perpetuity of borderland disputes between the two empires in South America was due to the fact that they had never sent mapmakers to draw the Tordesillas line on the ground. Even Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Spanish participants in the La Condamine expedition to the Amazon, agreed.

It is always necessary to utilize a map, or maritime chart, based in the exactitude that is determined by observations of longitudes in the most notable and principal places. [One should] not rely on the uncertainty and variety of those that are only made from diaries and nautical routes, nor on [those] that can be believed to be partial, for being national, to the interests of one of the two crowns.\footnote{“es preciso valernos siempre de algun Mapa, ó Carta Marítima, bastando para la exactitud, que se hallen determinadas por las Observaciones con fíxeza las Longitudes en aquellos parages mas notables, y principales: y para no incurrir en la poca certeza, y variedad de aquellas, que solo se fabricaron arregladas á los Diarios, y Derroteros de los Nauticos, ni en el defecto de las que pueden creerse parciales, por ser Nacionales, á los intereses de alguna de las dos Coronas.” Juan and Ulloa, \textit{Disertación histórica y geográfica sobre el meridiano de demarcación}, 71–72.}

Certainly numerous maps had been produced over the years in an attempt to add clarity to the issue, but these works were considered untrustworthy. Those drawn from engravers’ tables in European cities relied upon imprecise diaries and journals from missionaries or travelers, while those produced by direct observation and state-of-the-art measurement lacked the necessary transparency for them to be reliable.

Negotiators also agreed on the remedy, and by January of 1750 they had all signed the treaty. The main statutes relevant to the Río de la Plata were as follows. Portugal would cede the plaza of Colônia do Sacramento to Spain, which in return would order the evacuation of the “Siete Pueblos Orientales,” the Jesuit-Guaraní missions that had been established to the east of the Río Uruguay. In addition, the two crowns would finance joint mapping expeditions to determine a new line between their respective South American dominions. This borderline would replace all previous standards of determining territorial possession, as noted in the treaty’s first article.

The present treaty will be the only foundation and rule that should be followed in the future for the division and limits of dominions in all of America and in Asia. In virtue of this, whatever right or action that the two Crowns may have claimed will be completely abolished, whether derived from the bull of Pope Alexander VI, of blessed memory, and the treaties of Tordesillas, Lisbon, and Utrecht, from the sale [of the Moluccas] authorized in Zaragoza, or from any other treaties, conventions or promises. All of that, as much as it deals with the line of demarcation, will be of no value or effect, as if that and all the rest has never been determined. And in the future the said line will no longer be negotiated, nor will it be used to make decisions, however difficult they may be,
that occur about the limits, but instead the frontier that is prescribed in the present articles, [will be used] as an invariable rule and much less subject to controversies.91

To realize this initiative, teams of engineers, geographers, and cosmographers from both sides would meet together and walk the border in one another’s presence. They would be required to sign off on the same maps, which would then be used as the standard measure for future disagreements.

The Treaty of Madrid represented a marked shift in the way that imperial negotiators not only determined possession but also how they imagined it, a shift from plazas to provinces. Each earlier accord had considered plazas to be the key markers of imperial possession, with dominion extending out from them according to juridical antecedents, natural limits, or relations with native peoples. It was possible to have overlapping settlements, as occurred in the Río de la Plata, which is why the dueling Iberian empires sought to prevent new settlements by competitors. Each new plaza altered not only the physical but also the juridical landscape. In this context, maps served as representations of possession that had been determined through other means. The Treaty of Madrid employed the reverse logic – maps were not simply representations of territorial possession, but rather legal determinants of it. In this way, the borderline superseded the plaza as the key marker of the limits of imperial dominion, effectively eliminating the possibility of overlapping settlements, shared territorial access, or unclaimed lands. Territorial possession was henceforth unilateral, exclusive, and “without interruption,” at least in juridical terms.94

91 “El presente tratado será el único fundamento y regla que en adelante se deberá seguir para la división y límites de los dominios en toda la América y en Asia; y en su virtud quedará abolido cualquier derecho y acción que puedan alegar las dos Coronas, con motivo de la bula del Papa Alejandro VI, de feliz memoria, y de los tratados de Tordesillas, de Lisboa y Utrecht, de la escritura de venta otorgada en Zaragoza, y de otros cualquiera tratados, convenciones y promesas; que todo ello, en cuanto trata de la línea de demarcación, será de ningún valor y efecto, como si no hubiera sido determinado en todo lo demás en su fuerza y vigor. Y en lo futuro no se tratará más de la citada línea, ni se podrá usar de este medio para la decisión de cualquiera dificultad que ocurra sobre los límites, sino únicamente de la frontera que se prescribe en los presentes artículos, como regla invariable y mucho menos sujeta a controversias.” Full-text of the treaty is available [here](#).

94 Cortesão, Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750), Parte III, Documento XCII. Several scholars have pointed to the Treaty of Madrid as the moment in which uti possidetis finally became standard means to claim territorial possession. From this perspective, the Treaty of Utrecht represented the moment in which negotiators, geographers, and jurists alike began to replace the imaginary Tordesillas line with the notion of natural limits. Dauril Alden, *Royal Government in Colonial Brazil, with Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1799* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 68; Camargo, “Las relaciones luso-hispánicas en torno a las Misiones Orientales del Uruguay”: 237-8, 244–246; Íris Kantor,
This new logic and vision of territorial possession thrust mapmakers into the center of the interimperial dispute, making them the principal arbiters and giving their deliberations unprecedented weight in determining where to locate the division. Certainly, the diplomats who had congregated in Madrid to draft the treaty determined which territories to exchange and provided general guidelines for where to draw the line. They even developed a guide map, known as the “Mapa das Cortes,” which commissioned officials would carry with them as they traversed continental interiors. Nonetheless, mapmakers bore the burden of hashing out details and transforming the theoretical parameters of the treaty’s geographic vision into something compatible with local landscapes. Ultimately, the maps that they collectively underwrote would supersede the “Mapa das Cortes” as the principal determinants of the limits of one division or another. In short, the treaty maps were not simply representations, but rather legal documents that would guide imperial land policy throughout the rest of the colonial period.

The Treaty of Madrid also marked a shift in the ways in which Spain and Portugal discussed the territorial possessions of mobile peoples. While the concept of plazas allowed for the legal possibility of land possession through herding or trading, the concept of provinces did not. Instead, this way of seeing

“Soberania e territorialidade colonial: Academia Real de História Portuguesa e a América Portuguesa (1720),” in Temas Setecentistas: governos e populações no império português, ed. Andrea Doré and Antonio Cesar de Almeida Santos, 233–9 v. 1 (Curitiba: UFPR/SCHLA, 2009); Kantor, “Usos diplomáticos da ilha-Brasil”: 80; Magalhães, “Mundos em miniatura”: 85; Furtado, O mapa que inventou o Brasil, Capítulo 9. This narrative certainly explains how negotiators determined the placement of the new dividing line for the Treaty of Madrid. The concept of uti possidetis justified the drawing of the line in a way that incorporated new settlements, and in this way represented an end to the imaginary Tordesillas line. Nonetheless, settlements were not the only determining factor in where to draw the new line, as negotiators took into account historical narratives of possession, as well as earlier maps and treaties, when making their case. Furthermore, the concept of uti possidetis was discarded when determining what to do with Colônia do Sacramento and the Siete Pueblos Orientales. The significance of the treaty, then, was not the definitive victory of uti possidetis, but rather the first juridical attempt to determine a hard line between the two empires and to produce territorial exclusivity. From this point forward, uti possidetis would be a factor in arbitrating territorial disputes; however, the retention of new settlements depended upon their proximity to extant treaty lines. The borderline could be adjusted, as it was in 1777 and 1804, yet it could not be erased.

For more on the Mapa das Cortes, see: Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, Capítulo 2; Luis Ferrand de Almeida, Alexandre de Gusmão, o Brasil e o Tratado de Madrid (1735-1750), História Moderna e Contemporânea 5 (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1990); Mário Olímpio Clemente Ferreira, “O Mapa das Cortes e o Tratado de Madrid a cartografia a serviço da diplomacia,” Varia História 23, no. 37 (Junho 2007); Magalhães, “Mundos em miniatura”: 85–6; Furtado, O mapa que inventou o Brasil.
space relied squarely on cartographic measurement and demanded complete territorial control. It deemed usufruct rights subordinate to drawings on paper. By extension, then, native peoples could no longer be considered legitimate possessors of land, or even independent agents. As a result, imperial officials began to envision them as vassals, whether they had accepted reductions or not.

1749 was also an important moment for local interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata, as plazas in nearly all corners of the region gained traction in their efforts to establish reductions. During the next three years, Charrúa or Minuán caciques approached local officials in São Miguel, Montevideo, Yapeyú, and other plazas to discuss the possibility of establishing settlements, a direct result of the spike in interethnic violence. In São Miguel, the Minuán caciques Xiclano, Tacú, Agostinho, and Casildo discussed with the local commander the possibility of establishing a settlement near the plaza of Rio Grande. They represented as many as 80 families and 400 people in total, to whom Portuguese officials provided food, clothing, and other items. The initial plan for a large settlement fell apart, as settlers in Rio Grande resisted the idea and the Minuán caciques refused a modified plan. Nonetheless, as many as 83 Minuanes were baptized in Rio Grande between 1749 and 1753, and a number of them remained as salaried workers in Borujú, a nearby ranch that belonged to the Portuguese crown. Furthermore, many of those who ultimately did not choose long-term settlement, including Tacú, developed kinship ties with individuals in the plaza.

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96 More specifically, the Minuán caciques negotiated with Pedro Pereira Chaves, the commander of the Guarda do Chuí, which was an outpost near São Miguel.


98 The sacrament of baptism thus served principally as a means to establish kinship ties, rather than to signify conversion or vassalage. Such was the case with Tacú and the family of Antônio Simões and Maria Quitéria Marques de Souza. Maria Quitéria baptized and served as godmother for Faustina, Tacú’s daughter, and through this relationship that this fostered with Tacú,
One year after the four caciques approached the Portuguese guards, another toldería was in dialogue with Montevideo regarding the possibility of a settlement there. Canamazán, the principal cacique involved in the negotiations, and 39 other Minuanes spent the second half of 1750 waiting as the plaza scrambled to find priests to administer the reduction. Meanwhile, Montevideo’s authorities had begun to collect money and cattle from their residents in support of the new settlement. By the beginning of the next year, however, the Minuanes’ patience had worn thin and they left with a number of other tolderías that frequented the area. Their path now took them east, in the direction of São Miguel, though it is unclear whether they intended to meet with Portuguese officials or other Minuanes, or hoped to exploit local resources during the summer months.

While Canamazán and his toldería waited near Montevideo, a number of others approached the priests of Yapeyú to discuss the possibility of a reduction there. Although details of this exchange are thin, it appears that as many as 145 Charrúas had arrived at the plaza. Furthermore, according to reports, Minuán and Guenoa tolderías had gone to San Borja and other mission plazas with the same objective in mind. In the case of Yapeyú, Jesuit and Guaraní authorities were skeptical of the sincerity of the Charrúas’ interest in a reduction. They feared that this was simply a ploy that would allow them to take advantage of the mission’s seasonal harvest, only to leave thereafter and join together with nearby Minuán tolderías, with Simões was granted access to the local countryside. Other families developed similar relationships with Agostinho. Hameister, “No princípio era o caos”: 110-114-115.

They were prepared to offer as many as 265 cows, 510 sheep, 110 silver pesos, yerba, and eight months’ worth of jerky if the toldería would accept a settlement. Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 301–2;

It is indeed possible that the Minuán tolderías near Montevideo had ties to those who presented themselves to the Portuguese guard in São Miguel, or that they were one and the same. At the same time, according to Francisco de Gorriti, that area was “habitation común de los minuanes a temporadas” because of the quantity of deer there was to hunt. AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1750-07-22 & 1750-09-06); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 182–84; AGI - Charcas, 378, (Buenos Aires, 1751-04-26); Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 301–2.

AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Buenos Aires, 1750-10-12; Las Vívoras, 1750-11-09); Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 266.

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whom they had been previously.\textsuperscript{102} It is unclear whether or not any of the Charrúas stayed at Yapeyú, but it appears that most of them eventually left. According to the testimony of a former resident of the mission, the Charrúas they had since joined together with Minuán and Bohan tolderías somewhere near the Rio Queguay.\textsuperscript{103}

After so many years of refusing settlement, why would tolderías throughout the region simultaneously see reductions as a viable option? Traditional explanations have focused on the military might of Spanish forces vis-à-vis their native counterparts, pointing to campaigns that left from Santa Fe, the Campo del Bloqueo, Corrientes, Yapeyú, and Montevideo between 1749 and 1752. According to such accounts, these expeditions expelled Charrúas from lands west of the Rio Uruguay and gave Montevideo control of the Banda Norte.\textsuperscript{104} There is certain merit to this narrative, as Buenos Aires demonstrated a shift in interethnic policy in the region and several expeditions were successful. After decades of attempting to attract local tolderías to settle on reductions via “gentle methods” (métodos suaves), Buenos Aires’s Governor, José de Andonaegui, gave the following order to Montevideo in 1749:

I am informing the commander of that plaza on this occasion the following in order that [the Minuanes] either be reduced to a town and to our Holy Faith living in peace or, in the event that they continue with their hostilities, that [the commander] go out to punish them and ruin them, ending them once and for all.\textsuperscript{105}

Several months later, he issued a similar order to authorities in Santa Fe.

\textsuperscript{102} AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1750-11-15); Bracco, “Los errores Charrúa y Guenoa-Minuán”: 133.

\textsuperscript{103} AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-11-13), f. 794.

\textsuperscript{104} For example: Funes, 	extit{Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay}, Tomo II, 96–100 Sallaberry, 	extit{Los charrías y Santa Fe}, Capítulo 10; Acosta y Lara, 	extit{La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico)}, vol. 1, Capítulos 4-6; Livi, “El Charrúa en Santa Fe”: 36–40; Bracco, 	extit{Charrúas, guenoes y guaranies}, 264–71.

\textsuperscript{105} “le prevengo en esta ocasion al Comandante de esa Plaza lo correspond.te afin de que o se reduzcan [a los Minuanes], al Pueblo, y anra S.ta Fe viviendo en Paz, o en caso de permanecer haciendo hostilidades, pase à castigarlos, y arruinarlos, acabando con ellos de una vez.” AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 2, Carpeta 19, No. 3.
[You will direct yourselves] to the center of where the said infidel Indians are, whom you will punish, putting them to the knife in the event that they resist and making all who turn themselves in prisoners of war.106

This was certainly not the first time that Spanish authorities engaged local tolderías militarily; however, the simultaneous effort from nearly all of their principal plazas to kill or capture entire tolderías was unique.107 Armed militias and mounted guards undertook months-long campaigns with great violence. According to official reports, in April 1751, Montevideo’s forces attacked Minuán tolderías in an area known as the Calera del Rey, near Maldonado, killing 120 people and taking 82 captives back to the plaza. Among the dead was Canamazán, who only a few months earlier had been discussing the possibility of a reduction. The expeditions that took place near Santa Fe yielded similar results, killing more than 150 Charrúas and forcing 339 more to establish a reduction known as “Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Cayastá.”108

Despite the high death toll and large numbers of captives taken, when considered on a regional scale, the expeditions were not as devastating as scholars have claimed. First, they did not represent military superiority, but rather a shift in military strategy toward total warfare, since tolderías’ vassalage was no longer necessary for claims of territorial possession. In the years preceding and following these expeditions, Charrúa, Minuán, Yaro, and Bohan tolderías also had their share of victories.109 The difference in number of

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106 “dirijendose al zentro donde esten los referidos Yndios Ynfieles a los que castigaran pasandolos a cuchillo en caso de resistirse y a los que se rindieren los haran prisioneros de Guerra.” Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 298 See also: AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1750-11-03, f. 123.

107 This effort was not simply the result of a top-down order based exclusively upon interests from Buenos Aires. Rather, administrators in a number of plazas demonstrated a desire to replace pact-making with aggressive military engagement. AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-07-11); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 86-7, 117; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 127–30; Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 241–53.

108 AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 111-115, 182–6; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 228–30; AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1750-02-03, 1750-11-03, & 1752-01-19. Unlike earlier reductions, Cayastá was comprised of prisoners of war, who were forcibly marched to its location and kept under guard. AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1750-03-07, 1750-08-03, 1750-09-10, 1750-09-11, 1750-09-25, 1750-11-03 (several), 1750-11-09, 1750-11-26, 1751-01-07, 1755-09-09; AGI - Charcas, 378, (Buenos Aires, 1751-04-26).

109 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Vívoras, 1748-02-04; Campo del Bloqueo, 1749-05-22, 1749-07-21, 1756-02-24, & 1757-08-06; Montevideo, 1750-10-27 & 1751-01-19); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 47, 88-9, 111-113; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 129; AGI - Charcas, 215, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-09-07).
casualties and captives, however, was because tolderías were more interested in claiming cattle or a few prisoners, while Spanish militias sought extermination. A close look at the description of individuals slain or captured in these skirmishes reveals large numbers of men and women of all ages, implying that the forces commissioned from Santa Fe and Montevideo were raiding tolderías rather than strictly engaging armed fighters. In fact, many of their successes were due to their ability to surprise the tolderías they attacked, having gained information on their whereabouts by capturing and torturing individuals who were alone.¹¹⁰

Secondly, the devastation that Spanish forces enacted was restricted to a handful of tolderías. While any population estimate for tolderías in the region is a matter of guesswork, due to a lack of reliable sources, at this time there were likely at least 5,000 or 6,000 individuals living in them. Killing or capturing close to 500 people was certainly devastating to the tolderías that they lived in; however, such violence did not consume or even involve the large majority of Charrúas, Minuanes, and others. Documents from other parts of the region reveal large numbers of tolderías that were not subject to these campaigns.¹¹¹ Even amongst the tolderías that frequented Montevideo and Santa Fe, those impacted by Spanish military campaigns represented only a portion.¹¹² For this reason, by 1752, Spanish settlers near Santa Fe

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¹¹⁰ Both the expeditions against Charrúas near Santa Fe and those against Minuanes near Montevideo produced significant numbers of captives. This issue is discussed in chapter 5. In the 1751 expedition from Montevideo, officials captured a “cacique bonbero” near the arroyo Taquari, extracted information from him about local tolderías, and then killed him. Later that day, they attacked the toldería, killing not only armed fighters, but also “chinas y criaturas.” They also took 91 captives. AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 185.

¹¹¹ The Minuán tolderías near São Miguel, Rio Grande, and the Jesuit-Guaraní missions provide several clear examples. There were also numerous Charrúa tolderías further north, near Corrientes and Yapeyú, not to mention the Yaro and Bohan tolderías who do not figure into any of these accounts. Finally, the union of tolderías near the Río Queguay appears to have included many who were not seeking refuge from Spanish campaigns.

¹¹² According to Juan Faustino Sallaberry, there were three principal Charrúa tolderías around Santa Fe at this time: those associated with the Yasi family, those associated with the cacique Campusano, and one other. These tolderías occasionally conflicted with one another, and support shifted between them and with Santa Fe. For Sallaberry, the Yasi tolderías were most likely those who were defeated by Francisco Vera Mujica in 1750. Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 232, 234, 249, 262-3, 287-9. The vanquished tolderías were from between the Río Gualeguay and the Río Uruguay. AGI - Charcas, 378, (Buenos Aires, 1751-04-09). Nonetheless, the three caciques who went to Cayastá were named Naigualau, Gleubille, and Duimalnyé, none of whom appear to be Yasís. AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe, 1750-01-03. Regardless, it appears that the expeditions commissioned by Buenos Aires’s governor did not engage every toldería in the region, but rather a few. Furthermore, at least the tolderías associated with Campusano moved back and forth across the Río Uruguay, evidenced by a skirmish between them and Spanish forces led by Francisco Bruno de Zavala in 1749 near the Río Queguay. AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1749-
complained about their exposure to attacks by Charrúa tolderías, and respondents to a 1756 questionnaire noted that Charrúas continued to live in Santa Fe’s jurisdiction. Similarly, in 1751, months after the expedition from Montevideo, Minuán tolderías were again attacking Spanish settlers. The situation was problematic enough that the city proposed financing a permanent guard to protect the plaza.\textsuperscript{113} In short, the expeditions, though violent and devastating for some, were both restricted to the localities of certain plazas and to limited numbers of tolderías. They could not possibly have generated enough regional disruption to cause tolderías throughout the region to simultaneously consider reductions.

A more plausible explanation to this question can be found in the tolderías themselves. Tolderías throughout the region frequently competed with one another, and their interest in linking onto a plaza was usually the result of wartime duress. This was likely again the case at the eighteenth century’s midpoint, as suggested by dialogue between the Minuán tolderías and Portuguese officials in São Gabriel. For one thing, the tolderías arrived in São Gabriel at the beginning of June 1749, nearly two years before troops would leave from Montevideo to engage them and approximately four months before the Governor of Buenos Aires would authorize an expedition against Charrúas.\textsuperscript{114} More importantly, however, the Minuanes were explicit in their reasons for being there.

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\textsuperscript{113} AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1752-02-17; IEB - AL-068-002; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 86-7, 228-30, 235-41. Some scholars have also questioned the completeness of Charrúas’ expulsion from Santa Fe. Sallaberry, \textit{Los charrías y Santa Fe}, 264; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 1–2.

\textsuperscript{114} This would also explain the violence near the plazas in the years leading up to Spanish expeditions, as local authorities complained about theft of cattle and crop yields. If nearby tolderías were under duress due to conflict with other tolderías, this would be a likely response in order sustain themselves.
They arrived at the beginning of June 1749...Minuán Indians, who are the most valiant of the countryside, now in small numbers because the Indians called Tapes, and others called Charruas, in much greater numbers, are finishing them off and destroying them.115

Instead of mentioning Spanish assaults, these tolderías pointed to conflicts with both Charruás and Tapes. Moreover, they mentioned being outnumbered by their foes and therefore in need of aid. Spanish officials in Santo Domingo Soriano also claimed that neighboring tolderías were outnumbered by others, only in reverse. According to Soriano’s corregidor, nearby Charrúa tolderías were joining together with Minuanes, in part because the latter were greater in number.116

Not all tolderías sought relationships with local plazas during these years. Rather, as indicated by the official in Soriano, many instead joined with other indigenous communities. In particular, a large number of Charrúa, Bohan, and Minuán tolderías congregated somewhere around the Río Queguay. While a lack of documentary evidence makes it impossible to know the exact nature of their relationship, officials in Montevideo, Yapeyú, and Santo Domingo Soriano all expressed concern. Despite their successes against a handful of tolderías, they feared larger retribution by this new coalition.117 The coming together of Charruás, Minuanes, and Bohanes is significant for a variety of reasons. Principally, it represents the first documented instance of Charrúa and Minuán tolderías joining with one another. Beginning at this moment, Charruás and Minuanes appeared together with ever-increasing frequency, to the point that by the end of


116 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16).

117 Bracco, *Charrias, guenoeas y guaranies*, 270, nt. 47-50. Preoccupation about the union of Bohan, Charrúa, and Minuán tolderías was greatest in Santo Domingo Soriano, given that it was the plaza closest to the Río Queguay, where they had joined together. Nonetheless, plazas throughout the region reported on what they saw to be an alliance between tolderías. It is unclear from the sources whether certain tolderías were seeking refuge with others, or whether they sought mutual aid and peace. AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16, 1750-09-06, & 1750-09-29; Vivoras, 1750-10-13 & 1750-11-09); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1750-12-30, 1751-01-26, & 1751-11-13); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 47; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 2, Carpeta 35, No. 8, (Montevideo, 1751-10-09); AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1752-09-07).
the century some outside observers struggled to differentiate one from the other.\textsuperscript{118} This intermingling did not extend to all Minuán or Charrúa tolderías, but it nonetheless constituted a change from earlier patterns of engagement. This broader union was also significant for tolderías in the region not identified as Charrúa or Minuán. By the end of the 1750s, the ethnonyms “Bohan,” “Yaro,” and “Guenoa” disappeared from colonial sources altogether. Later travelers posited that this was due to Charrúa or Minuán aggression, yet it is more likely that this shift was a product of intermixing and ethnogenesis, however imbalanced power between tolderías may have been.\textsuperscript{119} After the end of the decade, no further evidence exists of tolderías seeking refuge in plazas during conflicts with other tolderías. Rather, strengthening ties with other tolderías appears to have been a more logical strategy.\textsuperscript{120}

Conclusion

The events of 1749 to 1752 were a turning point in interimperial and interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata. As Iberian negotiators reinvented the way that they would claim territorial possession, local administrators reimagined themselves vis-à-vis mobile native peoples. The jurisdictional certainty and exclusivity that went hand-in-hand with clearly defined borders generated a new context for interethnic relations. Territorial possession ceased to flow through native peoples, imagined as vassals; instead, Iberian officials began to imagine vassalage as the product of living within certain territorial limits. These shifts coincided with transformations in the ways in which plazas would relate to neighboring tolderías. Most notably, peaceful attempts to incorporate mobile native peoples into imperial projects were no longer a necessary or feasible strategy and imperial authorities directed their efforts to stamping out mobile lifestyles

\textsuperscript{118} Azara, \textit{Viajes por la América del Sur}, 182.

\textsuperscript{119} Azara, \textit{Descripción e historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara}, Tomo Primero, 169–70.

\textsuperscript{120} It is also possible that Bohan, Guenoa, and Yaro ceased to be significant terms to colonial writers. This would not imply their being vanquished, only an imperceptibility to outside observers.
by any means possible. For Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, and others, these years brought crisis and reconfiguration. Broader conflicts between tolderías presented two logical possibilities for caciques: they could seek refuge with plazas or they could forge new and more lasting ties with other tolderías. Increased aggression from Spanish plazas only added to the problem, and most likely impelled more tolderías to build bonds with one another than with them. Indeed, the only instance in which tolderías followed through on a proposed settlement was the case of the Minuanes in São Gabriel with the Portuguese.

By the time the dust settled on the turmoil that engulfed the Río de la Plata during these years, mapmakers from Spain and Portugal had disembarked in its ports. Their presence would have a much more dramatic effect than the Spanish military campaigns on territorial relations in the region, both immediately and in the long run. For the first time, imperial agents would make the long journey from the Atlantic Coast of Castillos Grande, near São Miguel, to the mission strongholds deep inside the continent and document their path. Their activities at once revealed the key contradiction of Iberian territorial claims – Spain and Portugal sought to divide between themselves territories that neither of them effectively controlled – and set the stage for new territorial conditions in the region. A close reading of the vast corpus of documents left by these expeditions provides valuable insight into the deep changes occurring in the Río de la Plata at the time.
CHAPTER 3: LIMITED LANDS

All that I have referred to could be much better understood with a map...because the lands that I exhibited in this account are little known or entirely unknown for the [upcoming] drawing of the line and all are dangerous and inhabited by nations of savages and infidels. – Francisco João Rocio

Borders, then, are essential to cognitive processes, because they allow both the establishment of taxonomies and conceptual hierarchies that structure the movement of thought...Cognitive borders, in this sense, often intertwine with geographical borders. – Sandro Mezzadra & Brett Nielson

Taxing Demarcations

On New Year’s Day 1787, two men approached the encampment of a Portuguese mapping team near the southern limit of Brazil. They came on behalf of a local Minuán toldería and sought both refreshments and permission for the rest of their kin to approach; they had been following the Portuguese troop for some time. The commanding Portuguese officer was wary of the Minuanes’ intentions and claimed that he and his compatriots were simply passing through the area and that they did not have any refreshments to give. Furthermore, he suggested, such a meeting was in no one’s best interest, as it would force all sides to brandish arms and could potentially result in fighting. Even though he traveled with a heavily armed guard, he was well aware that his troop was outmatched. Despite these protests, the next day a small group of Minuanes appeared and halted the mapmakers’ march. They were unarmed, and among them were five caciques and their wives. Claiming possession over local lands, they declared it their right to “tax all travelers” who went through it and demanded aguardiente, wine, sugar, salt, knives, tobacco, yerba

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2 Mezzadra and Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor, 16.
mate, cloth, and hats in exchange for safe passage. The Minuanes remained in the Portuguese encampment the entire day and evening, and did not let the mapmakers continue on their way until the next morning.\(^3\)

Following this encounter, the Portuguese travelers sought to avoid further incidents by setting up their camp in local ranches belonging to nearby Guaraní missions. This strategy proved successful for a short while, but on January 13 they were confronted by another Minuán cacique and members of his toldería. In this instance, the travelers had set up camp in a ranch named San Miguel, which belonged to the San Borja mission. The site did not deter the Minuanes from approaching, and though they were unarmed, the Portuguese officer had learned from his previous experience and offered payment immediately. The following day, the mapmakers continued along their way and crossed the Río Ibicuy. Here, a third Minuán cacique approached and required payment. Having exhausted the vast majority of their resources in their earlier encounters, the Portuguese found themselves left with no choice but to surrender a portion of their horses and oxen. Though they eventually made it to the San Borja mission, the mapmakers had struggled to complete their journey and arrived in shambles.\(^4\)

These encounters between Minuán tolderías and Portuguese mapmakers occurred during the demarcation efforts of the 1777 Treaty of San Ildefonso. This treaty, in the same spirit as the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, required that Portugal and Spain commission joint mapping expeditions to determine a border between Brazil and Spain’s South American viceroyalties. The officer in question, Francisco João Roscio, was one of a number of Spanish and Portuguese geographers and engineers who rushed across the countryside between Santa Tecla and San Borja in 1786 and 1787 (Map 3.1). He would later become Governor of the Capitania do Rio Grande de São Pedro. Although Roscio did not name a single cacique in his account, the diaries of other demarcation officials indicate that his encounters were most likely with

\(^3\) “estão na posse de taxar todos os passageiros” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 22v.

\(^4\) ibid.
Saltein, Maulein, Tajui, Batu, and Miguel Ayala Caraí. These caciques stopped every Portuguese and Spanish demarcation party that came through the area during those years. While the location of their encounters varied slightly, the result was the same. Each mapping team had to provide tribute payments to the caciques and host them in their encampment in order to be able to continue on their way.⁵

Map 3.1 – Key Sites of the Madrid and San Ildefonso Demarcations

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⁵ These caciques are mentioned by name in the accounts of the Spanish officer Diego de Alvear and the Portuguese officer José de Saldanha, who passed through the area in 1786 and 1787 respectively. Diego de Alvear, “Diario de la segunda partida demarcadora de límites en la América Meridional, 1783-1791 (continuación)” in Anales de la biblioteca, 343–44; José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 234–5, 241.
The interactions between geographers and representatives of tolderías in the Río de la Plata were generally brief, occupying only a small number of pages in official reports. Nonetheless, these incidents illuminate the central contradiction of the demarcation projects commissioned under the two Luso-Hispanic treaties. Portuguese and Spanish officials divided and claimed borderland territories that neither of them effectively controlled. As geographers traversed the region’s open plains to declare possession for their royal patrons, they encountered native peoples who asserted their own authority over regional space. Expeditionary officers were generally dismissive of tolderías in their written accounts, but their offering of goods in exchange for passage represented recognition of the effective control that Minuanes, Charrúas, and other wandering peoples exercised over the imperial borderlands. Their accounts are thus integral to understanding one of the defining elements of the region in the eighteenth century: Iberian attempts to superimpose a new territorial logic upon a landscape shaped by early-modern and indigenous territorialities.

Although overlapping plazas and mobile tolderías had established territorial order in the Río de la Plata through the first half of the eighteenth century, this means of organizing space was incongruent with Enlightenment-era modes of claiming territorial possession, particularly the notions of jurisdictional

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6 Officers from the Treaty of San Ildefonso’s mapping expedition that noted interactions with Minuano caciques in their diarios include Diego de Alvear, Félix de Azara, Sebastián Xavier da Veiga Cabral da Câmara, José Cabrer, Bernardo Lecocq, Andrés de Oyarvide, Alexandre Eloy Portelli, Francisco João Roscio, José de Saldanha, and José Varela y Ulloa. See: Diego de Alvear, “Diario de la segunda partida demarcadora de límites en la América Meridional, 1783-1791 (continuación)” in Anales de la biblioteca, 342–55; Félix de Azara, Geografía, física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay y misiones guaraníes (Montevideo: Museo Nacional, 1904), 118–19; AGNA – VII. Lamas 17, 2620; “Diario de la Segunda Subdivicion de Limites Española, por Joseph Maria Cabrer” f. 264-71; ANB – 86. Secretario de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, 22-3, 87-8; ANB – 86. Secretario de Estado, cod. 104, v. 10, f. 96-7v, 100, 194-5; Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la demarcación de límites en la América Meridional” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la América Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hombres, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros días, 191-2, 196, 211-213; José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 231, 239, 241, 261, 281; José Varela y Ulloa, “Plano para ejecutar la demarcación de esta América,” in Diario de la primera partida de la demarcación de límites entre España y Portugal en América, 2 vols., 130–47, Publicaciones de la Real Sociedad Geográfica (Madrid: Imprenta del Patronato de Huérfanos de Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1920-1925 [i.e. 1930]), 151, 316; José María Cabrer, Diario de la Segunda Subdivicion de Limites Española entre los Dominios de España y Portugal en la America Meridional; Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Livro 1, f. 264-7.
exclusivity, complete territorial ownership, and clearly defined borders. This tension resulted in perpetual warfare and strategic settlement between the two Iberian crowns, as they sought to dislodge one another and to produce enough evidence to justify their juridical claims of land ownership through the new language of territorial possession. Portuguese and Spanish officials competed to curry favor with local tolderías, offering frequent payments in exchange for access to the countryside and for alliances against their competitors. Meanwhile, Minuán, Charrúa, Guenoa, Bohan, and Yaro tolderías exploited the tensions between Iberian plazas to garner resources and to find refuge in moments of internal conflict. While they collectively arbitrated access to the rural countryside, individual tolderías benefitted from positive relations with local plazas as they sought an upper hand against competitors.

The Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso represented a rupture from this means of organizing space and constituted full-fledged attempts to impose Enlightenment-era logic upon a complex local landscape. Rather than accommodating shared access to regional lands, or acknowledging usufruct rights, these treaties aimed to expand jurisdictional claims over the entire region, divide Spanish and Portuguese dominion in two, and produce a clearly-defined border to separate one realm from the other. To realize this vision, however, required mapping expeditions that would observe and measure the local landscape, extrapolate on the general stipulations of the treaties according to local conditions, and determine just where the dividing line should run. Without mapping expeditions, the treaty would not carry the necessary legal weight and precision.

The mapmakers sent to the Río de la Plata embodied this new territorial vision, and their expeditions served as the moment when old and new ways of organizing space came to a head. Encounters between demarcation teams and local peoples varied widely, but always contained the possibility of violent conflagrations such as the so-called “Guaraní War” of the 1750s, which responded directly to the Madrid agreement. Despite these risks, mapmakers sought to impose a new territorial vision upon a landscape that belied it. As part of this effort, they garnered and organized knowledge of both the physical landscape and
the local inhabitants, and presented it in ways that incentivized new styles of government and new patterns of interethnic relations. By analyzing the events of these expeditions and the corpus of geographical and ethnographic knowledge they produced, it is possible to articulate the tensions inherent in their project.

This chapter assesses both the limitations of the mapmaking efforts and the changes they engendered. It begins by providing a logistical overview of the mapping expeditions to demonstrate that commissioned officials depended upon local peoples for protection, sustenance, guidance, labor, and information. I then turn to an analysis of mapping practices, or the expeditions’ social interactions. As imperial officials sought to reorder lands they knew very little about, local agents mediated and frustrated their efforts, forcing them to skip over certain areas or abandon their work altogether. Mapmaking did not occur in laboratories, and officials often found themselves caught up in local conflicts. At the same time, these imperial agents left their own footprint upon the landscape and generated responses from regional actors. In order to understand the ways in which local inhabitants experienced the expeditions, therefore, I examine both large-scale events, such as the Guaraní War, and more mundane interactions. Rather than treating native peoples and other local actors as a fixed part of a landscape, I focus on their interests and strategies and couple their actions to the outcome of the expeditions.7

Despite being limited by a variety of actors, the mapping expeditions nonetheless compiled and produced a vast corpus of knowledge. Thus I also assess mapping form, or the discursive depiction of regional space that the expeditions generated. Focusing not only on maps, but also on diaries and correspondence, I treat the expeditions as key discursive moments. Here one finds not only new geographical and historical perspectives, but some of the first and most frequently cited ethnographies of native peoples in the region. These mindsets would come to determine imperial policy vis-à-vis tolderías during the second half of the

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7 The demarcation expeditions, like other mapping or scientific expeditions were socially and culturally embedded performances that occurred in local contexts rather than laboratories. Focusing on the “social and material processes” of the demarcation expeditions allows us to identify the agency of local actors, link their actions to the final form of geographic texts, and consider the impact of the expeditions upon local dynamics. Safier, Measuring the New World.
century, and tropes of them continue to structure analyses of the regional past. Juxtaposing the social event of the mapping expeditions with the body of knowledge that they produced reveals the centrality of native peoples to the demarcation efforts and the importance of these events to the broader dynamics of the region’s past.

Imagining Borders

During the second half of the eighteenth century, Spain and Portugal signed two separate treaties to demarcate an interimperial borderline in South America. The first of these accords, negotiated in Madrid in 1750, represented a monumental shift in imperial logics of determining territorial possession. The two Iberian courts agreed to send joint mapping expeditions to walk and measure the border together, something that had never been done before. Although negotiators of earlier treaties had utilized maps and nautical charts to make their respective claims of territorial possession, none of these pacts had required or resulted in new maps. The Madrid agreement, otherwise known as the Treaty of Permuta, was therefore the first to link together mapmaking and treaty-making, a precedent that diplomats would follow for the next century and a half. Even so, it took a second accord, agreed upon in San Ildefonso in 1777, for the logic of mapped borders to become a permanent cornerstone of American territorial organization. Local resistance and renewed Iberian tensions had undermined the Treaty of Madrid’s fragile peace, but the Treaty of San Ildefonso produced a lasting territorial vision that would reshape and structure knowledge and policies for years to come.

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8 The name “permuta,” which means “exchange” or “transfer,” derives from the centerpiece of the Treaty of Madrid: the exchange of the Jesuit-Guarani missions that were east of the Río Uruguay, the so-called “Siete Pueblos Orientales,” for Colónia do Sacramento in order to make possible an interimperial borderline. This was the first treaty that commissioned joint mapping expeditions to the Americas, but it was part of a broader eighteenth-century trend to superimpose boundary lines upon frontiers as markers of territorially derived sovereignty. See: Abou-el-Haj, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703”; Sahlins, Boundaries; Standen and Power, Frontiers in Question; Madalina Valeria Veres, “Redefining Imperial Borders” in History of Cartography.
The mapping expeditions for the Treaty of Madrid and the Treaty of San Ildefonso occurred in the 1750s and the 1780s respectively. For the former, the first and second Portuguese and Spanish mapping teams, called "subdivisions," met along the Atlantic coast in Castillos Grande in 1752 and continued as far as Santa Tecla the following year. Santa Tecla’s occupants, in protest of the transfer of their mission from Spanish to Portuguese dominions, refused to offer them support, effectively forcing the demarcation teams to abandon their efforts (Map 3.2). Three years of warfare ensued, which pitted Iberian militias and their local allies against Guarani mission-dwellers and numerous Charrúa, Minuán, Bohan, and Guenoa tolderías, but the demarcation resumed in 1758 and was completed before the decade’s end. By 1761, however, a new agreement signed in El Pardo annulled the Treaty of Madrid and undermined the legal might of its mapping projects. The demarcation efforts of the Treaty of San Ildefonso began in the Río de la Plata in 1784 near São Miguel. After two years along the Lagoa Mirim, the Luso-Hispanic mapping teams began to work their way inland toward the Guarani missions in 1786 and 1787. This was where they emptied their coffers in payments to Minuán tolderías. The principal mapping efforts ended in 1791; however, the demarcation of several disputed areas remained incomplete into the nineteenth century.

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9 At this time, Santa Tecla was a ranch pertaining to the San Miguel mission, one of the Siete Pueblos Orientales.

10 Despite an absence of a standing interimperial accord, local officials sought to maintain a functional division through a de facto agreement in 1763. Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 45–48. Nonetheless, during these years, Colônia do Sacramento returned to Portuguese control, the Siete Pueblos Orientales transferred back to Spain, and the line moved through military engagements. Administrators even took down the stone pillars erected during the demarcations. While the division was meaningful to local officials, this agreement was in lieu of a new treaty and never meant to be permanent. Within four years of the de facto agreement, officials complained that the lack of a demarcation left the question of possession uncertain. AGNA - IX. 3-2-1, (Montevideo, 1761-08-25); IHGB - Arquivo, lata 168, doc 4, f. 63-5.

Map 3.2 – Itineraries of the Demarcation Teams. This map demonstrates the approximate paths taken by the first and second subdivisions of the treaties of Madrid (blue) and San Ildefonso (purple) and the third and fourth Spanish subdivisions of both treaties (green).

The method of these two treaties was simple. First, negotiators met together in Europe with individuals knowledgeable about South American geography to design a base map of the continent. They drew upon well-known and widely circulated maps to shape its final form, particularly for disputed areas, such as the Amazon River and the Río de la Plata. For the Treaty of Madrid, this base map was known as the “Map of the Courts” (Mapa das Cortes) and while the Treaty of San Ildefonso’s negotiators produced no
official map of their own, they too relied upon the Mapa das Cortes, as well as Juan de la Cruz Cano de Olmedilla’s *Mapa Geográfico de América Meridional*, to frame their debates (Maps 3.3 & 3.4). Second, officials drafted instructions for where the borderline should be drawn, according to the dimensions and shape of the continent represented in the base maps. Third, teams of trained mapmakers walked the border and drew a line, carrying the base maps and instructions as guidelines for their efforts. Each mapping expedition began their travels with conferences to negotiate the nuances of the interimperial limit and to establish the itineraries for their respective teams. For the earlier treaty, these meetings occurred in 1752 in Castillos Grande, and for the latter, officials met in 1783 in the plaza of Rio Grande and again in 1784 at the southern tip of the Lagoa Mirim. Here, the rough edges of the general treaty began to emerge and the first borderline disputes in the region occurred.

This strategy for inventing a legal border placed an enormous amount of decision-making power in the hands of commissioned officers in the field. Although the Mapa das Cortes and the Cruz Cano map provided general frames of reference, they were scaled to the continent or Brazil as a whole and did not include the nuance necessary to guide travelers through the borderlands. Likewise, the mapmakers’ instructions offered abstract itineraries rather than specific directions. For example, the fourth article of the

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12 Ferreira, “O Mapa das Cortes e o Tratado de Madrid a cartografia a serviço da diplomacia”; André Ferrand de Almeida, “O Mapa Geográfico de América Meridional, de Juan de la Cruz Cano y Olmedilla,” *Anais do Museu Paulista* 17, no. 2 (jul-dez 2009); Furtado, *O mapa que inventou o Brasil*.

13 The walking of limits to claim possession resembles earlier practices carried out on local scales. See, for example: Kathryn Burns, *Colonial Habits: Convents and the Spiritual Economy of Cuzco, Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 52–53.

14 AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 2, Doc 127; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 5, f. 63-6; IHGB - Arquivo, lata 109, doc 8, f. 9; IHGB - Conselho ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 28v.

15 In the case of the San Ildefonso expedition, the conferences set the stage for a protracted and antagonistic mapping effort. Both sides took advantage of the multi-year gaps between the signing of the treaty and its execution to visit parts of the regional countryside and to scour administrative archives for evidence that would support their territorial claims. See, for example: Félix de Azara, “Correspondencia oficial e inédita sobre la demarcación de límites entre el Paraguay y el Brasil,” in *Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata*, vol. 4, ed. Pedro de Angelis (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836), 1–17; Francisco João Roscio, “Compêndio Noticioso” in *O Capitalismo Pastoral*. 

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Map 3.3 – “Mapa das Cortes,” 1749

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Map 3.4 – Cruz Cano de Olmedilla, Juan de la, *Mapa Geográfico de América Meridional, 1775*

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Treaty of Madrid stipulated:

The confines of the dominions of the two Monarchies will begin in the reef that is formed along the [Atlantic Coast] by the stream that runs from the hill of Castillos Grandes. From this hillside the frontier will continue in a straight line along the highest summits of the hills whose rivers run on one side to the north of the aforementioned stream, or to the Lagoa Mirim, or Miní, and on the other side to the Atlantic Coast south of the river or to the Río de la Plata. In this way, the summits of the hills will serve as the dividing line for the dominions of the two Crowns. The frontier will continue this way until finding the principal origin and headwater of the Río Negro, and above it it will continue to the principal origin of the Río Ibicuí, continuing below this river until it drains into the Río Uruguay on its western bank. Portugal will keep all of the tributaries that drain into the aforementioned lagoon or into the Río Grande and Spain will keep all of the waterways that drain into the Río de la Plata.18

The proposed treaty line thus ran across the headwaters of distinct waterways, which included both known rivers and unnamed tributaries. Though drawing a division in this way made logical sense for treaty-makers, since it divided river systems, it was vague and imprecise. Which of the numerous streams that ran from Castillos Grande did the treaty mean to indicate? If the headwaters of the two watersheds did not reach one another, where in the intermediate space should the line go? Which peaks should serve as points along the division, when many stood side by side rather than in a straight line? Which of the Río Negro’s and the Río Ibicuí’s many tributaries constituted their “principal origin”? The Treaty of San Ildefonso offered vagaries of its own:

Along the continent, the line will go from the shores of the aforementioned Lagoa Mirim, then along the first southern stream that enters into the lagoon’s channel and that runs closest to the Portuguese fort of São Gonçalo, from which, without exceeding the limits of the aforementioned

18 “Los confines del dominio de las dos Monarquías principiarán en la barra que forma, en la costa del mar, el arroyo que sale al pie del Monte de los Castillos Grandes; desde cuya falda continuará la frontera, buscando un línea recta lo más alto, o cumbre de los montes, cuyas vertientes bajan por una parte a la costa que corre al norte de dicho arroyo, o a la Laguna Merín, o del Miní, y por la otra, a la costa que corre desde dicho arroyo al sur, o al río de la Plata. De suerte que las cumbres de los montes sirvan de raya del dominio de las dos Coronas. Y así se seguirá la frontera, hasta encontrar el origen principal y cabecera del Río Negro, y por encima de ellas continuará hasta el origen principal del río Ibicuí, siguiendo, aguas abajo de este río, hasta donde desemboca en el Uruguay por su ribera oriental, quedando de Portugal todas las vertientes que bajan a la dicha laguna, o al Río Grande de San Pedro; y de España, las que bajan a los ríos que van a unirse con el de la Plata.” “Tratado firmado en Madrid á 13 de Enero de 1750, para determinar los límites de los estados pertenecientes á las Coronas de España y Portugal, en Asia y América,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol. 3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 331–42 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900).
stream, Portugal’s belongings will continue along the headwaters of the rivers that run towards the mentioned Rio Grande and towards the Rio Jacuí.¹⁹

Spanish and Portuguese mapmakers dedicated hundreds of pages of correspondence to dispute the meanings of these instructions, halting the demarcation efforts for years at a time as they sought a general agreement. Since the borderland was of strategic interest to both sides, and commissioned officials were ultimately representatives of their respective crowns, the details mattered. Moreover, it was not until the mapping expeditions that either treaty began to carry any real weight. In their correspondence, diaries, and drawings, mapmakers were not simply executing a prescribed treaty, but writing and drawing the treaty into existence. As they set up makeshift conference rooms along the Río de la Plata’s countryside, the borderline remained open for negotiation.

Each subdivision comprised between 75 and 150 people and worked with a parallel subdivision representing the other crown. Portugal and Spain commissioned six subdivisions each for the Treaty of Madrid and seven for the Treaty of San Ildefonso. In total, each demarcation effort employed upwards of one thousand people. Half of them crossed through the Río de la Plata: while the first and second subdivisions focused on determining a border in the region, the third and fourth Spanish subdivisions passed through on their way to Paraguay, Moxos, and Chiquitos. These last two began their travels in Buenos Aires and then continued north through the region along the Río Paraná (Map 3.2). Although they would not meet with their Portuguese counterparts until they arrived at the borderlands between Paraguay and São

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¹⁹ “por la parte del continente irá la línea desde las orillas de dicha Laguna de Merín, tomando la dirección por el primer arroyo meridional, que entra en el sangradero o desaguadero de ella, y que corre por lo más inmediato al fuerte portugués de San Gonzalo: desde el cual, sin exceder el límite de dicho arroyo, continuará la pertenencia de Portugal por las cabeceras de los ríos que corren hacia el mencionado Río Grande y hacia el Yacuí...” “Tratado preliminar sobre los límites de los estados pertenecientes á las Coronas de España y Portugal, en la América meridional, ajustado y concluido en San Lorenzo, á 11 de Octubre de 1777,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol. 3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 343–55 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900).
Paulo, they nonetheless began their work of collection and observation while in the Río de la Plata.\textsuperscript{20} They too depended upon local plazas, hosts, and guides to help them navigate the region’s western corridor.

The chief administrators of these expeditions included military officers, diplomats, naval engineers, cosmographers, geographers, priests, surgeons, and accountants. Authorities in Lisbon or Madrid appointed them for their expertise, for previous service to the crown, or for their noble standing. These individuals authored the principal sources that exist regarding the expeditions, and it is through their gaze that historians have come to understand these events. Their ultimate goal was to transform the theoretical guide maps into useable maps of a local scale. In addition, they sought to negotiate the specific details of the borderline in a manner favorable to their crown. Thus they not only took great pains to interpret the treaties’ language to their advantage, but mined local archives and consulted with informants as they scoured for bits of evidence to support their claims. Furthermore, these officials kept a running record of their itineraries to provide a description of the local landscape. Their diaries included geographical, hydrological, and cosmological measurements, coordinates for key rivers, fords, and peaks, and descriptions of local people and wildlife. This information, along with the guide maps, would serve not only to stake a claim over the borderland, but as a tool for future administration and investment.

The handful of lettered elites who commanded the parties represented only a tiny fraction of the overall labor force. A close look at the expeditions’ accounting ledgers reveals a large body of American actors that occupied nearly three-quarters of the salaried posts.\textsuperscript{21} Likewise, a detailed reading of the day-by-day diaries written by commanding officers demonstrates that local agents performed the vast majority of the expeditions’ work, and served as key sources of information. While ranking officials debated the terms

\textsuperscript{20} The third and fourth Portuguese subdivisions traveled inland from São Paulo towards Paraguay and did not pass through the Río de la Plata region.

\textsuperscript{21} See, for example: AGNA - XIII. 15-4-4; AGNA - XIII. 15-4-5; AGNA - XIII. 15-4-6; AGNA - XIII. 15-5-1; AGNA - XIII. 15-5-2; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.1, f. 107. Many of these laborers were from the Guaraní missions. Sarreal, \textit{The Guaraní and Their Missions}, 152.
of the treaty and geographers measured river courses or plotted mountaintops, local guides (baqueanos) corrected errors in the “Mapa das Cortes” and other maps that the demarcation teams carried. In addition, armies of laborers carried chests of books and instruments, built and navigated boats, blazed trails to local peaks, and set up mobile campsites. Some led the way through fields and forests, while others managed and maintained lumbering carts full of foodstuffs, tools, or the large marble markers they would later erect to signal the limits. Still others tended to the hundred or so head of cattle that traveled with the teams, searching for pastures to graze and rationing their meat. Lastly, they provided safety for the demarcation officials, as troops of armed guards walked or rode alongside the rest. These largely unnamed individuals even saved the lives of demarcation officials, as occurred in 1785 when a team of swimmers rescued a drowning Portuguese captain.

Support for the demarcation efforts also came from local plazas, rural settlers, and native communities along the way. Administrators from both sides assured that supplies, provisions, and laborers reached the mapmaking teams. In fact, operational oversight of the southernmost portion of the Treaty of Madrid mapping expedition was one of the first responsibilities of the newly-created post of Governor of Montevideo in the 1750s. In addition to logistical support, local officials shared historical and geographical records with demarcation officers, whether by identifying informants or providing access to their archival repositories. Where administrators’ knowledge ended, native communities occasionally filled in the gaps. In some instances, caciques even demonstrated information from their own mapping and record-keeping devices.

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22 BNB - 09,3,012, f. 35-6; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 37-37v. Demarcation officials also carried maps drawn by Jesuits and other geographers, and the San Ildefonso subdivisions carried the maps and diaries produced by the Madrid demarcations. ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 494, pac. 1, f. 2-3v; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 239-239v; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, 153-153v; BNB - I-28,28,18, f. 12v-13; BNB - 04,4,003, f. 12v-13; BNB - 5,4,035; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 30-30v. Despite the number of maps that they carried, they still tended to rely upon guides for information. For example: BNB - 05,4,003.

23 BNB - 09,4,14, f. 80v-83v.
The same three Mbayá caciques have informed me that, six years ago, the Portuguese established a fort not far from the east coast of the Río Paraguay, to the north of their lands. [It was there that the Mbayás] killed 164 Portuguese four years ago. Belén’s priest adjusted this number according to the knots and signs that the Indians showed him.24

Further away from the purview of regional plazas, rural ranchers served as the primary support of the mapping expeditions. It was frequently from these sites that the expeditions’ geographers or mathematicians took their measurements of latitude and longitude.25 The fragile enterprise of mapmaking depended upon local peoples at every turn.

Walking the Line

As the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcation teams traveled through the Río de la Plata, they found themselves limited by the social and territorial contexts that they hoped to order. A close reading of the vast paper trail generated by these endeavors reveals the stakes of the expeditions and their dependency upon local peoples to accomplish their task. Mapmakers embodied an idealized restructuring of territorialities and social interactions, and local inhabitants recognized the threats and possibilities that their efforts posed. As the Iberian envoys lengthened the gaze of imperial authorities, they often rubbed against unsanctioned commerce or settlements. They also entered into territories over which neither crown had effective control, assuming that a prescriptive treaty would provide them with the security and capacity to complete their tasks. The reactions of local actors ranged from support – sharing information, trading,

24 “Los mismos tres caciques Mbayás me han informado, que no lejos de la costa oriental del río Paraguay, y al norte de sus tierras, formaron los Portugueses, hace seis años, un presidio ó fortaleza donde los Mbayás fueron fingiendo paces, y engañándolos, mataron á 164 Portugueses cuatro años há. El cura de Belen ajustó este número por los ñudos y señales que le mostraron los indios.” Félix de Azara, “Correspondencia oficial e inédita sobre la demarcación de límites entre el Paraguay y el Brasil” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, 3–7.

guiding, laboring – to armed resistance, as occurred during the Guarani War, and their actions limited the
scope and success of the mapmaking efforts.26

The demarcation expeditions provided the first textual accounts of the nuances of the region’s rural
landscape. Beyond measuring and cataloguing physical features, mapmakers also stumbled upon vestiges of
the activities of tolderías and other rural actors. Their depictions of these findings provide key information
about the territorial practices that had escaped the records of local plazas for decades. For one thing, the
demarcation teams generally walked along extant paths rather than blazing new trails, as the conditions of
the natural landscape and previous patterns of usage forced them through particular corridors. The third
and fourth subdivisions traveled principally along the royal roads that hugged the Río Paraná on their way to
Paraguay. Meanwhile, the first and second subdivisions marched along more precarious pathways, many of
which smugglers frequented or tolderías controlled (Map 3.2).27 It is likely for this reason that the former
two experienced little conflict, while the latter brushed up against illicit trade networks or native peoples
who brought their activities to a halt.

The accounts left by demarcation teams of both treaties indicate that tolderías continued to be the
principal arbiters of borderland space. While recent scholarship has used the mapmakers’ journals to
identify elaborate contraband networks, tolderías presented a more tangible threat to the success of the
mapmaking expeditions.28 Imperial officials on the expeditions sought to exert their authority over

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26 Examples of collaboration include: BNB - 09,3,012, f. 127-30; Costa, “Viajes en la frontera colonial”: 121. Attacks against the
demarcation teams, but unrelated to the Guarani War, included: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f.73v; IHGB -
Arquivo, lata 762, pasta 31, f. 1-5; Alejandro N. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su labor en el Río de la

27 José Varela y Ulloa, “Plano para ejecutar la demarcación de esta América,” in Diario de la primera partida de la demarcación de
límites entre España y Portugal en América, 123–47; Gil, “Sobre o comércio ilícito”.

74Such cases reveal the preexistence of trade networks along these rural pathways, and the newfound effort to define unregulated
commerce as contraband and to police it. This initiative would have limited success, due in part to the entrenchment of trade
economies in the borderland area and the investment of high-ranking officials in their perpetuation.
borderland traders, yet they actively avoided interactions with tolderías, attempting instead to move stealthily through the countryside. The sites of encounters between mapmakers and rural actors, even during the latter expedition in the 1780s, indicate that creole contrabandists tended to restrict themselves to lands adjacent to the Lagoa Mirim.29 Once the demarcation teams moved inland, such actors disappeared from their accounts. The mapmakers' alternative strategies — exerting imperial sovereignty over contrabandists versus rushing through the countryside to evade tolderías — contour the limits of Spanish and Portuguese territorial reach.30

Despite the demarcation teams’ best efforts to avoid tolderías, the corridors that directed their itineraries funneled them through river and highland crossings and made engagement inevitable. As they traversed the countryside, mapmakers mentioned toponyms that referred to native histories; they also discovered physical evidence of territorialities that existed beyond the vision and reach of local plazas. They camped at “Minuanes Crossing” (Paso dos Minuanos), crossed the “Minuanes Stream,” (Arroyo dos Minuanos), and paid tribute to caciques near the “Chief River” (Río Caciquey). The travelers marked on their maps the “Baumaxahate Stream” (Arroyo Baumaxahate), which according to some authors meant “cold peak” in Minuán, as well as the “Aceguá Hill” (Cerro Aceguá), also deemed a Minuán term. They noted other features that referred to known caciques and their kin: the “Arroyo de Zapata” and the “Arroyo de Batú.” They found cemeteries at the peaks of highland hills, came upon abandoned ranches where tolderías had evicted occupants, and crossed a waterway where an Indian woman had been found dead after being attacked by a tiger, the “Stream of the Dead Indian Woman” (Arroyo de la India Muerta). The San Ildefonso teams even

29 AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-03-26, 1785-04-01, 1785-04-07, 1785-05-24; Río Grande 1785-09-06); AGI - Buenos Aires, 73, (Charqueada en el Piratini, 1786, 02-02; Campamento do Pavaó, 1786-01-12); ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 65-78v, 86-91v, 94-9, 307v; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 31-9, 54v-56v.

30 It also explains the heavy imbalance of time that they dedicated to mapping the Lagoa Mirim area (2 years) versus lands between there and the Jesuit missions (five months). ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 10, 52-129, 190-196.
identified vestiges of the decisive battle of the Guarani War, including markings on trees and a cemetery where rebel fighters had buried their dead.31

Sometimes engagement was more direct. In October 1752, the Spanish and Portuguese teams had their first contact with tolderías while encamped near the southern tip of the Lagoa Mirim. A number of Minuanes slipped into the Spanish team’s camp during the dark of night and absconded with 200 horses. In response, soldiers stationed in the nearby Portuguese fort of São Miguel set out to recover the horses, but were unable to apprehend the perpetrators. Instead, they raided and took 28 captives from a nearby toldería, whose relationship with the original thieves was suspect. One month later, this time further north, Minuanes again entered the expedition’s encampments and extracted horses. A similar pattern of events transpired, as a subsequent imperial raid abducted 32 people from what appears to have been other tolderías.32 These encounters were overshadowed by events that occurred a few months later at Santa Tecla, when Guarani leaders from the San Miguel mission refused to provide aid or supplies to the demarcation teams. This confrontation prompted the disbanding of the mapping expeditions and three years of war.33 Nonetheless, Guarani protest of the mapping expeditions cannot be separated from the events that preceded it. By the time that the demarcation teams arrived to Santa Tecla, their supplies had already been depleted, leaving them no choice but to abandon their efforts.

These incidents point to a central role for tolderías in the territorial conflict generated by the Treaty of Madrid, which culminated in the 1753 to 1756 Guaraní War. Traditional and revisionist accounts have defined the war as a struggle between Jesuit-Guaraní missions and Luso-Hispanic armies, and none have considered tolderías to have been significant participants. Some have acknowledged the presence of tolderías in this armed uprising—pointing to their resistance to the transmigration of the seven missions or to their later alliance with Guaraníes—yet they unanimously frame it as a bilateral battle between imperial and mission interests. Reflecting deeper upon these two areas of toldería participation reveals that the war was as much a result of impingement upon tolderías’ territorialities as a Jesuit or Guaraní struggle for autonomy. In particular, the relocation of the “Siete Pueblos Orientales”—San Borja, San Nicolás, San Luis, San Lorenzo, San Miguel, San Juan Bautista, and Santo Ángel—would have placed many of them on lands controlled by tolderías. In addition, as the war began and Luso-Hispanic armies attempted to invade the missions, they too had to cross tolderías’ lands. In order to explain how the war began and how it played out, it is thus necessary to consider it the broader territorial framework of plazas and tolderías.

The Guaraní War might not have occurred or reached the scale that it did had it not been for the tolderías’ resistance to mission relocation. Faced with the terms of the Treaty of Madrid, several of the Siete Pueblos’s first response was not protest or armed uprising, but attempts to move their missions. Inhabitants of the San Luis, San Borja, and San Juan missions sought to establish new settlements along the

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Río Miriñay, the Río Queguay, and the Río Negro respectively, sites designated by imperial authorities (Map 3.5). 36 Charrúa tolderías controlled the first, while Charrúa, Minuán, and Bohan tolderías had joined together and controlled the others. The Jesuit father Bernardo Nusdorffer described the first journey by residents of San Luis to the Río Miriñay in the following terms:

The Charrúa cacique Gaspar Cossero had come to Yapeyú to protest…On the way from La Cruz to Yapeyú, a Charrúa who saw the residents of San Luis (Lusistas) forcefully removed the poncho that one of them was wearing…[the Lusistas] did not want to go to war with the Charrúas, who were upset and threatening to kill all of them. 37

Following these threats:

The Lusistas wanted to return to their mission because they did not want to have war with the Charrúas….some wanted to join other missions, others wanted to look for other lands in the Paraná in order not to meddle anymore in the Charrúas’ lands….I went myself to where [the Charrúas] were, and I divided among them a large amount of yerba mate and tobacco….After receiving all of it they returned to their horses and weapons…insolently asking for more…[The Lusistas] left quiet and peaceful lands, which belonged to their mission, and they did not want to be troubled with war; so from then on they were determined to return [to their mission]. 38

While the population of San Luis was not pleased with the need to uproot and establish a new mission, they complied nonetheless. It was not until the refusal of Charrúa tolderías to accept their settlement that they

36 MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C18, P2, No. 23; Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), Manuscritos da Coleção De Ángelis t. VII (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, Divisão de Publicações e Divulgação, 1969), 144, 164, 168-9, 176-80, 193, 197, 208, 264; Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 143, 386, 405; Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo Segundo, 84-8, 93-4; Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado, vol. 5, 60; Poentız, “Los infieles”: 2; Levinton, “Las estancias de Nuestra Señora de los Reyes de Yapeyú”: 37–8; Pereira, ‘Y hoy están en paz’, 27–32. While the transplantation of mission plazas had not occurred during the lifetime of anyone involved in this move, it was not without precedent. Seventeenth-century conflicts with bandeirantes had resulted in numerous relocation projects throughout the mission complex.

37 “el Casique Charrua D.” Gaspar Cossero avia venido al Yapeyu protestando…En el camino desde la Cruz a Yapeyu un Charrua, q.uo viò a los Luisistas, quito por tuerza el poncho a un Luisista….elos no querian tener guerra con los Churrus, q estaban de malas y les decian q los avian de matar a todos los Luisistas” Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. VII, 164–65.

38 “[Los lusistas] querian bolverse a su Pueblo, q ellos no querian tener guerra con los Churrus,…unos querian juntarse con otros pueblos; unos querian buscar otras tierras en el Parana para no meterse mas en tierras de Churrus…yo mismo fui adonde estaban asentados [los charrúas], y les dividí bastante Yerba y Tabaco…después que recibieron todo todos se pusieron otra vez con sus armas a cavallo…pidiendo con insolencia mas…[Los lusistas] dexaban tierras quietas y pacíficas, quales eran las de sus Pueblos; y no querian estar en inquietas y ocasionadas á guerra; y así que ellos estavan desde aora determinados á volver [a su pueblo].” ibid., 164-5, 168-9, 176-7, 179.
turned on their heels and went back home. Migrants from San Borja and San Juan faced similar protests when they attempted to move, and they too returned to their missions.  

For several of the Guarani missions, resistance to the Treaty of Madrid was not because they would have to uproot their plazas, but because there were no empty lands to where they could relocate. Although

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19 Around this time, there was also a proposal to divide the Yapeyú mission in two, which Yapeyú’s leadership opposed because the new mission plaza would be located near the Río Queguay, in lands controlled by Charrúas. This was the same site chosen for the new San Borja mission. Levinton, “Las estancias de Nuestra Señora de los Reyes de Yapeyú”: 44. Although the Río Miriñay and the Río Queguay were the principal sites targeted for new settlements, the missions’ residents also considered locales along the Río Paraná and the Río Paraguay. In the end, they considered that these sites were also unfit for new settlements because they were controlled by Abipones and Payaguás respectively. Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. VII, 144–45.

40 Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Río de la Plata, vol. 2, Mapa XXIV.
the Rio Miriñay, the Rio Queguay, and the Rio Negro were well within projected Spanish territorial limits, Charrúas, Minuanes, and Bohanes continued to claim and control these lands. Even when the migrants from the missions garnered armed support from other plazas, their forces were not enough to sway the opinions of local tolderías.⁴¹ Recognizing this, the Guaraníes returned to their missions and prepared to face imperial armies. For them, this was a more manageable challenge than to wage armed conflict against their Charrúa, Minuán, or Bohan neighbors. As they formalized their protests, Guaraní caciques would certainly point to their ancestral claims over the missions and the logistical difficulties of moving to new sites; however, their actions point to the lack of available lands as their principal motive for resisting.⁴²

Those of us from San Luis, having received word to move [our mission], went to a faraway land, complying with the will of our Holy King. Having gone there two times, we all became very tired, and we lost all of our goods. Neither the caciques nor the Indians liked [the move], and the infidel Charrúas and Minuanes did not want us to found [a new mission] in that land, saying to us ‘there are no lands for you who have no master. Your God has not made lands for you now, and if you want to enter into these lands it will have to be with war.’ With their spears pointed at us, we returned to our mission and there remained, as there were no more lands to be sought out. You see here how we have traveled to comply with the King’s will, and we ask him that, according to what he has offered to us as vassals, he maintain us in our lands.⁴³

Rather than suggesting that there were no grounds for them to move, Guaraní caciques instead argued that there were no grounds for them to move to. They had attempted to relocate to seemingly open lands and

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⁴¹ Militias from Yapeyú, Corrientes, and Santa Fe supported San Luis’s inhabitants as they attempted to move to the Rio Miriñay.

⁴² Guaraní histories, religion, and epistemologies were certainly rooted in the local landscape of their missions, giving them numerous reasons to be against the transmigration. Nonetheless, in their official opposition, they pointed to the presence of tolderías as the principal factor in their turning back. Ganson, *The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata*, 95; Levinton, *El espacio jesuitico-guarani*, - Volumen 80.

⁴³ “Nosotros los de San Luiz estando al aviso de que nos mudasemos, fuimos a una tierra muy lexana, cumpliendo la voluntad de nuestro Santo Rey; haviendo ido dos vezes, todos nos cansamos mucho; y perdemos todos nuestros bienes, mas no gostando los Caziques, y los Indios juntamente, y no queriendo los Infieles Charruas, y Mosanes que fundassemos en aquella tierra disiendnos no hay tierra para vosotros que no tenga dueno, no á echo aora no mas Dios Nuestro Señor las tierras para vosotros si quereis entrar en ellas ha de ser con guerra, y a punta de lanza nos volvimos a nuestro pueblo, y nos quedamos, no haviendo mas tierras que poder buscar, ves aqui como hemos andado por cumplir la voluntad del Rey, y le pedimos que segun lo que nos tiene ofrecido como a Vassallos suios nos mantenga en nuestra tierra.” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.31, 25-26v.
found that local tolderías would not accept their establishment. Refusing to be on the front lines against tolderías, the only option that remained for the mission dwellers was to resist transmigration.

In response to Guaraní refusal to support the mapping expeditions, Spanish and Portuguese officials abandoned the demarcation efforts and prepared for military assault. Portuguese forces would engage the missions from Rio Grande and Viamão in the east, while Spanish soldiers would approach from the south, along the Rio Uruguay. For the next three years, warfare engulfed the north of the Río de la Plata region. Imperial forces and their allies pitted themselves against fighters from the missions and whatever support they could garner. Here again, tolderías served as important actors. Despite resistance to the encroachment of the mission plazas upon their lands, by the end of 1753, Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, and Guenoas had all begun to collaborate with Guaraní forces against the imperial armies. Whether spying, participating in battles, or commandeering horses and supplies, they provided invaluable allies to the resistance efforts.

Why did many tolderías eventually align with the mission-dwellers in their uprising against imperial armies, particularly after mission forces had participated in the campaigns against them from 1749 to 1752?⁴⁴ One possible explanation is kinship ties. Charrúas, Minuanes, and Guenoas all had kin living in Yapeyú, San Borja, and other missions, and it is possible that they sought to lend them aid out of affinity or obligation. Indeed, Minuán spies provided advance warning to their kin in San Miguel as Portuguese forces planned to march upon their mission.⁴⁵ At the same time, however, many Minuanes eventually abandoned the resistance efforts, while others shifted their support to the Portuguese. Kinship ties may have been strong, but the support of local tolderías did not necessarily extend to the entire population of a given mission plaza. A second potential explanation is that Charrúas, Bohanes, Guenoas, and Minuanes hired themselves out as mercenaries to the mission armies. It is true that their involvement in the war came at the

⁴⁴ Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750–1802), t. VII, 164–65. These campaigns were discussed in Chapter 2.

⁴⁵ Frühauf García, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 620–1.
request of Guarani leadership, and that they received numerous payments over its duration.\textsuperscript{46} Still, yerba mate, tobacco, and a handful of other items probably would not have been enough for members of these tolderías to risk themselves in armed combat. Given the dynamics of plazas and tolderías that defined the region up to this point, these payments more likely served as a symbolic recognition of the authority such tolderías carried over the countryside. Offering goods was akin to a request for actions that Guarani fighters could not undertake themselves.

Rather than merely kin, clients, or hired aid, tolderías’ decisions to participate in the war derived from their position as arbiters of the countryside. For the most part, fighters from tolderías took up arms in their own lands rather than traveling deep into mission territories. Their skirmishes with imperial troops occurred as royal soldiers and militias attempted to cross lands that their tolderías claimed and controlled.

As Spanish forces marched north from Buenos Aires along the Río Uruguay to Yapeyú in 1754, Charrúas, Minuanes, and Guenoas came at the request of the mission’s residents, routing the imperial army handily and forcing them back to Buenos Aires and Montevideo (Map 3.6). In the East, Minuanes, Guenoas, and Guaranís halted Portuguese forces near the fort of Jesús María José, along the Río Pardo.\textsuperscript{47} This territorial dynamic was also evident in the rebels’ strategizing.

The Priest named Antonio, who is from the La Cruz Mission, has on his own called upon and given payment to infidel Indians [known as] Charrúas, Bohanes, and Minuanes, who were commanded by an Indian of the same nation named Don Joseph. [Antonio] gave them yerba mate, tobacco, and other objects so that they would survey the countryside, its entrances, and its exits, and that they would promptly report on whatever news they had, and that they would incorporate themselves into the Guarani forces to help them in the defense of their missions.\textsuperscript{48}


\textsuperscript{48} “El R. P. Cura nom.do Antonio que lo es del Pueblo de la Cruz, este por si mismo tenia congregado y Gratificado a Indios Ynfiel parcialidades Charrus, Bojanes, y minuanes dandoles Yerva, tavoaco, y otros efectos, Cuias partelidades las
Although Charrúas, Minuanes, and Bohanes provided auxiliary support for Guaraní militias near the mission plazas, their primary activity was to monitor the countryside’s “entrances and exits” – pathways to the south and east of the missions that led them to tolderías’ lands. Given that river fords, headwaters, and highland passes funneled travelers through the countryside, the rebels knew that imperial armies would have to pass through these lands on their way to the missions. In this way, mission interests coalesced with tolderías’ territorial control.

[The Guaraníes] have distributed their armadas along the headwaters of the Río Ibicuí and the falls of the Río Piraí, where they remain with infidel Indians, Charrúas and Bohanes, with the purpose of not letting any Portuguese enter.49

Charrúas, Minuanes, and Bohanes had maintained their tolderías in this area for decades in order to control flows of people and goods along the rural highway. To guard these key crossings was not simply to protect mission plazas, but to maintain their claims over the countryside.

By the end of the war, numerous tolderías had begun to side with the imperial invaders, and eventually the missionaries found themselves defeated. Spanish and Portuguese military officials recognized the need to garner safe passage across the countryside if they hoped to procure victory, and in early 1755, imperial forces near Santa Tecla invited Minuán and Guenoa caciques to parley. There they lavished the caciques with gifts, including clothing and money, seeking to procure their support. Responses from the

commandava vn Indio de la misma nacion llamado d.n Jph solo con el fin de que / reconozca las Campañas sus entradas, y salidas, y q.e de todo dize prompto auido de qualquer resulta, y se incorporase con los Cuerpos de Yndios Guaraníes para ayuda de ellos en defensa de sus Pueblos.” AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo III, 127, 130-1.

49 “teniendo repartidas sus Armadas a las Puntas del Yvicui, y Cahidas del Río Pareg, dondes mantienen con indios infieles, Charruas y vojanes para opoçito de no dexar entrar Portugueses alguno.” ibid., 126.
Map 3.6 – “Plano del Rio de la Plata”, [n.d.]. This map demonstrates the trajectories of the imperial armies and the sites of key events in the Guaraní War. The letters “A” and “B” represent Spanish and Portuguese marches in 1754, respectively, and where tolderías and Guaraníes turned them back. The letters “C” and “D” demonstrate their marches to Santa Tecla in 1755, where they parlayed with Minuán and Guenoa caciques and then passed through to the missions.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{50}\) Plano del Rio de la Plata que comprende los Pueblos de Misiones y Línea que se puso para dividir las Jurisdicciones entre los dos Monarcas de España y Portugal aunque después en el año 1759 se quedaron las cosas como estavan (s/f); AGMM - ARG-8,2.
Minuanes and Guenoas varied; most refused to lend aid, but others used the opportunity for the benefit of their own tolderías. In particular, the cacique Moreira agreed to return with his closest kin to the countryside near the Rio Cebollatí and São Miguel. While he offered to aid the imperial efforts personally, he leveraged that moment to find an exit for his tolderías and to reestablish peace with his Portuguese counterparts. Moreira’s tolderías were precisely those that the armies of the demarcation teams had attacked in 1752. For that reason, he and his kin had agreed to aid the missions’ resistance efforts and had waylaid imperial armies ever since.\(^{51}\) Hoping to avoid the tolls of the imminent battles between imperial and missionary forces, he and others absconded from the war and returned to the foothills where they had been before.\(^{52}\)

Moreira's actions demonstrate how internal motivations and territorial dynamics also shaped many tolderías’ decisions to avoid or exit the war. Moreira and his tolderías had not participated because of kinship ties with the missions’ inhabitants, nor had they done so for any sort of pan-indigenous identity. Rather, the conflict that they had experienced as the demarcation teams came into their lands gave them common cause with the mission plazas. Once they restored peace with imperial forces, there was no longer any need to continue in the war. Other caciques made similar decisions, especially after receiving payments from imperial armies and watching them move on to mission territories. Some even sought to convince their kin who had been living on the missions to abscond before the fighting reached them.\(^ {53}\)

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\(^{51}\) Following the skirmishes with the demarcation team, Moreira and his kin had taken the horses to the Yapeyú mission. AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 78, Doc 18218; Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. VII, 137, 188; “Diário compilado da 1a tropa” in Collecção de notícias para a história e geografia das nações ultramarinas que vivem nos dominios portuguezes ou lhes são visinhas, 72.

\(^{52}\) AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 78, Doc 18218; Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 505, 510-511, 519-20; Tadeo X. Henis, “Diario histórico de la rebellion y guerra de los pueblos guaranís, situados en la costa oriental del Río Uruguay, del año de 1754” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, 40; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 102–3; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”; 622.

\(^{53}\) A Minuán named Molina convinced at least 60 Minuanes from San Miguel to abandon the mission before the war started. Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 502–3. Other examples include: ibid., 430; AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 1, Doc 90.
whose lands were neither affected by the mission relocation projects nor by the subsequent military marches tended to avoid the war from the beginning, and many maintained peaceful ties with neighboring plazas throughout.54 A number of tolderías fought alongside Guaraní militias through the end of the war, yet as more and more chose indifference or aid to imperial forces over time, the rebels’ cause was lost.55

In 1758, two years after the war ended, the Iberian demarcation teams resumed their activities. In particular, the new personnel sought to draw a line between Santa Tecla and the Río Uruguay.56 Using maps that they had taken from several mission archives, the demarcation parties eventually completed their assignment. Still, the end of this undertaking did not signify the consolidation of regional territorial control by the competing empires. The comparison of treaty maps to written accounts again reveals that the finalized maps represented idealized visions of what imperial authorities hoped the region would look like, rather than how it actually looked from the ground.

According to reports that I had from the area, a large number not only of Tapes, but of Charrúas and Minuanes, have taken shelter [in lands south of the missions near the borderline]...[According to one of the expedition’s maps], those lands were neither vast nor were there Indians in them.57

Indeed, one of the results of the war was an influx of refugees from the missions to lands controlled by Charrúa and Minuán tolderías.58 This produced new competitors for the tolderías, but also provided

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54 During the 1750s, some Charrúa tolderías maintained ties with residents in Corrientes, while others negotiated settlement in Santo Domingo Soriano. IEB - AL-068-002; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, 1757-05-18; Campo del Bloqueo, 1757-04-26, 1757-06-09, 1757-08-05, 1757-08-06; Santo Domingo Soriano, 1757-07-01; AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, 1757-02-24; Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-02-27, 1758-09-10, 1758-11-06; 1760-01-22 & 1760-04-24; Buenos Aires, 1760-03-06 & 1760-08-09.


56 AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 1, Docs 42 & 74; Caixa 2, Docs 116 & 142.

57 “segundo as noticias que tive ali, viviam abrigados, não só bastante numero de Tapes, mas tambem Charruas e Minuanes: estes erão os Indios e aquelle o terreno indiviso... e se V. E. me diz que do plano que lhe remeti feito pelo Coronel Don Miguel Angelo de Blasco se manifesta não ser aquelle terreno vasto nem nelle haber Indios.” Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro Volume LIII (Rio de Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1931); publicados sob a administração do diretor Rodolfo Garcia, 318–19.

58 Historians most often associate outward migration from the missions with the expulsion of the Jesuit order in 1767. José María Mariluz Urquijo, “Los Guaraníes después de la expulsión de los jesuitas,” Estudios Americanos 6, no. 25 (1953); Wilde, “Guaraníes,
caciques with an opportunity to expand their kinship networks and increase their spheres of influence. At the same time, however, another vestige of the war was the establishment of forts and settlements in borderland spaces, most notably the Portuguese in Rio Pardo and the adjacent Sao Nicolau, populated by former residents of the Siete Pueblos. If only slightly, the demarcation of a border in the 1750s did alter the regional dynamic of the Rio de la Plata, though not according to imperial designs.

By 1761, the death of Fernando VI and the subsequent ascension of Charles III to the Spanish throne precipitated the annulment of the Treaty of Madrid. In juridical terms, the Siete Pueblos returned to Spain and Colônia to the Portuguese. Over the course of the next fifteen years, Iberian militaries would once again turn their guns on one another, with Colônia, São Miguel, and Rio Grande being occupied by Spain and Santa Tecla falling to Portugal. It would not be until the peace accord of 1777 that a dividing line again became the legal standard and not until the 1780s that demarcation teams reappeared in the region. This time, the imaginary line was further north, and while Colônia again returned to Spanish control, the eastern missions did not transfer to the Portuguese. By this point, the Jesuit order had been expelled from both Portuguese and Spanish dominions, and the missions were under duress. Armed resistance was neither of interest nor a possibility.

The San Ildefonso demarcation produced little armed backlash in the region. Instead, it revealed the consolidation of territorial control by tolderías in lands adjacent to the borderline, as well as the continued lack of territorial knowledge or engagement by Spanish or Portuguese administrators beyond the isolated locales of their individual forts. Establishing fortresses in Santa Tecla and Rio Pardo did not imply control over or knowledge of the borderlands. For this reason, once the demarcation parties moved north from

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Santa Tecla toward the missions in 1785 and 1786, they encountered powerful and well-known caciques and found themselves obliged to pay in exchange for safe passage.\(^5^9\) In addition for taxing travelers, Minuán caciques objected to the imprint that the demarcation teams left upon the local landscape. For example, in 1787, Spanish and Portuguese officers discovered that a number of Minuanes had been toppling the stone markers they had erected to signal the imperial limits. It would take further parleying to convince local caciques to permit the marble obelisks to remain in position. This occurred along the headwaters of the Rio Piraí and the Rio Jacuí, lands that tolderías continued to control three decades after the end of the Guaraní War.\(^6^0\)

If the Santo Ildefonso expeditions did not incite a regional war, they did brush up against local territorialities. They revealed a concentration of Minuán tolderías in particular in the vast spaces surrounding imperial forts and mission plazas. All along the newly-designed imperial limits, other native peoples exhibited similar territorial claims. Impinging upon them imperiled the demarcation teams, who thus sought to travel without detection.\(^6^1\) In the end, native protection of these unmapped territorialities proved more of an impediment to the demarcation efforts than the call to arms that had occurred three decades before. As late as 1797, Portuguese officials complained of a lack of knowledge of lands between Porto Alegre and Sao Martinho (Map 3.1), due to the presence of independent native peoples:

> Along the continuation of the line from here northward [from São Martinho], there are many impediments to finding firm points to determine what currently pertains to the dominions of Portugal. The highlands that cross this location and the closed forests that cover them and continue more or less thickly on their northern side, largely occupied by savage Indians, and transited little to none by the Portuguese, making this terrain unknown for the object that I discuss.\(^6^2\)

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\(^5^9\) See note 6.

\(^6^0\) ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 10, f. 194.

\(^6^1\) See: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, 73v, 84; Costa, “Viagens en la frontera colonial”; Erbig Jr., Forging Frontiers, Chapter 3.

\(^6^2\) “Na continuação da Raya d’aqui para o Norte [de São Martinho] me-he mais embaracozo encontrar pontos firmes para determinar, o que actualmente pertence aos Domínios de Portugal. A cordilheira que atravessa nesta situação, os Bosques serrados, de que hé corberta, e que seguem mais ou menos expessos da parte Septentrional, ocupados em grande parte por
Three years later, the Spanish Commander General of the Countryside, Felix de Azara, complained that his office, “lacked an exact drawing of the countryside and its frontier [with Brazil].” Here and in other areas along the imaginary imperial limits, administrators lamented the perpetuity of empty spaces of imperial knowledge and oversight. Belying the images presented in the maps produced by the demarcation teams, textual accounts revealed instead the hollowness of the borderline.

Geographies of the Future and Ethnographies of the Past

Even as they incited a regional war and brushed against existing territorial structures, the Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping expeditions served as a key moment in the production of geographical and ethnographic knowledge about the Río de la Plata. The discursive shift they exemplified and to which they contributed had two central components: the invention and normalization of the idea of the border and the reifying of the region’s indigenous communities within geographical and taxonomical categories. Although the attitudes and sensibilities that they promoted were part of broader epistemological shifts in the Atlantic World, the mapping expeditions were the principal means through which Iberian administrators discursively incorporated the Río de la Plata into these Enlightenment-era ideological frameworks. In both legal and epistemological terms, they ushered in a new era of engagement with the region for Portuguese and Spanish officials. Simply put, they enabled and impelled administrators to think in terms of provinces rather than plazas, and to imagine tolderías not as allies but as subjects.

When considered within the longue durée of regional writings, the body of knowledge produced through the demarcation efforts stands out as a significant discursive moment for geographic and

Indios Salvagens, e os poucos, ou nemuns transitos destes sertoens pellos Portuguezes fazem este terreno desconhecido para o objeito, de que trato.” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 13, f. 142.

61 “carece tanvien esta Comandancia de un Plano exacto de la Campaña y su Frontera.” AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Cerro Largo, 1800-02-13).
ethnographic knowledge. Sixteenth-century chronicles (crónicas) conceptualized the region principally as a pathway to Paraguay. Their geographical perspective was restricted to the riverine channels that ran between Buenos Aires and Asunción — principally the the Río de la Plata estuary and the Río Paraná — or the narrow terrestrial corridor that cut across the north of the region, connecting the Paraguayan capital eastward to the Atlantic coast. For this reason, early maps of the region and the South American continent alike provided oversized and detailed renderings of the two rivers while demonstrating little consistency in their depictions of the region’s countryside (Map 3.7). Knowledge of regional lands remained limited despite larger imperial efforts to systematize geographical information on the Americas, such as Spain’s Relaciones Geográficas, as administrators in the Río de la Plata met such endeavors with indifference. During these years, imperial narratives of engagement with native peoples consisted of episodic accounts of trade or warfare. Rather than offering systematic ethnographies, travelers limited themselves to ascribing ethnonyms according to the territorial locations where they encountered native peoples.

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64 At the time, many mapmakers considered the Río Paraná part of the Río de la Plata and thus labeled it as such.


As Jesuit missionaries began to engage the northern portion of the region in the seventeenth century, they developed their own corpus of written and drawn accounts. Their maps and reports served until the mid-eighteenth century as the most detailed renderings of local peoples and lands, and they demonstrated key shifts from the writings of earlier explorers. Specifically, as priests and friars attempted to garner support for new mission settlements, they aimed to locate non-missionized peoples and new resources. Beyond the administrative records of individual mission plazas, the Society of Jesus developed a voluminous archive of maps and descriptions of engagement with local tolderías. Their drawings of regional lands almost always included ethnonyms, as they sought to map the location of non-Christian peoples that

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they would eventually bring into the fold of Christendom (Map 3.8).\textsuperscript{68} In spite of these more detailed accounts, however, missionaries did not attempt to categorize tolderías in the region according to any universal ethnographic framework. Furthermore, their geographic knowledge was limited to the lands near their missions and the various networks of roadways that connected them.

Map 3.8 – Deyá, Ignacio, Mappa Paraquariae, 1746\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{68} See: Furlong Cardiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Río de la Plata, vol. 2.

\textsuperscript{69} ibid., Mapa XLVI.
During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Iberian cartographic production turned to claiming resources and defining pathways. As Jesuits and Spanish and Portuguese administrators debated regional possession and sought to identify the locations of resources, much of their mapmaking focused on coastal charts or regional roadways. Here again, both drawn and written sources revealed the limited territorial visions of their authors. Jesuits provided details on the mission complex to the north of the region, while imperial officials drew coastlines and harbors. Despite competing claims for territorial possession, maps drawn in the region did not include borderlines, as they were not operative concepts at the time. Prior to the demarcation expeditions, the borderline was the product of European engravers’ tables rather than American travelers' accounts. Jesuits continued to highlight native peoples’ perceived locations, as proselytization remained a possibility. Imperial authors were less consistent with their representations; however, they often discussed tolderías as potential trading partners. Still, until the demarcation efforts, no systematic effort had catalogued regional tolderías according to ethnic categories.

The lacuna of geographical and ethnographic information made the demarcation efforts duly important for imperial administrators. Along with producing evidence of a legal border, mapmakers aimed to compile and organize information on the regional landscape in a usable format for future governance. Thus they scoured local archives and interviewed countless informants along the way. The principal officers of the demarcation efforts were familiar with extant records, frequently citing earlier chronicles, route descriptions (roteiros), Jesuit histories, and oral testimonies as evidence of their claims. In framing this information, however, they presented an entirely new territorial vision that included fixed borders and provincial units. A close analysis of the details of this new structuring of knowledge also reveals new attitudes vis-à-vis tolderías in the region. Whereas earlier accounts depicted them as active trading partners or potential converts, the demarcation officials focused particularly on their nomadism and portrayed them as impossible subjects. By inscribing mobile peoples upon the landscape as obdurate, unchanging actors, mapmakers positioned them for the first time as obstacles to the realization of idealized territorial states. In
making the border and claiming all lands on one side or another, the demarcation teams redefined interethnic relations, presupposing that tolderías were vassals by virtue of living within the dominion of one of the two Iberian crowns.

The Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping expeditions generated geographical information in a variety of formats. In addition to continual correspondence with their counterparts, with imperial administrators, and with each other, the demarcation officials left day-by-day journals (diarios) of their activities. These voluminous tomes were meant to produce a level of detail that could not be captured by the treaty maps, a point expressed by Portuguese geographer José de Saldanha.

The painter, with a delicate brush can represent Nature, but cannot express circumstances, news, and movements of events. This is the part reserved for the historian....An extensive diary, which we compose in the countryside, is indispensable for the exact configuration of the drawings.  

The diarios included the systematic identification of rivers, highland peaks, and crossings, all of which the geographers catalogued according to latitude and longitude coordinate systems. In addition, they contained descriptions of local plants, animals, and terrain, which the travelers used to suggest sites for future settlements or economic ventures. The aim of this meticulous note-taking was not only to produce a border, but to collect, catalogue, and evaluate undocumented natural resources. Lastly, mapmakers georeferenced local histories, using the occasion of crossing a given geographical feature to recount events that had occurred there. This purpose of this gesture was generally to reinforce their respective claims through historical lineages of land usage.

The thousands of pages that detailed the countryside would have been relatively useless if not combined with the graphic representations of the treaty maps, which enabled readers to imagine the region as a unified whole. Accordingly, demarcation officials took care in their diarios to refer back to key points

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70 “Pode o Pintor com o delicado pincel representar a Natureza; mas não expressar as circunstancias, noticias, e movimentos dos sucessos. Esta hé a parte reservada ao Historiador...Hum extenso Diario, qual o que compomos na Campanha, hé indespensavel para a exacta configuração dos Planos.” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 10, f. 131.
or sections of their maps. They meant their textual and visual sources to be read side by side. Saldanha thus measured his call for detailed texts:

Nevertheless, this text continues to be tiresome to read, because of the multitude of additions of material, and similar to an annotation of laws of the superficial structure of the Earth. Thus, it is easy to see the need to construct another that does not simply summarize the previous one. The formation of a new map could also be of use, moreover, if several brief notes of the country’s natural history are added to it.  

In addition to providing a drawn, simplified version of the diarios, treaty maps served to demonstrate the border as an extant or achievable territorial structure. Whereas the written accounts aimed to guide travelers, the maps were the foundation of both Spain’s and Portugal’s legal claims to a border. Without them the treaties would have had little juridical and practical weight. For this reason, according to the instructions given to the demarcation teams, the chief officers of each side signed off on the final versions of the treaty maps.

The principal objective and product of the demarcation efforts was the discursive realization of an interimperial limit. Unlike earlier maps and written geographies, the corpus of drawings and texts produced by the mapping expeditions was legally binding and therefore set a new precedent for the imagining and administration of regional lands. Following the Treaty of Madrid, every subsequent peace agreement that sought to order territorial possession in the Río de la Plata included the concept of a fixed border. Despite the Treaty of Madrid’s eventual annulment, diplomats and mapmakers of the San

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71 “...porem elle fica sendo fastidioso à Leitura, pella multidão de adicçõens proprias da materia, e semilhante a huma Postilla das Leys da Estructura superficial da Terra. Daquí se vê facilmente a percisão de se construir outro, em o qual não somente se resuma aquelle, podendo servir tambem á formação de novo Mappa, mas ainda se lhe ajuntem algumas breves notas sobre a Historia Natural e do País,” ibid.

72 The various maps produced by the demarcation teams included both small-scale renderings of the region as a whole and large-scale drawings of specific points of contestation along the borderline. In addition to key plazas, these maps also located on their grids the various stone markers that the expeditions erected. For example: “Gráfico de los lugares donde se hallaban ubicadas las marcas fronterizas que separaban las jurisdicciones portuguesas de las españolas,” AGNA - VII. Lamas 32 [2635]; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 19, f. 105.

73 The lone exception to this rule was the 1761 Treaty of El Pardo, which annulled the Treaty of Madrid.
Ildefonso expeditions used its maps as a precedent for their own negotiations. The materials produced by the San Ildefonso demarcation teams would in turn serve as the principle reference point for peace accords between Spain and Portugal in 1801 and for postcolonial border disputes between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay through much of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{74}

The realization of a discursive and legal border to divide the Portuguese and Spanish dominions came not only through agreements, but also through conflict. In addition to providing a visual and written foundation for the imagining of a border that bisected the region, the treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso and their demarcation efforts transformed abstract conflicts over broad territorial possession into concentrated border disputes. Both treaties proposed the existence of a borderline and both mapping expeditions recorded the ceremonial performance of it, but it was the subsequent disagreements over its exact location that reinforced agreement on its existence. In order to debate possession of strategic locales, representatives of the two crowns necessarily accepted that the border was a real entity and that they, rather than tolderías, were legitimate possessors. It was only in this way that both sides could claim to have inhabited and possessed native lands along the borderline since “time immemorial.” The response to the idea of the border was thus as significant as the initial proposal of its existence.\textsuperscript{75}

The Treaty of San Ildefonso was particularly acrimonious for representatives of the two Iberian crowns. For this reason, the demarcation took nearly two decades to complete, with various multi-year gaps. It was most likely due to this enmity that the treaty became a principal legal precedent for years to

\textsuperscript{74} It is precisely for this reason that many of the diarios of the demarcation teams were transcribed and published in the nineteenth century. Examples include: Pedro de Angelis, ed., Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836); ilustrados con notas y disertaciones; Carlos Calvo, ed., Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros días, 11 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 1862); Melitón González, ed., El límite oriental del territorio de Misiones (República Argentina) t. 1 (Montevideo: Imp. a vapor de El Siglo, 1882).

\textsuperscript{75} ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 112; ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2, (Buenos Aires, 1793-07-10).
come. The case of the Rio Piratini serves as a clear example. During the Treaty of Madrid negotiations, this river, was clearly on the Portuguese side of the line, but the Treaty of San Ildefonso transformed the Lagoa Mirim into neutral waters and required that the “first southern stream that drains into its main tributary” serve as the dividing line as the border reached into the continental interior (Map 3.1). In the decades between the two treaties, contraband traders had developed vast commercial networks in the area, and the Portuguese military had settled a fort called São Gonçalo along the river. When the San Ildefonso demarcation teams arrived in the area in 1784, they disputed whether the Rio Piratini was indeed the “northernmost tributary,” or whether there existed another above it. This particular conflict brought about accusations on both sides, with Portuguese officers chastising their Spanish counterparts for “suddenly embarking” on demarcation activities, “despotically” commandeering goods, and evicting settlers. Spanish officers retorted that the Portuguese were “lovers of formalities” and unnecessarily delayed their tasks.

Eventually, the parties would continue along their pathways to the missions, only returning to the issue a decade later, again to no avail. This dispute produced on the one hand a vast array of arguments – historical, geographical, cartographic, pragmatic, and otherwise – to justify the competing claims, and on the other hand a rush to establish settlements along one side of the river or the other. In the 1790s, the Spanish founded three forts along the nearby Rio Jaguarão to fortify their claims, while the Portuguese issued land titles (sesmarias) along the Piratini’s coast. While future conflicts would alter the exact location of the line, the line itself persisted as a legal concept shaping administration and settlement in the area.

76 “el primer arroyo meridional, que entra en el sangradero o desaguadero de ella” “Tratado preliminar sobre los límites de los estados pertenecientes á las Coronas de España y Portugal, en la América meridional, ajustado y concluido en San Lorenzo, á 11 de Octubre de 1777” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, Artículo IV.
78 AGNA - IX. 24-2-4, f. 39, 48, 50, 53; AHRS - Informações sobre pedidos de terras, Maço 1, #62; AHRS - F1246, 140-142v, 190-191v; AHRS - F1247, 60-1, 100-101v, 183-184v, 189v-190, 250v-252, 247v-259, 288-289; AHRS - F1248, 1-2v, 22-3, 188v-190v, 216v-218, 277-279v, 289v-290; AHRS - F1249, f. 259v-261. Similar disputes emerged regarding the location of the Río Pepirí-guazú, the existence of the Río Igurey and the Río Corrientes, and whether the Portuguese forts of Coimbra and Albuquerque were on their side of the divide. See: “Informe del Virrey Arredondo á su sucesor Melo de Portugal, sobre el estado
Along with the geographical information that they produced through their diaries and their maps, demarcation officials sought to provide detailed descriptions of the native peoples they encountered. Particularly during the San Ildefonso expeditions, Spanish and Portuguese travelers added thorough descriptions of indigenous communities – including physical characteristics, languages, customs, historical anecdotes, and geographical locations – to their episodic encounters. In doing so, they generated some of the first ethnographic accounts of tolderías in the region, as they sought to classify Charrúas, Minuanes, and others according to rigid ethnic categories and situate them within the universal taxonomies of Carl Linnaeus, Georges-Louis Leclerc, and likely Lorenzo Hervás. Whether submitting their accounts and maps to imperial authorities or publishing them for broader circulation, members of the Iberian demarcation teams used this discursive opportunity to posit new possibilities and limitations for relations with tolderías.

Demarcation officials’ initial gesture was to remove mobile native peoples from their maps. Unlike earlier maps, which regularly included ethnonyms associated with tolderías, those generated by the Madrid and San Ildefonso expeditions represented the region as two consolidated imperial dominions. Three factors likely explain the change. First, the demarcation teams were principally concerned with visualizing the border in their maps and producing a general guide for administrators who read their textual accounts. This intention served as the principal filter for what they included in their maps – rivers, stone markers, physical features, settlements – and what they did not. Second, in keeping with the standards of Enlightenment-era

79 See, for example: José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 231; Azara, Geografía física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay y misiones guaraníes, xcv-xcvii, 392; Diego de Alvear, “Relacion geográfica e histórica de la provincia de Misiones, del Brigadier D. Diego de Alvear, Primer Comisario y Astrónomo en gefe de la segunda division de limites por la corte de España, en América,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol. 3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 479–553 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900). The San Ildefonso expedition can be considered a starting point for the production of “state ethnographies” by Spanish and Portuguese officials. Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 109–17; Sirtori, “Nos límites do relato”.

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mapmaking, the treaties’ commissioned geographers were reluctant to draw lands they did not directly observe themselves. For this reason, in map after map drawn and signed by demarcation officials, territories between the Río Uruguay and the walked borderline appeared as empty spaces. These were precisely the lands controlled by Charrúa, Minuán, and other tolderías in the 1750s and the 1780s (Maps 3.9 & 3.10).80 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the expeditions’ maps were prescriptive rather than representative. They revealed the geographical imaginations of their authors as they walked the countryside, but also served as models of what the region could become. The treaty maps were both legal precedent and templates for future settlement programs, and thus reflected the ambitions of imperial officials.

Given these purposes and the standards of contemporary cartography, mobile native peoples had no place in the maps produced by the demarcation teams. The only instances in which they did appear were in an 1801 map by the Spanish lieutenant Diego de Alvear and another from the same year by the Portuguese geographer José de Saldanha, both of whom participated in the San Ildefonso expeditions. Alvear’s map indicated the site of a cemetery most likely belonging to Minuanes, while Saldanha’s map marked a “Minuán settlement” along the borderline.81 These references were certainly the exception and were most likely included because of the fixity of these sites on the map. The cemetery was a significant site because it sat upon a hilltop from which one could survey in all directions, while the settlement referred to a site where several Minuán tolderías had established themselves around that time. Saldanha probably considered this settlement a permanent fixture and for that reason included it in his map.

80 The exception was when the demarcation teams rushed through Minuán lands. Despite taking few measurements, they had to draw a line in order to preserve their maps’ discursive and juridical validity. For Enlightenment mapping conventions, see: David N. Livingstone, The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), Chapter 4; Matthew H. Edney and Mary Sponberg Pedley, eds., The History of Cartography: Cartography in the European Enlightenment 4 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Forthcoming). These formulaic standards resembled other types of imperial writing. Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), Chapter 1.

81 Alvear, Diego de. “Plano Reducido o Esférico,” 1801 (AGMM - ARG-3,6); Saldanha, José de. “Mappa corographico da Capitania de S. Pedro,” 1801 (IHGRGS).
Map 3.9 – “Mapa Geographico del Terreno que demarcaron las Primeras Partidas,” 1759

82 Mapa Geographico del Terreno que demarcaron las Primeras Partidas de Sus Magestades Catholica y Fidelissima (1759); MNM - 43-A-2.
Map 3.10 – Azara, Félix de. “Mapa esférico de grande parte del Virreinato,” 1798

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81 Félix de Azara, *Mapa esférico de grande parte del Virreinato de Buenos Aires* (1798); MM - 23-5-4.
Despite the evacuation of tolderías from nearly all of the Madrid and San Ildefonso treaty maps, demarcation officers frequently acknowledged tolderías in their written accounts. While the military expeditions of the Guaraní War recorded engagement with Charrúa, Minuán, Bohan, and Guenoa fighters, members of the San Ildefonso demarcation teams penned systematic accounts of regional inhabitants. They catalogued tolderías according to ethnicity and defined the possible relations that contemporary and future administrators could have with them.\(^{84}\) While the nuances of their discussions varied, those authors offering taxonomical ethnographies of the region’s mobile peoples emphasized several characteristics. Spanish officials tended to accentuate tolderías’ mobility as evidence of primitivism and to cast doubt upon the possibility that they would ever adopt a sedentary, agricultural lifestyle. Alvear wrote of Minuanes: “Their greatest glory is their free and wandering lifestyle, they are given to drunkenness and lust, polygamy is common between them, especially among the caciques.” He offered a similar assessment of Charrúas.

The Charrúas are another of the ancient American nations whose wild, ferocious, and bellicose character has kept them from negotiation and communication. Their customs and lifestyle differ little, if at all, from those of Minuanes.\(^{85}\) Azara highlighted the repeated failure of efforts to missionize Minuanes, noting that despite missionaries’ best efforts, “they returned to their wandering and free lifestyle.”\(^{86}\) He concluded:

\(^{84}\) The most prolific of these imperial authors were Félix de Azara, Diego de Alvear, and Francisco de Aguirre for Spain, and José Saldanha and João Francisco Roscio for Portugal, yet other accounts existed. Spanish officials sought to cast tolderías as unredeemable “others, while Portuguese officials offered more favorable assessments. Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 109–17; Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”: 14–25.

\(^{85}\) “Su mayor gloria es su vida libre y errante, son muy dados a la embriaguez y a la lujuria, y entre ellos es corriente la poligamia, especialmente entre los caciques... Los charruas son otra de las naciones antiguas de esta América cuyo carácter agreste feroces y belicoso, les ha mantenido siempre retirados de todo trato y comunicación [y sus] costumbres y género de vida, en poco, o nada diiferen de los minuanes.” Paul Grousac, ed., Anales de la biblioteca: Publicación de documentos relativos al Río de la Plata con introducciones y notas, 10 vols. 2 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora de Coni Hermanos, 1902), 344–45.

\(^{86}\) “estos volvieron á su vida errante y libre” Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara, Tomo Primero, 165.
If the governors were to reflect upon the fruitlessness of their predecessors’ efforts to reduce the barbarians, they would give up on their efforts to have them all form reductions… and they would look for other ways to make use of them. \(^{87}\)

Portuguese ethnographies tended to agree that tolderías lived “in a truly free state,” yet refuted their Spanish counterparts’ association of mobility with violence. For example, Saldanha argued:

“It is certain that [Minuanes] are not as cruel as the Tape Indians. It has never been reported that the Minuanes killed a Portuguese or Spaniard, even though they found them alone or lost in the countryside, as Guaraníes have done numerous times.\(^{88}\)”

These ways of defining tolderías reflected contrasting imperial experiences and interests in the region. More importantly, these descriptions represented a shift from earlier approaches in their framing of possible relations with indigenous neighbors.

While early chroniclers had recounted their own interactions with regional inhabitants, and Jesuits had identified them as potential converts, the San Ildefonso mapmakers positioned Minuanes, Charrúas, and others as antiquated actors who imperiled the realization of the territorial states they hoped to achieve. Rather than understanding the seasonal and situational movements of tolderías as strategic responses to environmental or social conditions, demarcation officials identified mobility as an essential characteristic of tolderías. It represented a refusal to accept civility and Christianity, which were considered achievable only through a sedentary lifestyle. Unlike Guaraníes, who had moved from the irrationality of mobility to the rationality of sedentism, therefore becoming desirable imperial subjects, tolderías in the region were unchanging and an obstacle to the achievement of territorial states.\(^{89}\)”

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\(^{87}\) “Si los gobernadores reflexionasen el ningún fruto que han sacado sus antecesores en la reducción de los bárbaros, desde luego dependerían el afán que todos tienen de formar reducciones… y buscarían otros caminos de sacar utilidad de los bárbaros.” Azara, Geografía física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay y misiones guaranies, 368.

\(^{88}\) “em hum estado propriamente livre... Hé certo que elles não são tão cruéis como os índios Tapes nao consta que os Minuanos jámias matassem algum Portuguez, ou Hespanhol, posto q. o encontrassem só os perdidos pela campanha como costumão várias vezes fazer os Guaranis.” José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 235–36.

\(^{89}\) Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 114–7; Frühauf García, As diversas formas de ser indio.
“infidel” (*infiel*) transformed from an identifier of potential converts to a marker of mobility. While the term had always been linked to what imperial and ecclesiastical writers perceived as a failure to accept agricultural lifestyles, for the mapping expeditions it signified the impossibility of moving from mobility to sedentism. It was no longer a strategy, but rather a condition. As mapmakers employed a broad territorial perspective, they began to classify tolderías in the region according to ethnonym and then compare them to those of other locales. Thus, they were able to include not only Charrúas and Minuanes under the marker of infiel, but also Abipones and Mocovíes of the Chaco, or Tupíes that lived to the north and east of the Jesuit missions. The more demarcation officials traveled and corresponded with one another, the more evidence they produced to support the paradigmatic division between sedentism and mobility.

In addition to perceiving mobility as an immutable ethnic characteristic, officials also associated it with illicit behavior. This included laziness, drunkenness, violence, and theft, which writers understood as essential characteristics of particular ethnicities, rather than individual decisions or products of social conditions. Defined in this way, native peoples from regional tolderías were not only unfit subjects, but enemies of the empire. Spanish authors in particular linked Charrúas and Minuanes with contrabandists, thereby casting them as clandestine actors against the desired imperial order. The principal officer of the Spanish demarcation efforts, José Varela y Ulloa, explained: “That is how [the Portuguese] did it, allying themselves with the Charrúas and the Yaros and beginning to harass the Jesuit missions in the North, in which they found enough resistance to contain their advances.”

As the Guaraní missions were peaceful centers of colonial life, Charrúas and Yaros, allied with Portuguese agents, acted as aggressive and hostile neighbors. They were among the principal obstacles to the consolidation of the countryside.

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90 “Y así lo hicieron [los portugueses], aliándose con los charrúas y los yaros y comenzando á hostilizar la reducciones jesuíticas del Norte, en las que encontraron resistencia suficiente para contener su avance” José Varela y Ulloa, *Diario de la primera partida de la demarcación de límites entre España y Portugal en América*, 2 vols., Publicaciones de la Real Sociedad Geográfica (Madrid: Imprenta del Patronato de Huérfanos de Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1920-1925 [i.e. 1930]), 36.
While Azara, Alvear, and Saldanha were explicit in their taxonomical approach, others focused more on narrating historical engagements between tolderías and the projects of regional plazas. This style of description more closely resembled earlier Jesuit accounts, from which the demarcation officials derived much of their information. Still, rather than using the regional past as a means to identify future subjects or neophytes, the mapmakers referred to it as evidence of the need to extirpate tolderías from the countryside. The anecdotal accounts presented in their writings positioned tolderías as the principal impediment to the connecting of the region’s distinct plazas, which was one of the primary objectives of the mapping expeditions. The narrative aim of these historical accounts, then, was the expulsion of tolderías from the countryside in order to make way for ranches and farms, which were growing rapidly at the time. Francisco de Aguirre, the ranking officer of the fourth Spanish division, demonstrated this tendency clearly in his discussion of Minuanes:

The risk posed by the Minuán Indians impeded the settlers [of Montevideo] from traveling far [from the plaza] for many years. They caused harm as enemies until José Joaquin de Viana, the favorably-remembered governor of this plaza, made an expedition in which he annihilated them and the few that remained submitted to peace. And in spite of the natives, they distributed titles for ranches and nowadays there is a [Spanish] population 80 leagues or more from this area.

For Aguirre, Minuanes had been the principal obstacle to the advancement of Montevideo, but the military expeditions commissioned at mid-century liberated the countryside and enabled the city’s expansion.

In the mapmakers’ accounts there was thus a clear relationship between geography and ethnography. As both Spanish and Portuguese authorities aimed to draw a stable border and set up future

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91 See, for example: AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 38; AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 106; BNB - 04,4,003, 12v-13; IEB - AL-136-27-12, f. 56-7; IEB - YAP-011, f. 41-42v; Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 249, 285; Azara, Viajes por la América del Sur, 39–42.

92 "El riesgo de los indios minuanes estorbó alejarse mucho los pobladores, por algunos años; hacían daño como enemigos hasta que el Sr. D. José Joaquín de Viana, gobernador de buena memoria en esta plaza, hizo una expedición en que los aniquiló y los pocos que quedaron se sometieron a la paz. Y sin embargo por parte de los naturales, se fueron repartiendo las mercedes de estancias y en el día hay población a 80 y más leguas de este recinto". Paul Groussac, ed., Anales de la biblioteca: Publicación de documentos relativos al Río de la Plata con introducciones y notas, 10 vols. 4 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora de Coni Hermanos, 1908), 144.
projects to realize it, they identified tolderías as one of the principal obstacles to this goal. Since their maps represented idealized visions of achievable territorial space, they did not include tolderías in their images. Their written accounts presented Minuanes, Charrúas, and others as rigid antagonists who both resisted sedentary subjecthood and impeded the full exploitation of the countryside. This general sentiment was perhaps best expressed by Alvear in his description of Minuanes:

Seven or eight tolderías of Minuán Indians inhabit the shores of these streams, the remains of the ancient nation of this name that from the time of the conquest dominated the Campos de Vera, which is north of the Río de la Plata [estuary]. And since then, they have remained independent, and have refused to receive the light of faith. Until recently, the residents of Montevideo and Maldonado tolerated their being nearby, and the Minuanes even served as a relief in the labors of their ranches. But afterward, several delinquents and criminals joined together with them, people of all castes and perversation, corrupting them and making them accustomed to thievery, violence, and other disorder, which they would commit at every step of the way against travelers. For this reason, it became necessary to pursue them with armed forces until they were evicted from those regions. They took refuge in these lands, where they live today, with little correction of those vices. 93

For him, Minuanes were not simply rigid opponents of imperial and ecclesiastical aims, but also a waning relic of irrational lifestyles incompatible with the region’s future.

The situating of tolderías as unchanging and irrational wanderers not only represented a break with earlier discursive patterns, but carried clear implications for future interethnic relations in the region. In particular, it ruled out the possibility that they might become imperial Christian subjects. At the same time that imperial officials sought to redefine the subjecthood of Guaraníes from the missions, incorporating them more closely as secular subjects, they contemplated the eradication of tolderías through the killing or

93 “Sobre las margenes de estos arroyos habitaban seis u ocho tolderias de indios minuanes, resto de la antigua nacion de este nombre, que de tiempo de la conquista se extendia y dominaba los Campos de Vera, que son los septentrionales del Río de la Plata; y que desde entonces se ha mantenido en la independencia, sin haber querido recibir la luz de la Fe. Hasta estos ultimos tiempos los toleraron los vecinos de Montevideo y Maldonado en sus inmediaciones, y aun los minuanes les servian de algun alivio en los trabajos de las estancias; pero habiéndoseles agregado despues algunos delincuentes y facinerosos, gente toda de casta y perversa, los corrompieron y acostumbraron a las raterias, violencias y otros desordenes, que cometian a cada paso contra los caminantes; de forma que se vieron en la necesidad de perseguirse de mano armada, hasta conseguir desalojarlos de aquellas comarcas, y se acogieron de estas, donde viven en el dia, nocon mucha enmienda de queilos vicios” Groussac, Anales de la biblioteca, 343.
capture of their inhabitants. This was particularly salient for Spanish authors, as the imagined borderline placed most regional tolderías within their crown’s territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdictional completeness claimed through the mapping expeditions made impossible the idea of mobile peoples as third parties. They could only be vassals of one crown or another, and given their deviance from the idealized notion of sedentary subjecthood, they posed a problem for imperial designs. For Portuguese officials, the issue of mobility was more salient in other areas, such as in Amazonia and the Eastern Sertão. The positioning of the borderline in the Río de la Plata permitted them to draw different conclusions from their ethnographic assessments.

Conclusion

The demarcation efforts of the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso were watershed moments for legal thought, geographic design, and interethnic relations. As such, they generated immediate responses from local actors whose lands commissioned mapmakers traversed, transforming customary relations between imperial administrators and mobile peoples. A close reading of the accounts and maps produced by demarcation officials reveals the superimposition of an idealized territorial structure upon both early modern and indigenous territorialities. This change was principally discursive, at least at first, as maps served as templates for future endeavors rather than representations of extant socioterritorial conditions. Mapmakers envisioned complete territorial control, a stable borderline, and a sedentary population that could be easily administered. They also reified the region’s tolderías into rigid and unchanging ethnic categories, which in turn served to define possible relations between tolderías and imperial projects. In short, the template ruled out the possibility of incorporating tolderías as rational subjects.

94 While the Portuguese in the Río de la Plata tended to accept tolderías’ mobility, this was by no means a universal tendency. Interethnic policies were generally developed on a regional basis and were shaped by whether or not Portuguese officials were more concerned with accessing the other side of the border or preventing foreign competitors from accessing their side. See: Domingues, Quando os índios eram vassalos; Langfur, The Forbidden Lands; Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”.

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These discursive changes would have meant little if they had not impacted imperial policy and tolderías themselves. They would have been simply the musings of lettered elites, filed in distant archives. Instead, the two demarcation efforts initiated a new way for imperial authors to experience their relationships with tolderías, and altered the ways in which Charrúas, Minuanes, and other actors positioned themselves geographically. In other words, border thinking engendered border practices. The mapmaking expeditions were propositions to which all sorts of regional actors responded. As will be shown in the following chapter, the cumulative response to these events is what transformed the region’s territorial outlook.
CHAPTER 4: TO THE BORDER

The reduction of the barbarous nations can only take place in one of three ways: the first is through commerce and agreements, the second is by force, and the third is by persuasion. The first has never been tried, it is the longest and most difficult with some nations…The use of force or persuasion that inspires them to make reductions is the most expedited means. – Félix de Azara

[These Minuán tolderías] join together not only to collect gifts from contrabandists and travelers, [which they achieve] through intrusive requests, visits, and occasional threats. They also go frequently to the ranches of our missions, which are made to give them yerba mate, knives, tobacco, etc. because if they refuse, the Christian Indians [on the ranches] suffer various forms of harassment. – Andrés de Oyarvide

A Tale of Two Caciques

In May of 1785, a Minuán cacique named Bartolomeo sent a letter to the interim governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Rafael Pinto Bandeira. In it, he sought support from the Portuguese against the Spanish and safe passage across the border as he and his family moved their cattle from mission ranches along the Río Ibicuí to the Río Bacacá area (Map 4.1). Months earlier, Bartolomeo had been visited by representatives of the Spanish crown, who had offered to give him and his people “everything they wanted” in exchange for settling near Montevideo. The cacique was likely aware of recent Spanish raids against tolderías established by refugees from the Guaraní missions, and the pending threat that this posed to his people. Faced with

1 “La reducción de las naciones bárbaras sólo puede verificarse por 3 medios: el 1º es por el comercio y trato; el 2º por la fuerza y el 3º por la persuación. El 1º jamás se ha intentado, es el más largo y difícil con algunas naciones…El usar de la fuerza o del respeto que infunde para hacer reducciones es el medio más expedito.” Félix de Azara, Geografía, física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay y misiones guaraníes (Montevideo: Museo Nacional, 1904), t. 1, 366-7.

2 “se suelen unir no solo para cobrar de los changadores y pasajeros que encuentran sus regalos con impertinentes peticiones, visitas y á veces amenazas, sino que van á menudo a las estancias de nuestros pueblos de Misiones, y les han de dar la yerba mate, cuchillos, tabaco, etc. pues de lo contrario se exponen aquellos Indios cristianos á sufrir varias vejaciones.” Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la demarcación de límites en la América Meridional,” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros dias, ed. Carlos Calvo Tomo Octavo (Paris: A. Durand, 1866), 212.

3 On April 20, 1785, Spanish forces raided two “Tape,” or Guaraní, tolderías who had joined together with Charrúas and Minuanes near the Río Ibicuí, capturing 98 of them and taking them back to the missions. When the Charrúas and Minuanes drew
two options in dealing with the Spanish – resettle or endure violence – he sought to strike a deal with Pinto Bandeira and relocate to the Bacacaí area. Given the proximity of the Portuguese forts of Rio Pardo and Yacuí, they represented a useful ally against Spanish aggression.4

Pinto Bandeira immediately requested approval for the move from the Portuguese king. He also contacted another Minuán cacique, Miguel Ayala Caraí, in an effort to gather more information on near, the Spanish forces withdrew with their captives. AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-06-08). Bartolomé’s meeting with the Spanish likely occurred in January of that year, as recorded in AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (Santa Tecla, 1785-01-26).

4 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 7, f. 743; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 511; “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submetido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780),” Revista do Museo e Archivo Publico do Rio Grande do Sul, no. 23 (1930): 497.
Bartolomeo’s situation. A year would pass before Pinto Bandeira wrote again about the situation. In April 1786, he transmitted news from Caraí, who reported that Bartolomeo and his people had been “destroyed” by the Spanish and had gone to seek refuge with other caciques near Yapeyú. Caraí had gone to visit them, and Bartolomeo and the others had expressed their desire for a relationship with the Portuguese because the Spanish wanted to expel them from the “lands which they inhabit, as their ancestors did for many centuries, and which are theirs by right of being the first settlers there.” They hoped to move with 1,000 of their kin and over 2,600 horses and cattle to the Bacacai area, near Batoví. They offered to sell some of these animals in exchange for clothing and proposed a mutual accord against Spanish aggression. In an effort to facilitate this move, Caraí sent representatives to the Caxoeira Parish to procure a license of sale on behalf of the other caciques.

This case’s paper trail does not permit us to know whether Bartolomeo and the other five caciques eventually took their cattle to Batoví. The Portuguese viceroy in Rio de Janeiro was skeptical of the maneuver, citing a desire to avoid conflict with the Spanish. It is clear, however, that when the Spanish and Portuguese demarcation teams moved through the Río Caciquey area one year later, they were confronted by numerous Minuán tolderías that both claimed the lands as their own and charged them tribute for passage. The travelers remarked that Miguel Ayala Caraí continued to be the key figure in the area, with as many as eleven other caciques and their tolderías demonstrating loyalty to him. He was the first collector of payments from both mapmaking teams, as discussed in the previous chapter.

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6 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 205.

7 AHU - Rio de Janeiro (017), Caixa 128, Doc 10244.
The fragments of information relating to Bartolomeo’s predicament reveal some of the key dynamics of the Río de la Plata during the second half of the eighteenth century. On one hand, they demonstrate shifting Iberian engagement with the region’s interior. As Spanish authorities endeavored to eliminate tolderías from the countryside – through negotiated settlement or aggression – Portuguese officials frequently attempted to establish pacts with Charrúa and Minuán caciques. On the other hand, this case highlights the variety of responses from tolderías as Iberian bordermaking efforts presented them with both challenges and opportunities. Bartolomeo and the other four caciques experienced the increased violence, or the specter of violence, that these efforts produced. They found themselves wedged between competing empires that were at best inconsistent allies, and they could no longer spread their resources across distant locales. This was probably why they sought to concentrate their cattle in the Bacacaí area and to make pacts of mutual defense against Spanish aggression.

Despite the challenges faced by Bartolomeo and his kin, these changing territorial dynamics provided opportunities for other caciques and tolderías. At the center of this case, we find Miguel Ayala Caraí arbitrating Bartolomeo’s move with Pinto Bandeira, procuring trade agreements with local Portuguese officials, and collecting tribute payments from demarcation teams. In fact, during the 1770s and 1780s, Caraí seems to have been the most important figure in this part of the countryside. His ability to manage the new territorial conditions that the bordermaking efforts were creating made him one of the most noted caciques in Iberian sources. He developed kinship ties and political allegiances with other tolderías, with mission refugees, and with high-ranking imperial officials in the region. Both Spanish and Portuguese administrators recognized his regional authority and depended upon his support to make the borderline operative. They regularly offered him payments in exchange for protection or aid.⁸

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The mapmaking expeditions of the treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso thus initiated a radical restructurin of territorial and, in turn, interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata. Demarcation teams had not sought to represent extant territorial arrangements, but to transform the region into something knowable and manageable for their imperial patrons. Though their expeditions produced few immediate material changes, they laid the legal and discursive groundwork for Iberian administrators to reframe their engagement with the countryside and the people who lived in it. Administrative policies following the demarcations varied, yet they all sought to increase control over movement of their subjects and resources by means of sedentism, land titling, and surveillance. These objectives required a functioning borderline, and for that reason officials on both sides were invested in its success, despite interimperial competition and mutual distrust.

Spanish and Portuguese administrators' attempts to materialize the cartographic borderline on lands they did not physically control led them to engage tolderías in new ways. They depended upon caciques' support or toleration of new forts, towns, and ranches along the borderline, and they solicited their help in making the border work. The development of an operative borderline thus did not indicate imperial power, but rather a proposition embodied by mapmakers, settlers, and soldiers. The increased presence of new actors in the countryside demanded responses from tolderías, who often found their options conditioned by their proximity to the proposed borderline. While individual actions ranged from accommodation to resistance, they rarely fell into such neat categories, and nearly all responses tended to reinforce the border in the end. Iberian officers prescriptively declared the border to exist, but the collective responses of tolderías are what transformed the imaginary cartographic line into a meaningful territorial arrangement.

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9 One of the key tasks of the demarcation teams was to erect stone pillars intermittently along the border in order to indicate the beginning of one dominion and the end of another. On occasion, they also carved into trees as a means to mark key locations or the dates of particular events. Alejandro N. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su labor en el Río de la Plata,” Itzas Memoria. Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco 6 (2009): 752.

10 Cartography was only one part of a broad series of spatial practices through which the border became meaningful. Declaring a border through mapmaking was not enough to make it exist; only through the many responses to that call did it gain any
Imperial bordermaking initiatives and indigenous responses eventually generated a new borderland space within the Río de la Plata. Prior to the demarcation efforts, most engagement between tolderías and their imperial counterparts occurred near the walls of individual plazas. This had produced a series of local borderlands – for example, between Santa Fe and Charrúas or Rio Grande and Minuanes – around the perimeter of the region. Following the mapping expeditions, however, both interimperial and interethnic engagement gradually became concentrated along the general location of the borderline. This territorial restructuring became one of the defining features of the region from that point forward.11

From the Maps to the Land

Between the signing of the Treaty of Madrid in 1750 and the end of the San Ildefonso mapping efforts in 1805, three different borderlines bisected the Río de la Plata (Map 4.1). The Madrid line was drawn over the course of the 1750s and annulled by the Treaty of El Pardo in 1761. For the next decade and a half, Spanish and Portuguese officials sought to exercise their claims over the regional interior through a series of unprecedented military advances and local agreements.12 By 1777, the two crowns had reached a second border accord, the Treaty of San Ildefonso, and within seven years, mapping teams would begin the demarcation of the region’s second borderline. These efforts continued through the turn of the century, and

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12 Following the annulment of the Treaty of Madrid, administrators ordered that the stone obelisks be destroyed and thrown to sea. AGNA - IX. 3-2-1, (Montevideo, 1761-08-25). From 1762 to 1763, a Spanish expedition led by Pedro de Cevallos resulted in the occupation of Santa Teresa, São Miguel, and Rio Grande, after which local officials maintained a de facto agreement. Tamar Herzog, Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 45–46. In 1776, Portuguese forces pushed south to reclaim Rio Grande as well as the Spanish fort of Santa Tecla, and the following year, Cevallos retaliated by taking control of Santa Catarina and Colônia do Sacramento.
the 1801 Treaty of Badajoz reaffirmed the legal weight of the San Ildefonso line. Nonetheless, Portuguese soldiers took possession of the Siete Pueblos and adjacent lands in 1801, leading to a new territorial arrangement, which regional officials formalized in 1804 as a legitimate status quo.\(^{13}\) The mapping efforts, which had wound down over the course of the 1790s, definitively ended in 1805.

The borderlines were part of broader projects to reconceptualize and restructure Portuguese and Spanish governance in the new world. They coincided with the creation of new administrative units in the Río de la Plata region, including the Governorates of Montevideo (1751) and Misiones (1769), the Departments of San Miguel and Yapeyú (1769), and the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (1776) and its numerous intendancies (1782) by Spain and the Captaincy of Rio Grande de São Pedro (1760), parishes, and judicial districts by Portugal.\(^{14}\) In addition, the coincided with the expulsion of Jesuit missionaries from the Portuguese (1759) and Spanish (1767) empires, and subsequent reordering of lands that had been within their jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the long histories that diplomats adduced as they staked territorial claims served to present disparate plazas as cohesive territorial units. Most notably, the Jesuit-Guaraní missions east of the Río Uruguay became Siete Pueblos Orientales. Within these new units, imperial administrators sought to implement new policies to promote sedentism, agriculture, and regulated trade. In the Río de la Plata, this included the regulation of land tenure and the formation of units of mounted guards (blandengues) by the Spanish and the establishment of chains of forts, towns, and ranches along the border by both the

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Spanish and the Portuguese. Imperial officials simultaneously treated the borderline as a self-evident fact, a political objective, and a tool to achieve their ends.

Iberian diplomats devised the borderlines as a means to end their decades-old dispute over territorial possession in South America, but their efforts instead concentrated imperial conflicts in the lands through which the borders ran. The Río de la Plata was no exception, as old arguments regarding possession of the Banda Norte gave way to new ones regarding the precise location of the interimperial boundary. Such disputes were both the product of mapmakers’ attempts to interpret available historical, ethnographic, and geographical information to their crown’s advantage, and contradictions between treaty instructions and extant settlement patterns. The Madrid and the San Ildefonso accords provided guidelines for the location of the imaginary borderline, yet required that it cover existing settlements of each crown’s vassals. Dissonance between the line’s prescribed location and extant settlement patterns forced mapmakers to prioritize one or the other. As demarcation teams walked and plotted the dividing lines, they frequently discovered that Spanish or Portuguese vassals were living in lands recently designated for the other crown. Furthermore, as independent native peoples inhabited and controlled much of the disputed territory,

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16 The principal exception to this rule was the military expeditions ordered by the then Governor of Buenos Aires, Pedro de Cevallos, in 1762 and 1777, during which Spanish forces took control of the plazas of Colônia do Sacramento and Rio Grande.

17 See, for example, article nine of the Treaty of Madrid and articles four and twelve of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. See also: ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 106v. This facet of the demarcation instructions was built upon the premise of uti possidetis, as the treaties required that the line incorporate preexisting establishments into the dominion of their respective crown. This convention was only applied to lands proximate to the prescribed borderline, however, as evidenced by the Treaty of Madrid’s exchange of Colônia do Sacramento for the Siete Pueblos Orientales. Furthermore, the drawing of the border was meant to supersede uti possidetis; once officials agreed upon the precise location of the line, settlement would have to be adjusted to accommodate it. In this way, the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso did not represent the triumph of uti possidetis, as scholars commonly assume, but instead the replacement of the concept with that of the border. See, for example: Dauril Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil, with Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1799 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 68; Fernando Camargo, “Las relaciones luso-hispánicas en torno a las Misiones Orientales del Uruguay: de los orígenes al Tratado de Madrid, 1750,” Fronteras de la Historia 8 (2003): 237-8, 244–246; Íris Kantor, “Soberania e territorialidade colonial: Academia Real de História Portuguesa e a Améria Portuguesa (1720),” in Temas Setecentistas: governos e populações no império português, ed. Andrea Doré and Antonio Cesar de Almeida Santos, 233–9 v. 1 (Curitiva: UFPR/SCHLA, 2009), 233–39.
mapmaking officials occasionally sought to claim them as vassals. This was reflected in Spanish assertions that Mbayá Indians near Paraguay were their subjects because they had hosted Jesuit missionaries decades earlier, as well as the Portuguese rejection of Spanish claims over yerba mate forests (ervais) due to the presence of Tupi Indians there. The same logic applied following the 1801 Portuguese takeover of the Siete Pueblos and their ranches, as Portuguese officials claimed disputed lands on account of their being controlled by Charrúa and Minuán tolderías.18

In the Río de la Plata, the most contentious portions of the borderline were the Río Piratini and Montegrande (Map 4.1). While the Treaty of Madrid designated these zones to be well within Portuguese dominion, the San Ildefonso line ran through both. In the case of the Piratini, mapmakers disagreed over whether or not the San Ildefonso borderline should run along that river or one further south. Spanish officials decried Portuguese settlements along the river’s southern shore as a violation of the treaty’s statutes, while Portuguese officials countered that they preceded the demarcation and therefore warranted accommodation.19 Disputes over Montegrande played out in reverse. There, Portuguese officials accused

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their Spanish counterparts of attempting to create new settlements to alter the agreed-upon line of demarcation.\textsuperscript{20} It was due to acute disagreements such as these that the San Ildefonso demarcation efforts dragged on for decades, as mapmakers sought to hold the border’s certainty in abeyance in areas where their own settlers were advancing.\textsuperscript{21} While most of the mapping had ended by 1789, remaining points of contestation lingered until 1805, creating zones of jurisdictional uncertainty where both sides would attempt to establish control by settlement or by force. Similar conflicts over geographical ambiguity appeared throughout the continent.\textsuperscript{22}

Disputes over the precise location of the borderline did not serve to undermine its legitimacy; they instead fortified it in two key ways. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, in order to disagree over the precise location of the borderline, officials, administrators, and soldiers on both sides had to agree over its existence. If on a regional scale the border isolated territorial conflict in a relatively narrow corridor of land, differences in where the division ran could result in dramatic local consequences. The paper trail that resulted from these local disputes served to harden the notion of a borderline by constructing legal precedent, historical arguments, and geographic logic. Second, disagreement over the precise location of the borderline made the fortification and population of adjacent lands a political priority. Prior to the demarcation efforts, few of these locales had been a specific point of contestation between the two crowns. Instead, most efforts to establish effective territorial control had occurred along the northern coast of the

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\textsuperscript{20} IHGB - Arquivo, lata 110, doc 28, f. 18-37. This issue arose again after the 1801 conquest of the Siete Pueblos by the Portuguese. ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 13, f. 112-113v.

\textsuperscript{21} ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, 17-23, 109, 111v, 113v, 233-235v, 301; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 24-5.

\textsuperscript{22} Other disputes arose over the locations of the Río Peipi-guaçu and the Río San Antonio, as well as the existence and locations of the Río Igurey, the Río Igatimy, and the Río Corrientes. “Informe del Virrey Arredondo á su sucesor Melo de Portugal, sobre el estado de la cuestion de límites en 1795” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata; ANB - 1A. Cisplatina, caixa 494, f. 2-2v.
Río de la Plata estuary. Beginning with the treaty of Madrid, both sides ushered in new initiatives to make the imaginary line a material reality. The result was new settlement patterns in borderline areas that would not have occurred otherwise.

The Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping teams saw their work as the first step in realizing a new territorial order. Although the stated purpose of the demarcation efforts was to determine the location of the interimperial divide, mapmakers took copious notes on resources, grazing grounds, watering holes, and river crossings so that administrators could target areas for new population centers. The result was new settlement patterns in borderline areas that would not have occurred otherwise. They also designed their maps as living documents that would serve not only as a legal base for claims of possession, but as templates for future settlement initiatives. In writing to the Cabildo of Asunción, Félix de Azara stated:

[the maps that I have given to you] will be able to be used at any time not only to show the natural state of the province…but also so that when some town or parish is founded or moved, the cabildo can situate it upon them….In this way it can continue adding what is new.

For this same purpose, many members of the demarcation teams continued producing maps of the borderline after the end of the expeditions. In 1772, for example, Portuguese mapmaker José Custódio de Sá e Faria drew a map for the Governor of São Paulo in which he marked all of the places that according to our intelligence seem to be the most useful, which should be fortified or populated for the security and defense of the [Nossa Senhora dos Prazeres plaza] and also for the establishment of the dominions of His Majesty in this part of the south of Brazil.


24 “[los mapas que te entregué] podrán servir en cualquiera siglo no solo para hacer ver el estado natural de la provincia…sino también para que cuando algún pueblo, ó parroquia se fundase ó trasladase, pueda el cabildo disponer que se sitúe en dichos mapas….De este modo, insensiblemente y sin trabajo, se irá añadiendo lo nuevo.” Letter transcribed in: Félix de Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara Tomo Segundo (Madrid: Imprenta de Sanchiz, 1847), 257–58.

25 “vão marcados todos os lugares que segundo a nossa inteligencia nos parecerão mais uteis, e que se devião fortificar, ou povoar para Segurança e defensa da Praça do Guatemy, como tambem para estabelecimento | sic | dos Dominios de Sua Magestade por esta parte do Sul do Brasil.” IEB - YAP-035, f. 6-9. Three years later, Sa e Faria would make another journey to map borderlands near the Rio Iguatemy. Maps from that expedition can be found at: ANB - F4/MAP.675,
These maps gave governors and viceroy the capacity to think for the first time in terms of consolidated provinces.26 They were undoubtedly prescriptive renderings of regional lands, but at the same time they served as tools in the effort to produce such idealized territorial conditions.

Demarcation officials were also key policymakers in the region. Some, like Gomes Freire de Andrade, already occupied high administrative posts at the time of the expeditions, which they temporarily left in order to help draw the borderline. Others used the demarcation efforts as a springboard into long careers in the new administrative units that the expeditions produced, serving as governors or overseeing particular aspects of new territorial initiatives. These might include designing borderland forts, underwriting and certifying land titles for borderland settlers, serving as special advisors to viceroy, or founding new towns along the borderline (Table 4.1). Thus many former demarcation officials dedicated themselves to advancing the territorial vision that they and their teams had represented in their maps.

Bordermaking was not only a project to secure territorial possession, but a cornerstone of broader Iberian reforms. First, it was a means to connect distant locales into cohesive administrative and economic units and to focus on new portions of the South American continent. It thus dovetailed with the transfer of Brazil’s capital from Salvador da Bahia to Rio de Janeiro in 1763 and the foundation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with Buenos Aires as the capital city, in 1776. Viceroy in both cities aimed to link their various provinces, captaincies, or intendencies, and while treaty maps gave them the capacity to see the continent on a viceregal scale, they needed to secure the borders to coordinate commerce between regional units.27 Thus the border was not only a division, but a corridor. Borderland settlements served both as barriers to those hoping to cross from one side to the other and stopping points for those traveling along the

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27 One year after the signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, the Spanish king Charles III issued the “Reglamento de Libre Comercio,” which enabled for direct trade between Spanish ports in the Americas.
borderline, while waterways such as the Río Paraná and the Río Paraguay both marked the interimperial divide and served as key pathways for people and goods. In the Río de la Plata region, disparate Spanish forts, such as Batoví, Santa Tecla, Cerro Largo, and Minas operated as stopping points along the “Wagon Way” (*Camino de las Carretas*), which linked the missions to Montevideo and Maldonado.\(^{28}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME (CROWN)</th>
<th>DURING EXPEDITION</th>
<th>AFTER EXPEDITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gomes Freire de Andrade (Pt)</td>
<td>1st Officer of Demarcation</td>
<td>Governor of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Antônio Cardoso de Meneses e Sousa (Pt)</td>
<td>1st Officer, 1st Subdivision</td>
<td>Governor of Santa Catarina; Governor of Colônia do Sacramento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Pinto Alpoim (Pt)</td>
<td>1st Officer, 2nd Subdivision</td>
<td>Provisional Governor of Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Custódio de Sá e Faria (Pt)</td>
<td>1st officer, 3rd Subdivision</td>
<td>Governor of Rio Grande (Pt) Explorations in Patagonia (Sp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel Ciera (Pt)</td>
<td>Cosmographer</td>
<td>Compiled and edited treaty maps for Portuguese crown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaspar Tello y Espinosa (Sp)</td>
<td>1st Officer of Demarcation</td>
<td>Dean of Supremo Consejo de Indias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Bruno de Zavala (Sp)</td>
<td>Captain of Cavalry</td>
<td>Governor of the Misiones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diego de Alvear (Sp)</td>
<td>1st Officer, 2nd Subdivision</td>
<td>Major General in Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo Lecocq (Sp)</td>
<td>2nd Officer, Engineer</td>
<td>Engineer of borderland forts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Félix de Azara (Sp)</td>
<td>1st Officer, 3rd Subdivision</td>
<td>Commander of the Countryside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Antonio Cerviño (Sp)</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Mapped Province of Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André de Oyarvide (Sp)</td>
<td>Geographer/Pilot</td>
<td>Published map of Río de la Plata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebastião da Veiga Cabral (Pt)</td>
<td>1st Officer of Demarcation</td>
<td>Governor of Rio Grande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Joao Roscio (Pt)</td>
<td>2nd Officer, 1st Subdivision</td>
<td>Governor of Rio Grande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquin de Fonseca Manso (Pt)</td>
<td>Astronomer/Geographer</td>
<td>Sargent-Major of the Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José de Saldanha (Pt)</td>
<td>Astronomer/Geographer</td>
<td>Governor of the Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco das Chagas Santos (Pt)</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Demarcation of Badajoz Adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre Eloi Portelli (Pt)</td>
<td>Captian, Engineer</td>
<td>Frontier Commander in Rio Pardo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1 – Officers during and after the Treaty Demarcations**\(^{29}\)

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\(^{28}\) AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1793-09-30; 1794-03-15); Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira”: 12. Other attempts to develop travel routes along the border included: "Informe del Virrey Arredondo á su sucesor Melo de Portugal, sobre el estado de la cuestion de limites en 1795" in *Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata*, 406-7, 409.

\(^{29}\) The relative lack of officials that remained in the region after the Madrid expedition is likely because many of the participants of the technical experts of the former were Jesuits or from other European kingdoms. The Spanish captured the Portuguese officer José Custódio de Sá e Faria in 1777, from which point he began to work for them in Buenos Aires and Patagonia.
Second, bordermaking served as a means to control the movement of imperial subjects. Over the course of the eighteenth century, Spanish and Portuguese administrators became increasingly interested in monitoring and regulating their vassals’ travels. Accordingly, they required licenses or passports for individuals who sought to enter the countryside and created increasingly long paper trails for travel and activities outside of individual plazas. The use of passports was a longstanding practice; however, it was at this moment that administrators aimed to control activities in the countryside, not only movement from one plaza to another. Military guard-posts along the borderline were important to this endeavor because they allowed for surveillance of key travel routes, and the day-by-day records from such sites reveal the interception of numerous individuals. Administrators in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Río Grande, and Porto Alegre all sought to exercise new levels of control over subjects who moved beyond the purview of local plazas.31

Third, the border was a means to determine property rights and control commodities. For the Río de la Plata, this meant cattle, which could be used for meat, hides, wool, tallow, grease, oils, and transportation, thus serving as a principal foodstuff for the region and a lucrative export. With the growth of mining and plantation labor in southeastern Brazil, Portuguese officials hoped to transport cattle and cattle-based products like jerky and leather from the Río de la Plata to such areas.32 Meanwhile, Spanish

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30 Tamar Herzog, “Naming, Identifying and Authorizing Movement in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America,” in Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History, ed. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter, 191–209 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). The immensity of the border made this objective elusive for administrators, yet the requests for passports or licenses to travel in the countryside or cross the border indicate the risks involved for individuals traveling without them.

31 AHRS - F1243, f. 163-4.

merchants not only traded leather in Europe, but found lucrative markets for jerky and other products with the growth of plantation labor in the Caribbean. Félix de Azara calculated that with proper territorial organization and oversight, the region could provide enough meat, hides, and tallow for all the sailors in the world, feed all the slaves in Havana and other parts of the Americas, and generate double the profits of all the mines in the Americas combined. By defining a border and claiming dominion, both Portuguese and Spanish officials could begin to regulate the ownership and commerce of cattle and other livestock. Vacant lands (tierras baldias) became royal lands (tierras realengas), and territorial possession became less an issue of access to resources than one of ownership. Imperial officials exerted property claims over feral livestock located within their dominion and sought to inhibit the movement of both royal and privately owned livestock across the border. In 1764, for example, the Spanish crown issued a royal decree that prohibited the transportation of animals from Spanish dominions into Brazil, an assertion that would have been impossible without a clear sense of what constituted the dominions of either crown. Likewise, the start of the San Idefonso demarcation coincided with a series of Spanish initiatives, known as the “Ordering of the Countryside” (Arreglo de los Campos) to promote and enforce territorial occupation, sedentism, and ranching.

33 Félix de Azara, Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes (Buenos Aires: Editorial Bajel, 1943), 10, 23-4.


35 Smaller-scale “arreglos de los campos” occurred around mid-century, particularly in areas between Santa Fe, Santo Domingo Soriano, and the Campo del Bloqueo. AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vivoras, 1746-07-02). The 1784 “Arreglo de los Campos” intended to regulate the slaughter and sale of cattle, resolve jurisdictional disputes within the newly claimed lands, protect ranchers, and enhance the economic productivity of the Río de la Plata. It focused on territories between the Río Yi and the Río Negro, where agents from Montevideo competed with others from the missions for control of local cattle. At this time, these lands lay beyond the jurisdiction of either locale, and were instead known as “tierras realengas.” Over the course of the next two decades, Spanish officials expanded its principals throughout the region and to the borderline. A copy of this document is available at AGI - Buenos Aires, 333. See also: AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo XV, 187–201; See also: Aníbal Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado: Contribución a la historia rural uruguaya, Biblioteca Uruguaya 5 (Montevideo: Ediciones del Nuevo Mundo, 1967), 184–86; Julio Carlos Rodriguez, Torre, Nelson de la. and Lucía Sala de Touron, Evolución económica de la Banda Oriental, 2nd ed. (Montevideo: Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, 1968); Jorge Gelman, Campesinos y estancieros (Buenos Aires: Editorial
By clarifying territorial possession, officials could also recast longstanding commercial practices as contraband. A dispute between Portuguese mapmaker Francisco João Roscio and his Spanish counterpart, Diego de Alvear, about commerce around the Rio Piratini reveals this gesture. Roscio wrote in 1785:

These lands were the refuge of many vagrants of the two nations, since they had not yet been determined, nor divided according to which of the two dominions they pertained to. For that reason, what has been found does not appear to me to be contraband because it was not clandestine commerce in the land of another Power. It is certain that only a few bull hides were found, which were gathered wild and untamed, like any other stock that does not have an owner. [Alvear] responded to me that this was not so because these lands expressly belonged to Spain, and the Spanish, being in possession of them, had strict orders from their court to patrol and guard them and to pursue offenders.36

It was only by defining territorial possession that officials could intercept traders who operated in the countryside and deem them to be smugglers. Since the locations of the Madrid and San Ildefonso lines placed most cattle reserves in the region on the Spanish side of the border, officials such as Alvear often had greater incentives to solidify territorial claims. Still, unsanctioned cattle trade had deleterious effects for the Portuguese as well. In particular, it undermined their ability to tax the entrance of cattle into their own lands, fomented the growth of regional strongmen, and allowed other commodities such as tobacco to flow across the border in the other direction.37


36 “estes campos erão refugio de muitos vadios das duas Nasçõens, por não estarem ainda determinados, nem devididos a qual dos Dominios pertencia, e por isso, o que se encontrasse, me não parecia rigorozo contrabando, porque não era comercio clandestino em terreño de outra Potencia, sendo certo que só se acharião alguns couros de touro, que apanhavão selvagens, e sem domo, como qualquer outra Casta que não tem Senhorio: respondeome q’ não era assim, por que estes campos erão de Espanha expressam.te; e delles estavão de posse, e tinha ordens apertadas da sua corte para os patrulharem, guardarem, e persseguirem os infractores.” BNB - 09,4,14, 32v, 208-209v.

37 Tensions occasionally arose between officials in Porto Alegre and borderland agents such as Rafael Pinto Bandeira, whose name was ubiquitous with illicit trafficking of cattle towards the end of the century. Gil, Infiéis Trangressores. Such conflicts derived from the heterogeneity of imperial agents, including those along the borderline, those in capital cities, and “trans-imperial” actors. See: Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution”; Fabricio Pereira Prado, “A carreira transimperial de don Manuel Cipriano de Melo no Rio da Prata do século XVIII,” Topoi. Revista de História 13, no. 25 (jul/dez 2012). Examples of Portuguese regulation of contraband along the border include: ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 174-82, 200, 354-357v; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 444.
The borderline also generated points of mutual interest between the two imperial projects, and officials on both sides frequently collaborated in making it function. Together, they established official practices designed to eliminate “disorder” (moving bodies) and “contraband” (unsanctioned commerce). For example, the Treaty of Madrid’s nineteenth article stated:

Along the entire frontier, commerce between the two nations will be prohibited and deemed to be contraband…. In addition to this prohibition, no person will pass from the territory of one nation to the other by land or by water; nor will they navigate in the rivers that are not exclusive to their nation, or shared [by both], regardless of their pretext or motive, without obtaining beforehand a license from the Governor, or from the superior of the lands that they go to, or might go to, [having been] sent by the Governor of their own land for some express purpose. To this end, they will carry their passport and transgressors will be punished.38

The Treaty of San Ildefonso’s seventeenth article repeated this sentiment.

Any individual from these two nations who is apprehended for contraband trade with individuals from the other will be punished in terms of themselves and their goods, according to the laws of the nation that apprehended them. The same punishments will be incurred by the subjects of one nation if they even enter into the territory of the other, or in the rivers or parts of them, that are not exclusive to their nation or shared by both. The only exception is in the event that they arrive in a port or adjacent lands on account of indispensable and urgent necessity (which they must prove in every possible way) or if they cross to neighboring territories having been commissioned by their Governor or the superior of their respective country in order to communicate a letter or news, in which case they must carry a passport that expresses this motive.39

It also included a clause regarding the return of runaway slaves:

At the same time, since the riches of that country consist of slaves that work in agriculture, their Governors will agree to mutually return [slaves] in the event that they run away, so that they do not gain freedom by passing to the other’s dominion.40


40 ibid.
Thus, in conjunction with the prescriptive borderlines, the two crowns established new rules of engagement for the region’s countryside. Hoping to use the border as a means to regulate the movement of bodies and commodities, they hinged the success of the treaties upon mutual participation in its operation.\(^{41}\)

In the years following these treaties, administrators on both sides frequently negotiated with their counterparts to put the new rules into practice. Combing through manuscripts from borderland establishments such as Santa Tecla and Rio Pardo, one finds numerous letters regarding the return of fugitive slaves, military deserters, and other individuals traveling without a passport.\(^{42}\) Given that the documentary record mostly reveals cases in which officials complied with the rules—there would be no reason to note their incompliance—it is difficult to estimate how often they did not. Moreover, local interests led numerous officials in borderland posts to overlook the movement of certain people and goods, as they used their regional authority to develop contraband networks and undermine challengers. Nonetheless, Portuguese and Spanish administrators knew that the apprehension and return of individuals leaving their dominions required that they also keep track of those entering into it, leading them to collaborate as well.\(^{43}\) The “good harmony” that diplomats hoped to instill through the treaties and the borderline required at least an aura of mutuality in the joint policing of it.

Following the demarcation efforts, both sides raced to populate lands adjacent to the current borderline. The mapping expeditions provided Portuguese and Spanish administrators the legal authority to

\(^{41}\) For example: ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2 (1793-03-04).

\(^{42}\) ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 132-136v; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 440-440v; ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2 (Montevideo, 1799-04-17; Buenos Aires, 1791-07-21; Rio Grande de São Pedro, 1791-10-12); AGNA - IX. 1-3-5, (letters from Azara to Ólaguier Feliú, 1798-01-26, 1798-02-01, 1798-02-11); AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (San Miguel, 1799-07-18 & 1799-09-18; San Nicolás, 1799-10-20); AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (letters dated 1780-05-16 & 1794-11-09); AGNA - IX. 1-5-3, (Puesto de Santiago, 1759-06-26; s/l, 1760-05-04); AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (1753-06-01); AGNA - IX. 4-3-2. (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-06-27; Buenos Aires, 1758-07-07 & 1760-11-30; San Borja, 1759-12-13 & 1759-03-21; Salto, 1759-09-24); AGNA - IX. 4-3-3, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1761-06-26, 1761-07-09, 1761-07-10, 1761-08-21, 1761-08-31, 1761-09-23, 1761-09-27, 1761-11-23); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Colonial, 1777-06-20); AGNA - VII. Lamas 32 [2635], f. 113v-115v.

\(^{43}\) AHRS - F1245, f. 12v-13; Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira”.
issue titles to lands beyond the reach of their plazas. Prior to the accords, neither side could offer land
grants to settlers, as they exercised neither legal nor physical control over such spaces. During and after the
demarcation efforts, however, officials strived to create a human frontier that would solidify the newly
produced cartographic lines. Borderland settlements took a variety of forms, including forts, towns, and
individual farms and ranches. Spanish authorities first sought to establish a chain of forts or towns along the
borderline, while the Portuguese principally issued land titles (sesmarias) to individuals, a policy that the
Spanish began to replicate toward the end of the century. Regardless of the particular strategy, the
demarcation efforts were both an impetus and a tool toward demographic engineering along the borderline.
Most borderland plazas were founded during the mapping expeditions, in the 1750s, 1780s, and 1790s
(Map 4.2), and a close look at the dates of issuance of sesmarias near the borderline reveals a similar uptick
during those years. Conversely, during the 1760s and 1770s, decades in which no legal border existed in
the region, efforts to create new borderline settlements nearly came to a standstill.

44 Each strategy had limitations, as forts were necessary to protect and police local settlers, while agricultural and pastoral
production was necessary to sustain a fort. Nonetheless, both sides eventually concluded that no amount of forts would be
sufficient to control such a vast countryside, and that a contiguous line of settlers along the borderline was necessary to make it
operational. Azara, Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes, 6-7, 16; Francisco João Roscio, “Compêndio
Brindes, 1980), 139.

45 “Demarcação do sul do Brasil: pelo Governador e Capitão General Gomes Freire de Andrada, 1752-1757,” Revista do Arquivo
Público Mineiro 24, no. 1 (1933): 49–295; AHRS - F1244, p. 171v-172; AHRS - F1246, 140v-142, 190-191v, 197v-198, 216v-
217v; AHRS - F1247, 60-1, 100-104, 147-148v, 183-184v, 189v-190, 250v-252, 257v, 259, 288-9; AHRS - F1248, 1-2v, 22-3,
37v-38v, 67-8, 188v-190v, 216v-218, 263-5, 277-279v, 289v-290; AHRS - F1249, 69-70v, 76-8, 111v-113, 200-201v, 259v-
261, 263v; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 2, #28 & #45; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 3; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 5; AHRS - Sesmarias,
Maço 5; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 7, #137 & #148; Aurélio Porto, “Fronteira do Rio Pardo: Penetração e fixação de
povoadores,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano IX, 1 trimestre (1929). For more on sesmarias, see:
The establishment of settlements along the interimperial borderline was neither the closing of Portuguese and Spanish imperial frontiers nor the result of natural population growth in the region. Instead, it was part of explicit projects to establish imperial control far beyond the reach of existing plazas. At the time of the demarcation efforts, Portuguese and Spanish territorial authority was limited to the various plazas that dotted the region’s perimeter and portions of the fragile corridors that connected them. The borderlines did not supplant other local borderlands dynamics, such as the relations of Montevideo, Santo

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46 Portuguese soldiers founded Santa Teresa in 1762, but Spanish forces took control that fort and São Miguel the following year.
Domingo Soriano, and Yapeyú with Charrúas and Minuanes, or the “three frontiers” of Rio Grande. Nor did they transform the vast territories that were beyond imperial control into consolidated, governable spaces. The desire to control the borderline engendered a jump in settlement patterns, from the plazas’ vicinities to distant lands, thus creating a new borderland that had not previously existed. For this reason, administrators on both sides relied on new settlers – mission inhabitants interested in acquiring land titles or immigrants from Portugal’s and Spain’s Atlantic Islands – to populate sites such as Rio Pardo, Novo Maldonado (modern-day San Carlos, Uruguay), Canelones, Minas, Belén, and Batoví. They offered land titles in exchange for a settler’s promise to remain on the land, cultivate it, build houses, participate in local militias, support military officers, refuse to harbor contrabandists, and help to sustain a local priest. To their chagrin, these efforts to involve settlers in the policing of the borderline frequently failed, given the settlers' exposure and imperial authorities' inability to compete with other networks of regional authority.

Despite their ambitions, Iberian administrators struggled to materialize their designs on the ground. The sheer length of the borderline was overwhelming and stretched their logistical capacities. Officials from each side frequently complained that they lacked the personnel and resources to monitor and control


48 Juan Alejandro Apolant, Operativo Patagonia: Historia da la mayor aportación demográfica masiva a la Banda Oriental (Montevideo: Imprenta Letras, 1970); José María Mariluz Urquijo, La fundación de San Gabriel de Batoví (Montevideo, 1954); Apartado de la "Revista Historica". Racialized skepticism of mission Indians’ industriousness led many officials to offer land grants instead to islanders, and for this reason, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, Desterro (modern-day Florianopolis, Brazil) and Montevideo became significant ports of disembarkation for immigrants from the Azores and the Canary Islands. BUC - MS 148, f. 138v-139; IHGB - Conselheiro Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.29, f. 51v-55v, 72v-84. Particularly in the Spanish case, these settlers lived off a stipend and held a special legal status that restricted their movement until receipt of their lands. AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 243, carpeta 3, no 114; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 249, carpeta 2, no 119. For more on settlers from the missions, see: José María Mariluz Urquijo, La expedición contra los charrúas en 1801 y la fundación de Belén (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1952); Separata de la "Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay" Tomo XIX, 53-94; Elisa Frühauf García, As diversas formas de ser índio: Políticas indígenas e políticas indigenistas no extremo sul da América portuguesa (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2009).

49 ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2, (Porto Alegre, 1773-09-02); Azara, Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes, 17–18. This effort to populate borderland spaces generated tensions between large-scale ranchers/landowners and small-scale farmers. Rodríguez, Torre, Nelson de la. and Sala de Touron, Evolución económica de la Banda Oriental; Gelman, Campesinos y estancieros; Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution”. While estimates differ on the proportion of large- versus small-scale farmers, it is certain that imperial aims to incorporate settlers into the policing of the countryside were fraught with frustrations and shortcomings.
borderline activities effectively, as the countryside was simply too vast. As a result, contraband networks persisted and grew, and many individuals moved relatively freely through the countryside. Though the consequences for apprehension without a license or passport were severe, neither imperial government was able to achieve the omnipresence that it desired. Each effort to regulate commerce or limit movement met with individuals and groups who persistently crossed the imaginary borderlines, occupied lands without titles, and slaughtered cattle they did not legally own. The bordermaking efforts also resulted in the growth of alternative networks of authority, as local administrators or strongmen moved goods and distributed land titles without their governor’s or viceroy’s consent. Imperial officials complained about the very individuals to whom they had given land titles, accusing them of occupying lands beyond the limits of their titles, refusing to remain in one place, abandoning their properties, or harboring smugglers.

The convention of neutral lands (campos neutrales) illustrates Iberian authorities’ limited capacity to enforce the borderline. While the Treaty of Madrid projected a single line across South America, growing contraband trade led the Treaty of San Ildefonso’s demarcation teams to draw parallel lines in areas where smuggling was particularly problematic. The idea was to create complementary rows of military establishments – one on each side of the neutral lands – through which contrabandists would have to pass when transporting cattle and other commodities. Imperial officials also hoped that these neutral lands would prevent future disputes between the two crowns regarding settlement and military activity; neither side could issue property titles for these lands, nor could they enter them with armed soldiers or guards. While the two crowns hoped these neutral lands would be a panacea for the problems of illegal trade

50 AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1795-02-26).
51 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 442v; AHRS - F1244, f. 171v-172; Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution”; Gil, Infiéis Trangressores; Prado, “A carreira transimperial de don Manuel Cipriano de Melo no Rio da Prata do século XVIII”.
52 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.29, f. 71-72v; AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Buenos Aires, 1760-08-09).
53 See articles five and six of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. See also: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 267v; Segarra, Frontera y límites, 18.
Map 4.3 – “Mapa Esferico de las Provincias Septentrionales del Río de la Plata,” 1796. The Treaty of San Ildefonso’s neutral lands (marked with red lines) began along the Atlantic Coast, encompassed the Lagoa Mirim and portions of Montegrande, and continued to the Río Uruguay further north, covering approximately 3,000 square miles.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{54} Mapa Esferico de las Provincias Septentrionales del Río de la Plata (1796); MNM - 42-B-7; Segarra, Frontera y límites, 18.
and settlement, in the end they proved to be the opposite. Imperial subjects began to occupy what were supposed to be empty lands, and smugglers used these areas as harbor from the mounted guards that the two empires had placed along the edges. There was little that officers in borderline forts could do in response, as surveilling or pursuing individuals into neutral lands constituted a rupture of the treaty agreement and incited negative responses from their counterparts.\textsuperscript{55} Designed to enhance the effectiveness of the borderline, neutral lands ultimately served to undermine its utility.

**Engaging Tolderías**

The largest obstacle to imperial efforts to populate and enforce the borderlines were the people whose lands they bisected. Despite the presumption of imperial control (or eventual territorial control) that the border demarcations implied, Minuanes and Charrúas controlled much of the borderline through the end of the eighteenth century. A close look at areas of Spanish and Portuguese settlement reveals this, as most towns and forts were located in the easternmost part of the region, near the Lagoa Mirim and the Rio Piratiní (Map 4.2). Further west, between Santa Tecla and São Martinho, neither side was able to entrench itself firmly along the borderline. Moreover, while key plazas such as Santa Tecla and Rio Pardo held upwards of 50 troops, only about one to two dozen guards operated others such as Batoví or San Rafael.\textsuperscript{56} Such a small number of troops could barely maintain a fort’s existence, and military agents and settlers alike found themselves subject to the interests of Charrúa and Minuán caciques. For this reason, imperial officials had difficulty selling titles to lands frequented by tolderías and chose instead to concentrate their settlement

\textsuperscript{55} AGNA - IX. 1-3-5, (Cerro Largo, 1798-11-25); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Colonia, 1775-09-26; Real de San Carlos, 1775-09-30); AGNA - IX. 37-8-5, f. 15-18; AHRS - Informações sobre pedidos de terras, Maço 1, (Erval, 1800-11-09); AHRS - Autoridades Militares, Maço 1, (Rio Grande, 1795-10-26); ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 1, (Rio Grande, 1792-06-02); ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 93, v. 1, (Buenos Aires, 1779-04-28; s/l, 1779-10-04); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 28v.

\textsuperscript{56} AGNA - IX. 1-3-5, (Cerro Largo, 1800-06-30 & 1805-10-01).
in other areas. The presence of tolderías also undermined Spanish efforts to use the borderline as a roadway to link Paraguay and the Guaraní missions to Montevideo and Maldonado. While the chain of forts that appeared along the borderline were intended to bridge this gap, an observer commented in 1801 that “it is difficult to cross a country so extensive, rugged, and inhabited only by barbarous and ferocious Indians.”

In order for their borderland institutions and settlers to survive, Spanish and the Portuguese administrators needed the support, or at least the indifference, of tolderías. With the assistance of local caciques and their people, imperial agents sought both to achieve the principal goals of the borderline – control of moving subjects and commodities – and to destabilize their rival. As they did so, officials of both crowns assumed hierarchical relationships with Charrúas and Minuanes, even if many of their actions betrayed the fallacy of this assumption. While interimperial discussions posited that tolderías were independent, if landless, actors protected by natural law, Iberian officials presumed Charrúas and Minuanes to be imperial subjects or subordinates when developing internal policies. Amidst these broader tendencies, Spanish and Portuguese administrators developed unique strategies vis-à-vis tolderías in the region, and the nuances of these initiatives were shaped by the location of the operative borderline.

The various borderlines of the late eighteenth century Río de la Plata situated most independent tolderías and cattle reserves within Spanish dominions. As Spanish authorities aimed to establish territorial “order” on their side of the border, they began to engage tolderías in new ways. First, with the extension of imagined possession from plazas to the entire countryside, Spanish officials asserted that all lands on their

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57 Imperial officials considered the presence of tolderías both when calculating the value of land titles and when determining sites for new plazas. Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado, 70, 188.

58 “Esta mesma diverção não produzirá tanto efeito como talvez se imagine, para facilitar mais a conquista; porque a vastíssima porção digo vastíssima extensão do terreno compreendido entre os dois Rios não permite que dois estabelecimentos centrais acudem forças para protegerem a Costa marítima por ser difficilíssimo, ou atravessar hum Paiz extenso inculto, e só habitado de Indios barbaos e ferozes, ou fazer o tranzito em Canôas que convem serem infinitas para ó transporte de quanto exige hum corpo numerozo de tropas” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 344v-345.
side of the border constituted imperial dominion and that all resources on those lands were by extension property of either the crown or whichever plaza held jurisdiction. By claiming the regional interior as “royal lands,” Buenos Aires’s governors and viceroys effectively imagined Charrúas, Minuanes, and other mobile peoples off the map, discarding their claims over cattle or for control over particular areas. It was for this reason that as Yapeyú, San Miguel, and other missions intensified efforts to establish ranches and collect cattle, they did not recognize their expansion as an intrusion upon lands over which tolderías had claims.59

Writers from these locales instead narrated the responses of Charrúas and Minuanes, which included raiding or occupying these new ranches, as “invasions” that impinged upon the property rights of ranchers.60 If feral livestock belonged to the crown or plazas, tolderías were necessarily thieves.

Second, Spanish agents ceased to imagine mobile native peoples as independent agents with whom they could strike partnerships and potentially negotiate vassalage. Instead, they considered tolderías to be imperial subjects by virtue of their living on imperial lands. Assuming subjecthood to be the a priori condition of those living within the territorial dominions of a given crown, Spanish officials ceased to rely upon reducciones or pacts with tolderías to claim them as vassals. With this territorialization of subjecthood came the expectation that tolderías abide by Buenos Aires’s dictums and proclamations regarding land and property or face “punishment” or “extermination.”61 They were “inhabitants” of royal lands, rather than

59 Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, Chapter 8.
60 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vivoras, 1750-11-09); AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-10-03). Many historians have repeated this idea, even though it is predicated upon a subjective notion of territorial possession and property rights. See, for example: Mariluz Urquijo, La expedición contra los charrúas en 1801 y la fundación de Belén; Eduardo F. Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), 2 vols. 1 (Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso, 1989), Capítulo 11; AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Vivoras, 1798-09-28); AGNA - IX. 3-9-2, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 261v.
61 Examples of the use of the term “castigar” (to punish) include: AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-01-26); AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo de Bloqueo, 1749-10-29, 1752-10-19, 1757-07-19, 1757-08-06; San Salvador, 1746-05-16, 1746-09-20; Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Arroyo de la Virgen, 1797-12-27); AGNA - IX. 24-3-6, leg 30, exp 8 (Las Vivoras, 1800-02-18); AGNA - IX. 28-7-7, (Montevideo, 1803-10-24). Examples of the use of the term “exterminar” include: ANHA - Enrique Fitte, III-75; AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (San Salvador, 1799-09-24); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Buenos Aires, 1806-05-23); AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 10, carpeta 2, no 1-2; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), capítulo 4; Juan Alejandro Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya (Montevideo: Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay, 1966), 861; Hebe Livi, “El Charrúa en Santa Fe,” Revista de la Junta Provincial de Estudios Históricos de Santa Fe, no. 49
autonomous agents, and any refusal to respect imperial decrees was considered an affront to Spanish sovereignty. This new aversion to negotiation and pact-making intensified over time, as settlement initiatives through evangelization, trade relations, and other partnerships gave way to campaigns for expulsion, extermination, or containment.\(^62\)

Third, the mobile lifestyles practiced by tolderías were antithetical to the new ideal of sedentary subjects. Mirroring broader Iberian attitudes, authorities in the Río de la Plata began increasingly to develop pejorative opinions of mobile peoples over the course of the eighteenth century.\(^63\) It is certain that the seasonal mobility of tolderías had always befuddled imperial and ecclesiastical writers, as early modern epistemologies featured sedentism as a core attribute of Christianity and subjecthood. Still, the eighteenth century saw intensified disdain for mobility, a point made clear through the frequently-used term “vagabond.” According to the 1739 Diccionario de Autoridades, a vagabond referred to both a “subject who wanders from one site to another without stopping at any, even though they have a purpose or intention” and “lazy people, who could work, and live with ambition, but do not do it.” Similarly, while Raphael Bluteau’s 1728 Vocabulario Portuguez & Latino defined a vagabond as “one who wanders without residence or

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a clear dwelling place,” Antonio de Moraes Silva’s 1789 Dicionário da língua portuguesa added, “because they do not have a King, nor a homeland that they love.”

Over time, mobility became synonymous with vagrancy, landlessness, and lack of loyalty to a crown.

In the Río de la Plata, these changing notions of territoriality and subjecthood increasingly led Spanish officials to associate tolderías with contrabandists and general territorial “disorder.” Time and again, as imperial authorities sought to explain tolderías’ raids on newly-established ranches or the exaction of payment from travelers, they attributed such behavior to tolderías’ alliances with or subjugation to contrabandists. In other instances, they considered Charrúas and Minuanes to be Portuguese subjects and thus enemy combatants. In addition, the new imperial ethnographies that grew out of the demarcation efforts deemed tolderías’ actions to be the result of their “bad inclination” (mala inclinación), thus discarding any material or territorial explanation. For example, in explaining several military expeditions near the Río Uruguay, officials noted that ranchers had been exposed to “those people, who for no other reason than whim killed, robbed from their ranches, and set fire to their settlements and harvests.” If tolderías simply acted out of malevolence, rather than in logical defense of land claims or to gain access to resources, then amicable relations were impossible.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, Spanish officials adopted two principal strategies in their engagement with Charrúas and Minuanes: military action and strategic settlement. Both of these aimed to force individual tolderías to accept reduction. Beginning with the 1749 military expeditions near

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64 Dicionário de autoridades Tomo VI (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1739); Fuente electrónica elaborada por el Instituto de Investigación Rafael Lapesa y editado en Madrid por la Real Academia Española; Raphael Bluteau, Vocabulário Português e Latino, 8 vols. 8 (Coimbra: Colégio das Artes da Companhia de Jesus, 1728), 346; Antonio de Moraes Silva, Dicionário da língua portuguesa - recompilado dos vocabularios impressos ate agora, e nesta segunda edição novamente emendado e muito acrescentado 2 (Lisboa: Typographia Lacerdina, 1789), 826.

65 See, for example: AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de Churireri, 1776-06-04 [x2], 1776-10-27; San Nicolás, 1776-04-01, 1776-04-04, 1776-04-09; San Borja, 1776-05-06).

66 “de aquella gente, que sin otra razon que la de su antojo mataban, robaban las aciendas, e incendiaban las poblaciones, y las mieses” AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, “Undated Letter to Viceroy”.

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Santa Fe and Montevideo, Spanish authorities began to echo a common refrain—“kill all of those who [refuse reductions]”—and the subsequent campaigns to “clean the countryside” represented a stark shift from earlier policies. While military engagement had always been a facet of relations between plazas and tolderías, prior to 1749 it tended to be in response to acute conflicts rather than aimed at subjugation. Furthermore, when describing these earlier campaigns, imperial writers tended to characterize them as military campaigns (salidas), rather than police actions. These endeavors had often been in response to raids on ranches or attacks upon imperial subjects traveling outside of the plazas, and they had frequently ended with pacts between a plaza and neighboring tolderías or with no engagement at all. Most importantly, the objective had been neither settlement by force nor extermination. Although imperial and ecclesiastical agents had hoped that tolderías would ultimately accept reduction and a relationship of vassalage, this had never been a precondition of ending military conflicts.

Preemptive military action to force settlement became a centerpiece of Spanish engagement with tolderías at the same time as the demarcation efforts. This occurred in three waves: the 1750s excursions from Santa Fe and Montevideo, attacks from Montevideo and Santo Domingo Soriano in the 1760s, and a sustained assault near the borderline from 1796 to 1806. In each instance, military officers predicated their aggression upon prior hostilities by local tolderías, generally in the form of raids on newly-founded ranches in indigenous lands. Nonetheless, the objective of the subsequent military attacks was not simply to dissuade tolderías from entering ranches or attempting to recover livestock. Their purpose was to purge the

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67 “lo pase a cuchillo si no se contenían despues de haberlos requerido con Paz” AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 2, carpeta 24, no 2, f. 1; Norberto Levinton, El espacio jesuitico-guaraní: La formación de una región cultural, Biblioteca de Estudios Paraguayos - Volumen 80 (Asunción: Centro de Estudios Antropológicos de la Universidad Católica (CEADUC), 2009), 112; AGI - Buenos Aires, 333, “Copia del informe sobre arreglo de campos”.

68 See, for example: RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, f. 54-59v; AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1713-12-30.

69 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charraís en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), capítulos 4-12. In addition to the 1750s expeditions, military incursions occurred in 1761. If nearly all of these expeditions were in response to “hostilities” by tolderías, most of their raids were against newly founded ranches in their lands. AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 10, carpeta 2, no 1-2; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 11, f. 38v-39; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 229, carpeta 7, no 57.
countryside of tolderías to make way for future settlements. These initiatives gradually intensified and became systematized, culminating in the 1797 formation of a group of blandengues to patrol the countryside, uproot contraband networks, and extirpate Charrúa and Minuán tolderías. Between 1798 and 1806, blandengues and local militias were in a near constant state of warfare with Charrúas and Minuanes between Santo Domingo Soriano, Yapeyú, and Batovi. They raided tolderías one by one, killing all the men they could and shipping captured women and children to Buenos Aires. Passenger logs of boats traveling down the Río Uruguay between 1798 and 1801 reveal no less than 210 Charrúa captives, while one of Buenos Aires’s main holding centers, known as the “House of Confinement” (Casa de la Reclusión), recorded dozens of Minuanes as well.

The stated objective of blandengues’ expeditions was to protect ranchers and individuals from the plazas who were herding and slaughtering cattle, but in practice, their forays were part of a broader plan to force tolderías to accept reduction. In 1801, for example, a commission from Yapeyú approached the Minuán cacique Masalana near the Río Cuareim and presented an ultimatum (Map 4.1).

If it pleases you to establish a population in the vicinity of the San Marcos ranch, given the land’s fertility and the abundance of wood, water, and fish, I will mark for you a place large and comfortable enough to be populated. With respect to this location, I would be pleased to have you nearly within sight and would be able to meet your needs more easily, attending to you in everything as a beneficent and loving father….But if you are ungracious and disregard the great charity of the Honorable Lord Viceroy, and the expressive signs that I give of my benevolence, and you want to persist obstinately in your wickedness, I will execute the higher orders that His

70 The blandengues of Montevideo modeled similar military orders that operated along Buenos Aires’ southern frontier and in Santa Fe. Klein, “El destino de los indígenas del Uruguay”: 7; Weber, Bárbaros, 177; Fradkin, “Las milicias de caballería de Buenos Aires, 1752-1805”: 140–1. Within a year of their formation, they had already begun expeditions against Charrúa and Minuán tolderías. AGNA - IX. 2-9-7, (San Miguel, 1798-12-18). Militias from the missions also organized expeditions against Charrúas and Minuanes. AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Yapeyú, 1799-09-17, and 1799-10-17; Santo Tomé, 1799-07-20; San Borja, 1799-07-19); AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20).

71 In many cases, elite families in the city claimed these captives as domestic laborers in exchange for the promise of instruction in Christian doctrine. AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Salto Chico, 1798-08-29, 1798-09-26 [x2], 1798-10-13; Capilla Mandizoby, 1798-08-25; Yapeyú, 1798-08-17); AGNA - IX. 21-2-5, (Buenos Aires, 1797-10-02 & 1801-07-21); Susana Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva: cautivos en el interior de la frontera,” Mundo Agrario. Revista de estudios rurales 7, no. 13 (2006).
Excellency has communicated to me, and I will not desist until I have exterminated [your] malignant, inhuman, and harmful race.\textsuperscript{72}

This declaration demonstrated at once a prescriptive sense of Spanish territorial sovereignty and the belief that Charrúas and Minuanes were unruly inhabitants of imperial territory. Viceroy Gabriel de Avilés echoed this declaration; he considered himself “obligated to punish them to make an example,” yet desired to “forgive them for their crimes, and pardon them from the punishment that they deserve” in an act of “clemency and humanity.” Rather than serving to promote peaceful relations, the proposed reduction was a strategy for subjugation. The commission described this site to Masalana as lush, and presented the arrangement a means to solidify amicable relations with the mission, yet declared internally:

[If the tolderías settle in the] vicinity and almost within sight of Yapeyú, we will be able to observe the conduct of these Indians and easily contain any excess or act of disorder. It will also lead to maintaining the respect and subjugation of the Indians.\textsuperscript{73}

Masalana’s toldería rejected the offer and absconded to the Río Ibira-puitã, near the interimperial border.

Over the course of the next year, however, militias from Yapeyú and numerous teams of blandengues ambushed nearby tolderías, taking dozens of prisoners and killing scores more.\textsuperscript{74} The violence was so severe

\textsuperscript{72} “Si fuese del agrado de Vms. que se establezca su poblacion en la vecindad de la Estancia de San Marcos, yá por la fertilidad del terreno, como por la abundancia de maderas, aguas, y pesca, les señalarè el sitio suficiente y comodo para poblarse: en que tendrè mucho placer, por tenerlos casi a la vista, respecto de la inmediacion, y tambien para remediar sus necesidades con mas facilidad; asistiéndolos en todo como Padre beneficio y amoroso….Pero si por desgracia de Vms. despreciasen la grande beneficencia del Exmò. Señor Virrey, y las expresivas señales que les doy de mi benevolencia, y quisiesen persistir obstinados en su iniguidad, pondrè en ejecucion las superiores ordenes que S.E. me tiene comunicadas, y no desistirè hasta extorminar una raza tan maligna, inhumana, y perjudicial.” AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, no 1, f. 20-20v.

\textsuperscript{73} “por q.e estando con immediacion, y cuasi à la vista de ese Pueblo de Yapeyù podrâ observarse la conducta de estos Yndios, y contenerse facilmente cualquier exceso ò desorden. Tambien podrà conducir mucho à mantener el respeto y sugecion de los Yndios.” ibid., no 1, f. 6.

\textsuperscript{74} Casualties from these encounters included the caciques “Ignacio el Gordo,” “Juan Blanco,” and “el Pintado” (Charrúas), as well as “Zará” and “el Zurdo” (Minuanes). AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, no 1, doc. 17, f. 29-30, no. 2-11; MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C28, P1, No. 3; AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Concepción del Uruguay, 1799-11-12, 1800-03-24; Paysandú, 1800-04-23, 1800-11-14, 1801-01-03, 1801-01-17, Buenos Aires, 1800-10-04; Quartel General del Yacuy, 1801-03-21); Francisco Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay Tomo Segundo (Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 1895), libro 6, 337-353.
that the commander of these expeditions, Jorge Pacheco, claimed that he had eliminated all tolderías from the countryside. Nonetheless, a closer look at the details of these expeditions reveals that the blandengues frequently found themselves outmatched, hiding from tolderías, suffering defeat, or retreating. This included losses against Masalana’s tolderías in 1804. While they were certainly a threat to individual tolderías, the blandengues did not dominate the countryside.

Given the limited success of the extermination campaigns undertaken by blandengues, the Spanish government in Buenos Aires also sought to eliminate tolderías through strategic settlements. In addition to producing a human border and potentially undermining contraband, these establishments functioned to prevent tolderías from accessing key stopping points (paraderos) and to separate them from principal resources. The most ambitious of these projects was San Gabriel de Batoví, which was founded in 1801 along the Río Bacacai near the interimperial divide. The head of this initiative, Félix de Azara, was a former official of the San Ildefonso boundary demarcation. He compared his settlement program to Pacheco’s military expeditions in the following way:

I know how useless many of [Pacheco’s expeditions] have been, and I am far less vain than he has been in saying that he will extinguish the infidels. My system is entirely the opposite, and it can be reduced to positioning the troop so that it covers advancing populations. I would manage things this way until the infidels have to abandon the countryside, or as is more natural, turn themselves in or go join our mission Indians, as this would not be the first time they have done it. I will not take one step towards pursuing them even if I see them in front of me. I do not consider this task to be as long as one might think. Maybe less than a year and a half.
Whereas Pacheco’s objective was to overwhelm tolderías by systematic attacks, Azara contended that such a strategy would prove useless, given the vastness of the countryside and the control that Charrúas and Minuanes continued to exercise over it. Instead, he suggested that by founding settlements in strategic locations, the Spanish could eventually force tolderías to accept reduction. Yet his tactics proved as futile as Pacheco’s expedition, and by the end of the year, Charrúa and Minuán tolderías together with Portuguese military forces evicted Spanish authorities from Batoví, the Siete Pueblos, and other settlements along the border.

Following the demarcation efforts, Portuguese officials adopted a radically different approach to engaging tolderías in the Río de la Plata. With the mapping of the San Idelfonso line, authorities in Río Grande found themselves cut off from many of the region’s cattle reserves. Charrúas and Minuanes thus became necessary partners in the acquisition of cattle on the other side of the border, given their liminal status as independent agents protected by natural law and unbounded by the restrictions of the interimperial limit. They enabled Portuguese officials to engage the other side of the border without inciting a military response from their Spanish counterparts, and their superior knowledge of the countryside allowed them to evade the borderline forts and patrols established to intercept trade. Whether transporting cattle themselves or guiding smugglers, their presence was a key component in accessing and extracting this valuable resource. Most importantly, through the end of the eighteenth century, tolderías represented the

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79 Azara, *Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes*, 17. Azara considered numerous sites for the new settlement, including the ruins of the former Guenoa reduction of Jesús María; however, in the end he determined that this place and others were too exposed to attacks by local tolderías. Mariluz Urquijo, *La fundación de San Gabriel de Batoví*, 19.

80 ANHA - Enrique Fitte, III-75, (Batoví, 1800-11-07); AHRS - Autoridades Militares, Maço 1, (Acampamento do Santa Maria, 1801-11-29; Acampamento da Conceição, 1801-11-29); Mariluz Urquijo, *La fundación de San Gabriel de Batoví*.


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preeminent power along the borderline and Portuguese officials knew that the survival of their forts and settlements depended upon positive relations with Charrúas and Minuanes.

Portuguese officials did not adopt a policy of reduction or extermination with local tolderías, but rather one of hierarchical collaboration and mutual aid. In fact, they stopped seeking reductions almost entirely. For them, the sea of tolderías that separated them from Spanish plazas served as an important buffer against the military advances of their imperial foe. An 1801 letter from the Governor of Rio Grande to the commander of the borderline fort of Rio Pardo, encapsulated this sentiment.

I agree with and I am very satisfied by the meeting of the infidel Indians, as the Honorable Lord General had recommended, God willing: Nothing is risked by letting them work hostily against our enemies, [or] at least perform the service that our explorers could do if we had them. They are troublesome when they make wild demands, but it is necessary to suffer these things to have them on our side; and [we should be careful not to] offend them; because beyond being grateful for their good will we should avoid increasing our enemies.

As the Portuguese in Rio Grande prepared to reconquer the Siete Pueblos and other territories between the San Ildefonso line and the Río Uruguay in 1801, they depended upon the support of Charrúa and Minuán tolderías. Aware of their own lack of control over the borderline and adjacent lands, as well as their lack of knowledge of lands on the other side, they identified tolderías as necessary allies. Though sustaining Charrúa and Minuán support was a costly endeavor that required frequent payments, having them as enemies would have been even costlier. This strategy paid off, as toldería attacks caused Spanish forces to...

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83 “Convenho, e me-fica sapatifação na reunião dos Indios Infieis, conforme o havia recomendado o Ex.mo S.nor General, que Deus haja: Nada se arisca em deichalles obrar hostilmente contra os nossos Inemigos, e pello menos fazem o serviço, que poderião fazer os Aventureiros se os tivsesemos. Elles são importunos quando se lhes fazem desmariadas vontades, e agazalhos; mas hé precizo sofrer algua couza para os ter da nossa parte; e de todas as formas deve ser prohibido, e acuadulado o escandalizallos; que alem da gratidão a sua vontade devemos evitar aumentar Inemigos." ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 13, f. 68.
abandon lands south of the Río Ibicuy, west of the Río Ibira-puitã, and as far south as the Río Queguay even before Portuguese troops arrived, thus resulting in an adjustment to the San Ildefonso line.84

Porto Alegre’s successful partnership with Charrúas and Minuanes in 1801 was part of a longer pattern of collaboration following the demarcation efforts. A quarter-century earlier, as Portuguese forces advanced southward and took the then-Spanish fort of Santa Tecla, Charrúa and Minuán tolderías played an important role in their victory. Not only did they provide guidance and safe passage to the borderline fort, but they also maintained a protracted assault on San Borja’s and Yapeyú’s ranches and cattle herds. While the tolderías certainly had their own motivations for attacking these ranches, such as Yapeyú’s increased impingement upon their lands and accelerating cattle extraction, they proved willing to coordinate with the Portuguese in pursuits of mutual interest.85 In addition to these two moments of interimperial war, Minuán and Charrúa caciques made pacts with Portuguese officials in Rio Pardo and Porto Alegre in 1786, 1805, and 1806.86

Still, relations between administrators in Rio Grande and tolderías ran deeper than wartime assistance. Charrúas and Minuanes served as key trading partners and were likely seasonal laborers on Portuguese ranches and hemp plantations (feitorias do linho cânhamo). Tolderías also proved to be key sources of information about activities on the other side of the border, reporting on the movements of...

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84 This included ranches belonging to Yapeyú, San Borja, San Luis and Santo Ángelo. “Documentos relativos à incorporação do território das Missões ao domínio portugues no anno de 1801”: 56–7, 72; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 257-60v, 261v; Archivo Artigas, 406; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charruás en la Banda Oriental (período hispánico), capítulo 13; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 13; Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 251–52. This territorial advancement by the Portuguese resembles the actions of the United States of America following Comanche raids in northern Mexico. Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

85 AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Letters dated 1776-04-01, 1776-04-08, 1776-04-09, 1776-04-15, 1776-05-02, 1776-05-06, 1776-06-04, 1776-07-04, 1776-10-27); “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 124–5; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 3–5; Sarreal, The Guarani and Their Missions, Chapter 8.

86 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 252-252v, 286-288; AHU - Rio Grande (019), Caixa 11, Doc 667; Caixa 121, Docs 720 e 754; Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 258–63. Following the 1777 peace agreement, Portuguese authorities struggled to convince Minuanes and Charrúas to stop their raids against Spanish ranches. “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 174–6.
Spanish troops and travelers. The Portuguese officials' need for Minuanes and Charrúas is perhaps best illustrated by the case of Rafael Pinto Bandeira, a coronel who led the 1776 invasion of Santa Tecla and served as the interim governor of Rio Grande during the 1780s. Contemporaries and historians alike have known Pinto Bandeira for two things: successful military campaigns against the Spanish and an extensive network of contraband trade. He was an integral component of Portuguese expansion in the region, yet at the same time a perpetual thorn in the side of authorities in Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro. Pinto Bandeira’s success was in large part due to his relationship with Minuanes. While his father, Francisco Pinto Bandeira, had maintained ties with several Minuán tolderías, Rafael married Barbara Victoria, the daughter of cacique Miguel Ayala Caraí. It is also clear that following his campaign against the Spanish in 1776, Pinto Bandeira distributed approximately 800 heads of cattle, valued at over one million reais, among Minuanes “in order to have them content and satisfied.”

The Governor’s dealings with Minuanes was so well known and valued that the Viceroy in Rio de Janeiro noted in 1786:

He knows how to manage [these services] with great astuteness and subtlety, showing himself very necessary to that Continent [of Rio Grande de São Pedro, and] perhaps all of his actions, as bad as they might be, should be overlooked and tolerated by whomever governs.

Regardless of how detrimental Pinto Bandeira’s participation in smuggling might have been to imperial objectives, his relationship with Minuanes was one of the principal reasons why he maintained his post until his death in 1795.

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88 “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 124–5. Regarding the marriage of Pinto Bandeira and Barbara Victoria, see: Augusto da Silva, “Rafael Pinto Bandeira: De bandoleiro a governador. Relações entre os poderes privado e público no Rio Grande de São Pedro,” (Dissertação de Mestrado Inédita, PPGH-UFRGS, 1999); Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira”: 5.
Performing Borders

Cartographic borders were undoubtedly European inventions designed to define territorial possession and produce governable states. Yet the need for an operative borderline, the determination of its location, and its material production in the Río de la Plata, were inextricable from the activities of tolderías. The initial invention of a borderline had been a response to tolderías’ control over regional lands, as it allowed Portugal and Spain to claim possession without having to claim tolderías as imperial subjects. When treaties had transformed into mapping expeditions, tolderías had limited the activities of demarcation teams. Disputes over the borderline’s precise location, and its movement over time, had derived from the fact that it cut through native lands. Following the demarcations, as administrators attempted to transform cartographic lines into operative territorial arrangements, their actions—declaring possession, occupying spaces, soliciting aid, offering payments, signing pacts, and undertaking raids, to name a few—elicited responses from tolderías. Tolderías’ replies ultimately determined the outcome of bordermaking projects, and while responses varied according to tolderías’ locations in the region, when taken together, they tended to reproduce borderline territorialities.

The demarcation efforts ushered in a variety of changes for tolderías in the region, resulting in a general pattern of migration toward the borderline. By georeferencing the over 500 cited locations of Charrúa, Minuán, Bohán, Yaro, and Guenoa tolderías from 1750 through the end of the demarcation efforts in 1806 (Map 4.4), we can clearly see this trend. Over the course of a little more than a half century, imperial records show both increased interactions with tolderías near the borderlines and decreased interactions with those in other parts of the region. During the 1750s, tolderías could be found as far west as Santa Fe and Corrientes, as far south as Colônia do Sacramento, Montevideo, and Maldonado, as far east as Río Grande, and as far north as the plazas of the Siete Pueblos. Conversely, by the 1790s and the 1800s, nearly all citations refer to tolderías in areas between the San Ildefonso line and lands immediately south of the Badajoz adjustment.
Map 4.4 – Cited Toldería Locations, 1750-1806

How can we account for this broad trend in the extant documentary record? It is necessary to recognize first that this geographical pattern reflects imperial perceptions of individual tolderías’ locations rather than their actual locations. Given the limited spatial vision of imperial texts and the fragmented nature of borderland archives, more tolderías existed than those this map represents, and more citations will likely surface in the future. The pattern of increased recorded activities near the borderlines thus represents in part a heightened presence of imperial actors in those areas, who in turn engaged with tolderías that already lived there. This is only a portion of the story, however, as the increased number of citations near the borderline was accompanied by a decreased number around region’s perimeter, where imperial settlers were more entrenched and therefore more likely to generate documentary evidence.
Given the frequent references to tolderías in such areas in earlier decades, this discursive disappearance suggests tolderías’ eventual absence from these lands. Some tolderías moved toward the borderline, while some individuals remained behind to work on local ranches and farms. The former moved beyond the purview of local record-keepers, and imperial writers were unlikely to identify the latter according to ethnic identifiers if they were not clearly associated with tolderías.

Amidst this general tendency to move toward the borderline, specific reactions to bordermaking initiatives varied from toldería to toldería. The unique circumstances that particular tolderías faced and their responses to them did not correspond to imagined ethnic divisions. It is therefore impossible to write of a “Charrúa” or a “Minuán” response to the border, as the varied responses of tolderías identified by the same ethnonym present persistent contradictions and inconsistencies. Rather, the actions of each toldería were rooted in changing territorial conditions that affected caciques and their kin on local levels. Minuanes who moved between Colônia do Sacramento and Maldonado experienced territorial changes very differently than Minuanes who moved between Santa Tecla and Yapeyú, for example, and therefore they adopted unique strategies. Broadly speaking, tolderías located far from the borderlines faced greater pressures, while those closer to the borderlines frequently found new opportunities in exploiting imperial initiatives and appropriating the boundaries for their own purposes.

As imperial agents engaged the Río de la Plata’s countryside ever more intensely, new challenges arose for many tolderías. Expanding markets for hides brought new actors into indigenous lands and increased pressures upon the region’s cattle reserves, particularly those located between the Río Negro and Río Yi. As competitors from Yapeyú, Santo Domingo Soriano, and Montevideo all sought to slaughter cattle and extract hides as quickly as possible, smugglers and cattle rustlers (gauderios) developed far-reaching contraband networks across the border to Brazil and to other portions of the region.90 In addition,

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90 Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 7–8; Gil, Infiéis Trangressores; Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, 194–95.
when epidemics periodically spread through nearby missions, individual tolderías found themselves at great risk. Information regarding the impact of diseases upon Charrúa and Minuanes is scant, but the citations that exist point to a correlation between mission outbreaks and sickness in tolderías. For example, in 1787, two years after a smallpox outbreak in the Departments of Yapeyú and San Miguel, a Spanish demarcation official commented, “All of these [Minuanes] are very fearful of contracting smallpox, and if they know that there are sick individuals in some ranch, they will not go there for a long time.” There were also reports of smallpox in Minuán tolderías near the Río Yi in 1762, two years before an outbreak throughout the missions. If smallpox and other epidemics posed grave challenges to the Guaraní missions, they were potentially devastating to tolderías, given their generally small populations. The challenges of foreign pathogens were certainly not new, but the increased presence of mission inhabitants in the region’s interior made it increasingly difficult for tolderías to avoid disease.

Individual tolderías experienced these broader changes in a variety of ways, according to their location in the region. In the southern and western portions of the region, the increased presence of ranchers, the drying up of Colónia do Sacramento as a trading center, and the violent military campaigns from Spanish militias placed tolderías in a precarious situation. The new boundary resolved the competing

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91 “Todos estos infieles son muy temerosos del contagio de viruelas, de manera que les basta saber que en alguna estancia hay enfermos de ellas para no llegarse en mucho tiempo” Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la demarcación de límites en la América Meridional (Parte II de IV)” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros días, 212.

92 Revista del Archivo General Administrativo: Colección de Documentos para Servir al Estudio de la Historia de la República del Uruguay, 13 vols. 3 (Montevideo: Imprenta "El Siglo Ilustrado" 1887); Patrocinado por el gobierno y dirigida por el Dr. D. Pedro Mascaro, 357. Recent studies on the impact of pathogens upon tolderías include: Itala Irene Basile Becker, Os índios charrua e minuano na antiga banda oriental do Uruguai (São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil: Editora Unisinos, 2002), capítulo 11; Mario Consens, Extinción de los indígenas en el Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2010); Anderson Marques Garcia and Saul Eduardo Seiguer Milder, “Convergências e divergências: Aspectos das culturas indígenas Charrua e Minuano,” vivência 39, no. 39 (2012): 45.

imperial claims to lands in the south of the region, along the northern shore of the Río de la Plata estuary. This enabled Spanish administrators to distribute land titles and populate territories south of the Río Yi, which they did at a remarkable rate in the eighteenth century’s closing decades. The establishment of new settlements, guard posts, farms, and ranches between Santo Domingo Soriano, Colônia do Sacramento, and Montevideo challenged tolderías’ access to local livestock and strategic stopping points in the area. Meanwhile, the cession of Colônia to the Spanish also dried up a once vibrant market for cows, horses, and other goods that tolderías had provided to Portuguese settlers earlier in the century. It also eliminated the need for Minuán guides between the plaza and Rio Grande, as Portuguese traders ceased to move back and forth between the two areas.94 While had once been an advantage for these tolderías, the region’s territorial restructuring undermined its utility.

Cut off from the Atlantic economy and no longer the dominant force in the countryside, tolderías in the South and West of the region adopted a number of strategies. One was to seek partnerships with local plazas and ranchers. The increase in Spanish settlers increased the demand for Charrúa and Minuán laborers, who were known throughout the region for their ability to tame horses and herd cattle.95 Much like their northern counterparts who worked seasonally at Portuguese feitorias, Minuanes near Maldonado could be found gathering cattle for Spanish ranchers, while Montevideo’s cabildo recognized them as “useful men” to have on the ranches.96 The lack of documentary records from ranches, combined with the use of general terms such as “indio” or “peon” to identify rural laborers, makes it difficult to assess how frequently

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94 Between the signing of the Treaty of Madrid and the official transfer of Colônia do Sacramento to Spanish control, Portuguese traders attempted to transport livestock from there to Rio Grande. The official opening of the Sorocaba market, near São Paulo, in 1750 also increased demand for livestock in lands north of the Río de la Plata. Fonseca, Tropeiros de mula, 67.

95 Charrúas & Minuanes hired to herd cattle & tame horses. Poentiz, “Os infieles”; Azpíroz Perera and Dávila Cuevas, “Indios 'Infieles' y 'Potreadores'”.

individuals from tolderías participated in such activities. Nonetheless, given the continued presence of
tolderías near plazas such as Montevideo and Santo Domingo Soriano until at least the end of the 1760s, it is
likely that their members were regularly involved in herding and corralling cattle.

Partnerships between plazas and tolderías far from the borderline were necessarily unequal. Unable
to dominate the countryside and bereft of opportunities to exploit Spanish and Portuguese competition,
numerous tolderías turned to reductions. As had happened earlier in the century, negotiations over
reduction occurred in moments of duress, local populations conflicted with native newcomers, and
settlements were generally short-lived. This was the case for several Charrúa tolderías near Santo Domingo
Soriano immediately after the Guaraní War. In exchange for settling near the plaza, Spanish administrators
offered to give the families in these tolderías one cow per day to sustain themselves. This relationship of
dependency angered the plaza’s residents, who were reluctant to share from their stocks; they also accused
the newcomers of crimes against local women. It posed risks for the Charrúa families as well, as they found
themselves wedged between hostile hosts and nearby Charrúa, Minuán, and Bohán tolderías, and by the end
of 1759, they had abandoned the plaza and returned to the countryside. A similar instance involved the
Minuán cacique Cumandat and a number of tolderías that lived near the Río Yi. After two years of
negotiations, Cumandat and other caciques reached a peace agreement with Montevideo in 1764 and settled
about seventy-five miles north of the plaza, at the limits of its jurisdiction. Faced with smallpox and an
increasingly hostile environment, these tolderías considered peace with Montevideo a logical course of
action. Much like Charrúas in Soriano, these Minuanes also found themselves exposed to attacks. Six years

97 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Buenos Aires 1757-05-02; Santo Domingo Soriano, 1757-07-01; Campo del Bloqueo, 1757-03-10, 1757-
04-14, 1757-08-05; s/l, 1757-05-18, 1757-06-09); AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-02-27, 1758-04-01, 1758-
09-10, 1758-11-06; Buenos Aires, 1760-08-09).
after the agreement, when a band of forty men raided the Minuanes’ ranches, the nearby Spanish guard proved ineffective in stopping the attack.98

These two settlements, along with the Cayastá reduction near Santa Fe, demonstrate the trajectories of a handful of tolderías, but represent only a part of the story. Given the number of tolderías in the southern and western portions of the region at the time of the Madrid demarcation and the absence of settlements near Maldonado, these cases are hardly representative of a broader trend. It appears more likely that over time individuals from southern and western tolderías either blended together with rural populations or migrated toward the borderline to integrate with other tolderías. Judicial and ecclesiastical records reveal the presence of individuals identified as Charrúa or Minuán living in or immediately outside of Santa Fe, Montevideo, and Maldonado through the end of the century. Some married, baptized their children, and made use of the legal system, while others found themselves imprisoned for a variety of offenses.99 Though few in number, these cases point to numerous individuals leaving tolderías for cities or farms. Overall numbers are also likely larger than the documentary record suggests, given the ambiguous terms used to identify native peoples who were not associated with a toldería.

More evidence exists of tolderías moving toward the border and integrating with others. For example, the Minuán cacique Moreira, who was an integral player in the Guaraní War and among those

98 Several of these caciques also had kinship and economic ties in the city, which likely contributed to their decision to form a settlement. AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 11, carpeta 3a, no 1; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 12, carpeta 7, no 1; Revista del Archivo General Administrativo, 357-9, 390-3; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charraís en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), Capítulos 8 y 9; AGI - Buenos Aires, 536, (Arroyo de Pintado, 1770-04-11; Montevideo, 1770-05-14). Sometimes tolderías found plazas to be unwilling partners in the establishment of reductions, as a group of Charruas and Bohanes discovered in 1773. Norberto Levinton, “La burocracia administrativa contra la obra evangelizadora: una reducción de Charrúa fundada por Fray Marcos Ortiz,” Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas. Universidad del Norte Santo Tomás de Aquino (Agosto 2003); De las Primeras Jornadas de Historia de la Orden Dominicana en la Argentina.

99 See, for example: AGI - Buenos Aires, 536, (Buenos Aires, 1759-07-02); AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1775-05-26); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Batóvi Chico, 1801-08-20); AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1772-04-11, 1780-10-03, 1790-10-05, 1802-07-04; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 3, No 18; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 26, No 43; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 28, No 31; Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya, 176-8, 264, 351-2, 369, 384, 387, 406, 467-71, 480, 512-3, 534, 609-611, 630-631, 802; Juan Apolant, Padrones olvidados de Montevideo del siglo XVIII tomo II (Montevideo: Imprenta Letras, 1966), 117.
who accompanied Cumandat to Montevideo in 1762, stood alongside Miguel Ayala Caraí at Santa Tecla in 1775. Another Minuán cacique, Saltein, was present for the 1762 negotiations in Montevideo, and then appeared with Caraí in 1787 as they charged tribute to the demarcation teams. In the same way, the Charrúa cacique Ignacio sought out a reduction in San Borja in 1794, only to return to the countryside and become a “supreme caudillo” six years later.\(^\text{100}\) Joining together with other tolderías was often a complicated enterprise, however, as evidenced by the stories of Miguel Salcedo and his two sons, Juan and Pedro Ignacio. All three had been baptized and raised in Cayastá, and by the early 1790s they had abandoned the reduction with their kin. Nonetheless, by 1794, Miguel appeared in Santo Domingo Soriano and Juan in one of San Borja’s ranches, hoping to negotiate new reductions. They had gone to the countryside, but returned to seek refuge from contrabandists. Pedro Ignacio was apprehended in the blandengue expeditions of 1801, alongside other Charrúas and Minuanes.\(^\text{101}\) Within a decade of leaving Cayastá, each of these men was pulled back into the Spanish colonial apparatus.

For all of the challenges faced by tolderías far away from the various treaty lines, there was a plethora of new opportunities for those who lived nearest to them. In particular, the bordermaking initiatives provided new chances to develop commercial ties, kinship relationships, and patronage networks. While the transfer of Colônia do Sacramento to Spanish control dried up numerous markets along the Banda Norte, it coincided with an expanding network of borderline commerce. As an inhibitor of the movement of imperial subjects, the borderline created a demand for individuals who could transport cattle across it. Charrúas and Minuanes thus positioned themselves as key commercial intermediaries, since their

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\(^\text{101}\) AGNA - IX. 24-2-6, exp. 27; AGNA - IX. 36-2-6, (Informes de Zabala al Virrey, 1794-03-24, 1794-04-25, & 1794-05-23); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Batoví chico, 1801-08-20); Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 9–11; Leonel Cabrera Pérez, “La incorporación del indígena de la Banda Oriental a la sociedad colonial/nacional urbana,” Revista TEFROS 9 (Agosto 2011): 16.
tolderías continued to exert some control over the regional interior. They guided Portuguese smugglers (changadores) back and forth across the border undetected by Spanish cavalries, led them safely to cattle ranges, aided in the herding and slaughtering of cattle (vaquerías), and tamed wild horses. In other instances, they transported cattle and horses directly across the border themselves, cutting out intermediaries and selling them to buyers on the other side. They sought other economic opportunities as well, including seasonal labor on ranches or at Portuguese feitorias.

As Charrúas and Minuanes built new economic networks across the interimperial divide, they retained their position as the principal arbiters of access to rural lands. Although the growing number of outsiders entering the countryside undermined their autonomy, tolderías continued to exercise territorial authority, particularly in lands east of the Río Uruguay and north of the Ríos Negro and Yí. In some instances, they aided individual plazas in combatting raids upon their ranches, as occurred in Santo Domingo Soriano in 1757. More often, they prevented imperial cavalries from pursuing contrabandists or other enemies into their lands. In 1795, for example, as Spanish guards from Batoví sought to apprehend contrabandists near the border, a number of Charrúas intercepted them and left at least two soldiers dead. Similarly, in 1805, a militiaman named Miguel Lenguasár found himself on the run from Spanish mission authorities and sought to escape to the Portuguese side of the border.

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102 For examples of tolderías working as guides: Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 6–8; giving harbor to contrabandists: AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Arroyo de la Virgen, 1797-12-27); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 273-280v, 289-289v, 327-331v. Nationalist historiographies have long used the figure of the gaucho/gauderio as a stepping-stone a long process of toldería acculturation and incorporation into creole societies, while some recent works have considered gauchos/gauderios and tolderías distinct and competing groups. Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 11–2; Diego Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes: Interacción y destrucción, indígenas del Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2004), 291–92; Cesar Castro Pereira, “Y hoy están en paz: relações entre os índios ‘iníciis’ da Banda Oriental e guaranis missionários no período colonial tardio (1737-1801),” (Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, dezembro de 2008), 14-16, 36. Evidence suggests instead that many tolderías participated in informal economies, but that this was not a process of acculturation. Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 629.


104 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1757-04-26, 1757-05-02). In the 1757 case, Charrúa tolderías found themselves on both sides of the conflict. Some supported the residents of Santo Domingo Soriano against deserters from the missions known as
He resolved to flee, and the Portuguese recommended to the Infidel Indians that they let him pass to these places as has been verified, not only without experiencing poor treatment, but also with their guidance…. He was able to count over 600, including Minuanes, Charrúas, and Tapes from the missions occupied by the Portuguese, who live together in seven tolderías.105

The positive relations that these tolderías maintained with Portuguese officials at the time made Lenguasár’s escape possible. While it is unclear exactly where the militiaman had escaped from, the tolderías deposited him well onto the Brazilian side of the 1804 status quo division (Map 4.1). Thus despite Portuguese claims of dominion, these tolderías continued to arbitrate movement across the border. Their control over the countryside was not lost upon individual travelers, either. For example, in 1799, when a party of blandengues apprehended a Portuguese man named Juan Adolfo on the Spanish side of the border, he was unable to present a passport and claimed that he had lost it in an ambush by Charrúas as he transited the “unpopulated countryside.”106 Regardless of the veracity of this account, Adolfo’s telling of it indicates that it was potentially believable.

The control that certain caciques and their tolderías exhibited over borderland spaces was in many ways enhanced by Iberian efforts to establish an effective borderline. As both empires’ borderline institutions were notably weak, they frequently sought to establish partnerships with tolderías as a means to make the borderline operative. For example, in October of 1775, Spanish troops stationed at Santa Tecla invited a contingent of Charrúa and Minuán caciques to the fort, offering gifts and soliciting their aid in apprehending unauthorized travelers. The caciques agreed to monitor the countryside, but demanded that the Spanish withdraw their troops into the fort and make specific personnel changes, to which the Spanish

105 “se resolvió á huir recomendado delos Portugueses á los Indios Infieles para que ledejasen pasar á estos lugares como lo há verificado, no solo sin experimentar vejamen alguno, sino que los mismos Indios le condujeron… pudo contar ses cientos, y tantos entre Minuanes, Charrúas, y Tapes de los Pueblos de Misiones ocupados por los Portugueses, que viven juntos en siete Tolderías.” Archivo Artigas, 396. See also: Frühauf García, *As diversas formas de ser índio*, 253–54.

106 AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Concepción del Uruguay, 1799-10-13).
acquiesced. Despite this agreement, Minuán caciques guided Portuguese soldiers to Santa Tecla the following year, enabling them to topple the fort. This case reveals the ability of caciques and tolderías to extract benefits from the establishment of borderline institutions. They drew upon the Spanish need to monitor the countryside to obtain payments from officers at Santa Tecla and to regulate the activities of soldiers stationed there. Likewise, they exploited the Portuguese desire to expel their imperial foe in order to obtain even higher payments from them.\textsuperscript{107} Charrúas and Minuanes along the borderline were more than allies of imperial agents; they also acted as the principal authorities in various locales. Even after Portuguese forces abandoned Santa Tecla and retired northward, Minuán caciques continued to control the area. They reported the Portuguese departure to scouts from the missions, but prevented them from traveling to the area to see for themselves.\textsuperscript{108}

The primary cacique involved in the events surrounding Santa Tecla, Miguel Ayala Caraí, provides a clear example of how a savvy individual could use the influx of imperial actors to develop expansive networks of kinship and allegiance. Years before the Portuguese invasion, Caraí had married his daughter to its principal architect, Rafael Pinto Bandeira, and he was likely among the Minuanes who collected payments from Pinto Bandeira’s personal account following the attack. At the same time, he orchestrated the escape of Santa Tecla’s ranking officer, Miguel Antonio de Ayala, with whom he likely shared familial bonds as well.\textsuperscript{109} Caraí had not always been a powerful cacique; he was born to an immigrant from Santiago.

\textsuperscript{107} The caciques involved in this meeting included Ruvio, Miguel, Christoval, Carvayo, Agustín, Coraya, and Moreira, among others. AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (Letters dated 1775-05-26, 1775-06-17, 1775-08-19, 1775-10-20, 1775-11-15); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Letters dated 1776-04-01, 1776-04-04, 1776-04-08, 1776-04-09, 1776-04-15, 1776-05-02, 1776-05-06, 1776-06-04, 1776-07-04, 1776-10-27). Two years after the accord and the subsequent Portuguese invasion, a Minuán cacique named Lorenzo presented papers to Spanish authorities, which certified the alliance. He agreed to direct the five tolderías and over 200 individuals under his authority to apprehend contrabandists and deserters and bring them to Santa Tecla. He also offered to provide safe passage to Spanish troops moving through the countryside. AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (Letter dated 1778-02-09).

\textsuperscript{108} AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de Chunireria, 1776-06-04).

\textsuperscript{109} “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 124–5. In addition to sharing a name with the cacique, Miguel Antonio de Ayala frequently served as an intermediary between Caraí and Santa Tecla and provided regular gifts to Minuán tolderías. It is possible that he was the cacique’s father. AGNA - IX. 17-4-6, (1776-04-09);
del Estero and a Minuán woman and spent much of his youth as a ranch hand for Francisco Pinto Bandeira, Rafael’s father. At some point, perhaps because of his ties to both Spanish and Portuguese leaders, he rose to become cacique. In fact, “Caraí” was most likely an honorific rather than a surname.\footnote{In Guaraní, the term karai means, among other things, “Lord,” “Spanish,” “white,” or “baptized.” The rough antonym of this term would be ava, which means “savage” or “unconverted Indian.” It is likely that the use of Carai was an honorific for Miguel Ayala, rather than a surname, and the term also applied to Bartolomeo in his letter to Pinto Bandeira.} By the 1770s, he had become one of the most important figures in the borderland region, repeatedly referred to as the “cacique of caciques” in Spanish and Portuguese sources. Whether managing the events at Santa Tecla, developing trade networks, brokering the settlement of his fellow Minuán cacique Bartolomeo, or collecting tribute payments from Spanish and Portuguese demarcation teams, he positioned himself as a principal authority along the borderline.\footnote{AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (1776-04-04-01, 1776-04-09); Levinton, El espacio jesuitico-guaraní, 110.}

The influx of migrants to areas near the borderline also enabled some tolderías to expand their networks of kinship and power. Following the Guaraní War in the 1750s and continuing through the end of the century, many individuals and families left the missions for other areas of the Río de la Plata region. While many of them settled in other missions, rural ranches, or nearby cities, others integrated into Charrúa or Minuán tolderías or formed tolderías of their own.\footnote{Citations on population decline and outward migration. Guillermo Wilde, “Los guaraníes después de la expulsión de los jesuitas: dinámicas políticas y transacciones simbólicas,” Revista Complutense de Historia de América 27 (2001): 102; Guillermo Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII,” Horizontes Antropológicos 9, no. 19 (julho de 2003): 87; Robert H. Jackson, “The Post-Jesuit Expulsion Population of the Paraguay Missions, 1768-1803,” Colonial Latin American Historical Review 16, no. 4 (2007); Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, 156–57.} The level of desertions worried administrators, who continually tried to separate mission dwellers from neighboring tolderías. They believed that Charrúas and Minuanes had corrupted these “runaway Tapes” (tapes cimarrones) and that their...
mobile lifestyles made them prone to steal cattle or take captives. For Minuanes and Charrúas, however, these migrants represented an opportunity to expand their familial and tributary networks. By incorporating them into their own tolderías or as clients, individual caciques could extend their range of influence. For example, in 1785, refugees from the San Nicolás mission declared that they “recognized no other God or King than Batu of the Minuanes, to whose toldería they had sent all of their women and possessions in anticipation of the arrival of [Spanish forces].” When the Spanish troops subsequently attacked and killed the head of this toldería, Chuannera, and six others, the rest ran away and sought protection from Minuanes.

Distant tolderías also moved toward the border, where they developed ties with others already there. By the end of the 1760s, the number of ethnonyms used to identify tolderías dropped from five to two – Bohanes, Guenoas, and Yaros disappeared from written records, leaving only Charrúas and Minuanes – as imperial observers struggled to differentiate one from another. At this same time, Charrúas and Minuanes, who for decades had appeared in imperial records as antagonistic enemies, began to appear together on a regular basis. It is unclear whether this discursive shift corresponded to native self-identification, but it does point to new relationships between previously distant native communities.

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113 “Tapes” refers here to Guaraníes. AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campos del Bloqueo, 1758-04-26); AGNA - IX. 17-7-2, (San Luis, 1785-05-11); AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-06-08) IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 278-279v; Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 112–7. When Portuguese authorities took control of the Siete Pueblos, they too aimed to separate mission inhabitants from nearby tolderías. IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 276v, 278v.

114 “no reconocía mas Dios ni mas Rey que el cacique Batu de los Minuanes, a cuia toldería abia remitido, con anticipación a su venida todas las mujeres y otras cosas, que es regular tuviese.” AGNA - IX. 17-7-2, (San Nicolás, 1785-04-13). See also: Poentiz, “Los infieles”; 8; Guillermo Wilde, “Guananes, ‘gauchos’ e ‘indios infieles’ en el proceso de disgregación de las antiguas doctrinas jesuíticas del Paraguay,” Universidad Católica Revista del Centro de Estudios Antropológicos XXXVIII, no. 2 (Diciembre 2003): 105, 107.

115 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1750-12-30). Subsequent imperial ethnographies often explained this change as the extermination of one “nation” by another. Félix de Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obras póstumas de Félix de Azara Tomo Primero (Madrid: Imprenta de Sanchiz, 1847), 145, 160-161; Gustavo Verdesio, Forgotten Conquests: Rereading New World History from the Margins (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 99–107. Recent scholarship has framed this engagement as an “alliance”; however, given that the ethnonyms “Charrúa” and “Minuán” were identities “imposed” by imperial writers rather than categories of national self-identification, it is better understood as a process of ethnogenesis, comparable to the “araucanización” of the pampas between Buenos Aires and the
addition, this tendency toward tolderías’ union coincided with shifting relationships with plazas. No accounts exist after 1760 of tolderías allying with Spanish or Portuguese settlers against other wandering peoples. Whereas prior to the demarcations, individual tolderías had used plazas as refuges or allies in moments of conflict against others, this ceased to be a strategic possibility. Conflict undoubtedly existed between tolderías, and imperial agents continued to be important allies against other imperial adversaries, but the local relationships between plazas and tolderías that had once superseded ethnic or imperial identities ceased to exist in imperial records.

Bordermaking initiatives and increased numbers of outsiders in the regional interior also created challenges for tolderías nearest to the borderlines. This was perhaps most evident in the relationships between Charrúas and Minuanes and ranchers from the Guaraní missions. Extant documentary records point to acrimonious relations between ranchers and tolderías, usually as justification for military expeditions of blandengues or militias. These reports depicted tolderías “invading” mission ranches, for which they offered one of two explanations: the “bad inclination” of tolderías or the influence of Portuguese officials who wanted access to the ranches. For example, in 1776, as Portuguese forces took control of Santa Tecla, Charrúa and Minuán tolderías attacked numerous ranches pertaining to the Yapeyú, San Borja, Santo Tomé, and San Nicolás missions. In a letter to Governor Joseph Vertiz, Francisco Bruno de Zavala argued that “these insults presently committed by Minuanes are known to have been promoted and encouraged by the Portuguese, [who offered them] shelter and protection and to buy from them whatever they steal from the missions.” Although these attacks occurred soon after the takeover of Santa Tecla, they began well before the Portuguese invasion and continued for months afterward, even after Portuguese

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Andes described by Guillaume Bocarra. *Beacco, Charrías, guenos y guaraníes*, 270, nt. 47-50; Lidia R. Nacuzzi, *Identidades impuestas: Tehuelches, aucas y pampas en el norte de la Patagonia*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2005); Guillaume Bocarra, *Los vencedores: Historia del pueblo mapuche en la época colonial*, 1 ed (San Pedro de Atacama: Línea Editorial IAM, 2007); traducido por Diego Miles. One exception to this discursive trend was the use of the term “Bohanes” in 1773 to identify tolderías who were considering a reduction along the Río Uruguay. Levinton, “La burocracia administrativa contra la obra evangelizadora.”
authorities petitioned the tolderías to stop.\footnote{“Estos insultos cometidos por los Minuanes en la presente ocasión se dexan conocer que han sido promovidos y persuadidos por los Portug.s ofreciéndoles su abrigo, y amparo y comprarles lo que robasesen en los Pueblos.” AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de Chunireri, 1776-06-04; San Borja, 1776-05-06). See also: “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 174–7; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 5–7. Portuguese authorities found themselves in a similar situation as they tried to establish peace with the Spanish after retaking the missions. IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 286-288.} This points to different motivations for Minuán caciques that were independent of Portuguese interests. It is likely that, given the accelerated rate in which the Yapeyú mission in particular had begun to slaughter cattle during these years, the response was due to what Minuán caciques perceived as increased incursions upon their lands.\footnote{Sarreal, \textit{The Guaraní and Their Missions}, Chapter 8. While the 1760s saw no recorded conflicts between tolderías and mission actors, violent encounters in and around mission ranches abounded in the 1770s.}

Despite Spanish administrators’ trope of Charrúa and Minuán hostility, individual tolderías likely felt themselves to be on the receiving end of ranchers’ and militias’ aggression. As imperial writers denounced the repeated attacks on newly-established ranches, they presumed that the ranches were located within the universally recognized jurisdiction of a given plaza or upon royal lands and, by extension, that local resources were the ranches' property. However, the resolution of imperial possession and jurisdictional divisions did not correlate with control of rural lands, and for local tolderías, new ranches instead constituted an intrusion. Few ranches existed far beyond individual plazas at mid-century, but the demarcation efforts precipitated the founding of many new ones that were hundreds of miles away, as the missions in particular sought to garner cattle from between the Río Negro and the Río Yi. These ranches were generally isolated and located in areas controlled by tolderías (Map 4.5).\footnote{Most “invasions” occurred on “advanced ranches” (estancias avanzadas), rather than those nearest to a given plaza. AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Buenos Aires, 1799-11-20).}

The founding of new ranches would not necessarily have been a problem for caciques and their kin, as they likely did not share the concept of individual property rights with their imperial counterparts.

Nonetheless, if mission inhabitants were to maintain ranches in Charrúa or Minuán lands, local tolderías
would likely have expected them to recognize their authority and limit their levels of resource extraction.

The evacuation of San Borja’s ranches in 1784 illustrates this dynamic:

The infidels are with their tolderías in our ranches consuming the cattle that we have herded, [even though] we pay in tribute all that they ask for, in particular yerba mate and tobacco. And although we give all of this continually, those that are outside of the ranches [commit] great insults, taking horses from cowboys or scattering the cattle that they have collected. And this past March, they took all of the horses from a herd, killing one of our Indians and injuring another badly. This establishment, in addition to the express and indispensable tribute to the infidels [and other expenses, nonetheless] acquires all that it needs in yerba mate, cotton, sugar, honey, lumber, and the rest only with the cows that it collects from the countryside.\(^{119}\)

While various tolderías permitted the existence of San Borja’s ranches in their lands, they required frequent payments from the ranches’ inhabitants. The tolderías subsequent takeover of these ranches, which occurred during a moment of peace between Spain and Portugal, was therefore not part of a broader war effort. It was more likely a response to dissatisfaction with the payments they had received. This coincided with the demands for tribute payments that Minuán caciques placed on demarcation officials two years later when they passed through this area.\(^{120}\) It may also have been a response to what the tolderías perceived to be unbridled impingement upon their own resources, as the dates coincide with a peak of hide production in the missions.\(^{121}\) For tolderías, the founding of ranches, the accelerated extraction of cattle, Spain’s extermination campaigns, and violence by gauderios would have resembled aggression or invasions more than any of their own responses.

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\(^{119}\) “los ynfieles los que se allan con sus tolderías en nrâs propias estancias gastando de el ganado de aquellos rodeos ya que se agrega estarles contribuyendo con q.to piden en Particular la Yerva, y el tavaco, y aun con todo hacen de contínuo los que estan campo afuera grandes ynsultos ya quitando las cavalladas a los Baquer.s o ya desparramandoles el ganado que acopian, y en el mes de Marzo proximo passado quitaron la Cavallada a una Baquería dando muerte a uno de estos Naturales y a otro mal erido Este establecimiento amas de la contribucíon expresada è indespensa a los Ynfíeles la manutencíon y vestuario de todos sus natur.s paga de R.s tributos sueldos de Adm.or Maestro de Escuela y Capataceses adquiere quanto necesita de yerva, tavaco, algodon, azúcar miel tablasón, y demas solo con las Bacas de recogen en sus campos...” AGNA - IX. 22–8-2, exp. 3, f. 13.

\(^{120}\) In fact, the second time Minuán tolderías stopped the Portuguese demarcation teams and required that they pay a “tax,” they were near one of San Borja’s ranches. ANB - 86. Secretaría de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 22–23.

Map 4.5 – Mission Ranches. This map represents the approximate locations of mission ranches (green) and outposts (orange) during the second half of the eighteenth century, derived from four georeferenced maps. While this is not an exhaustive rendering of ranch locations, it nonetheless demonstrates their scattered and isolated nature, particularly between the Río Negro, and the Río Ibicuí.¹²²

The varied responses of tolderías do not fit neatly into the analytical categories of resistance or accommodation. Considering, for example, Charrúa and Minuán raids of mission ranches, one can see how such actions both undermined and reinforced the border. In taking cattle, charging tribute, or occupying...

¹²² Guillermo Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Río de la Plata, 2 vols. 2 (Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1936), mapa XXIV; AGNA - IX. 22-8-2, (Map signed in La Cruz, 1784-09-14); José Varela y Ulloa, Plano topográfico que comprende una parte del Montegrande, el Río Yacuy, los establecimientos y misiones del Uruguay, los yervales que actualmente poseen los indios guaraníes y el curso del mismo Uruguay desde la boca del verdadero Pepiri o Peguiri hasta el paso que llaman de Concepción ([178-]); LOC - G5202.U7 178-. V2.
ranches, tolderías rejected imperial claims to territorial possession and, by extension, individual claims to property, both of which were facets of the borderline’s territorial logic. At the same time, by taking cattle and moving it across the border to Portuguese buyers in Río Grande, these tolderías made possible new borderline economic networks. Likewise, as caciques such as Miguel Ayala Caraí rejected imperial authority over borderland spaces by collecting tribute from bordermaking teams or requiring Santa Tecla’s soldiers to remain within the fort, they also reinforced the new territorial logic by agreeing to apprehend unauthorized travelers and allowing the establishment to remain. While these tolderías probably did not share the bird’s-eye perspective of imperial officials, their experience of changing territorialities on a local level produced responses that simultaneously reinforced the borderline and limited its functionality. When taken together, however, this multiplicity of responses all reinforced the borderline in the end. Whether through migration or the incorporation of migrants, trade, or tribute, apprehending contrabandists or contrabanding themselves, tolderías made the borderline meaningful by their appropriation of it.

**Conclusion**

The invention of an interimperial border was a watershed moment for interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata region. The mapping expeditions of the treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso represented an epistemological and legal shift in the ways Iberian officials engaged the countryside. Presuming territorial possession over the totality of regional space, both Portuguese and Spanish authorities assumed they had legal authority over all inhabitants within their borders and property rights over all objects within their realm not otherwise subject to individual title. They pursued ideals of territorial order, which to them meant sedentary imperial subjects, regulated land titling, and controlled commerce. These efforts to attain fixity proved elusive, due to would-be imperial subjects' tendencies to move and informal exchanges among them, as well as the continued territorial authority exercised by independent, mobile native peoples. Challenges were greater for Spanish officials in the region, as the precise location of the various borderlines
situated most resources within their dominions, leading them to implement different strategies than those of their Portuguese counterparts. Nonetheless, in each case, imperial officials were faced with the conundrum of depending upon settlers and tolderías to make the borderline function while simultaneously attempting to exert increased control over them.

For tolderías in the region, imperial bordermaking initiatives demanded responses and, depending upon a toldería’s geographical location, provided either challenges or opportunities. Those further away from the imaginary borders suffered from the transfer of Colônia do Sacramento to the Spanish, as it shifted informal markets toward the border and allowed for increased settlement initiatives in the area. Conversely, tolderías located near the borderlines exploited imperial desires to make the cartographic convention operative. They incorporated new migrants into their networks of kinship and authority, utilized new settlements as sources of tribute, and developed new economic networks. In these ways, territorial conditions rather than imagined ethnic categories were the principal determinants of indigenous action during the latter part of the eighteenth century. Additionally, despite a wide variety of local responses to bordermaking efforts, tolderías collectively participated in making the borderline a meaningful territorial division.

Over time the opportunities that the borderline provided tolderías gave way to challenges. As borderland institutions became more entrenched, settlers increased pressures on cattle reserves, mounted guards persistently harried individual tolderías, and imperial authorities collaborated against mobile peoples, lands near the borderline became perilous spaces of conflict. The principal advantage of tolderías – their ability to control vast swaths of land with relatively small numbers of people and simultaneously engage distant locales – soon became a liability amid growing populations in the region. Eventually, bordermaking efforts transformed the region into an uninhabitable space, presenting mobile native peoples with difficult decisions about how to survive.
CHAPTER 5: WHERE THE LINE ENDS

When the Marquis of Avilés arrived in Buenos Aires, he found Charrúa and Minuán women, young and adult, who had been deposited in a former Jesuit house called the residence. These women were entrusted to wealthy people with good morals, who wanted to take charge of maintaining them and instructing them in civil and Christian life, under the watch of the parish priests and the neighborhood mayors. – Miguel de Lastarria, 1804

Every day we see Indians around us and living in our own houses: I am speaking of the Pampas and Charruás – Letter to the editor of Telégrafo Mercantil, 1801

After the Raids

On the morning of May 3, 1831, Montevideo’s police force corralled seventy-nine Charrúa captives into one of the city’s military barracks. The captives included women, young and old, as well as children and infants, each of whom the police would entrust to local individuals or families. Having arranged the captives in a line according to their list of names, the police commenced their distribution (repartición). One by one, elite families and military officers approached and selected the captives they desired, no more than one or two per petitioner. Once they had made their choice, these petitioners signed an agreement to “treat [their captives] well, to educate them, and to Christianize them.” None of the captives could be required to remain in a household for more than six years, nor could they be taken outside

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1 “Quando llegó el Marqués de Avilés á Buenos Ayres halló varias mugeres chicas y adultas Charruas y Minuanes depositadas en una Casa de los Exjesuitas, que llaman la residencia; y las fue entregando á las personas pudientes, y de buenas costumbres que quisieron hacerse cargo de mantenerlas, é instruirlas en la vida civil y Christiana; estando á la mira los Parrocos, y los Alcaldes de Varrio.” Miguel Lastarria, “Descripción topográfica y Física,” in Documentos para la Historia Argentina, 147–343, Tomo III (Buenos Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1914), 273–74.

2 “Todos los días presenciamos con los Indios que tenemos á nuestros alrededores, y que viven en nuestras propias casas: hablo de los Pampas y Charruás.” Telégrafo Mercantil: rural, político-económico e historiográfico del Río de la Plata (1801-1802) Tomo VI (Buenos Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1914); Reimpresión facsímil dirigida por la Junta de Historia y Numismática Americana, 85-6 (115-116).
the country. The individuals distributed that day represented less than half of the captives brought to Montevideo the previous week. Even before their arrival in the city, military officials from the countryside had begun to receive requests from families for captives of specific profiles, most often children between seven and ten years of age or infants. Montevideo’s police withheld male captives over the age of fifteen from the distribution, considering them too dangerous to be entrusted to individual families. They instead detained them in the city’s jail, sent them to public works projects, or offered them to ship captains on the condition that they no longer set foot on shore.

Over the course of the following months, the Charrúa captives appeared numerous times in local police records, which in turn provide a glimpse of their experiences of captivity in Montevideo. Those who were not claimed during the repartición remained in the city jail, sustained by a daily ration of meat, tobacco, and yerba mate. Their numbers dwindled to eleven by a week after the general distribution; however, they grew over time as some families sought to return their captives for being “useless,” while others simply deposited them in the streets. A second convoy of captives arrived in September that year. Those in jail often remained for months on end, until they were claimed, succumbed to smallpox, or died of other causes. Those who remained in the custody of local families endured other sorts of suffering. In a letter to El Universal, one of Montevideo’s newspapers, several people who had acquired women during the repartición lamented having separated them from their children. They reported that these captives “cried for hours on end, clamored for their children, and sometimes pulled out their own hair,” and on the grounds of sympathy for motherhood, they sought to arrange a place and time for the women to be

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3 “son obligados a tratarlos bien, educarlos y cristianarlos” Eduardo F. Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo patrio). 2 vols. 2 (Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso, 1989), 73 (Documento U1). The principal exception to this six year limit were captives under twelve years of age, who would remain until their eighteenth birthday.

4 Ibid., 51-72 (Documentos G1-S1).

5 Ibid., 74-5, 78, 105-6 (Documentos W1, X1, Z1, & S1).
reunited with their children. One young Charrúa named Felipa sought asylum from the woman in whose house she lived. She presented herself at another household with “burn marks on her face and scars on her body... saying that she preferred death to returning to her master who had treated her with great cruelty,” but soon after the master, a woman, appeared with a soldier and an order from the chief of police for her return. Like Felipa, numerous others sought to escape their plight by running away, only to be apprehended by local police and returned to the city.

The captives taken to Montevideo in 1831 were from tolderías ambushed near the Río Salsipuedes in the north of Uruguay earlier in the year. Their plights have represented a denouement to both triumphant national histories celebrating the settling of the countryside with the extirpation of tolderías and revisionist accounts lamenting the “tragic” end of Charrúas. Indeed, their tolderías were among the last to succumb to the violent attempts at a gendered ethnocide by the newly formed republic, and their captivity was an effort to disappear them from the countryside. Nonetheless, this case raises a number of important questions. How, one hundred years after they nearly forced the abandonment of Montevideo, and nearly fifty years after stopping demarcation parties to charge them tribute, did tolderías in the region cease to exist as sociopolitical entities? Did the disappearance of tolderías from documentary records imply the end of Charrúas, Minuanes, and other ethnicities? How did individuals manage the changing territorialities and relationships of power between tolderías and plazas over the course of the eighteenth century?

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6 “llorar las horas enteras, clamar por sus chiquillos, y á veces hasta arrancarse los cabellos” ibid., 72-3 (Documento T1).
7 Ibid., 73, 77-8 (Documentos V1 & Z1), 107-8 (Documento X).
8 For example: Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo patrio), vol. 2, Parte II; Oscar Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final (Durazno, Uruguay: Tierradentro Ediciones, 2004), 60–79; Ángel Vidal, La leyenda de la destrucción de los charrúas por el General Fructuoso Rivera (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1933); Apartado de la "Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay" Tomo IX, 1932" Annie Houot, El trágico fin de los indios charrúas (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2013), 13–16; Diego Bracco, Con las armas en la mano: Charrúas, guena-minuanos y guaraníes (Montevideo: Planeta, 2013), Capítulo IV. Other authors have focused on these captives as a means to suggest that Spanish officials sought to integrate Charrúas and Minuanes into colonial society, rather than exterminate or disappear them from the countryside. Leonel Cabrera Pérez and Isabel Barreto Messano, “El ocaso del mundo indígena y las formas de integración a la sociedad urbana montevideana,” Revista TEFROS 4, no. 2 (2006).
Despite their relatively late date, the accounts of captives in Montevideo connect to a strategy of interethnic engagement adopted by Spanish officials during the mid-eighteenth century and replicated by republican authorities soon after Uruguayan independence. While captive-taking had always been a facet of relations between plazas and tolderías, captive-taking as an imperial strategy of territorial dispossession represented a significant shift from earlier policies. Long after prohibitions on tributary labor grants (encomiendas) and captive-taking (rescate), Spanish and Uruguayan officials aimed to combine extermination campaigns with captive-taking as a means to remove tolderías from lands coveted by ranchers and settlers. This policy posed an ever-present danger to tolderías on the Spanish side of the border and had a significant impact upon subsequent historical recollections.

Both nationally inspired and revisionist histories of the Río de la Plata have generally marked 1831 as the end of Charrúas, preceded by an end to Minuanes, which in turn was preceded by the disappearance of other native peoples from the countryside. Historians have depicted the demise of independent native peoples in the region as a product of superior imperial and republican military forces, rampant pathogens, alcoholism, or the loss of women to gauchos and other rural competitors. While military aggression, disease environments, and new actors certainly placed pressures upon tolderías, these explanations overlook the discursive and sociocultural processes that contributed to the disappearance of these ethnonyms from written records. They equate the waning of Charrúa, Minuán, and other ethnonyms employed in written records to the disappearance of the native peoples and kinship communities to whom they referred. Furthermore, they uncouple tolderías from plazas and the rural worlds of farmers and ranchers from which contemporary societies have claimed lineage.

9 Francisco Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay Tomo Segundo (Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 1895); Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (período patrio), vol. 2; Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final; Diego Bracco, Charrúas, guensoas y guaraníes: Interacción y destrucción, indígenas del Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2004), 263-4, 316, 332-3, 337, 344-5; Mario Consens, Extinción de los indígenas en el Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2010).
The story of plazas and tolderías in the Río de la Plata in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was one of shifting territorial and sociopolitical structures, which shaped both the options available to native individuals and the ways in which they appeared in written records. Changing patterns of territorial organization made possible certain power, kinship, and economic relations in a multipolar world of local affiliation and authority. Still, numerous individuals traversed the divisions between plazas and tolderías, blurring the lines between them. Some moved back and forth for their own interests, while others found themselves taken captive and trapped in unfree relationships. Amid broader structural changes, individuals from both plazas and tolderías faced ever-present risks, including abduction, starvation, and death; nonetheless, some also found new opportunities to improve their economic or social status. Many acted as economic, linguistic, and cultural brokers between local authorities or developed kinship ties across ethnic divisions. Their narratives are significant for understanding connections between individual actions and broader territorial changes; they are also crucial for dissociating the eventual demise of tolderías from the supposed elimination of the people who inhabited them.

A close look at civil records from plazas and their proximate countryside reveals the persistent presence of individuals from tolderías living and working among settler communities. These individuals represented the reverse of the captives, migrants, deserters, and merchants incorporated into tolderías. They arrived in urban centers or rural settlements not only through captivity, but through arranged marriages and other kinship ties, the lure of economic opportunities, or because tolderías had become a less viable option. Appearing occasionally in baptismal, marriage, and death records, their activities reveal patterns of mestizaje and a blurring of divisions between plazas and tolderías. They also highlight the complex decisions faced by individuals, families, and caciques as they managed the region’s ever-shifting territorial dynamics. Particularly, as tolderías struggled to control vast amounts of regional space through strategic mobility and as borderlines became increasingly hostile environments, native individuals considered movement beyond tolderías, while caciques strived to maintain their tolderías intact.
The actions of eighteenth-century individuals add depth to the broader narrative of plazas, tolderías, and bordermaking. They also demonstrate the fragility and fluidity of the imposed ethnonyms appearing in imperial sources. Ethnic identifiers, such as Charrúa or Minuán, were inextricably linked to tolderías and their geographical locations, with few exceptions. Depending upon whether individuals were acting in or on behalf of their toldería or living within the walls of a given plaza, they may appear in written records according to their ethnonym or by generic terms such as “indio” or “china.” The converse was true for the emigrants from missions and other plazas whom imperial authors engaged while in tolderías. When taken together, these individual cases also reveal that movement was not unidirectional from tolderías to plazas or vice-versa, and that although there were risks involved in traversing the plaza-toldería divide, numerous people were able to move back and forth.

The imagined disappearance of Charrúas, Minuanes, and other native peoples cannot be separated from the material and discursive processes set off by the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcation efforts. These initiatives transformed imperial objectives in engaging tolderías in the regional interior, presenting increased opportunities for tolderías nearest to the borderline and challenges for those furthest away. Nonetheless, imperial instability in the early nineteenth century led to an unstable borderline, and the advantages that the interimperial division had once presented to nearby tolderías ceased to exist. At the same time, the ethnographies produced by the mapping led many imperial officials to see tolderías as unreformable and to rule out the possibility of their peaceful acceptance of sedentary subjecthood. These officials both reified ethnic categories and prescriptively excised tolderías from their maps. Just as ethnonyms were linked to tolderías, the elimination of certain tolderías led to the disuse of an ethnonym – not elimination of the people previously identified in that way.
Territorial Removal through Captivity

As in many other borderland regions of the Americas, captive-taking was an integral aspect of interethnic relations in the eighteenth-century Río de la Plata. Although the practice has garnered little attention in scholarship on the region, both plazas and tolderías raided nearby establishments, taking with them individuals whom they hoped to incorporate into their own social order. Patterns of captive-taking by tolderías in the Río de la Plata resembled those of other independent native peoples in the Americas. Like the raids (malones) of the Pampas, Araucanía, and the Chaco, they tended to be in response to imperial aggression in the form of advancing ranches or military assaults and raids. Like the Comanche raids in Texas and Northern Mexico in the nineteenth century, they correlated at times with lapses in tribute flows from local settlers to caciques. And as occurred in most borderland areas, women and children were the

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predominant targets of such endeavors. Yet captive-taking did not appear to be the principal purpose of toldería raids on imperial settlers in the Río de la Plata. These assaults were primarily a way to extract cattle and enact violence; kidnappings were not ubiquitous with raids, and captives comprised a relatively small proportion of tolderías’ populations.\(^{11}\)

Spanish raiders were instead the principal agents of captive-taking in the region during the eighteenth century. Far greater numbers of individuals from tolderías were seized by Spaniards than vice-versa, while the Portuguese largely abstained (Table 5.1). These differences derived from the respective territorial strategies of the competing empires, as Portuguese officials depended upon tolderías to connect Colônia do Sacramento to the rest of Brazil, and after the Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping expeditions, to access cattle reserves on the Spanish side of the border. Conversely, Spanish and missionary officials saw captive-taking as a means of territorial appropriation and toldería depopulation. This strategy existed throughout the eighteenth century, yet it intensified following the demarcation efforts, reaching a crescendo as the century came to a close. Spanish raids against tolderías in the Río de la Plata resembled strategies they employed against Apache peoples at the far north of their empire. They aimed not only to exact punitive damage, but to exterminate or contain whoever they could while displacing the rest.\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\) Imperial writers and record keepers often distinguished their attacks and abductions from those of tolderías. They understood their own aggressions to be “punitive campaigns” (“salidas al castigo”) and those whom they seized to be “prisoners.” Conversely, they considered tolderías’ attacks to be “invasions” and those whom they abducted to be “captives.” The underlying premise of this distinction was that tolderías were aggressors and imperial agents were simply responding defensively under the precepts of just war. To avoid this moralizing and pejorative distinction, which was based upon subjective notions of property rights and imperial sovereignty, I use the terms “raids” and “captive” to identify both imperial and indigenous attacks and abductees from both sides. See: Conrad, Captive Fates, 10–11.

<table>
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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CAPTIVES TAKEN</th>
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<th>F</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<th>DESTINATION</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1697</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1702</td>
<td>Mbojas, Mbatidas, Yaros, others</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>San Borja; Jesús</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Missions</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>164</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Minuanes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>San Miguel Ranch (Yapeyú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quartel del Yacuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>Charrúas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>Charrúas; Minuanes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>Charrúas; Minuanes</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 – Spanish Raids. This table demonstrates the numbers of native captives (male, female, child) taken compared to the numbers of Spanish captives rescued during Spanish attacks on tolderías. Destinations refer to the remittance of native captives following their abduction.13

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13 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg 1, exp 1; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo; 1749-10-29 & 1757-04-26); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-05-07); AGNA - IX. 28-7-7, (Montevideo, 1803-10-24); AGNA - IX. 2-9-7, (Colonía, 1798-08-23; San Miguel, 1798-12-18); AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Yapeyú, 1798-08-15); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Río Queguay, 1800-05-28; Estancia de Román, 1801-05-25; Campamento en el Ibirapuita-guañú, 1806-04-24; Batovi chico, 1801-08-20); AGNA - IX. 24-3-6, leg 30, exp 21; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 46-8, 88-9, 110-115 184-8; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 127-30, 229; AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 1, f. 24-30; AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de 1750-01-14, 1750-02-03, 1750-11-03 y 1752-01-19; AG - Buenos Aires, 235, f. 12, 89v, 108, 130-130v, 150v, 172, 214v,
raids against Apaches, however, these instances of Spanish aggression were not designed as a means to procure a labor force. Given the availability of laborers from the Guaraní missions and the steady influx of enslaved Africans toward the end of the century, the numbers of captives from local tolderías would have been insufficient for this purpose.\(^{14}\) Captives were integrated as unfree laborers, but captive-taking was principally a measure of territorial removal.

Spanish efforts to acquire captives in the Río de la Plata dated back as far as the sixteenth century. Most notably, throughout the seventeenth century, residents of the plaza of Santa Fe frequently traded with nearby Charrúa tolderías for individuals whom the Charrúas had seized from other tolderías (indios de rescate). This practice continued though most of the century, despite official prohibitions in 1612, 1618, and 1680 and numerous efforts from Buenos Aires to eliminate it.\(^{15}\) Ignoring these restrictions, in 1690,
residents of Santa Fe who had acquired captives (piezas) rationalized their commerce as a means to save these individuals from imminent death at the hands of Charrúas.

Those who are captured or bought are sentenced to death; they kill those captured from their enemies, executing this harshness with no exception for age or sex…. [We received] the prisoners from the Charrúa Indians, who of their own will offer them in exchange for useless items… We can continue this exchange without the Indians having to remain slaves. 16

By building such commercial relationships with Charrúas, traders in Santa Fe were able to acquire a labor force while circumventing imperial prohibitions. This manner of obtaining captives, while common in the seventeenth century, disappeared soon after. 17

Beginning in 1697, evidence emerges for a new pattern of acquiring native captives. Rather than relying upon commercial ties with indigenous intermediaries, imperial agents began to attack tolderías directly, generally under the pretext of punitive campaigns. In that year, a resident of Santa Fe named Balthasar Ramírez de Arrellano requested custody of two captive women, Petrona and Micaela, and their three children following a campaign against Charrúas, Machados, and others. He promised to bring them “to Christian brotherhood and civility” and to support them from his own finances, and his petition was approved “for the purpose of indoctrinating and raising them in Christian education.” 18 This stated objective would become a common refrain in justifying the distribution of captives acquired in such raids. Raiding for captives also expanded beyond Santa Fe, as armed fighters from the Jesuit-Guaraní missions abducted as many as 500 “Mbojas, Mbatidas, Yaros, and the rest of their allies” in 1702, using them to populate the

16 “hay pena de la vida impuesta contra los que los rescataren o comprasen, sucede que pasan a cuchillo a los así apresados de sus enemigos, ejecutando este rigor sin excepción de edades ni sexos…. [Nosotros recibimos] las presas de los indios charruás, quienes de su voluntad las ofrecen y por muy poco útil que se les dé; de esta materia se puede tratar sin que los indios queden esclavos.” José de Herrera y Sotomayor. Expediente iniciado el 28 de abril de 1690 sobre rescate de cautivos a los charruás. Documento H3. Fondo de Documentos del Archivo General de Indias, Museo Etnográfico de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, transcribed in Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”: 124.

17 Santa Fe also exchanged captives with Abipones and Mocovíes from the Chaco; however, their persistent purchase of captives from Charrúas was unique. ibid., 122.

18 “al gremio y policía cristiana… con el fin de doctrinarlas y criarlas en la educacion christiana” AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg 1, exp 1.
newly-founded missions of San Borja and Jesús. In addition to acquiring neophytes, participants justified this particular campaign by arguing that if this war had not been made, [the twenty eight Jesuit-Guaraní missions] would have suffered great need for food….[The tolderías] were allied with the Portuguese in the fortress of San Gabriel…[and] they were the cause of the breaking of peace between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns.

If they had not attacked and forcibly taken these captives, deponents claimed, they would have lost access to the large cattle reserves that the missions coveted. Furthermore, the presence of tolderías in the countryside disrupted the fragile peace with Portugal that had held since the founding of Colônia do Sacramento. Similar campaigns by mission forces occurred in 1707 against Yaros, in 1715 against Bohanes, Charrúas, Machados, and Yaros, and around 1728 against Charrúas.

In 1750, a shift occurred in Spanish patterns of captive-taking in the region. Dovetailing with the Treaty of Madrid’s cession of nearby lands to the Spanish crown, military expeditions from Santa Fe, Santo Domingo Soriano, and Montevideo all sought to inflict maximum damage against the tolderías that neighbored each plaza. Although imperial authors exaggerated the overall impact of these expeditions, they did produce a large number of captives: 339 were taken to Santa Fe, 124 to Montevideo, and 53 were distributed among the campaign’s participants. In addition to producing hundreds of captives, these raids also constituted the first Spanish efforts at territorial removal. Rather than pointing to religious justifications, the Spaniards hoped to “clean” and “order” the countryside through extermination.

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20 “sino se hubiera hecho esta Guerra padecerian suma necesidad de comida dichos veinte y ocho pueblos por las razones que se dizen en la preg.ta [’estaban apoderados de las baquerias propias de dichos pueblos christianos’]…estaban coligados con los portugueses de la Ciudadela de S. Gabriel…avían de ser causa de quebrantamiento de la paz entre las dos coronas España y Portugal” Acosta y Lara, *La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico)*, vol. 1, 42.


22 AGPSF, *Actas de Cabildo de 1750-01-14, 1750-02-03, 1750-11-03 y 1752-01-19*; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo; 1749-10-29); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 46-8, 88-9, 110-115, 184–7; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 229.
Although officials explained each military foray as a small-scale raid against specific tolderías that had captured or killed settlers, they also pointed to the benefits of removing mobile native peoples from the countryside and presented the assumed completion of that objective in their post-expeditionary reports: “I am persuaded that none of the neighboring Charrúa Indians remains in the countryside.”

Given this aim of territorial removal, Spanish raids were disproportionate to indigenous attacks and targeted numerous tolderías rather than those directly responsible for earlier aggressions.

For most of the next half-century, Spanish captive-taking occurred intermittently, but by the century’s end it would again accelerate. Between 1752 and 1797, only one recorded raid against tolderías occurred: in 1785, Spanish forces surprised two tolderías of Tapes who had deserted the missions to live near the Río Ibicuí. They seized 98 individuals and returned them to the mission plazas they had abandoned. By 1797, however, with the formation of a regiment of mounted guards (blandengues) in Montevideo, viceregal authorities restarted their campaign of territorial removal through captive-taking. Over the next five years, blandengues commanded by Jorge Pacheco engaged in a systematic effort to raid tolderías one by one, killing as many adult men as possible and capturing women and children. This initiative, which focused on tolderías between the Yapeyú mission and the interimperial divide, proved unsuccessful in expunging them from the countryside, but it produced a steady flow of captives, most of whom Pacheco sent to Buenos Aires.

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23 AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 3; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vivoras, 1746-07-02). These campaigns broadly targeted mobile peoples (“gente vagabunda”), and included the employment of imperial subjects who were not cultivating crops as well as the elimination or subjugation of independent native peoples through military campaigns.

24 “me lo persuade mas el constarme no haber quedado Cuerpo de Yndiada Charrúa en la Campaña que èran los Fronterizos ¿A las referidas Poblaciones” MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C28, P1, No. 3, f. 3.

25 AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-06-08).

26 For details on the Pacheco expeditions, see Chapter 4.
While Spanish raids on tolderías sought territorial appropriation through death and dislocation, tolderías’ incursions into Spanish and mission ranches generally were in response to imperial aggression or territorial occupation. Extant sources are insufficient to draw direct connections between Spanish raids and native responses, yet a temporal correlation existed (Table 5.2). For example, after Yapeyú’s militia took 100 captives to their mission in 1708, Guenoas and Bohanes took twenty-six captives from the mission’s ranches. Similarly, one year after the 1715 expedition led by Francisco García de Piedrabuena, Charrúas,..

<table>
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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CAPTORS</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>CATTLE</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70 mares &amp; 2 horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Santa Cruz; Yapeyú</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Itati</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Infieles</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cows &amp; mares</td>
</tr>
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<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td>Charrúas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>cows &amp; oxen</td>
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<td>3,000 horses</td>
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<td>Paysandú</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>horses</td>
</tr>
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<td>Infieles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Mission ranches</td>
<td>Charrúas, minuanes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>900 horses</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2 – Native Raids.** This table demonstrates the numbers of captives (male, female, child) taken in toldería raids or apprehended in the countryside, as well as the number of horses and livestock extracted.  

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28 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, f. 4-11v; AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, f. 794 (Montevideo, 1751-11-13); AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-03-03 & 1758-04-26; Buenos Aires, 1758-05-11); AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de las Puntas de Chunireri, 1776-06-04); AGNA - IX. 2-9-7, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 3-9-2, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Paysandú, 1799-11-04 &1800-04-23; Concepción del Uruguay, 1799-11-05); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 46-8, 88-9, 110-115; AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 5, f. 122-3 & no 6, f. 124-7; AGI - Charcas, 382, Informe del fiscal (1716-10-17) y resolución del Consejo
Bohanes, and Yaros began capturing women and children from Itatí and other settlements in the area.  

Other cases of increased violence and native raiding followed a similar pattern; raids occurred in 1728 (after Jesuit-Guarani raids), 1750 to 1751 (after campaigns from Santa Fe, Santo Domingo Soriano and Montevideo), 1758 (after the Guarani War), 1798 (following attacks by farmworkers [faeneros]), and from 1799 to 1800 (following blandengue attacks). Moreover, certain sources indicate that indigenous captive-taking was principally a measure of retribution. Following the midcentury expeditions, Santo Domingo Soriano’s magistrate (corregidor) expressed concern that “we have ever more enemies; if before they were only Charrúas and their kin, now Minuanes have joined with them and they are the greatest in number. The majority of [our] captives are Minuanes and they always set out to seek vengeance.” Likewise, a 1797 report explained the underlying motives for Charrúa and Minuán attacks against mission ranches in the following way:

Their tolderías were sacked and set on fire not once, but many times, and their occupants were killed like livestock at the butcher. The majority of the elderly of both sexes gave their necks to the knife and the ferocity of a mob of men abandoned by the sentiments of humanity, and the youth were expended and condemned to the captivity of capricious injustice. These acts, Your Excellency, gave Minuanes and Charrúas motive to join together and plant their tolderías in an advantageous location that offered them protection….The Indians ambushed a vaquería, killing three individuals….They surrounded another where they killed as many as ten.
As tolderías’ raids responded against their own kin, they resembled the malones that occurred in the Pampas, Araucanía, and the Chaco. Since many such raids in the Río de la Plata involved the burning of crops and buildings and the killing of ranch hands, captive-taking was likely not their principal objective. In addition, the occasional offering of captives to local plazas, an action that at once served as a means to obtain commodities and as a gesture of goodwill in an effort to procure peace, aligns them with malones in other areas.33

Raids into Spanish or mission ranches also occurred in moments of apparent peace. For example, numerous Minuán tolderías extracted cattle, killed ranch hands, and took captives from mission ranches in 1776, and reports suggested that they intended to do the same in 1785.34 Nonetheless, given the accelerated extraction of mission cattle during these decades and lapses in payments from ranches to tolderías, it is likely these raids were retributive as well.35 The numbers of captives taken in tolderías’ raids paled in comparison to those of their Spanish and mission counterparts' raids, and many raids did not include captive-taking at all. In most instances, tolderías took no more than a dozen captives, and frequently fewer than that. Rather, they targeted cattle, which they often took in large numbers. This tendency indicates that captive-taking was principally a wartime measure, while the extraction of cattle was a more common

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33 See, for example: AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vivoras, 1750-11-09); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, f. 794 (Montevideo, 1751-11-13); AGI - Buenos Aires, 536, (Buenos Aires, 1759-07-02). Comparative cases include Mayo, “El cautiverio y sus funciones en una sociedad de frontera”; Daniel Villar and Juan Francisco Jiménez, “Para servirse de ellos”; Cautiverio, ventas a la usanza del país; y rescate de indios en las pampas y araucanía (siglos XVII-XIX), “Relaciones de la Sociedad Argentina de Antropología XVII-XVIII” (2001); Guillaume Boccara, Los vencedores: Historia del pueblo mapuche en la época colonial, 1 ed (San Pedro de Atacama: Línea Editorial IIAM, 2007); traducido por Diego Milos; Operé, Indian Captivity in Spanish America; Raul Mandrini, “Transformations” in Contested Spaces of Early America; Lucaioni and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”: 125–6.

34 AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de las Puntas de Chunireri, 1776-06-04).

35 Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, Chapter 8. For more on ranches and tribute payments, see chapter 4. For a comparative case articulating relationships between tribute payments and raids see: DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts.
practice that belied Spanish and mission assumptions of property rights. On a visit to Santa Fe in 1743, for example, the Bishop of Buenos Aires, José de Peralta noted:

[Nearby Charrúa tolderías] stole all of the cattle during peacetime, which were uncared for in the countryside, saying that the peace agreement served only to prohibit the killing of men and women, but not to stop robbing cattle whenever they could.\(^{36}\)

While Santa Fe was at peace with Charrúa tolderías to the east and Abipón and Mocovi tolderías in the west, they could not prevent their native counterparts from extracting cattle.\(^{37}\)

In the back and forth of raiding, individuals forcibly removed from tolderías far outnumbered those taken from imperial settlements, and they arrived at numerous destinations, in cities, in the countryside, and on missions. During the first half of the eighteenth century, most captives found themselves taken to one of the southernmost Jesuit-Guarani missions, presumably to be baptized, catechized, and incorporated as neophytes. Beginning with the 1750 expeditions, however, invading forces also remitted captives to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Maldonado, and other plazas. Captives arriving at non-mission plazas generally found themselves divided and distributed among one of three sorts of beneficiaries – military personnel, bureaucrats, or elite families (gente decente).\(^{38}\) These distributions occurred both informally, among participants in the expedition before arrival at the plaza, and formally, upon arrival.

It was customary for the individuals to whom the captives were entrusted to sign agreements that outlined the terms of captivity. The earliest such agreements resembled both contracts of indentured servitude and encomiendas, as they established a finite period for service, prohibited the transfer or sale of

\(^{36}\) “en medio de la paz se roban todos los ganados, que por descuido en el campo se quedan, diciendo, que la paz sirve solo p.a no hacer muertes de hombres ni muxeres, pero no p.a dexar de robar quando pudieren” AGI - Charcas, 373, f. 8.

\(^{37}\) Captive-taking likely occurred between tolderías as well, though little documentation exists beyond the sixteenth-century exchanges between Santa Fe and neighboring tolderías.

\(^{38}\) Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”; 8–9. This shift in destinations reflects the growth of Spanish fighting forces over time, and decreased dependence upon Guarani militias.
captives, and required religious instruction. Following a 1752 expedition, for example, the Governor of Buenos Aires declared:

I have determined that [the captives] be distributed among the participants in the expedition to serve for ten years, with an obligation [for their recipients] to teach them the mysteries of our Holy Catholic Faith. . . . The sale of these prisoners is not permitted since they should be treated as free people with only a payment (pensión) of ten years of service. 39

These captives, which included men, women, and children, were duly distributed and bound to a ten-year agreement of servitude. Each captor was required to instruct them in Catholicism, and at no point could he legally sell them or transfer them to another’s custody. By contrast, the agreement that governed the distribution of captives in Buenos Aires in 1801 neither restricted their term of captivity nor prohibited their transfer or sale.

The Indian shall be turned over to the supplicant who solicited him, obliging [the supplicant] to respond at all times to this superior Government and to maintain, dress, and educate him, instructing him in the mysteries of our Sacred Religion without employing him in hard or excessive labors. 40

This contract implied a relationship of perpetuity, as the captor was required to provide not only religious education, but clothing and sustenance. It provided for vague limits on treatment, yet made no mention of the transfer or sale of the captive. Each of these agreements made the distribution of captives conditional upon a promise of Catholic instruction in exchange for labor; however, this was a governing principle of the captor-captive relationship rather than a justification for the raids. Captive-taking was a strategy aimed at territorial removal and exile rather than the acquisition of a steady labor force.

39 “determino se rrepartiesen entre estos con la pension de servidumbre por dies años con la obligaz.n de enseñarles los misterios de nra S.ta Fe Catholica,...no se permita venta destos prisoneros por deber se tratar como personas libres con sola la pension de servidumbre por diez años” AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1752-01-19.

40 “Entreguese al/a la suplicante el chino/a que solicita obligandos a responder de él en todo tiempo a este superior Gobierno y a mantenerlo vestirlo y educarlo, instruyendolo en los Misterios de nuestra Sagrada Religion sin emplearlo en trabajos duros ni excesivos” AGNA - IX. 21-2-5, (Buenos Aires, 1801-07-21).
Records surrounding two of the largest captive distributions (repartos) involving Charrúas and Minuanes— in Montevideo in 1751 and in Buenos Aires in 1801— provide clues about the intentions of petitioners and the experiences of the indigenous individuals who found themselves in such a predicament. In each instance, as expeditionary forces returned from their campaigns, residents lined up to petition for the rights to newly-arrived captives. Since most captives were women or small children, many petitioners hoped to incorporate them into their households as domestic laborers. After the distribution, however, numerous recipients of captives complained that they were unfit for household duties. Other captors sought conjugal relations with their captives, as occurred in 1798 when a sergeant was killed trying to abscond with a Minuán captive whom he aspired to marry.\footnote{AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Vivora, 1798-10-15).} Individual requests for custody occasionally specified particular profiles for captives, with petitioners often preferring children to adults. Sometimes, officials in charge of the distribution offered captives as gifts: in 1751, for example, Montevideo’s governor sent a Minuán woman to the wife of the Governor of Buenos Aires.\footnote{AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-05-19 & 1751-07-11).} While women and children found themselves claimed by individuals or families, the few men taken captive faced different circumstances. Those who were caciques tended to be separated from their kin and exiled to other locales, as occurred in 1751 when the Minuán cacique Manuá was sent to Buenos Aires.\footnote{AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I. 188.} Others might be sent to public works projects, as occurred with a cacique named Foroñan, likely from Buenos Aires or Patagonia, who was brought to Montevideo with twenty of his kin in 1774 and sentenced to perpetual labor.\footnote{AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 37, Carpeta 6, no 6, 1774-09-22.}

Beginning in 1797, a steady flow of women and children abducted in the expeditions commanded by Jorge Pacheco began to arrive in Buenos Aires little by little via the Uruguay River. Upon arriving in the
city, they were detained at a holding center known as the Casa de la Reclusión de la Residencia.\(^4\) This former Jesuit residence reopened in the 1770s as a detention facility for captives within the jurisdictional limits of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata as well as for orphans, enslaved women, and women whose social behavior was deemed illicit.\(^4\) The experiences of captives who arrived there differed according to provenance. Pampas and other women from lands adjacent to Buenos Aires might be used as ransom for Spanish captives held by neighboring tolderías, while those who came from lands north of the Río de la Plata estuary had no such possibility. The transfer of Charrúas and Minuanes to Buenos Aires constituted a permanent exile and an intentional act of territorial removal.\(^4\) Their distribution to the capital city rather than local settlements was an effort to prevent their escape and return to the countryside. Revealingly, Juan de Ventura Ifrán, the leader (comisionado) of an expedition against tolderías, complained in 1800 about instructions to take captives to one of Yapeyú’s ranches.

> It would be useful if you could tell me where I should put these infidel prisoners. I should explain that it is necessary to have them under all custody and security, anything to the contrary and they will all run away….I find it to be necessary that the said families be sent to that town where they will be more secure because in the San Marcos [ranch] they remain exposed to the invasion of others from their nation.\(^4\)

Since the purpose of captivity was territorial removal, it was necessary to relocate captives to distant places where they could not escape or be rescued by their kin.

\(^4\) AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Yapeyú, 1798-08-17; Capilla de Mandizoby, 1798-08-25; Salto Chico del Uruguay, 1798-08-29, 1798-09-26, 1798-10-13; Buenos Aires, 1798-09-06, 1798-08-16); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Puerto de S. José, 1797-09-26; Cuchilla de Tacuarembó, 1797-10-14; Buenos Aires, 1797-10-02).


\(^4\) Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”: 6.

\(^4\) “Sirvase decirme en donde debo poner estos infieles apresados: deviendo exponerle que se necesita tenerlos bajo de toda custodia y seguridad, y a lo contrario se han de huir todos…hallo ser preciso que dhas familias las mande pasar a ese pueblo en donde estarán con mas seguridad, porque en [la estancia de] San Marcos quedan expuestas a la imbasion de los de su Nacion” AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 1, f. 29-29v.
In addition to the territorial disorientation that captives would likely have experienced, their subsequent distribution in the city would have separated them from most of their kin. A survey of the 1801 distribution of Charrúa and Minuán captives shows that no more than three went to any given household (Table 5.3). Those claimed by a single household were generally mothers and children; however, they too faced separation at times.\footnote{AGNA - IX. 9-2-9, transcribed in Leonel Cabrera Pérez, “La incorporación del indígena de la Banda Oriental a la sociedad colonial/nacional urbana,” Revista TEFROS 9 (Agosto 2011): 10. See also: Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”; 9–10.}

Furthermore, being bound to individuals or families made captives subject to

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
RECIPIENT OF CAPTIVE & TITLE & ADULTS & CHILDREN & INFANTS \\
\hline
María Teresa García & Widow of Former President-Elect & 25 years & M; 4 years & F; 4 years \\
Gregorio Ramos Expindola & & 40 years & F; 1.5 years & \\
Mariano José Sánchez & Bishopric Priest & 36 years & F; 4 months & \\
Vicente García Grande y Cárdenas & & 24 years & F; 6 months & \\
María Antonia Suio & Vecina & 36 years & F; 1 months & \\
Laureana Mancilla & & 20-21 years & F; 1-1.5 years & \\
José Antonio Sánchez & Josef Sanchez's son & 22-24 years & F; 6-7 months & \\
Ana Ynes Seyer & Vecina & 24 years & F; 5 months & \\
Manuel Ignencio de Uriarte & & & F; 7-8 years & \\
Josefá Gabriela Ramos Mexico & & & F; 2-3 years & \\
Martina Palacios & Vecina & 40 years & S; 8 months & \\
José Ignacio de Picazarri & Priest & 20 years & S; 3-4 months & \\
Tomasa Escalada & & & F; 6-8 years & \\
Buenaventura Berenguier & Vecino & & M; 4 years & \\
Mauricio Berlanga & Lieutenant & & M; 6-7 years & \\
José García Martínez de Casares & Commander & M; N/A & & \\
Agustín Rameri & Captain & 20 years & M; 2-3 years & \\
Francisco María Sempol & Ayudante & 20 years & F; 1 months & \\
Juan Clavería & Vecino & & F; 3 years & \\
Bernarda Perez de la Rosa & Vecina & 38 years & F; 1 months & \\
Gregorio Ramos Expindola Mejia & & & F; 9 years & \\
Bartolina de San Luis y Boyso & & 40 years & & \\
María Concepción & & N/A & N/A & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textit{Table 5.3 – Charrúas and Minuanes Distributed at the Casa de la Reclusión, July 1801}\footnote{AGNA - IX. 21-2-5, (Buenos Aires, 1801-07-21).}
their changing residences, particularly if the individual was a military official. Such was the case for
Francisca, a Minuán woman who was stabbed to death in Buenos Aires in 1774. Francisca was a servant and
the only individual identified as “minuana” in the house of Lieutenant Coronel Lucas Infante, who had
brought her to the city from Maldonado. 51 Similarly, following the 1751 distribution in Montevideo, a
surgeon brought a captive Minuana and her daughter with him to Buenos Aires, and following the 1801
distribution in Buenos Aires, another Minuana had to move with her captors to the frontier settlement of
Luján. 52

Not all captives found themselves in the households of petitioning families. Following the 1750
campaign against tolderías near the Gualeguay and Uruguay rivers, administrators in Santa Fe marched 339
captives across the Paraná River to establish a reduction north of the city. This settlement, Nuestra Señora
de la Concepción de Cayastá, was designed both as a forced exile for captives and as a buffer between the
plaza and Abipones and Mocovíes from the Chaco. 53 Accordingly, it included a walled exterior and an
adjacent fort (Map 5.1). Authorities in Santa Fe had sought to erect a fort in this area as early as 1726, and
the foundation of an advance settlement instead would “enable the residents [of Santa Fe] to recover their

51 AGNA - IX. 39-8-8, leg. 284, exp. 13; AGNA - IX. 4-3-3, (Campo de las Vacas, 1761-06-02).
52 AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-05-19); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 187–88; Aguirre, “Cambiando de
perspectiva”: 10.
53 This reduction, operated by the Franciscan order, represented one of three that they operated to the west of the Paraná River,
along with San Jerónimo de Abipones (1748) and San Francisco Javier de Mocovíes (1753). AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1756-04-
10; Sallaberry, Los charraías y Santa Fe, 266–78; Florencia Sol Nesis, Los grupos mocovi en el siglo XVIII (Buenos Aires: Sociedad
Argentina de Antropología, 2005), 89–97; Carina P. Lucaioli, Abipones en las fronteras del Chaco: Una etnografía histórica sobre el siglo
XVIII (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2011), 107–21. In purpose, these reductions resembled settlements
populated by genízaros in the north of New Spain, given their strategic position as a defensive buffer between Spanish settlers and
independent native peoples. In the case of Cayastá, however, its occupants constituted an exile community who had little
knowledge of the lands they had come to occupy, served no military purpose, and could not claim any legal right to return to
their homeland and kin. See: James Brooks, “We Betray Our Own Nation: Indian Slavery and Multi-Ethnic Communities in the
Southwest Borderlands,” in Indian Slavery in Colonial América, ed. Alan Gallay, 319–52 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2009), 322, 324, 326, 331, 337.
former possessions” by providing a first line of defense. Indeed, within five years of Cayastá’s founding, its inhabitants found themselves subject to raids from “rebels from these nations [Charrúas, Mocovíes,

Map 5.1 – Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Cayastá

54 “posibilitará al vecindario recuperar antiguas posesiones.” AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de 1750-09-11, 1750-09-25, & 1795-11-09; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, 402v.

55 AGNA - IX. 31-6-6, leg. 33, exp. 975.
Abipones], many of whom remain dispersed and unsubjugated."56 Over the course of the next forty years, the reduction repeatedly endured attacks, droughts, plagues of locusts, and insufficient aid by residents of Santa Fe, who had agreed to support the settlement militarily and with livestock. By 1790, Cayastá’s population totaled less than sixty adults, one sixth of the number of original settlers, and three years later it was abandoned completely. Many of these individuals left for the countryside and incorporated themselves into other tolderías, while others likely found employment in or around Santa Fe.57

**Worlds Together**

The acquisition and distribution of indigenous captives generated long paper trails, yet these individuals were not the only ones who moved from tolderías to plazas. A handful of eighteenth-century records exist of people identified as Charrúa or Minuán who lived in plazas and neighboring ranches in all corners of the region. While isolated and infrequent, the appearance of such individuals in imperial records points to broader patterns of activity and indicates the probable presence of others in similar circumstances. Their activities belie the conceptual divide between sedentary and mobile societies and challenge the notion that the waning numbers of tolderías at the turn of the nineteenth century signified the elimination of peoples who had inhabited them. A close look at available evidence reveals the challenges that such individuals faced and the strategies they employed, both legal and extralegal, to make lives for themselves.

To search for evidence of Charrúas or Minuanes living within the walls of Santa Fe, Buenos Aires, Rio Grande, or Montevideo is to look for a needle in a haystack. In the abundant imperial and ecclesiastical records generated daily in these plazas and others, few accounts exist of individuals identified by the

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56 “los rebeldes de estas naciones, que mucho se mantienen dispersos sin sugesion.” AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1755-09-09.

57 AGNA - IX. 7-2-1, (Buenos Aires, 1782-05-21 & 1792-01-13); AGNA - IX. 37-5-3, (Pueblo de la Concepción, 1789-08-01 & 1790-06-30; Santa Fe, 1790-10-19; s/l, 1793-04-29). Among those who abandoned Cayastá were the Salcedo family, caciques who integrated into tolderías east of the Uruguay River. It is unclear how many of their kin followed their movements, but the sharp decline in the reduction’s population indicates that it did not serve to contain the exiled captives.
ethnonyms most often assigned to tolderías. Nonetheless, this paucity of sources derives more from the
perceptions of imperial writers and their inability to monitor the activities of their own farms and ranches
than from a physical absence of such actors. Principally, ethnic identifiers ceased to be significant or
perceptible to record-keepers once an individual was separated from a toldería. Terms such as Charrúa and
Minuán were a means for officials to catalog and conceptualize the many tolderías that occupied the
countryside, and carried little weight within the walls of a given plaza. Their application to an individual
was contingent upon that person’s perceptible connection to a toldería – living within it, acting on behalf of
it, or having recently left it – and the greater the temporal and geographical distance that people had put
between themselves and the toldería from which they came, the less likely they would appear in record-
books with a specific ethnonym.

Myriad generic terms were employed to situate individuals within the social milieu of the lettered
city, replacing the ethnonyms that had previously associated them with tolderías. These included terms that
indicated indigenous ancestry, such as Indian (indio) or Indian woman (china); some that emphasized age,
such as pre-adolescent child (párulo) or infant (criatura); others that highlighted occupation, such as
domestic laborer (criada), peon (peon), or attached household dependent (agregado); and some that pointed
to color, such as mulatto (mulato). Such identifiers occasionally appeared alongside ethnonyms, particularly
in the cases of new arrivals to a given locale, yet tended to replace them over the course of an individual's
lifetime. Even when an individual entering into a plaza had a clear association with a toldería, as occurred
with captives, that association sometimes disappeared from the documentary record over time. Likewise,
ethnic identifiers tended not to cross generational boundaries, as few sources mention “Charrúa” or
“Minuán” children born in a particular plaza or adults who were taken captive and distributed in their
infancy or youth. Part of the reason for this transition may have been the forcible breaking of kinship ties
through the distribution of captives or the occlusion of ancestry through mestizaje, yet not all inhabitants in
plazas were subject to distributions. The principal exception was at Cayastá, where individuals continued to
appear as Charrúa into the 1790s. In this instance, however, the reduction itself was associated with Charrúa captives and was distant from the plaza of Santa Fe. It is therefore more likely that "Charrúa" functioned as a catch-all term for its inhabitants, similar to "Guaraní" in the thirty Jesuit missions, "Abipones" in San Géronimo, or "Mocovíes" in San Javier.58

Records regarding native individuals on the outskirts of a given plaza, working or living on farms or ranches, also provide few mentions of ethnonyms. Despite evidence suggesting that tolderías’ inhabitants worked as seasonal laborers, traded with local settlers, and tamed horses for them, they largely remained invisible to imperial and ecclesiastical record-keepers or too unremarkable to warrant mention. This overall absence from the documentary corpus did not signify physical absence, but the limited reach of the lettered city. Christian baptism or marriage were not prerequisites to participating in ranching activities, and the few censuses that included rural households did not account for nonresident laborers.59 As a result, it is difficult to estimate the numbers of individuals from tolderías who inhabited or participated in the economies of plazas and their adjacent ranches. Moreover, the lack of ethnonyms prevents the association of records regarding Indians or laborers with emigrants from tolderías.60

Combing through eighteenth-century civil records, one nonetheless finds a few mentions of individuals identified by ethnonym, almost always Charrúa or Minuán. These references varied

58 Unlike captive distributions in Montevideo and Buenos Aires, the establishment of Cayastá was not designed to break kinship ties. Whereas distributions aimed to incorporate captives into a creolized social order, the reduction instead sought to transform “indios infeles” to “indios de misión” through exile and separation from Spanish settlements. Its purpose was therefore not acculturation, but instead “Indianization.” Guillermo Wilde, “Indios misionados y misioneros indianizados en las tierras bajas de América del Sur: sobre los límites de la adaptación cultural,” in La indianización: Cautivos, renegados, "hommes libres" y misioneros en los confines americanos (s. XVI-XIX), ed. Salvador Bernabéu Albert, Christophe Giudicelli and Gilles Havard, 291–310 (Madrid y París: Ediciones Doce Calles; Écoles des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2012).


60 The propensity of imperial record-keepers to omit ethnonyms has created a formidable hurdle to the study of a Charrúa or Minuán diaspora. Future research will require large-scale data collection and triangulation in order to identify individuals via the households of their captors or other individuals to whom they were directly associated.
geographically and in content, and they ranged from baptisms in Rio Grande to marriages in Montevideo to domestic disputes in Buenos Aires. Though infrequent and scattered, they nonetheless demonstrate the presence of individuals associated (or previously associated) with tolderías in each of the region’s plazas. This includes not only plazas that had neighboring tolderías, but places where Charrúas and Minuanes were seemingly absent. For example, before the wave of blandengue raids that swept across the northern portion of the region, numerous individuals identified as Charrúa were already living in Buenos Aires. This included Josef Ramos (1794), María Mercedes Charrúa (1796), Josef Maria Charrúa (1797), and Juana Manuela Benita Peralta (1797), all of whom were baptized as children and appear to have been distributed among the city’s elites (recinos). It is also clear that Charrúa and Minuán women were taken as far away as Chile and Rio de Janeiro, the former through captivity and the latter for reasons that are unclear. More significantly, decades after the supposed expulsion of Charrúas from lands between the Paraná and Uruguay rivers, individuals identified as Charrúa appeared in Santa Fe’s prison. They included Felipe Antonio Silva, for having drawn a knife against a priest; José Bernardo Ramírez, for having freed an Indian woman from prison; José Bernardo Campuzano, who was perhaps a descendant of the cacique Campusano, for having abducted a woman in the countryside; and Juan Bautista, for theft. Given their Christian names, these


62 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg 1, exp 1; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 59-62 AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 17, Doc 3580. Between 1776 and 1802, 67 Charrúas and 9 Minuanas were baptized in the La Merced and Concepción parishes in Buenos Aires. Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”: 5.

individuals appear to have been baptized, and were possibly former residents of Cayastá, although their presence in Santa Fe and the adjacent countryside indicates that they had since left.

In other plazas, migrants from tolderías arrived for reasons other than captivity and comprised a more visible presence. In 1747, a man from Buenos Aires, Esteban Rodríguez, and a Minuán woman named Josefa baptized their daughter in Rio Grande, with the plaza’s governor acting as godfather. Two years later, 54 Minuanes were baptized in what was likely a ceremonial pact between the plaza and numerous caciques, and 23 more received the same sacrament in 1753. Of the 54 baptized in 1749, exactly half were listed as children or grandchildren of caciques, while the only cacique baptized was José Ladino (Table 5.4). The baptisms were sex-segregated, with male recipients going first followed by females; almost all the females had godparents listed next to their names, while none appeared next to the males. The baptismal records do not articulate the motives, but the caciques presumably entrusted their daughters and other girls to Portuguese families in an effort to establish kinship ties. In the same way, Portuguese godparents would have been able to use these bonds as a means to gain access to the countryside. In the decade following the baptisms, several Minuanes also married in Rio Grande, although it is unclear whether these were the same individuals who had been baptized years before or others who lived in and around the


65 Ladino was baptized at some point before this event, and while his actions suggest a certain position of authority, sources do not directly refer to him as a cacique. It is possible that he was the same “José” who was baptized in Rio Grande in 1739. López Mazz and Bracco, Minuanos, 146.

66 Martha D. Hameister, “‘No princípio era o caos’: a formação de um povoado na fronteira americana dos Impérios Ibéricos através do estudo das relações do compadrio,” Revista de História Regional 15, no. 2 (2010): 110–5. Both sides would have benefitted from such ties: Portuguese settlers would gain access to the countryside and Minuán caciques would gain allies, access to external goods, and potential clients to add to their broader networks of authority.
plaza. Similar cases of baptism occurred over the years in Buenos Aires, San Borja, and Colónia do Sacramento.\textsuperscript{67}

<table>
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<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 – Caciques with Children Baptized in Rio Grande, 1747-1750\textsuperscript{68}

Numerous civil and criminal records from Montevideo provide perhaps the most detailed glimpse into the activities of individuals who resided around plazas.\textsuperscript{69} These accounts reveal numerous women identified as “indias minuanas” marrying, serving as witnesses in marriages, baptizing their children, and utilizing the legal system to settle civil disputes. Spouses included other Indians and Afro-descendants (pardos), almost all of whom were migrants to Montevideo; none was identified as Minuán. Their places of origin included the Jesuit-Guaraní missions, Paraguay, Santo Domingo Soriano, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santiago del Estero, Mendoza, and Valparaíso, Chile, indicating that they too had been separated from local

\textsuperscript{67} FURG - Centro de Documentação Histórica, Microfilme 16, cited in: Carolina López Israel, “As relações de fronteira no início do século XVIII a partir de um estudo demográfico de Rio Grande,” Biblos 20 (2006): 53, 62. Baptisms in Buenos Aires likely occurred in the seventeenth century, while those in San Borja are based upon Jesuit Juan José Rico’s 1743 estimate that one third of San Borja’s population was Güenoa. Nicolás del Techo, Historia de la Provincia del Paraguay 2 (Madrid: A. de Uribe y Compañía, 1897); Versión del texto Latino por Manuel Serrano y Sans, 175; AGI - Charcas, 384, “Petición del Procurador de la Compañía de Jesús, padre Juan José Rico (s/f), pero visto en consejo en (1743-10-17)”; Aurélio Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Segunda Parte), Jesuítas no Sul do Brasil Volume IV (Porto Alegre: Livraria Selbach, 1954), 44.

\textsuperscript{68} *Casildo’s grandson was also baptized. "Brasil, Rio Grande do Sul, Registros da Igreja Católica, 1738-1952,” images, FamilySearch.

\textsuperscript{69} From 1726 to 1773, the city conducted four censuses, some of which extended into the adjacent countryside. Isabel Barreto Messano, “Padrones y archivos parroquiales en el Uruguay” in Poblaciones históricas, 100.
kinship networks. These marriages thus point to an effort to develop new familial ties and social networks, as witnesses also tended to be outsiders to the region. The dates of these unions – most occurred in the 1750s and 1760s – indicate certain entry points for such "indias minuanas." Many appeared as criadas of military officials or vecinos, indicating that they had arrived in the plaza during the 1751 distribution. In some instances, they remained identified with the person who had claimed them in the distribution, but in others they gained release from their custody. For example, a woman named Juana de Rivas appeared as the criada of Francisco Cardoso in the record of her 1754 marriage, yet in 1772, she reportedly lived on a ranch belonging to Pedro Almeida; Cardoso had died in 1774. Similarly, María Josepha Gutiérrez’s 1759 marriage record notes that she was the criada of Francisco Gutiérrez, but a decade later she appeared living on a farm (chacra) outside of the city with her sister-in-law. Some records noted that other Minuán women were living outside the city in the nearby countryside during the 1760s, raising the possibility that they maintained relations with the Minuán tolderías that made peace with the plaza during those years.

The appearance of Minuán and Charrúa men in several records from Montevideo’s countryside intimates that their arrival was not linked to captivity. A census of Montevideo’s armed forces in 1772 and 1773 identified three Charrúa men within a company of foreigners (forasteros) that included individuals from the Jesuit-Guaraní missions, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, and even Brazil. These three lived on the outskirts of Montevideo’s jurisdiction, near the Río Santa Lucía, and their ages – one was about 50 years old, while the others were born in the mid-1750s – and assigned ethnonym means they were probably not captives from the city’s 1750 expedition. The circumstances that led them to participate in this

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70 Juan Alejandro Apolant, *Génesis de la familia uruguaya* (Montevideo: Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay, 1966), 176-8, 351-2, 384, 369, 387, 406, 467-71, 480, 512-3, 534, 609-11, 630-631, 661-2, 802. The principal exception to this rule was Felipa García, the illegitimate daughter of a man from Cordoba and “una de sus minuanas.” She married a soldier in Maldonado. ibid., 264.

71 Ibid., 167-8, 369, 609-11.

72 Ibid., 512-13; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 30, No. 8.
company are unclear, but their location placed them far away from any tolderías identified as Charrúa. At the same time as census-takers were tallying these Charrúa men, Montevideo’s police sought out a Minuán named Francisco Camejo for having killed a man on a ranch outside the city. The manhunt came to no avail, as Camejo absconded to the countryside and the investigation was soon abandoned. Camejo’s presence on the ranch and ability to find refuge in the countryside show that despite the disappearance of Minuán tolderías from local source material, some individuals remained. Indeed, a decade before Camejo’s name appeared in judicial records, Minuán caciques had brokered an agreement with Montevideo’s cabildo to allow individuals from their tolderías to work in Montevideo’s ranches.

The young men of their nation with license from their caciques to work on the ranches and farms will be able to do so only if they desire, certain that the Lord Governor will compensate them for their work in the event that there is any neglect by the people who contracted them. In spite of a 1767 military campaign that supposedly expelled nearby tolderías, Montevideo’s cabildo confirmed the sustained presence of Minuanes in its residents’ ranches in a 1789 session. The cabildo concluded that “they were useful on the ranches and many [ranch owners] maintained them there for convenience and in order to gather livestock.”

Living within the jurisdiction of a given plaza placed Charrúas and Minuanes under the watchful yet limited gaze of imperial authorities. In 1758, authorities in the Rosario district, near Santo Domingo Soriano, sought to apprehend a Christian Charrúa woman on account of her alleged drunkenness.

According to reports, the woman had expended all of her husband’s possessions, although it is unclear

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74 AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 26, No. 43.
75 “los Muchachos Desu Nacion con Lisencia desus Casiques conchabarse enlas estancias, y Chacras podrian bien hacerlo asu Voluntad sola Seguros de el S.or Gov.or les haria satisfas.r su trabajo en caso Deq.e en esto hubiese alguna òmision para las Personas quelos Conchavasen” Revista del Archivo General Administrativo, 392.
76 “eran hombres utiles en las Estancias, y varios los mantenian en ellas por conveniencia propia, y con el fin de recojer el Ganado.” AGI - Buenos Aires, 107, (Montevideo, 1789-03-05).
whether he had been the one to notify authorities. In response, local administrators confiscated her goods and “deposited her children in houses where they would be educated.” Given the proximity of tolderías at the time, however, Soriano’s authorities were fearful that the woman and her remaining son might contact their kin and incite them to attack, and thus returned to apprehend them as well. To their chagrin, they were only able to locate the son. The report did not mention whether this woman was one of the Charrúas who had been supported by Santo Domingo Soriano around this time, nor did it directly link her to the attacks by tolderías against nearby ranches the previous year. Nonetheless, much like Camejo, she faced imperial measures of social control, and her principal mode of resistance was a return to nearby tolderías. Escape to a toldería was not always an option, however, particularly for those who had been separated from their kinship communities through captivity. For example, María Francisca Torre and Josepha Plaza, two Minuán women who were domestic laborers in Montevideo, found themselves enveloped in a 1770 scandal that involved their husbands, two pardo shoemakers. They and their husbands were sentenced to exile in Buenos Aires and the penalty for return would be ten years of labor. Without a nearby toldería to which they could escape, the woman found themselves with few options but to accept their fate.

In some instances, Charrúas or Minuānes living in plazas utilized the legal system to their individual or collective benefit. In 1773, a Minuán woman named Juana Arnero brought a case against a man with whom she was living on account of his failure to follow through with a promise of marriage and his mistreatment of her children. Her case was successful and the man was exiled to Buenos Aires the following month. Similarly, in 1790, a Charrúa man named Cipriano Lencias petitioned the viceroy directly

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77 “deposición con los demás hijos menores en casas donde los hubercasen” AGNA - IX, 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-12-05).

78 Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya, 630–31; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 39, No. 13.

79 AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 28, No. 31. It is possible that this was the same woman – Juana de Rivas – who had achieved separation from the man to whom she was entrusted upon captivity. Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya, 176-8, 369, 609-11.
regarding the poor treatment, scarcity of food and clothing, and poor administration of the Cayastá reduction. His case, in which he compared the reduction to others nearby (San Jerónimo and San Javier), caught the attention of authorities in Buenos Aires, who initiated an investigation into its mismanagement. Three years later they ordered the reduction’s evacuation.\footnote{AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1790-10-15; AGNA - IX. 37-5-3, f. 1-28v, 36-36v.} Lencias’s petition was not the first attempt by Cayastá’s inhabitants to bring their case before regional authorities; it followed a 1782 complaint to Franciscan authorities and a request by one of its caciques in Santa Fe to be named administrator.\footnote{AGNA - IX. 7-2-1, (Buenos Aires, 782-05-21); AGNA - IX. 37-5-3, f. 24.} When taken together, these cases reveal Charrúas’ and Minuanes’ occasional use of imperial forms of authority. While too small a sample to represent a broader trend, they nonetheless demonstrate the capacity of individuals to adapt to the modes of justice available in plazas.

Movement from tolderías to plazas was not always unidirectional or permanent, and a return to one’s toldería did not always indicate conflict with imperial authorities. Some individuals drew upon their ability to move between plazas and tolderías, as well as their connections to people in diverse locales, as a means to personal gain. One of the Minuán children baptized in Rio Grande in 1749, Joseph Francisco, demonstrates this dynamic. A close look at the baptismal records from that date suggests that Joseph was the son of the cacique Casildo and six years old at the time of the event. Although no godparents appear next to his name, he maintained close ties with Portuguese settlers over the years, working as a bricklayer and later as a ranch hand near Rio Pardo. Years later, Spanish authorities apprehended him near Maldonado, where his mother was said to have lived, and nearly sentenced him to death. From there he escaped, and by 1772, several contrabandists had contracted him to extract livestock from near Santa Tecla in order to establish a new ranch in Portuguese lands. Joseph had become so well known that when demarcation teams
passed near the Rio Camaquã they noted that one of the river’s main crossings had been named after him.\textsuperscript{82} His story reveals the opportunities available for individuals who were able to move not only between plazas and tolderías, but across the interimperial divide. The son of a cacique who had built bonds to both Portuguese settlers in Rio Grande and Spanish settlers in Maldonado, he used his knowledge of the countryside to work as a ranch hand, to guide contrabandists, and to earn wages moving livestock.

These opportunities did not extend only to children of caciques, nor were such networks restricted to Portuguese contrabandists. Several years after Spanish officials apprehended “Joseph the Minuán” on his way to Rio Pardo, a Minuán boy named Francisco found himself in a similar situation. Only ten to twelve years old at the time, Francisco was transporting livestock to a known contrabandist in Montevideo when Spanish authorities arrested him. An investigation into his past revealed that years earlier his godfather had turned him in to Montevideo’s police for having stolen horses from a ranch near Santa Teresa. He was then claimed by one of Montevideo’s vecinos, Miguel de Larraya, who took him back to his house. Larraya soon returned Francisco to the prison after he had stolen clothing, and the boy again found himself claimed by one of the city’s elites. He escaped soon after, and began to move between ranches and farmhouses, stealing from one and escaping to another. He eventually became associated with a Paraguayan contrabandist and the two made a living for some time moving livestock between Montevideo and Rio Pardo.\textsuperscript{83} Unlike Joseph, Francisco appears to have been the product of captivity, as he was continually entrusted to elite individuals. Nonetheless, from a young age, he was able to participate in networks of unsanctioned trade between different plazas in the eastern portion of the region. While the details of his case describe his association with contrabandists, the information that it omitted warrants further interrogation. Why did Francisco begin to steal horses at such a young age? To whom would he have sold them? What made him


\textsuperscript{83} AGI - Buenos Aires, 542, (Santa Teresa, 1778-01-22; Buenos Aires, 1778-01-29).
identifiably Minúan, rather than an “indio,” like so many others? More evidence would be necessary to provide definitive answers, yet given the time and places of his activities, it is possible that he forged new connections with Minúan tolderías or with other individuals associated with them.

The movement of people back and forth between tolderías and plazas positioned certain individuals as intermediaries between them. These “go-betweens” occupied a variety of roles, from translators to guides to commercial brokers, and their actions shaped both the trajectory of events and the messages communicated and recorded in intercultural exchanges. Details on particular “go-betweens” are scarce, yet these individuals were present in many recorded interactions between plazas and tolderías, often occupying central roles.  

Nearly every Portuguese, Spanish, or missionary foray beyond the immediate reach of a plaza required a guide who knew the countryside and the locations of tolderías. For example, in his 1705 journey from the San Borja mission to the Vaquería del Mar, Jesuit Silvestre González traveled with several Guenoa guides, who helped his troop avoid interactions with tolderías of Guenos and Yaros. Likewise, when imperial or ecclesiastical agents sought out tolderías, they frequently relied upon native individuals who had come from them to seek them out, as occurred in 1731 when Francisco de Borja, a Guenoa man, guided a Jesuit peace commission to his former toldería. Similar patterns occurred throughout the eighteenth century, during military campaigns, peace initiatives, mapping expeditions, and borderland patrols. Nonetheless, travel logs that named guides did not always ascribe ethnonyms to them, thus

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84 Alida C. Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); Yanna Yannakakis, The Art of Being In-Between: Native Intermediaries, Indian Identity, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). While the concept of a "go-between" can apply to a wide variety of actors, I focus here on native intermediaries. It is also important to note that not all individuals who moved from a toldería to a plaza or vice-versa served as go-betweens. Many, such as individuals who ran away to tolderías to evade the imperial legal system, or captives who were exiled, never mediated relations between plazas and tolderías.


86 See Chapter 1.
prohibiting the identification of direct connections to tolderías, and many seem to have been ranch hands, mission-dwellers, or settlers who possessed knowledge of the countryside.

Clear linkages between native intermediaries and specific tolderías are more apparent in instances of baptisms or catechism. For example, the 1749 baptisms of Minuanes in Rio Grande might never have occurred if not for José Ladino, a Minuán who was fluent in Spanish. Although several tolderías had sought refuge at São Miguel earlier in the year, they refused to enter the fort because a Minuán woman had been gravely wounded within its walls. To assuage their apprehension, the Portuguese governor sent a Jesuit priest and Ladino to meet them in the countryside. The Minuanes were “assured by the catechist Ladino that they would find good treatment with the [Jesuits],” and he convinced them to travel to Rio Grande.87 Ladino’s role in the negotiation was threefold: he served as a translator between the priest and the tolderías; he was a catechist, indicating that he also prepared individuals for baptism; and he provided an example for others, as he and several of his children were baptized as well.88 It is unclear whether Ladino was a cacique or how long he had lived in Rio Grande before this event. It is possible that he was from one of the other Minuán tolderías that were already in Rio Grande at the time of the exchange, and his fluency in Spanish rather than Portuguese indicates that he had not lived in the plaza very long. It suggests Ladino had close relations with either the Jesuit-Guarani missions or Spanish settlers near Montevideo and Maldonado. Other intermediaries also facilitated baptisms and settlement on a smaller scale, generally traveling with members of their extended families. In 1731, for example, a man who had been taken captive by Charrúas as a child returned to the Yapeyú mission with his “gentile” wife, their two children, and an old woman who had

87 “assegurados pela catequista Ladino do bom tratamento que achariam nos Padres,” Serafim Leite, *História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil*, 10 vols. 6 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945), 528–29. According to this document, the baptisms occurred in 1750, but it is more likely that they occurred in 1750. Martha D. Hameister, “Para dar calor à nova povoação: Estudo sobre estratégias sociais e familiares a partir dos registros batismais da Vila do Rio Grande (1738-1763),” (Tese de Doutorado, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2006), 284–85. Regardless, it appears that two groups of Minuanes entered into the plaza of Rio Grande: those who arrived with Ladino in 1749 and those whom he was sent to convince later on.

88 Ibid., 284.
raised him. They were followed later that year by “an Infidel Guenoa with his wife and their nursing child.” Particularly in the first of these two cases, the ties that the former captive held with the Yapeyú mission facilitated not only his return, but the emigration of the rest of his family from the toldería.⁸⁹

Native intermediaries were also integral figures in diplomatic negotiations between plazas and tolderías, both for their linguistic skills and for their familiarity with both sides of the divide. Many of these individuals had been taken captive years earlier, only to serve as negotiators in subsequent expeditions. For example, the 1801 commission from Yapeyú to persuade Charrúa and Minuán tolderías to form a reduction included two Charrúas who lived in Buenos Aires, Antonio Ocalián and Vicente Adeltú. Both were deemed Christian and the latter was a cacique. According to reports from the leader of this endeavor, Juan Ventura Ifrán, these two men had been sent to Buenos Aires years earlier as prisoners, most likely as a result of the Pacheco expeditions. Ifrán requested that Ocalián and Adeltú serve as the principal “ambassadors” (embajadores) to the tolderías because they were “Indians from their same nation,” and he hoped that they could “persuade [the Charrúas and Minuanes] to settle on a reduction and live in peace.”⁹⁰ His plan was to receive the two said ambassadors [at the Salto del Uruguay], Vicente Adeltú and Antonio Ocalián, and then lead and escort them to wherever the Infidel Charrúas and Minuanes were. He would have them go out and negotiate the peace propositions with [the caciques].⁹¹ Rather than serving merely as guides or interpreters, Adeltú and Ocalián were proxies for the viceroy, charged with procuring peace. They worked under the auspices of Ifrán, yet appeared to have autonomy in

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⁸⁹ “un Infiel Guenoâ con su muger y un hijo de pecho” Jaime Cortesão, ed., Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri: Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Paraguai (1703-1751), Manuscritos da Coleção De Ângelis VI (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1955), 164–248. These cases illustrate the mechanisms through which individuals facilitated baptisms; they do not indicate any sort of “spiritual conquest.” Numerous individuals from plazas also found themselves imprisoned after being discovered in tolderías and charged with apostasy. For example: AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1749-12-24.

⁹⁰ “por medio de Vicente Adeltú, y Antonio Ocalian Yndios de su misma Nacion, que fueron remitidos como prisioneros a la Capital de Buenos Ayres…. [Los enviamos para] persuadirles que se reduzcan a vivir en paz” AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 1, f. 19.

⁹¹ “recibirà los dos dichos Embajadores que se hallan en aquel destino, Vicente Adeltù, y Antonio Ocalian, conduciéndolos, y escoltandolos hasta donde halle alguna parcialidad de Ynfielos Charruas, ó Minuanes; en cuio caso los hará salir a tratar con ellos las proposiciones de Paz, y amistad q.e en nombre del Rey” ibid., No. 1, f. 34.
the negotiations. Upon arrival at the tolderías, the two men were the first to speak, offering a presentation to the caciques; after the expedition, they returned to Buenos Aires to provide an official report to the viceroy. The details of Adeltú and Ocalián’s exchange with the caciques escaped the written record, but given the troublesome experiences of other captives in Buenos Aires, their presentation was likely less enthusiastic than Ifrán would have wished. In any case, their position as the principal negotiators reveals at once the dependency of imperial officials upon native intermediaries and the relative autonomy that such individuals could come to possess in negotiations with tolderías.

The ability to communicate in Spanish, Portuguese, or Guaraní also appears to have been a key attribute of many caciques in the region’s tolderías. In many documented encounters in and around tolderías, imperial and ecclesiastical writers noted the languages in which they communicated and whether or not a translator was present. Examples include Moreira, who “knew the Paraguayan language well and even Spanish”; Juan Yasú, who spoke “in the language of Paraguay”; Juan Salcedo, who spoke Spanish; his son Pedro Ignacio Salcedo, who “[spoke] Spanish with much skill, and [spoke] Guaraní, Charrúa, and Minuán perfectly”; and Vaimaca Perú, who spoke Spanish and Portuguese. Being multilingual might even have been a path to becoming cacique, as it positioned one as a linguistic intermediary and was a sign of knowledge of neighboring peoples. This would explain how an individual such as Miguel Ayala Caraí, who

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92 Ibid., No. 1, f. 19-20v, 21-21v, 34-34v, 38, 42-43v, 45. See also: Acosta y Lara, *La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (período hispánico)*, vol. 1, 163.


94 In other regions, such as the Pampas and Patagonia, tolderías sometimes had multiple caciques, each of whom held a different function – caciques of war, caciques of peace, and ceremonial caciques. It is possible that a similar arrangement existed in the Río de la Plata, which would explain both the ability of certain individuals to return to tolderías as cacique and their visibility in imperial sources. See: Lidia R. Nacuzzi, “Repensando y revisando el concepto de cacicazgo en las fronteras del sur de América (Pampa y Patagonia),” *Revista Española de Antropología Americana* 38, no. 2 (2008): 77–8.
was the son of a Spanish man and a Minuán woman, was able eventually to rise to the position of cacique.\footnote{Elisa Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados: as relações de 'amizade' entre os minuanos e os lusitanos no sul da América portuguesa (c. 1750-1800),” \textit{Varia História} 24, no. 40 (jul./dez 2008): 628–9.}

At the same time, fluency in Spanish or Guaraní would necessarily have positioned one as an intermediary in negotiations with plazas, leading counterparts to assume one was a cacique.

The 1763 peace negotiation between Minuanes and Montevideo perhaps best encapsulates the many ties that linked plazas and tolderías despite their many divisions. As Minuán caciques stood in the halls of the cabildo and faced the city’s authorities, their conversation was translated and mediated by “Petrona, an Indian from the same nation who lives among us since she is now a Christian, and also sister of the cacique Don Joseph….[She is a] translator or interpreter for the said Indians, and speaker of our language.”\footnote{“Petrona Yndia Dela misma nas.on que Vive entre nosotros siendo ya Christiana, y hermana del dho Casique d.n Joseph….Yndia Lenguaras ó Ynterprete de dhos Yndios, y ladina en nrô Ydioma.” \textit{Revista del Archivo General Administrativo}, 391.} Given Petrona’s linguistic ability, she had probably inhabited in the city for some time, and was perhaps the same Petrona who married a Pampa Indian in 1755.\footnote{Apolant, \textit{Génesis de la familia uruguaya}, 406. Petrona also appears to have been the sister of Cumandat, since Joseph was his brother. \textit{Revista del Archivo General Administrativo}, 289.} The cabildo record did not indicate who selected her to be interpreter, but her presence nonetheless suggests preexisting kinship ties between the plaza and Minuán tolderías. She was not Joseph’s only family member who lived in the city, either.

The Indian Don Joseph, one of the four caciques in attendance and brother of the Cacique [Cumandat], wanted to remain in the city because his wife lived here. [We communicated that] if he wanted to do so no violence would come upon him, to which [Cumandat] responded that he did not oppose this arrangement and of course he would concede it with pleasure.\footnote{“el Yndio d.n Joseph (vno de los referidos q.tr) hermano del Cacique quería quedarse enestaCiu.d por tener aqui Su mujer Viese Si venia gustoso enello pues no se intentaba hacerle ninguna violencia, sino que arbitrarse en esto a su libre voluntad, a que respondió el Casique que no se le Ofrecia poner reparo alguno en la quedada del dho Yndio pues desde luego la concedía, y dispensaba gustoso.” \textit{Revista del Archivo General Administrativo}, 293; Acosta y Lara, \textit{La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico)}, vol. 1, 112. It is unclear whether Don Joseph’s wife was also Minuán and how she came to live in the city.}

By assuring Joseph’s safe entrance and exit from the city, Montevideo’s officials formally recognized a marriage that crossed the plaza-toldería divide. The accords sought to deepen such ties through economic
exchange as well, and although official peace was short-lived – the city attacked the tolderías in 1767 – the individual ties that it recognized and created persisted nonetheless.99

The End of the Line

The first decade of the nineteenth century was critical for bordermaking and tolderías in the Río de la Plata. In 1801, after Charrúa and Minuán tolderías had taken control of Guaraní mission ranches, Portuguese forces followed their lead and retook possession of the Siete Pueblos east of the Río Uruguay, as well as Batovi, Santa Tecla, and other Spanish settlements along the border. This move necessitated an adjustment of the San Ildefonso line, and officials moved three years later to formalize the de facto division the invasion had produced.100 Tolderías again were central to this dispute, as negotiators debated tolderías' relationships with the two crowns in order to determine whether or not their expulsion of ranchers constituted a Portuguese takeover. Meanwhile, the fighting produced a heavily militarized borderline area, in which Spanish military forces sought simultaneously to prevent further Portuguese advances and to continue their extermination campaigns against Charrúa and Minuán tolderías.101 Portuguese forces aimed to consolidate their gains and expand their own ranching economies, while tolderías began to move back and forth across the new de facto limit for commerce and for refuge against Spanish attacks. This dynamic proved short-lived, as Spanish and Portuguese forces joined in a particularly devastating attack on tolderías

99 AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 14, Carpetas 3 & 4.


101 The 1801 hostilities in the Río de la Plata occurred after the signing of the Treaty of Badajoz, which ended the War of the Oranges between Portugal and a Franco-Hispanic alliance, yet before news of the war’s end had reached the region.
in 1806. Tumult ensued for tolderías, and the next quarter-century witnessed numerous armies and factions moving back and forth across the region. By 1832, tolderías disappeared altogether from the documentary record.

To that point, as we have seen, the various borderlines that came to define imperial action in the late eighteenth century had provided numerous opportunities for tolderías. Whether through developing kinship or tributary relationships with new migrants, creating commercial networks across the interimperial divide, or moving back and forth in times of duress, tolderías near the borderlines did not simply adapt to imperial territorial arrangements, but instead made them their own. Their investment in the opportunities the borderline provided would eventually break down, however. As the borderline area became an increasingly dangerous place, more and more tolderías found themselves exposed to violence and competition. Moreover, as the border had created avenues for personal gain for caciques, the far-flung networks of indigenous authority that reached from mission plazas to Montevideo and Maldonado no longer existed. In the final decades of the century the “caciques of caciques,” or those who ostensibly held authority over numerous tolderías, such as Miguel Ayala Caraí, Batu, Masalana, or Ignacio “El Gordo,” had concentrated themselves near the borderlines. When the border failed to restrict the movements of imperial agents and the alliances predicated upon the border no longer guided imperial action, tolderías’ mobility ceased to be an advantageous strategy. As caciques’ success and their tolderías’ survival had become intimately tied to borderline territorialities, the rupture of these arrangements undermined both.

In the wake of the 1801 hostilities, tolderías experienced two contradictory conditions. First, the de facto borderline incorporated many of their lands into Portuguese dominions. Territory to the south of the Río Ibicuí had been controlled by tolderías when the fighting broke out, and its subsequent acquisition

by the Portuguese was a direct result of their relationships with Charrúas and Minuanes. In order to claim these lands – which once held numerous mission ranches, but had since been abandoned – the Governor of Rio Grande argued:

The wilderness of San Borja, as well as [lands to] the south of the Río Ibicuí and the west of the Río Ibará-puitã, having been abandoned by the Spanish nation beforehand, due to hostilities from Charrúa and Minuán Indians, were nonetheless explored during the war by our repeated patrols as a precaution, and also by militiamen, natives, and those undomesticated Indians who inhabit the solitary highlands in between and are declared enemies of the Spanish.

Given the abandonment of the mission ranches, the continued occupation of these lands by tolderías, and the ability of Portuguese agents to traverse them, the governor considered them to be effectively Portuguese possessions. By pointing out the declared enmity between tolderías and Spaniards – most likely a reference to the Pacheco expeditions – he also sought to undermine Spain’s potential claims to tolderías’ lands through vassalage. In the temporary absence of an official line to determine sovereignty and possession, the Portuguese governor instead relied upon an argument about occupation rights and indigenous independence. If Charrúas and Minuanes were declared enemies of the Spanish crown, the lands that they controlled and Portuguese forces explored during the conflict would necessarily pertain to Portugal. This meant the tolderías would have to cross a new line to gain refuge from Spanish aggression.

103 Make sure that I discussed this issue in the previous chapter. AGNA - IX. 18-2-3, (Yapeyú, 1801-04-17); Poentiz, “Los infieles”; 13.


105 For the first time since the Treaty of Madrid, the juridical concept of uti possidetis guided legal imperial possession in the Río de la Plata, since most of these territories were conquered during the conflict. In addition, Portuguese diplomats sought to discredit Spanish claims that mission inhabitants and tolderías were their vassals; when describing the struggle, they claimed that residents of the Siete Pueblos greeted them as liberators, while Charrúas and Minuanes expelled the Spanish themselves. Regardless of the arguments, however, the pervasive objective of both sides was to restore a functional borderline. ibid., 71 Segarra, Frontera y límites, 22; Frühauf García, As diversas formas de ser índio, 201–2.
without the neutral zone that had existed under the Treaty of San Ildefonso. They knew that by crossing the line, they would move beyond the reach of Spanish attacks.\textsuperscript{106}

The second result of the 1801 fighting was intensified militarization of the borderline area. As occurred after the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcations, officials in both Buenos Aires and Porto Alegre moved to populate the new borderlines with ranches and plazas, including military forts. In the 1780s and 1790s, Spanish authorities had used the presence of autonomous tolderías as a principal justification for the establishment of forts and roving guards along the line. This had produced occasional tensions with officers across the border in Portuguese forts, who accused their Iberian counterparts of moving too close to Portuguese dominions or entering into neutral grounds under the guise of responding to tolderías’ aggressions.\textsuperscript{107} The territorial losses incurred by the Spanish in 1801 made these formerly intermittent disputes a fixture of borderline politics. On numerous occasions between 1801 and 1806, Portuguese officials denounced Spanish officials for using Charrúas and Minuanes as a pretext to reclaim lost lands. The Governor of Rio Grande complained in 1803:

I do not cease to be cautious with those neighbors, principally when I see them keep troops in the countryside. Even though they are more than 100 leagues distant from our frontiers, and they have assured me in two letters that [the troops] are for the Charrúa and Minuán Indians, I am nonetheless always suspicious that they are waiting for some orders from Europe.\textsuperscript{108}

Patrício José Correa da Camara, a military officer at the time, was less circumspect about the situation.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 254–58.

\textsuperscript{107} Disputes over Spanish breaches of the agreed upon line occurred in 1783, 1785, and 1792. These cases demonstrate both Spanish attempts to disregard the borderlines in conflicts with tolderías and the limits on their capacity to do so, given the tensions that it caused with Portuguese officials. ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 5, f. 170-170v; ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac. 1, (Rio Grande, 1792-06-02); BNB - 09,4,14, f. 111v-119, 508v.

\textsuperscript{108} “eu não deixo de estar sempre com toda a cautela naqueles vizinhos, e principalmente em quanto lhe vir conservar Tropa no campo ainda que distantes das nossa Fronteiras para cima de cem legoas, e certificarem-me nas duas cartas ser para os Indios Charruas e Minuanos, com tudo eu sempre estou na desconfiança que elles esperão algumas ordens da Europa” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 63-63v.
[The Spanish] augment their forces little by little with the apparent motive of pursuing Infidel Indians, gauchos, and wrongdoers to the point that they occupy places that they want to add to their system of disputed lands.\textsuperscript{109} For Portuguese officials, Spanish aggressions against tolderías did not constitute the punishment of unruly vassals, but instead a strategy to mitigate the losses incurred in 1801 and even to reconquer lost lands.\textsuperscript{110}

The territorial limits of Spanish engagement with tolderías generated a broader discussion with their Portuguese neighbors regarding territorial possession, sovereignty, and the rights of independent native peoples. With few exceptions, Spanish officials generally respected the de facto borderline in their forays against tolderías. Their first strategy in combatting tolderías’ ability to move back and forth across the borderline was thus to solicit Portuguese enforcement of their side of the border, even before the de facto limit became official. Following the 1801 hostilities, Spanish officials wrote to Francisco João Roscio, Governor of Rio Grande:

Rather than allowing these delinquents and infidels to find refuge in those dominions with the vassals of [the Portuguese Crown], you must have the commanders of that district, for the good harmony, union, and alliance that reigns between our august sovereigns, not only pursue them in common agreement with the Spanish chiefs and commanders, but take interest in their punishment and chastisement as any cultured nation should…. In observance of the existing treaties, your government must conduct itself along the border between the two nations with the circumspection and good faith that they demand.\textsuperscript{111}

Similar requests occurred through the end of 1805, and Portuguese officials repeatedly offered promises to patrol their side of the border. They denied association with tolderías and pointed to their own attempts to

\textsuperscript{109} “elles cada vez augmentarrão mais pouco a pouco as suas forças com o aparente motivo de perseguirem ao infieis, gauxos, e malfeitores até ao ponto de occuparem os lugares que querem adicionar ao sistema das suas disputas.” ibid., f. 255v-256.

\textsuperscript{110} Other instances included: AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 4, Doc 272; AHU - Rio de Janeiro (017), Caixa 208, Doc 14559; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 13, f. 151-2, 155; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 65v-66, 208-209v, 237, 258-9v, 261v.

\textsuperscript{111} “lejos de encontrar estos delincuentes e Infieles abrigo en esos Dominios e vassalos de S.M.F. dispondra V.S. que los Commandantes de ese distrito en justa correspondencia de la buena armonía, union, y alianza que reina entre nuestros Augustos Soveranos, no solo los persignan de comun acuerdo con los Gexes y Commandante Españoles sinoii que por el interes que en su castigo y escarmiento deve tomar toda nacion culta… en observancia de los Tratados subsistentes se conducirá ese Gobierno en punto a limites entre las dos naciones con la circunspeccion, y buena fee, que aquellos exigem” ibid., f. 240v-241.
expel them from certain territories, further contending that the countryside was too large to exercise complete control.\footnote{For example: ibid., f. 65v-66v, 247-8; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 158-162.} Dissatisfaction with Portuguese efforts and the perpetuity of conflict with tolderías led the Spanish to level accusations that the Portuguese were acting in bad faith and violating the statutes of the borderline. An 1804 discovery of clandestine vaquerías that purportedly included both Portuguese vassals and tolderías confirmed their suspicions, and the Spanish decided to act unilaterally.\footnote{Ibid., f. 273-279v, 289-289v, 292-5, 327-331v, 365-74. Portuguese prisoners denied the participation of tolderías in the vaquería, yet affirmed that they were trading partners. Archivo Antigas Tomo II (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1951), 281–323.} Rather than crossing unannounced into lands occupied by Portuguese settlers and soldiers, however, they instead requested license. In 1805, the commander of Spanish forces wrote to the Governor of Rio Grande.

Those barbarians, when they feel persecution [by Spanish forces], find asylum and security, crossing to the dominions of [the Portuguese Crown], aware or suspecting that the armies of the [Spanish] King cannot pursue them there. It is necessary for me to give prior notice to Your Excellency of my intention to have you permit me in this case to enter into those dominions for the sole purpose of pursuing the Infidels, extinguishing them, and finishing them, because this is the only way to prevent the continuous persecution and hostility that this countryside suffers.\footnote{“como esos barbaros al sentir la constancia de la persecucion jurguen hallar asilo, y seguridad, pasando-se a esos Dominios de S.M.F. instruidos, o sospechosos de que las armas de el Rey no puede seguir-los en ellos, me es preciso anticipar a V.Ex.a el aviso de mi determinacion para que me permita en el expuesta caso entrar por esos Dominios con el solo proposito, y objecto unico de perseguir á los Infieles, extinguir-los, e acabar-los, porque solo de este modo pueden prevenir-se los continuados prejuicios, y hostilidades que padecen estos campos” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 263v.}

This petition for access simultaneously acknowledged Portuguese territorial possessions and sought temporarily to suspend the agreed-upon borderline. It also highlighted the relationship between the territorial limits of imperial authority and the incapacity of officials in Buenos Aires and Montevideo to assert control over territories they claimed to possess.

Portuguese responses to this request were invariably negative, and the grounds for their opposition was rooted in precise definitions of imperial territorial possession and tolderías’ natural rights. Rio Grande’s governor answered the commander of the Spanish forces in the following way:
I consider it to go against natural and human rights for me to concur in attacking the savage nations, embroiled in war with your government [if I do not have] a higher order or motives other than the pretext that they do not have any political representation. Consequently, I judge myself unable to permit Your Lordship to pass Portuguese guardposts with an armed force for the purpose of pursuing and finishing your enemies. This would be an injury to the state, would violate its territory, and would harm human rights.\textsuperscript{115}

This two-pronged rejection simultaneously claimed Portuguese territorial possession and positioned tolderías as nonsubjugated actors. The argument for territorial integrity was clear – Portugal had the exclusive right to inflict punishment within the limits of its territory – but the argument for natural rights was more nuanced. The governor suggested that any attack against tolderías was predicated upon the idea that they “had no political representation,” thus marking them as autonomous and not Portuguese vassals. Rather, he treated them as landless peoples over whom he had no authority and for whose actions he therefore had no responsibility, as they occurred outside Portuguese dominions. Moreover, since there was no direct conflict between the tolderías and Portuguese authorities, he saw no justification for attacking them.\textsuperscript{116} He instead offered “neutrality.”

\begin{flushright}
I have resolved to observe the most perfect neutrality, and in that way consent should not be given to Spanish troops breaking the sovereignty and territorial independence [of Portuguese dominions], entering with an armed force beyond our guards, for the purpose of pursuing their enemies. In the same way, all kinds of help and favor to the savages should be denied.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{115}“considero contrario ao direito natural, e das gentes concorrer eu a atacar as Naçães selvagens empenhadão em guerra com esse Governo, sem ordem superior nem outros motivos da minha parte, e unicamente com o pretexto de não terem alguma representação política. Conseguintemente julgo-me tambem nas estreitas circunstancias de não poder permitir que V.S.a passe as guardas Portuguezas com força armada, a fim de perseguir e acabar os seus inimigos, no que se faria uma injuria ao Estado, se violaria o territorio, e se feriria o direito humano” ibid., f. 265-265v.

\textsuperscript{116}This line of argumentation differed markedly from the back and forth between the governors of Buenos Aires and Colônia after the death of Jesuit Manuel González in 1703, as discussed in chapter 2. Whereas in the earlier case, the Spanish governor offered to seek out and punish tolderías for grievances filed by his Portuguese counterpart, the governor of Rio Grande offered no such assurances in 1805. This was due to the fact that his territorial claims did not require him to define tolderías as vassals; they instead derived from the juridical weight of cartographic demarcations and borderline agreements.

\textsuperscript{117}“estou resolvido a observar a mais perfeita neutralidade, e assim como não deve consentir se que as Tropas Hespanholas quebrantem a Soberania e independência do Territorio, entrando com força armada para dentro das nossas guardas, afim de perseguirem seus inimigos, da mesma sorte deve negar-se todo o genero de ajuda e favor aos selvagens”ibid., f. 265-265v, 270-270v; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 271-2.
A position of neutrality enabled the governor to honor his duty to maintain the border without being forced to attack Charrúa and Minuán tolderías, who were useful allies.

Meanwhile, authorities in Rio Grande were simultaneously negotiating with tolderías. Most notably, in September of the following year, a Charrúa cacique named Gaspar traveled to Porto Alegre and made pacts with the cabildo. In justifying the agreement, the governor argued:

Such an alliance is of utmost interest to the State, in the event of any breaking [of peace] with the bordering nation, since these individuals are the most dexterous in the handling of horses and the most practiced in this countryside. For these reasons, they have always been made to dread the Spanish, who anxiously desire their total extinction. In this way, during times of peace, they will serve us as a formidable barrier against any surprises by our neighbors, and in [times of] war, without expenditures of the Royal Coffers, they will augment the number of [fighters on our side].

By striking a mutual defense agreement, he hoped to procure a buffer against potential Spanish incursions into recently claimed lands. Gaspar’s tolderías were located south of the Río Ibicuí, lands principally controlled by tolderías and claimed by Portugal in the 1801 hostilities. Whereas Spanish troops sought tolderías’ extermination, the Portuguese governor saw them as useful allies who could access the Spanish side of the border and prevent Spain from entering Portuguese dominions without his having to claim responsibility for their actions.

For tolderías, since Portuguese officials in Porto Alegre were unable to enforce arrangements in the countryside, the borderline eventually ceased to be a means of protection. While the Governor of Rio Grande and the Spanish commander of the region sought to resolve hostilities between tolderías and Spanish

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118 “tal alliança é de summa interesse ao Estado, na occasião de algum rompimento com a Nação confinante, sendo estes indivíduos os mais destros no manejo dos cavallos, e os mais práticos desta campanha, por cujos motivos se tem feito sempre temer e recear dos Hespanhoses, que aniosamente deseja a sua total extinção e assim no tempo da paz servindo-nos d’uma formidável barreiro contra qualquer surpreza dos nossos visinhos, na guerra, sem despeza á Real Fazenda, aumentarão o numero dos hostilizadores” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 286-8.

119 Portuguese officials also made pacts with Minuán tolderías during these same years. ibid., f. 252-3, 268v-71. For more on the pacts between “Dom Gaspar” and Portuguese authorities in Porto Alegre, see: Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 258–63.
ranchers in a way that would preserve the borderline, blandengue captain Jorge Pacheco procured support from Portuguese captain Antonio Adolfo as well as a contingent of gauderios. In exchange for an attack on tolderías, Pacheco offered fourteen thousand head of cattle to Adolfo and six pesos to each gauderio. In April of 1806, Pacheco reported having raided three tolderías, killing 46 inhabitants and capturing 67 more, whom he remitted to Buenos Aires. His expedition soon ended, however, and before long, invasions by English ships along the coast diverted the attention of Spanish imperial officials. Nonetheless, the collaboration between Spanish blandengues, Portuguese troops, and gauderios constituted an unprecedented rupture of the borderline arrangement that tolderías had come to manage efficiently.

Whereas late-eighteenth-century borderlines had produced predictable territorial practices on the part of imperial officials, this breach restructured power dynamics and undermined standing pacts.

By 1806, attempts to map the de facto borderline also fell by the wayside. Following the 1801 conflict, officials on both sides had made calls to formalize the de facto interimperial division through renewed expeditions. The former demarcation official, Francisco João Roscio, who had become Governor of Rio Grande, complained that his Spanish counterparts wanted to “alter the entire system and order of the Legislation of Limits,” and that the former head of the Spanish demarcation teams had already returned to Spain. Two years later, however, the Spanish Viceroy in Buenos Aires replied that he wanted to establish a

120 AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Tacuarembó Chico, 1806-01-20, 1806-02-01, 1806-02-28, 1806-03-28; Buenos Aires, 1806-03-16, 1806-04-12; Pontos de Nhandei, 1806-02-25; Chacra, 1806-02-17; Campamento en el Ibirapuitá-guazú, 1806-04-24); Frühauf Garcia, *As diversas formas de ser índio*, 254–58. Pacheco and other Spanish officials had appealed for a joint expedition with their Portuguese counterparts against tolderías since at least the previous year. See: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 241v-244v, 267-286v; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 156-7, 159-162. Two years before this expedition, prisoners interrogated by Pacheco estimated that there were about 400 to 600 people living in tolderías in the countryside, suggesting that while significant, this attack only involved a portion of tolderías. *Archivo Artigas*, Tomo II, 311, 316. Pacheco continued his campaign for another year, and he claimed to be closing in on seven of nine remaining tolderías. Nonetheless, it appears that he never engaged them between that moment and the end of his tenure as blandengue captain in 1810. AGNA - IX. 18-3-7, (Belén, 1807-07-29); Guillermo Wilde, “Guaraníes, ‘gauchos’ e ‘indios infieles’ en el proceso de disgregación de las antiguas doctrinas jesuíticas del Paraguay,” *Universidad Católica Revista del Centro de Estudios Anthropológicos* XXXVIII, no. 2 (Diciembre 2003): 115.

121 In 1804, numerous tolderías had made pacts with Antonio Adolfo. Some were baptized and moved to the San Borja and San Juan missions. *Archivo Artigas*, Tomo II, 305.
provisional line to avoid future conflicts.\(^\text{122}\) By 1804, the two sides had signed an agreement to formalize the
de facto border, but bilateral mapmaking expeditions would not occur until 1852, as part of an agreement
between the Brazilian Empire and Uruguay. As borderlines again became political objectives and sources of
contestation in the region at mid-century, republican diplomats relied upon the cartographic works of the
Madrid and San Ildefonso expeditions as legal precedents and guidelines, claiming territorial inheritance
from colonial states.\(^\text{123}\) They raced to publish and interpret the works of imperial demarcation officials in
order to fortify their own claims, at times reprinting eighteenth-century maps with new lines and labels
(Maps 5.2 & 5.3).\(^\text{124}\) By this point, however, tolderías had ceased to be a viable option for native peoples in
the countryside and two decades had passed since the last reference to Charrúa or Minuán communities.

\(^{122}\) “alterar todo o sistema e ordem da Legislação de Limites” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 205, 210, 366. A
“provisional line” would be a predetermined division to be certified by demarcation teams, as had occurred in the Treaties of
Madrid and San Ildefonso. In the end, the demarcation never happened, as most of the San Ildefonso officials had either died
(Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral, 1801 & João Francisco Roscio, 1805), returned to Iberia (José Varela y Ulloa, 1791, Félix de
Azara, 1801, and Diego de Alvear, 1805), or been assigned to different projects. ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 1,
12, f. 98-109; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, 1.2.19, f. 212-245v; Alvaro Mones and Miguel A. Klappenbach, Un
ilustrado aragonés en el Virreinato del Río de la Plata, Félix de Azara (1742-1821): Estudios sobre su vida, su obra y su pensamiento
(Montevideo: Museo Nacional de Historia Natural, 1997); Alejandro N. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su
labor en el Río de la Plata,” Isas Memoria. Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco 6 (2009); Teresa Zweifel, “De Palas a Minerva:
panorama de la representación técnica en el Río de la Plata 1789-1866,” in Historias de la Cartografía de Iberamérica: Nuevos caminos,
viejos problemas, ed. Héctor Mendoza Vargas and Carla Lois, 307–28, Colección Geografía para el siglo XXI, Serie Libros de
investigación 4 (México, D.F.: Instituto de Geografía, UNAM; INEGI, 2009), 309–16.

\(^{123}\) Cândido Baptista de Oliveira, Reconhecimento topográfico da fronteira do império, na Província de São Pedro (Rio de Janeiro: Na
Typographia Nacional, 1850); Segarra, Frontera y límites, 18, 38, 44, 46. As occurred following the Madrid and San Ildefonso
demarcations, the subsequent years saw numerous projects to populate the borderline. Other borderline disputes in which
imperial maps served as important legal antecedents included those between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and between
Argentina and Uruguay. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su labor en el Río de la Plata”: 753.

\(^{124}\) Examples of published volumes designed to define and claim national space through imperial documents include: Pedro de
Angelis, ed., Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta del Estado, 1836); ilustrados con notas y disertaciones; Meliton González, ed., El limite oriental del territorio de Misións
(República Argentina) t. 1 (Montevideo: Impl. a vapor de El Siglo, 1882); Moussy, Victor Martin de, Description geographique et
statistique de la Confederation Argentine (Paris: Imprimeurs de l'Institut, 1873). These retrospective gazes fetishized perceived
national spaces and projected contemporary territorial imaginations upon colonial pasts. Ana Frega, “Uruguayos y orientales:
itinerario de una síntesis compleja,” in Crear la nación: Los nombres de los países de América Latina, ed. José Carlos Chiaramonte,
Carlos Marichal and Aimer Granados, 95–112 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2008), 96–102. This trend would
continue until the foundation of national geographic and topographic societies – Brazil (1838), Argentina (1879), and Uruguay
(1892) – which began to print their own cartographic works. Susana I. Curto et al., “La fundación de GÆA Sociedad Argentina de
Map 5.2 – Cabrer, José María, *Carta Esférica de la Confederación Argentina*, 1853 [1802]. This was the published version of a manuscript map drafted by Spanish demarcation official José María Cabrer, who had compiled the works of numerous San Ildefonso demarcation teams. The 1853 publication substituted Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay for the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ José María Cabrer, *Carta esférica de la Confederación Argentina y de las Repúblicas del Uruguay y del Paraguay* (París: Imprenta Bineteau, 1853 [1802]); MM - 23-1-42.
Map 5.3 – José Pedro Cesar, *Mappa da Provincia de San Pedro*, 1830. This was a published version of a manuscript map that had been made for the Visconde de São Leopoldo to accompany his *Annais da Provincia de São Pedro*. It was a composite of maps created under the San Ildefonso mapping expeditions, including Josef Varela y Ulloa and Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral’s *Plano topografico que comprende la costa del mar* and José de Saldanha’s *Mapa Corographico*, framed to highlight the features of the Brazilian state.\(^{126}\)

References to tolderías between 1806 and 1831 were few and far between, and those identified by historians generally pertain to their participation in wars between Spanish and Portuguese armed forces and agents of republican independence. Most notably, tolderías allied with José Gervasio Artigas against an 1811

Portuguese invasion, aided him in an 1813 siege of Montevideo, and were present at his defeat in 1816.\footnote{127 \textit{Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo patrio), vol. 2, 3, 5-6, 8, 19-21, 57; Padrón Favre, \textit{Los Charruás-Minuanes en su etapa final}, 8, 12-16.}}

The breakdown of an operative interimperial border and the rise of numerous factions created a precarious environment for tolderías, as imperial and republican militaries crisscrossed the countryside, consumed its resources, and inflicted violence. Faced with armed and unpredictable allies, different tolderías supported different parties or moved between them, appearing in the encampments of rival armies.\footnote{128 \textit{Ibid., 164–66.} The cacique most closely associated with Artigas in historical texts was Manuel Artigas, “El Caciquillo.” It is possible that this was the same “Caciquillo” who had moved his tolderías to San Borja in 1794. AGNA - IX. 36-2-6, “Informes de Zabala al Virrey de 1794-03-24, 1794-04-25, and 1794-05-23”; Pocentiz, “Los infieles”: 9–10.} These relations occasionally proved beneficial, as several caciques and tolderías that had previously accepted reductions or abandoned certain lands reappeared to stake claims over contested grounds. Masalana, whose toldería had been continuously harried by Pacheco’s blandengues, appeared alongside Artigas in 1812, as did “Caciquillo,” whose tolderías had previously settled on missions.\footnote{129 Barrios Pintos, “Caciques Charrúas en Territorio Oriental”: 88; Padrón Favre, \textit{Los Charruás-Minuanes en su etapa final}, 40; \textit{Archivo Artigas} Tomo X (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1969), 26-8, 32-6. This is the only recorded captive raid by the Portuguese against Charrúa or Minúan tolderías.} Moreover, for the first time in nearly fifty years, Minuán tolderías returned to Montevideo to participate in the city’s siege. Upon visiting the encampment overseeing Montevideo’s siege, one traveler observed, “I had the opportunity to speak with the Minuán caciques….One of them ate with his wife at the General’s table.”\footnote{130 \textit{Ibid., 2, 19–21.}} Still, armed forces proved to be precarious allies at times. The Charrúa cacique Gaspar, who had traveled years earlier to Porto Alegre to make a pact with the Portuguese governor, met with Portuguese forces in 1812, receiving gifts of aguardiente, tobacco, and yerba mate. He was accompanied by Masalana and others. One week later, this same force raided their tolderías, killing as many as 80 people, taking 66 captives, and burning their fields.\footnote{131 At least 100 Charrúas also participated in the siege. \textit{Archivo Artigas} Tomo XIII (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1975), 249.}
Tolderías remained key actors in the military conflicts that embroiled the region’s countryside through the end of the decade. They were present in key battles and also limited the movements and communications of rival forces throughout the countryside.132 When Artigas retreated to Paraguay in 1820, however, tolderías chose not to follow. They instead remained active agents in the Río de la Plata’s countryside during the years of Brazilian occupation – the Cisplatine Province – and through Uruguayan independence. For administrators they were both useful allies, as they apprehended and traded deserters for payments, and obstacles to the realization of idealized territorial states. They were important actors in the military expeditions that helped achieve Uruguayan independence, yet soon after found themselves the target of extermination campaigns.133 By this time, the number of tolderías in the countryside had dwindled through captivity, emigration, or the adoption of lifestyles that made them indistinguishable in sources from other native peoples. The borderline that had once offered opportunities no longer served as a useful tool, and in the wake of years of factionalism and warfare, mobile independence ceased to be feasible.

Conclusion

The disappearance of tolderías, and by extension ethnonyms, from imperial records was not a unidirectional or inevitable process of vanquishment. Although military aggression, disease environments, and competition for resources placed pressures on certain tolderías, these factors do not alone explain their discursive erasure. In many parts of the region, particularly near the borderline, local caciques and their tolderías initially saw an expansion of their power and tributary networks with the increased presence of imperial settlers and traders. Thus neither nationalist nor revisionist histories that point to gradual decline captures the heterogeneity of tolderías’ experiences or the indistinguishability of Minuanes and Charrúas

133 AGNU - Ministerio de Gobierno, Caja 805, f. 403-4; AGNU - Ministerio de Gobierno, Caja 807, f. 428; Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final, 43–60.
from other native peoples once they were separated from their tolderías. There was never a “Charrúa War,” and not all individuals from tolderías responded to imperial agents bravely, albeit futilely, “with their weapons in hand.” Nor did the disappearance of tolderías signify the vanishing of individuals who had lived in them or their de-Indianization through mestizaje. In fact, baptismal records as late as the 1860s identify individuals as “Charrúa.”

Three factors instead contributed to the eventual absence of Charruás and Minuanes from written records: captivity, invisibility, and the rupture of borderline territorialities. Over the course of the eighteenth century, approximately two thousand individuals from tolderías, and perhaps more, found themselves abducted in imperial raids and subjected to exile from their homelands. The vast majority nonetheless remained in the region, alienated from their kin and distributed among elites and military officials as unfree laborers. This separation from tolderías made their ancestry or kinship ties invisible or insignificant to imperial writers, as ethnonyms were mostly linked to tolderías themselves. In the same way, the ever-present networks of collaboration and exchange with imperial settlers, evidenced by intermittent references in record books, largely escaped the gaze of the lettered city. For these reasons, those tolderías that were attacked or captured between 1806 and 1831 were not the final holdouts from a gradually waning ethnic community, but those whose livelihood had become intertwined with a functional borderline. In the eventual absence of a clear and predictable interimperial division, tolderías struggled to manage the movement of peoples and goods and eventually found themselves without refuge.

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134 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1; Bracco, Con las armas en la mano.

135 “Uruguay, bautismos, 1750-1900,” index, FamilySearch; Thomas Charrua, 16 Mar 1839; Nuestra Señora del Carmen, Salto, Uruguay, FHL microfilm 625,269; "Uruguay, bautismos, 1750-1900," index, FamilySearch; Candida Charruas, 4 Sep 1863; Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes, Mercedes, Soriano, Uruguay, FHL microfilm 625,479. While scant, these records nonetheless point to the persistence of individuals who had once been associated with tolderías.
CONCLUSION

In the early months of 1849, in preparation for a joint border demarcation with Uruguay, the Brazilian Empire sent a topographic team to survey its southernmost limits. The surveyors set out to determine the borderline from the Atlantic Coast to Bagé, a town near the ruins of Santa Tecla. To guide themselves, they carried “two maps of [Rio Grande], accompanied by a note containing the positions of important points in the province, as determined by the Commission of Limits, which began its work in 1784.” As they moved inward from the coast, they came upon the remaining walls of the former São Miguel fort, where they paused to survey the local landscape. The leading officer of the expedition, Candido Baptista de Oliveira, climbed a nearby hill to gain a better vantage point, where he noted “an abundance of certain plants that generally appear in lands fertilized by animal remains, as is generally observed in cemeteries.” He asked a local inhabitant about this anomaly, and the man replied that this mound and others nearby were “cemeteries of the savage Indians [Tapes or Minuanes] who used to wander around this part of the countryside” and that “any digging done there uncovered human bones.” Oliveira calculated that there must have been hundreds of cadavers below his feet, and concluded that it must have been a mass grave dug after a great battle with the fort.

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1 “Pelo Archivo Militar da Côrte me havião sido fornecidos hum Circulo Repetidor de Trougton inteiramente novo, e dou mapas da Província de S. Pedro, acompanhados de huma nota, contendo as posições de diversos pontos importantes d’essa Província, as quais havião sido determinadas pela Comissão de limites, que no anno de 1784 começara os trabalhos da demarcação” Oliveira, Reconhecimento topográfico da fronteira do império, na Província de São Pedro, 7; Segarra, Frontera y límites, 33.

2 “Notando eu que, na pequena elevação do terreno, em que eu me havia colocado para melhor descobrir os objetos situados além do Arroio, abundavão certas plantas, que costumão aparecer nos terrenos estrumados por detritos animaes, como de ordinário se observa nos cemitérios…inquiri de hum morador do lugar, que nos havia acompanhado…fui por elle informado que, em razão dos ossos humanos que se mostravão em qualquer escavação ali feita, acreditava-se, que fôra esse local outr’ora o cemitério dos Indios selvagens, que vagueavão por esse lado da campanha” Oliveira, Reconhecimento topográfico da fronteira do império, na Província de São Pedro, 12–13.
Oliveira’s diary resembled those of Spanish and Portuguese officials in the 1750s and 1780s. It interspersed historical anecdotes and topographical measurements with an itinerant account of places names and descriptive observations. Unlike the earlier demarcation teams, however, his party traveled without a rival counterpart, and they concluded their labors in approximately three months. Oliveira dedicated a large portion of his text to narrating the history of this international limit, beginning with the 1750 Treaty of Madrid. He recounted the numerous attempts to “definitely demarcate Brazil’s frontier,” seamlessly assembling earlier demarcations in a century-long history that culminated in his efforts. This diary also differed from prior accounts, since it entirely expunged tolderías from its narration. As tolderías no longer occupied the countryside, Oliveira deemed their actions peripheral to his teleological narrative of the realization of contemporary territorial order, a pattern that would characterize subsequent historical accounts.3

This dissertation has provided a different interpretation of the relationship between borderlines and native peoples in the Río de la Plata region. It differs from both traditional accounts – which, like Oliveira’s, considered the mapping of lines as the achievement of imperial territorial order – and those of revisionists who have dismissed borderlines altogether. Instead, I suggest intimate ties between imperial bordermaking and indigenous actions. I began with a new conceptual framework for eighteenth-century patterns of territorial organization – an archipelago of plazas and tolderías – that emphasized the overlapping, localized, and relatively isolated nature of imperial and ecclesiastical settlements, as well as the centrality of independent indigenous communities to regional dynamics. Tolderías arbitrated plazas’ access to and travel across the Río de la Plata’s countryside, and used their mobility to negotiate between settlers from distant locales.

3 ibid., 20–25. See also: José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira, Memória histórica sobre a questão de limites entre o Brasil e Montevideó (São Paulo: Typ. Liberal de J.R. de A. Marques, 1852).
We also saw how local territorial dynamics interacted dialectically with broader juridical debates in the Iberian and European worlds. Through the first half of the eighteenth century, Spain and Portugal relied upon relationships with tolderías not only to access regional lands, but to claim possession over them. Given the restricted reach of their own settlements, each side sought pacts with tolderías in order to prevent the establishment of foreign settlers. Meanwhile, in diplomatic debates, each claimed tolderías as vassals in order to stake claims to the lands that native communities effectively controlled. Yet the uncertainty, ephemerality, and locality of agreements between plazas and tolderías proved troublesome, and ultimately untenable, for Iberian governors, viceroy's, and royal courts. Their solution was to place their faith in the latest mapping technologies as a means of projecting their respective territorial claims and undermining the legitimacy of their competitors'. By midcentury, the two royal courts had agreed to combine mapmaking and treaty making, and signed an agreement in Madrid to commission massive demarcation teams to devise an interimperial divide throughout South America.

The Treaty of Madrid, and later the Treaty of San Ildefonso, relied upon teams of trained mapmakers to transform the general framework of a jurisdictional borderline into a usable template for local administrators. These expeditions performed the imaginary lines, as teams of approximately one hundred workers walked, rode, or navigated the length of their designated portions. Their experiences constituted the meeting point of extant and idealized territorial orders, thereby inciting responses from indigenous communities that ranged from collaboration to violent attacks. In the Río de la Plata, the Madrid expeditions incited three years of warfare, while the San Ildefonso expedition members found themselves paying tribute to tolderías as they claimed possession of their lands. The details of these encounters, kept in the daily journals of demarcation officials, contrasted with the stable images of their maps and the neatly-catalogued ethnographies that some officials provided. Therefore, the vast corpus of documentation generated by the expeditions both revealed continued indigenous territorial control and incentivized imperial administrators to populate lands adjacent to the borderlines.
The borderline demarcations both correlated with and enabled a broad overhaul of Spain’s and Portugal’s territorial and interethnic policies in the region. Spanish administrators began to imagine tolderías as imperial subjects because most of them lived on the Spanish side of the border. They expected them to behave as sedentary subjects, respect property claims, and avoid commerce with Portuguese neighbors. In contrast, Portuguese officials used tolderías as a means to access the Spanish side of the border without inciting interimperial conflict, offering them payments in exchange for safe passage or for transporting cattle to their ranches. For their part, caciques and their tolderías utilized the growing presence of imperial actors near the imaginary borderline, and the increased imperial need to operationalize or subvert the border, as a means to advance their own interests. Caciques often incorporated migrants into their tolderías, extracted payments in exchange for policing the borderline (or undermining the policing of it), and built commercial networks across the interimperial divide.

But if the development of a borderline territoriality provided opportunities to certain tolderías, its dissolution eventually served to debilitate them. Beginning with a joint operation against tolderías in 1806, many more Spanish and Portuguese agents moved back and forth across the imaginary divide with impunity. While tolderías had once used the borderline as a means of taking refuge from Spanish raids, they could no longer employ this tactic, as the following quarter-century saw numerous armed factions crossing these lands. Still, the eventual disappearance of tolderías from the documentary record did not signal the end of the people who had inhabited them, only the discarding of ethnonyms. As patterns of captive-taking, interethnic mixture, and individual movement between plazas and tolderías blurred the divisions between imperial and indigenous actors, ethnonyms disappeared from the documentary lexicon. Terms such as Charrúa and Minuán gave way to others, such as “indio” or “china,” as distance increased between individuals and tolderías.

The production of an interimperial borderline in the Río de la Plata was therefore a defining event, deeply tied to native authority, dependent upon native participation, and significant for native advancement.
or decline. The invention of a borderline did not imply the consolidation of imperial authority, nor did it constitute the discursive representation of extant territorial conditions. Rather, it was a strategic response to the inability of either Iberian crown to exert control over lands and actors beyond the reach of its isolated settlements. The changing juridical landscape aimed to circumvent local conditions – particularly native authority – when defining territorial possession. The Madrid and San Ildefonso lines were prescriptive declarations of an idealized spatial order that impelled and legally equipped imperial administrators to pursue new territorial policies. Maps produced by the demarcation expeditions were not simply cultural texts, but territorial templates that local officials utilized as they sought to claim lands and impose order. Such efforts depended upon the participation of autonomous native communities, whose support Iberian administrators alternatively requested or demanded. Native leaders responded in numerous ways, yet in engaging and molding the bordermaking initiatives, they ultimately reinforced them. It was not until after the demarcations that tolderías tended to concentrate themselves in lands adjacent to the imaginary line, as for them it became a regional center. The borderline was nonetheless an unstable institution, and its dissolution eventually led to tolderías’ demise.

This case points to borderland dynamics that diverge from current narratives about the Río de la Plata region and the Americas as a whole. I demonstrate the centrality of independent native peoples, organized in tolderías, to broader economic, political, and social networks in the region. Rather than constituting a backyard to the settlements that dotted the region’s perimeter, the rural interior was the center that enabled such settlements to exist. As imperial agents sought access to, and eventually control over, the regional interior, they simultaneously challenged and enhanced indigenous authority. Particularly for tolderías situated near the imaginary borderlines, the late eighteenth century was a moment of expanding power, not another step in a long march toward defeat and disappearance. The actions of people

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4 Furtado, *O mapa que inventou o Brasil*, 18–19.
identified as Charrúas and Minuanes also force us to reconsider the significance of mapped lines in borderland spaces. European bordermaking did not imply native decline, as it augmented imperial needs and, in turn, dependency upon indigenous communities. The invention of the borderline required that administrators stretch their human resources across a vast and hostile countryside, making themselves vulnerable to and reliant upon tolderías. Thus the development of borderline territorialities simultaneously represented European territorial imaginations and increased indigenous authority. Migrants to the borderline were at once a human frontier against an imperial foe and tributaries or kin to tolderías, and seemingly divergent, incompatible territorialities – European versus indigenous – coexisted in the same space.

Bordemaking efforts in the Río de la Plata also offer a new vantage point for interpreting the power of mapmaking. Maps were undoubtedly tools of empire that served to appropriate space discursively by concealment, incorporation, naming, and other gestures. They also represented shifting spatial order and spatial imaginations, evidencing on-the-ground changes. This case demonstrates that mapmaking was also significant for what it engendered. The Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcations were prescriptive calls to idealized territorial order, backed by the weight of interimperial accords. Mapmakers performed the borders through their expeditions, then sought to replicate them materially as they assumed governing positions in their newly-imagined territories. As mapped lines shaped imperial initiatives and human movement, mapmakers, travelers, and settlers embodied the new territorial pattern. Their actions solicited responses from independent native peoples, who most likely never set eyes upon the demarcation maps. Regardless of their actions – whether apprehending contrabandists or moving cattle across the border – tolderías, by increasingly engaging borderline practices, reproduced the borderline as a meaningful territorial order. In a context where imperial dominance did not exist and native peoples were neither imperial subjects nor clients, the borderline nonetheless became meaningful.
To identify the interplay between divergent territorial imaginations and changing interethnic relations, this study adopted a regional approach. Consequently, it identified certain contextual factors that might not extend to other places and times. The mapped borderlines discussed here were interimperial boundaries backed by treaties to resolve territorial disputes in an area contested by Spain and Portugal. If not for the treaties, the maps produced by these expeditions would not have had sufficient legal weight to enable property claims, land titling, and borderline policing. Lines drawn in areas where only one European empire was present, as in Patagonia, the Chaco, or northern New Spain, might not have engendered the same opportunities for local communities. Similar studies in other parts of the Americas have demonstrated comparable results. Most notably, it appears that demarcations in the Amazon region were very much analogous to those in the Río de la Plata, although the competing Iberian empires occupied reversed roles. There, native communities utilized the Portuguese desire to stabilize the borderline to their advantage, challenging Portuguese attempts to incorporate them as imperial subjects and relying on the specter of Spanish competitors. It remains to be seen whether other mapping endeavors, such as the work of the Spanish Royal Corps of Engineers in northern New Spain, produced similar scenarios.  

This regional approach focused on broad dynamics and patterns throughout the Río de la Plata, sometimes at the expense of the detailed analyses of individual plazas and neighboring tolderías. More work is thus necessary to evaluate how much this new regional perspective allows us to reconsider local events. Likewise, by subordinating ethnic identifiers to territorial factors in interpreting the actions of tolderías, my approach demonstrates the need for a reassessment of the meaning of ethnonyms and their significance to the peoples whom they sought to define. To what extent did such terms correspond with indigenous social order? Did native peoples ever come to adopt them as self-identifiers? In addition, this study points to the

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5 Domingues, Quando os índios eram vassalos, Capítulos 3 & 4; Dennis Reinhartz and Gerald D. Saxon, eds., Mapping and Empire: Soldier-Engineers on the Southwestern Frontier (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).
presence of numerous individuals from tolderías in settlements throughout the region. More research is required to determine the trajectories of such individuals and their roles in urban societies. Lastly, in focusing on the Río de la Plata’s countryside and independent indigenous peoples, my analysis has intentionally provincialized traditional areas of study, such as Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and the mission complex. More efforts to connect tolderías to other actors, such as small farmers, Afro-descendants, and deserters, would undoubtedly yield many fruits.

Historical perceptions of territorial order and indigenous action continue to imbue political discourse and social movements in the Río de la Plata region. In 1989, the Association of Descendants of the Charrúa Nation (Asociación de Descendientes de la Nación Charrúa) was formed in Uruguay, and during the following decade, Uruguayan activists lobbied for the repatriation of the remains of famed cacique Vaimaca Perú from France as a matter of national patrimony. In 2002, his body was placed in the Uruguayan National Pantheon, and in 2009, the Uruguayan Parliament declared April 11 the “Day of the Charrúa Nation and of Indigenous Identity.” Meanwhile, scientists have matched vestiges of Perú’s DNA with that of current Uruguayans, estimating that about 0.7% of the Uruguayan population has Charrúa ancestry. Biologists in Rio Grande do Sul have made similar arguments, while a community outside Porto Alegre has petitioned for territorial rights under a claim of Charrúa descent. Such efforts have been polemical, pitting “Charruists” against the skeptics, including former presidents and prominent scholars, who dismiss them as

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6 Uruguay’s government placed Peru’s remains in the National Pantheon, which is the same location where Fructoso Rivera, the country’s first president and the architect of the cacique’s exile to France, can be found. See: Klaus Hilbert, “Charruas e minuanos: entre ruptura e continuidade,” in Povos indígenas, ed. Nelson Boeira and Tau Golin, 179–205, História Geral do Rio Grande do Sul Volume 5 (Passo Fundo: Méritos, 2009), 185; Gustavo Verdesio, “Entre las visiones patrimonialistas y los derechos humanos: Reflexiones sobre restitución y repatriación en Argentina y Uruguay,” Corpus. Archivos virtuales de la alteridad americana 1, no. 1 (1er semestre 2011).

pseudoscientific romantics. In each case, indigenous pasts are measured by their relationship with national presents, generally in terms of biological or cultural lineage. By focusing on the actions of tolderías in eighteenth-century Río de la Plata, we can liberate indigenous pasts from such nationalistic retrospection and develop a new framework for imagining regional history.


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